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Abstract
This thesis empirically examines a bold and profoundly new way of governing 
environmental problems. This so called “new environmental governance” (NEG) is palpable 
around the globe and aims to overcome the limitations of the interventionist state and its market 
alternative to offer more effective and legitimate solutions to today’s most pressing 
environmental problems. To counter the pathologies of these traditional approaches, NEG 
emphasises a host of novel characteristics including participation, collaboration, 
decentralisation, deliberation, flexibility, learning and adaptation and “new” forms of 
accountability.
While these unique features have generated significant praise and excitement from scholars, 
there has in fact been very few systematic evaluations of NEG programs in practice, and it is 
still unclear whether this unique approach will in fact “work”, and if so, when and how.
Responding to these issues, this study seeks to contribute to closing the gap between theory 
and practice by examining the conditions under which we can achieve “good” NEG. Focusing 
its inquiry around some of the most central, controversial and/or under researched 
characteristics of NEG, the thesis provides insights into the conditions under which we can best 
achieve successful collaboration, effective learning and adaptation, meaningful participatory 
and deliberative governance and effective forms of accountability.
To derive its insights the thesis examines three Australian experiments in NEG that cover 
point source pollution, diffuse urban pollution and natural resource management. Comparing 
across these diverse cases ensures the study goes beyond the limited existing research by 
capturing a wide diversity of conditions and offering unique comparative insights into the 
operation of NEG in different policy areas.
The findings that emerge suggest that NEG can work, but it may not be as straightforward 
or as effective as many may hope. This conclusion leads the thesis to identify seven key 
conditions or pillars of “good” NEG that are central to its success and can provide useful 
guidance for practitioners and scholars. The thesis also reveals four additional key insights for 
NEG theory. First, the findings suggested that NEG in practice supports claims by both critics 
and proponents of NEG’s novel approach to governance. This leads the thesis to counsel both 
sides to put the boxing gloves to one side and better respond to the world as it is rather than as 
they would like it to be. Second the thesis’ research confirms the hybridity hypothesis regarding 
the interaction between law and new governance. Thirdly, it provides some key insights into the 
role of the State, suggesting that it remains strong and active, but pointing to the need for 
normative theories to better address the thesis’ findings regarding the risks of State authority. 
Finally it draws on empirical insights to highlight the divergent types of non government actors
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1Chapter 1 : Introducing the New 
Environmental Governance1
1.1 Background
Over the last decade a profoundly innovative and very different approach to environmental 
governance has emerged across the globe. This seismic reorientation in both environmental 
policymaking processes and the tools employed in their implementation3 has seen the functions 
of the State shifting “downwards” to regions, “outwards” to a host of non-state actors and, in 
some cases, “upwards” to transnational institutions and organisations.4
In Australia, such trends are clearly evident in collaborative efforts between local 
residents, regulators and “big” industries to reduce pollution impacts in Victoria and Western 
Australia;5 in attempts to foster partnerships between communities, small and medium sized 
enterprises, state agencies, local governments and environmental groups to address diffuse and 
complex environmental problems in the neighbourhoods of Victoria; and in broader based 
regional initiatives nation wide, involving the establishment of 56 regional natural resource 
management bodies. This latter initiative has involved billions of dollars being invested into 
wide reaching “partnerships” between federal, state, and local governments, regional 
communities, farmers, and industry bodies to try and address natural resource problems.6
Broadly similar endeavours can also be found in the European Union7 where there has 
been increasing multiparty collaboration and participation8 via environmental assessment and
1 The research contained in this thesis was supported by an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant in partnership 
with the Victorian Environmental Protection Authority. Pursuant to the grant, some o f this thesis’ research was 
developed and built upon in the following two joint articles: Holley C and Gunningham N, “Environmental 
Improvement Plans: Facilitative Regulation in Practice” (2006) 23(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 448; 
Gunningham N, Holley C and Shearing C, “Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans: Community 
Empowerment, Voluntary Collaboration and Legislative Design” (2007) 24(2) Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 125. The referencing style in this project follow s the style guidelines for the Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal established by Lawbook Company. For ease o f  reference it restarts the footnote referencing system in 
each chapter.
2 NEG is also evident in other areas. See for example: Virtanen P, “Local Management o f Global Values” (2003) 
16(3) Society & Nat. Resources 179; Frieder J, Approaching Sustainability (Ian Axford NZ Fellowship in Public 
Policy, 1997).
3 Karkkainen B, “ ‘N ew Governance’ In Legal Thought And In The World: Som e Splitting As Antidote To 
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 M innesota Law Review 471 at 473.
4 Lawrence G, “Promoting Sustainable Development: the Question o f Governance” Plenary Address XI World 
Congress o f  Rural Sociology, Trondheim Norway, 25-30 July 2004, p 15; Karkkainen B, “Post-Sovereign 
Environmental Governance” (2004) 4(1) Global Environmental Politics 72; Pierre J and Peters G, Governance, 
Politics and the State (Macmillan, 2000).
5 Holley C and Gunningham N, “Environment Improvement Plans: Facilitative Regulation in Practice” (2006) 23 
EPLJ 448.
6 Head B, “Participation or Co-govem ance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R 
and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Developm ent (Ashgate, 2005); Lawrence, n 4.
7 Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave, 2003).
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2framework directives, the Open Method of Coordination9 and forms of voluntary agreements 
with industries.10 The United States of America (USA) has also been at the forefront of such 
trends -  most notably in the endeavours of multiple agencies and stakeholders addressing 
competing demands on water resources in the San Francisco Bay Delta" and in habitat 
conservation planning by landowners, various tiers and agencies of government, 
conservationists, independent scientists, and other interested citizens.12
These are just some of the novel and exciting experiments that constitute the new 
environmental governance (NEG), and that evidence a fundamental rethink in how we can and 
should cope with the pressing environmental problems of our time.13 Rather than the traditional 
one size fits all, top down, and prescriptive approach used for regulating environmental issues, 
NEG broadly seeks to achieve more responsive, effective and legitimate solutions to 
environmental problems by emphasising participation and collaboration, multi-level integration, 
diversity and decentralisation, deliberation, flexibility, learning and knowledge creation.14
Somewhat surprisingly, although the emergence of NEG is evident around the globe, it is 
still unclear whether it will in fact “work”, and if so, when and how.15 While NEG has generated 
significant praise as a means to produce innovative and more democratic solutions to 
environmental problems, it has also faced a litany of criticisms, including claims that it leads to 
lowest common denominator solutions, rent seeking, dominance by self interested economic 
actors, and disenfranchised environmental interests.16 Much empirical research is accordingly 
still needed to resolve these normative disagreements about the impacts of NEG.17
8 Scott J and Trubek D, (2002) 8(1) “Mind the Gap” European Law Journal 1 at 5-6.
9 Scott J and Holder J, “Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union” in De Burca G and Scott J 
(eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006), p210, 213, 224; Sabel C and Zeitlin 
J (2006) “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture o f Experimentalist Governance in the European Union” 
European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No C-07-02 (2007) at http://www.Connex-netowrk.org/eurogov/pdf/epg- 
connex-C-07-02.pdf at 42-46 viewed 10 May 2008.
10 See for example: Holzinger K, Knill C and Schafer A “Rhetoric or Reality? The ‘New Governance’ in EU  
Environmental Policy” (2006) 12(3) European Law Journal 403.
11 Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795.
12 Karkkainen B, “Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso 2003) p 211-212; For earlier 
background on HCP under endangered species see: Farrier D, “Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives 
for Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations?” (1995) 19 Harvard Environmental Law Review 303.
13 Salamon L, A Guide to the New Governance (Oxford UP, 2002), p 1.
14 Walker N , “EU Constitutionalism and New Governance” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 22.
15 Trubek D and Trubek L, “The Birth o f a Notion: Some Reflections on New Governance and Regulation at the 
Berlin Conference on Law and Society in the 21st Century”, W isconsin Project on Governance and Regulation, EU  
Centre o f  Excellence, UW -M adison, July 31, 2007 at 1-2; Koontz T and Thomas C, “What Do we Know and Need to 
Know About the Environmental Outcomes o f Collaborative Management” (2006) December Public Administration 
Review 111 at 113; Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great Lakes” 
(2006) 19 Pacific M cGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209 at 212.
16 For an overview see: Koontz and Thomas, n 15 at 113; Homstein D, “Complexity Theory, Adaptation and 
Administrative Law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913 at 949-951.
17 Koontz and Thomas, n 15 at 113.
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3Questions also remain as to the principles and practical conditions (based on empirical
investigation) that will allow these NEG experiments to be replicated and successfully applied 
18in practice. Furthermore, the broader implications of NEG in practice for understanding the 
State (which is arguably “decentred” by such initiatives) and for relationships between 
traditional law and new governance remain uncertain.19
Most NEG scholarship has only just begun to grapple with these concerns, having often 
remained focused on “first principle” debates regarding the merit of NEG.20 In short, there have 
been few systematic evaluations of NEG programs in practice.
Responding to these gaps and pressing research questions, this thesis takes a “hard look” at 
NEG in practice and seeks to provide insights into these issues.22 It immerses itself in the details 
of “experiments” in NEG in order to answer the question: under what conditions can “good” 
NEG be achieved? Conducting a comparative analysis of 80 interviews from 3 leading NEG 
programs in Australia, it tests theories, speaks to key debates and draws lessons for the literature 
and policy on an array of vital issues for environmental governance.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the initial groundwork for this analysis by 
outlining the context, focus and aims of the study. It does this in the following five sections. 
Section 1.2 introduces and defines the concept of NEG that informs this thesis. Section 1.3 then 
provides some necessary background on the thesis’ inquiry into NEG by outlining, in broad 
brush strokes, some of the trends and developments in environmental governance that lead to 
the emergence of this important new approach. Section 1.4 then turns to consider NEG 
scholarship and outlines in more detail some of the key debates and questions raised in the 
literature that are addressed in this thesis. This outline is followed by a discussion of the aims of 
this study and its guiding research questions. Section 1.5 concludes by outlining the structure of 
the thesis.
1.2 What is NEG?
It is important at the outset to be clear on exactly what is meant by NEG. As the term is 
used in this thesis it refers to innovative forms of so called “new governance” in the
18 Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 
Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189 at 243.
19 Gunningham N, ‘T h e New Collaborative Environmental Governance Paper for the International Meeting on Law 
and Society in the 21 Century, Humboldt University, Berlin, 25-28 July 2007; De Burca G and Scott J, “Introduction: 
New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU 
and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 3-10.
20 Karkkainen, n 15 at 212.
21 Camacho A, "Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management" (2007) 55 UCLA Law 
Review available at http://ssm.com/abstract=969676 viewed 10 May 2008 at 1; Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2.
22 Karkkainen, n 15 at 212.
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4environmental policy arena. But this begs the question of what “new governance” involves?23 
Before defining this concept, it is perhaps useful to first make clear exactly what the term 
“governance” itself means, since this concept is notoriously vague24 and has been defined in a 
variety of ways in a variety of literatures.25
At a broad level,26 it can be understood to mean the “management of the course of events 
in a social system”.27 This may involve various structures, processes and relationships for 
managing or influencing events, such as “top down” enforcement of rules by governmental 
authorities,28 as well as more “horizontal” relationships where public, private and non 
governmental actors29 employ economic incentives, moral suasion, shaming or other innovative 
forms of social control.30
The subsequent addition of the term “new” to the concept of “governance” is not intended 
to signify governance efforts that are recent in time,31 but rather something that is distinctive 
from what has gone before.32 That is, “new governance” is generally characterised as involving 
a shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches33 understood as involving representative 
democracy, singular authority, centralised and hierarchical commands, rigidity, and uniform 
regulatory rules. In its place, NEG involves forms of public governance34 that are “less rigid, 
less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature”.35
Beyond this, new governance experiments are often depicted in terms of the key 
characteristics that they exhibit.36 These characteristics in turn are thought to counter the
23 Gunningham, n 19 at 1; Walker, n 14, p 21-24; De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 2; Karkkainen, n 3 at 472, 496; Lobel O, 
“Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 498 at 499-501.
241 note that the term governance is defined in the literature in several ways. For instance, Rhodes identifies six 
separate uses o f  the term governance and consequently claims that governance may have “too many meanings to be 
useful”; Rhodes R, Understanding Governance, Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Open 
University Press, 1997) p 15, 47; Pierre and Peters, n 4, p 7.
25 For further see: Head B , “Governance” (2005) in Saunders P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and Influence Social 
Science and Public Policy in Australia (UNSW  Press, 2005) chapter 5; Kooiman J, Governing as Governance (Sage, 
2003); Pierre J and Peters G, Governing Complex Societies (Palgrave, 2005); Rhodes, n 24 at chapter 3.
26 By extension, terms such as “environmental governance” refers to the various structures, processes and 
relationships that have materialised, or are materialising, for the management and influence o f a course o f  events in 
relation to the environment. Burris S, Drahos, P and Shearing C (2005) “Nodal Governance” Aust. J. Legal 
Philosophy 30 at 30; Stewart J and Jones G, Renegotiating the Environment (Federation Press, 2003) at 12.
27 Burris, Drahos and Shearing, n 26 at 30. For further discussions o f the concept o f governance see for example: 
Kooiman, n 25; Pierre and Peters, n 4.
28 Parker C and Braithwaite J, “Regulation” in Cane P and Tushnet M (eds), Oxford Handbook o f Legal Studies 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) p 119; Black J, “Critical Reflections on Regulation” (2002) 27 Australian Journal o f  
Legal Philosophy 1; Head, n 25 at 44.
29 Head, n 25 at 44; Stewart and Jones, n 26 at 11.
30 Parker and Braithwaite, n 28, p 119; Gunningham N (1998) “Introduction” in Gunningham N and Grabosky P (eds), 
Smart Regulation (Clarendon Press, 1998) p 4.
31 Although many new governance experiments are in fact quite “young” - being less than a decade old.
32 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 2-3.
33 Walker, n 14, p 21-22.
34 Karkkainen, n 3 at 472.
35 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 2.
36 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 3.
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5perceived pathologies of conventional forms of regulation.37 Although there is little agreement 
on38 a single set of characteristics that offer a definitive “new governance model” per se, some 
of the most common characteristics identified by researchers internationally include forms of 
governance that are open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, collaborative, consensus 
orientated, deliberative, flexible, integrative, pragmatic, adaptive,39 and (at least according to 
some NEG theories) involve “new” forms and mechanisms of accountability.40
Consistent with evolving understandings of new governance, not all these characteristics 
need be present for a particular program to fall within this category -  indeed there are very few 
single institutional forms that fully capture the idea of new governance in its entirety.41 
However, the more characteristics that are present the stronger the claim that they fall within the 
category of new governance.42
Of course, it is important not to overstate the novelty of these characteristics identified in 
NEG. Forms of multiparty collaboration and participation, for example, have had a long 
history.43 Like most allegations of “newness” the existence of NEG is largely about degree and 
emphasis.44 Nevertheless, when compared with dominant approaches that have historically 
characterised environmental governance, NEG stands as a distinct and identified trend towards a 
“post-regulatory” approach to governing environmental problems.45 Locating NEG in the 
context of previous ways of governing environmental problems is the focus of the next section.
37 Some common characteristics cited by Karkkainen (Karkkainen, n 3 at 473-474, 496) include “collaborative, multi­
party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving” unpinned by aspirations to be more “open-textured, participatory, 
bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic...and adaptive”. Others such as Lobel 
have argued that new governance is characterised by 8 clusters o f approaches, namely Participation and Partnership, 
Collaboration, Diversity and Competition, Decentralization and Subsidiary, Integration o f  Policy Domains,
Flexibility and Non-coerciveness (or Softness-in-Law), Fallibility, Adaptability, and Dynamic Learning, Law as 
Competence and Orchestration (Lobel O, “The Renew Deal: The Fall O f Regulation And The Rise O f Governance In 
Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342 at 371-404); See also De Burca and Scott, n 
19, p 2 -  3; Gunningham, n 19.
38 Som e o f these disagreements relate to specific common characteristics o f  new governance, for example discussions 
around terminologies such as “soft law”; De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 3; Lobel, n 23 at 506-508; Karkkainen, n 3 at 
485-489.
39 Walker, n 14, p 22; Karkkainen, n 3 at 473-474; Lobel, n 37 at 371-404; Gunningham, n 19 at 5-6.
40 Notably, the last o f these characteristics - “new” forms o f  accountability - has not specifically been raised in any 
meta-analysis o f  new governance o f  NEG thus far. Nevertheless, for the purposes o f  this thesis inquiry, this feature 
arguably warrants inclusion as a common characteristic o f  NEG, both because it is an explicit feature o f some 
individual NEG theories and, as discussed below, accountability is widely seen as central to success o f NEG ’s unique 
approach to governing. See for example Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” 45 (1997) 
UCLA Law Review 1 at 30, Lawrence, n 4 at 17-18.
41 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 3.
42 Gunningham, n 19 at 1; Scott and Trubek, n 8 at 5-6;
43 Head, n 6, p 137.
44 McDonald L, “The Rule o f  Law in the ‘New Regulatory State’ ” (2004) 33 Common Law World Review 197-221.
45 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 1-2.
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61.3 The Emergence of NEG
One doesn’t need to have seen Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient Truth”46 to know that 
rapid environmental change is prevalent across the globe.47 The climate crisis, loss of 
biodiversity, degraded land, air pollution, serious degradation to coast and oceans and 
deteriorating water and soil quality are amongst the most serious threats to the natural 
environment.48 These and other environmental challenges, as the World Commission on 
Environment and Development49 pointed out 20 years ago, endanger not only nature, but also 
health and economic wellbeing.50
Of course, governments, citizens and industry groups are alert to these issues and have 
attempted, with variable success, to resolve them using quite different approaches to 
environmental governance.51 This section sets the thesis’ research within the context of these 
developments by outlining in broad terms the two dominant approaches to environmental 
governance, namely command and control and markets before identifying the limitations of 
these approaches that have increasingly led governments, industry and citizens to turn toward 
NEG. This turn, as will be illustrated by some specific vignettes offered below, is evident across 
a range of environmental policy areas.
Initially, beginning almost 40 years ago, Western governments sought to address 
environmental problems by establishing environmental protection agencies. Their main aim was 
to improve air and water quality and the designated technique was so called “command and 
control” regulation (CAC) of large industries.52 Echoing the Hobessian ideal of a sovereign ruler 
exercising top down punitive control over its subjects, this approach involved the “command” 
of centralised legislatures who set blanket environmental targets (eg. emission standards, 
exposure levels or technology standards). Agencies then “controlled” by subsequently 
monitoring and policing industries’ compliance and imposing penalties where standards were 
breached.53
46 For further on the Inconvenient Truth see http://www.climatecrisis.net.
47 Ki-moon B, United Nations Environment Outlook: Environment for Development Assessm ent (United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2007) p xvi; Lawrence, n 4 at 3.
48 Australian State o f  the Environment Committee, Australia State o f the Environment Report 2006  (DEH, 2006) p 
36, 49, 74, 76; Ki-moon, n 47 , p xvi; Held D, McGrew A , Goldblatt D and Perraton J, Global Transformations: 
Politics, Economics and Culture (Polity Press, 1999).
49 Bruntland G, Our common future -  The report to the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Oxford University Press, 1987).
50 United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook: Environment for Development Assessment 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2007) p 4.
51 United Nations, Agenda 21 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UN, 1992).
52 Holley and Gunningham, n 5.
53 Gunningham N and Grabosky P, Smart Regulation (Clarendon Press, 1998) p 5, 38-91, 434-436.
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7Certainly, at least in some circumstances, this CAC approach was relatively effective for 
regulating large industries,54 and achieved a number of gains in halting and slowing 
environmental degradation.55 However, CAC has also suffered from a number of significant 
limitations. For example, adversarial enforcement by stick waving agencies produced 
counterproductive resistance from regulated individuals and firms.56 Its centralized nature, 
reliance on scientific or technocratic knowledge57 and uniform rules have also been widely 
berated58 as costly,59 cumbersome, inefficient60 and insensitive to local contextualities.61
This insensitivity, along with the tendency of governments to administer CAC through 
departments that are fragmented along ecologically arbitrary, human-defined boundaries, has 
also limited the use of CAC for managing more complex environmental problems. These 
problems typically involve multiple polluters and require a more holistic, integrated and 
localised ecosystem level approach that is beyond centralised and fragmented CAC 
mechanisms.62 Even if governments could coordinate agencies to implement CAC in a more 
integrated manner, it would arguably be difficult -  if not impossible -  to licence, inspect and 
levy fines on the vast number of dispersed sources of pollution that cause these problems.63 
Finally, CAC has also met with increasing calls for superior forms of citizen inclusion, at least
See discussion in Cole D and Grossman P, “When is Command and Control Efficient?” (1999) 5 W isconsin Law 
Review 887.
55 Durant R, Chun Y, Kim B and Lee S, “Toward a New Governance Paradigm for Environmental and Natural 
Resource Management in the 21SI Century?” (2004) 35(6) Administration and Society 643 at 644 & 645.
56 Lazarus R, The Making o f Environmental Law (University o f  Chicago Press, 2004) p 90.
57 De La Mothe J, “Re-thinking Policy in the New Republic o f K nowledge” (2003) 41 Minerva 195 at 202; Ladeur K, 
“Coping with Uncertainty: Ecological Risks and the Proceduralisation o f  Environmental Law” in G Teubner, L 
farmer and D Murphy (eds) Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility (John W iley & Sons, 1994) p 324;
Bell S, “Appropriate Policy Knowledge and Institutional and Governance Implications” (2004) 63(1) Australian 
Journal o f Public Administration 22 at 25.
58 See for example arguments in: Stavins R and Whitehead B, “Market Based Environmental P olicy” in Chetwo M 
and Esty D (eds), Thinking Ecologically: The Next Generation o f Environmental Policy (Yale University Press,
1997).
59 See: Cutting R and Cahoon L, “Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights as a Key to Environmental Protection”
(2005) 22 Pace Environmental Law Review  55 at 62 (noting that the current administration has cut $492 million from 
the EPA budget and the Bush Administration has proposed a five per cent (5%) cut overall for 2005-2006); 
Gunningham, n 30 p 5-7.
60 Stewart R, “A New Generation o f  Environmental Regulation?” (2001) 29 Capital University Law Review 21 at 61; 
Gunningham, n 30 p 5-7, 41-47.
61 Karkkainen B, “Information Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), 
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 293.
62 Farrier D, “Fragmented Law in Fragmented Landscapes: the Slow  Evolution o f Integrated Natural Resource 
Management Legislation in NSW ” (2002) 19(2) EPLJ 89 at 90; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 806-814.
63 John D and Mlay M, “Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic Environmentalism” in 
Sexton K, Marcus A, William Easter K and Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental Decisions Strategies for  
Governments, Businesses and Communities (Island Press, 1999) p 354.
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8other than through its complaints and appeal procedures,64 or indeed the “notice and comment” 
and consultation processes that often take place after plans are already far advanced.65
As a direct result of these limits, new approaches to governing environmental problems 
have increasingly moved away from this purely State-centred, hierarchical style of 
environmental protection66 toward an array of more decentralised approaches.
One of the earliest and most touted of these alternatives was economic or market based 
instruments.67 Prominent during the 1980s climate of economic rationalism,68 these market 
approaches arose from Adam Smith’s vision of an “invisible hand” leading self-maximising 
individuals to promote the public interest.69 This approach was expressly concerned with 
improving governance outcomes by integrating widely dispersed knowledges of ‘individuals’ 
that exist away from the centre. As such, markets, at least in theory, can overcome the cost and 
limitations of the highly centralised knowledge base of CAC, as well as its sole dependency on
• • 70government capacities.
In this paradigm, the standard advice from economists was that environment degradation 
was occurring because of a failure of markets to value environmental endowments.71 As no 
price was emerging in markets to reflect resource scarcity value, the markets were failing to 
fulfil fundamental function -  rationing scarce assets efficiently.72 What was needed then was 
market signals that charged for the use of scarce resources appositely, or alternatively a process 
that determined the amount of pollution that the environment could assimilate and allocating 
rights to those emissions, letting the market determine the appropriate price.73
Government-led and designed economic and market based instruments (“MBIs”) ,74 
subsequently emerged, such as “cap and trade” schemes, subsidies and pollution taxes. Some 
prominent MBI approaches to address point source pollution include the acid rain trading
64 This includes its interventionist and adversarial nature that can prompt counterproductive resistance from regulated 
parties; Lazarus, n 56, p 90.
65 Meadowcroft J, “Deliberative Democracy” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental 
Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) at 189.
66 Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) (and the 
contributions therein); Karkkainen, n 3 at 4 7 1 ,4 7 4 .
67 Freeman and Färber, n 11 at 814-819.
68 Cutting and Cahoon, n 59 at 62; Gunningham, n 30, p 5-7.
69 A Smith (1776) An inquiry into the nature and causes o f the wealth o f nations Edinburgh, available in full text at 
http://www.adamsmith.org/smith/won-index.htm viewed 30 May 2008.
70 Gray J, Hayek on Liberty (3rd ed, Routledge, 1998) p 25-26.
71 Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002) p 115; Freeman and Färber, n
11 at 816; Roma A, “Energy, M oney, and Pollution” (2006) 56 Ecological Economics 534 at 534; Gunningham and 
Grabosky, n 53, p 8.
72 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71, p 115.
73 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71, p 115.
74 See generally: Stewart, n 60 at 94-128.
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9scheme in the USA,75 or load based licensing in Australia.76 Economic incentives have also been 
used to address more complex “second generation” issues such as local urban air pollution.77 
Moreover, subsidies and different market approaches78 such as land acquisitions and payments 
have been employed for natural resources, particularly in Europe.
Yet, despite some success, many MBIs have failed,79 or proved to be less environmentally
effective than CAC.80 Furthermore, MBIs tend to operate at the margins of environmental
81governance - used only to address environmental issues in a limited number of contexts. In 
part, this is because of the difficulty market approaches can face in identifying tradable units 
(i.e. fungible commodities) when dealing with complex problems. In addition, efficiency 
benefits are often undermined by a variety of practical and contextual difficulties faced by 
governments who seek to develop and rely on MBIs. Indeed, despite their claims to knowledge 
mobilisation, many MBIs share with CAC a requirement for centralised planning and 
knowledge such as setting the right level for a tax, charge or even capping levels, which can 
often be difficult for policy makers in the absence of an existing market reference.82 In 
summary, MBIs like CAC suffer from limitations and provide only partial answers to the range 
of environmental problems facing society, particularly those of a complex nature.83
Recognising this fact, environmental policy-makers during the 1990s began to search for 
governance instruments that overcame some of the limitation of earlier approaches and were
75 Stavins R, “What we can learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from S 0 2  Allowance Trading”, in 
Stavins, R (ed), Economics o f the Environment—Selected Readings (John W iley & Sons, 2000) p 472.
76 See for example, NSW  Environmental Protection Authority, Load-based Licensing A Fairer System that Rewards 
Cleaner Industry (NSW  EPA, 2001). See also NSW  Department o f Environment and Conservation “What is 
Emissions Trading?” (NSW  DEC) at http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/Iicensing/emissionstrading.htm view ed 30 May 
2008.
77 Such as funding to encourage either the replacement or upgrading o f domestic wood stoves. See, for example, 
Western Australia Department o f  Environment and Conservation, Halt The Haze 2006 Wood Heater Replacement 
Program (W A DEC, 2006).
78 Cumow P and Fitzgerald L, “Biobanking in N ew  South Wales: Legal Issues in the Design and Implementation o f a 
Biodiversity Offsets and Banking Schem e” (2006) 23 EPLJ 298; Gordon S, “Innovative Economic M echanisms for 
Addressing Agricultural Non-Point Source Water Pollution” (2005) 22 EPLJ 55; Farrier, n 12 at 399-405.
79 Blackman A and Harrington W, “The Use o f Economic Incentives in Developing Countries: Lessons from 
International Experience with Industrial Air Pollution” (2000) 9 J. Envt & Dev. 5 at 32; Howes R, Skea J and 
Whelan B, Clean and Competitive? Environmental Performance in Industry (Earthscan Publications, 1997) Chapter 9.
80 See discussion o f benefits and shortcomings in: Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 815-819; Cutting and Cahoon, n 59 at 
62; Gunningham and Grabosky, n 53, p 69-83.
81 See for example Farrier D and Whelan R, “(W hy) Do W e Need Threatened Species Legislation?” in Hutchings P, 
Lunney D and Dickman C (eds), Threatened Species Legislation Is It Just An Act? (Royal Zoological Society o f  
NSW , 2004) p 39-41; Gunningham N and Sinclair D , Environmental Partnerships: Combining Sustainability and 
Commercial Advantage In The Agricultural Sector Publication No. 02/004 Project No. ACL-1A (RIRDC, 2002) at 7- 
9.
82 Levels may also be subject to lobbying which can reduce effectiveness.; Gunningham and Grabosky, n 53 p 69-83; 
Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 815-819; Sabel C, Fung A and Karkkainen B, “Beyond Backyard Environmentalism” 
(1999) October/November Boston Review 1 at 2-3.
83 Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 815-819; Gunningham N, “Reconfiguring Environmental Regulation” in Eliadis P,
Hill M and Howlett M (eds), Designing Government - From Instruments To Governance (M cG ill-Queens’ University 
Press, 2005).
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
10
better suited to today’s challenges.84 Some have tried business led voluntary approaches83 or 
education and informational strategies such as product labelling and corporate reporting.86 
While the former has achieved limited success, general opinion is that it is unlikely to make a 
substantial contribution as a stand-alone approach to environmental governance.87 This is 
largely because voluntary approaches typically fail to achieve acceptable levels of industry wide 
compliance and, firms are widely seen as “untrustworthy” partners in governance systems,88 
whose ostensible support for the environment may not necessarily translate into concrete 
business decisions.89
Similarly, across the various forms of informational strategies some have been shown to 
operate quite successfully, such as the Toxic Release Inventory.90 However most forms of 
informational regulation have been relegated largely to complements of CAC, rather than a 
stand-alone approach themselves. This is largely because their success depends on accurate 
information and the willingness and ability of individuals to properly process the released 
information and to act on it.91 Misguided or ineffectual responses from the public may 
commonly arise if information is inappropriate (eg. too technical for people who are 
undereducated, elderly, or poor), difficult to access or irrelevant (eg. third parties may believe 
that there isn’t anything they need to know about environmental issues, or at the other end of the 
spectrum, it may give rise to "alarmist bias" regardless of what is true).92
More recently, and particularly in the last decade, policy makers and theorists have 
increasingly focused on a very different form of governance involving collaboration between 
stakeholders to a extent that would have been unimaginable some years before. In short, the 
most profound shift in recent times has been towards N E G .93
This shift is largely premised on explicit or implicit normative claims that NEG 
characteristics such as participatory aspirations, deliberation, collaboration and a variety of
84 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71 ; Kettle D (ed), Environmental Governance: A Report on the Next Generation o f  
Environmental Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2002).
85 Segerson K and Dawson N, “Environmental Voluntary Agreements: Participation and Free Riding” in Orts E and 
Deketelaere K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in United States 
and Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2001) p 369.
86 Stewart, n 60; W eil D , Fung A, Graham M and Fagotto E, "The Effectiveness o f  Regulatory Disclosure Policies”
(2006) 25 (1 ) Journal o f Policy Analysis and Management 155 at 156.
87 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71 p 155; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 831-832.
88 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71 p 145-148,155; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 831-832.
89 Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 832.
90 Fung A and O ’Rourke D, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and 
Expanding the Success o f  the Toxics Release Inventory” (2000) 25(2) Environmental Management 115; Karkkainen 
B, “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?” 
(2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 257.
91 Stewart, n 60 at 141-143.
92 Fung and O ’Rourke, n 90 at 118; Weil et al, n 86 at 161, 164; Sunstein C, “Informational Regulation and 
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond” (1999) 147 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 613 at 626-629.
93 Stewart, n 60; “National Symposium on Second Generation Environmental Policy and the Law” (2001) 29(1) 
Capital University Law Review  1-318.
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related characteristics can deliver effectiveness, legitimacy and democratic benefits beyond 
those provided by traditional approaches to governance.94 Many of these are spelled out in more 
detail in chapter 2, but a few illustrations are useful for present purposes.
For example, compared to an exclusive reliance on centralised knowledge to set suitable 
CAC standards or caps/taxes in some MBIs, characteristics such as collaboration, participation 
and deliberation are said to lead to problem solving which is inclusive of local circumstances 
and able to capitalise on the unique local and other knowledges and capacities of multiple public 
and private actors. Direct involvement of actors in deliberative styles of governance can also 
foster stakeholder ownership and ‘buy in’ and can give greater voice to marginalised interests 
(as opposed to an exclusive reliance on science in CAC or price, competition and the efforts of 
professionals in markets).95
Similar processes such as policy learning and adaptation, meanwhile, are thought to ensure 
that NEG copes better with the dynamism and complexity of environmental problems than 
either CAC (which can be particularly ossified in nature)96 or many MBIs (where significant 
post-hoc program corrections to pollution levels and permits set from the centre become very 
difficult without undermining the security of ownership rights on which the market itself 
depends).97 Collaboration and “new”, as opposed to traditional, forms of accountability may98 
also help to leverage government expenditure by mobilising the resources of others in 
implementation, monitoring and enforcement roles.
To illustrate these benefits and provide some real world examples of the nature and 
emergence of NEG, consider, for example, a few vignettes regarding the shift that has occurred 
toward NEG style approaches in point source pollution, urban diffuse pollution, and natural 
resource issues.99 These are contained below in Boxes 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
94 Lobel, n 23 at 502.
95 Gunningham, n 19 at 1; Durant R, O ’Leary R and Fiorino D, “Introduction” in R Durant, D Fiorino D and O ’Leary 
R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 4.
96 Orts E, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227 at 1238; 
Gunningham, n 19 at 1 ; Durant, et al, n 95, p 4.
97 Sabel et al, n 82 at 3.
98 Weber E, “The Question o f Accountability in Historical Perspective: from Jackson to Contemporary Grassroots 
Ecosystem Management” (1999) 31(4) Administration and Society 451 at 458.
99 John D, “Civic Environmentalism” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance 
Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 227.
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GOVERNING POINT SOURCE POLLUTION
P oin t source pollu tion  prob lem s relate to the b illo w in g  sm o k e  stacks, w astew ater  o u tfa lls  and other so  
ca lled  “end o f  p ip e” p o llu tio n  releases from  p ow er p lants, p lastic  refineries and other “b ig  in d u str ies” that 
dot the urban la n d sca p e .100 T h e  co n ven tion a l approach to g overn in g  industry p o llu tion  fo llo w e d  the  
tradition o f  the “lib era l-w elfare  S tate” 101 and the “N e w  D e a l” era 102 in the U n ited  States o f  A m erica  that 
saw  W estern govern m en ts create cen tralised  environ m en ta l a g en c ies and enact a raft o f  leg is la t io n  that 
prohib ited , restricted and en forced  narrow ly d efin ed  en viron m en ta lly  harm ful activ ities  cau sed  by  
in d u str ies’ op era tio n s.103 A s noted  above, th is approach to govern an ce  is co m m o n ly  term ed C A C .
A fter  a lm ost a decade o f  operation , the lim its o f  the C A C  approach to go v ern in g  poin t sou rce  p o llu tio n  
from  large industries w ere  in creasing ly  apparent and this, in conjun ction  w ith  c a lls  for  greater  
participation led  p o licy  m akers to seek  out m ore e ffe c t iv e  and less  co stly  a lternatives that in crea sin g ly  
e m p lo y ed  and aspired to the p r incip les o f  N E G . E xam ples o f  these  approaches inc lu de  en v iron m en ta l 
contracting in W estern E u r o p e ,104 “regulatory f le x ib ility ” in itia tives in the U n ited  S t a t e s 105 and  
E nvironm ental Im provem en t P lans across A u stra lia .106 W h ile  the sp ec ific  form  o f  these approaches  
varies, m ost aim  to im part greater resp on sib ility  to industry and stakeholders at m ore “lo c a lise d ” industry  
site  lev e ls  for contro lling  environm ental h arm s.107 T hey  aim  to reduce g o v ern m en t costs  by g iv in g  these  
parties greater d ec is io n  m ak in g , m onitoring and im plem entation  ro les , en h an ce  inn ovation  and fo ster  
greater flex ib ility  (and in so m e  variants, engender reflex iv e  and adaptive lea r n in g )108 by a llo w in g  
stak eh old ers, industry and govern m en t to co llab orate , de liberate, and participate, in the d e sig n  and 
m onitoring o f  m anagem en t sy stem s tailored to ind iv idu al c ircu m stan ces o f  each  ind ustry .109
Box 1.1: Governing Point Source Pollution -  from CAC to NEG.
11)0 Hutter B, “Socio-Legal Perspectives on Environmental Law: An Overview” in Hutter B (ed), A Reader in 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) p 10; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71 p 9.
101 Scott C, “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27(1) Journal o f Law and Society 38 at 44.
102 Lobel, n 37.
103 Gunningham and Grabosky, n 53, p 38-50; Weidner H, “Capacity Building for Ecological Modernization” (2002) 
45(9) American Behavioral Scientist 1340 at 1345.
104 Stewart, n 60 at 80-86; See also Orts E and Deketelaere K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative 
Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (Kluwer, 2001).
105 See for example: Freeman, n 40 at 31.
106 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71, Ch 8.
107 Freeman and Färber, n 11 at 829.
108 See for example: Orts, n 96.
109 Gunningham, n 19 at 1.
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GOVERNING DIFFUSE SOURCE POLLUTION
W h ile  contro lling  the behav iou r  o f  industries w a s the rational p o licy  resp o n se  for im provin g  air and 
w ater quality in the 1 9 7 0 s , other p ressing  environ m en ta l problem s qu ick ly  em erged  that cou ld  not be  
pinned  on sin g le  in d u str ies .110 T h ese  w ere environ m en ta l issu es  that arose from  the cu m u la tiv e  im pact 
o f  m ultip le  and often  “sm a ll” sou rces o f  p o llu t io n .111 For exam p le, an urban local creek  m ay be  
pollu ted  by sed im ent ru n -o ff  from  construction s ite s , storm w ater d ischarges co n ta in in g  d o g  fa e ce s  and 
street litter, p estic id es from  h o u seh o ld  law ns, p etro -ch em ica ls  w ashed  o f f  roads and p o llu tio n  from  
sm all and m edium  size  en terprises (SM E ). T h ese  so -ca lled  “ seco n d  gen eration ” environ m en ta l 
ch a llen g es in urban areas tended to cross traditional govern m en t bou nd aries, fa llin g  under the 
jurisd iction  o f  m ultip le lo ca l go v ern m en ts , and/or state and federal ag en c ies.
B eca u se  o f  these  un ique featu res, the approach to g o v ern in g  these  prob lem s w a s largely  a d isjo in ted  
and adhoc affair, in v o lv in g  m ultip le  a g en c ies  and govern m en ts exerc isin g  their separate C A C  pow ers  
(or  other relevant p o licy  to o ls) . For ex a m p le, to address p o llu tion  o f  an urban steam , an education  and 
en forcem en t cam paign  m ay ha v e  been m ounted by a loca l govern m en t to d issu ad e  littering, another  
lo ca l govern m en t m ay im p lem en t a storm  w ater m anagem en t plan, there m ay be increased  contro ls  
im p osed  by a state agen cy  regarding discharge to sew ers , and a cleaner production  program  m ay be  
d ev e lo p ed  by an environm ental regulator w ith certain SM E s. W h ile  these  action s m ay be cred ib le , such
9» 11 2
uncoordinated so lu tion s have tended to am ount to little  m ore than “g overn in g  around the e d g e s  .
T h ese  lim itations have led  p o licy  m akers and other stakeholders to experim en t w ith N E G  approaches  
such  as com m u nity  based  environ m en ta l p r o te c tio n 113 and so  ca lled  “c iv ic  en v iro n m en ta lism ” in 
U S A ,114 as w ell as N e ig h b o u rh o o d  E nvironm ental Im provem en t P lans in A u stra lia ,115 and com parab le  
experim en ts in U K .116 L ike  N E G  approaches for p o in t source pollu tion , th ese  experim en ts are ty p ica lly  
co llab orative , participatory and delib erative  in nature. That is, they draw on the unique k n o w led g e ,  
cap acities and resources o f  m ultip le  pu blic  and private stakeholders to d es ig n , im p lem en t and m onitor  
strategies to im prove lo ca l environ m en ta l con d ition s. T his approach is intended to b e  f le x ib le  and 
contex tu a l, a llo w in g  institu tional structures and so lu tio n s to be tailored to each  sp ec if ic  p r o b le m .117 
H o w ev er , un lik e end o f  p ip e approaches, w h ich  fo c u s  on ind ividual industry s ite s , th ese  N E G  
approaches ex p lic itly  aim  to respond to the w isd o m  o f  eco sy stem  and adaptive m a n agem en t by
110 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71; Kettle, n 84.
111 Groundwork, Small Firms and the Environment: A Groundwork Status Report (Groundwork Foundation, 1998).
"2 Gunningham N, Holley C and Shearing C, “Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans: Community 
Empowerment, Voluntary Collaboration And Legislative Design” (2007) 24(2) Environmental and Planning Law  
Journal 125.
1,3 John and Mlay, n 63, p 361.
114 See for example: John, n 99.
115 Gunningham et al, n i 12.
116 Taylor, n 7, p 2; Craig G, Taylor M and Parkes T, “Protest or Partnership? The Voluntary and Community Sectors 
in the Policy Process” (2004) 38(3) Social Policy& Administration 221 at 223.
117 Karkkainen, n 3; Karkkainen, n 4.
118 For further, see discussion in chapter 2.
119 Karkkainen, n 61, p 295.
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m anaging  problem s in a “p la ce  b a sed ” m anner. T h is ty p ica lly  in v o lv es  gov ern a n ce  that is m ore  
integrated , h o listic  and adaptive  in nature - idea lly  o v erco m in g  govern m en t fragm entation  and “sca le  
m ism a tch es” b etw een  environ m en ta l p rob lem s and govern m en ta l ju r isd ic tio n s ." 9
Box 1.2: Second Generation Urban Problems -  Nominal CAC To NEG.
GOVERNING NATURAL RESOURCES
A k in  to seco n d  generation  issu es , the third and fina l prob lem  o f  non-urban natural resource issu es a lso  
arises from  m ultip le  sou rces o f  d iffu se  po llu tion  that tend to cross traditional jur isd iction al boundaries. 
T h ese  prob lem s include degraded  rivers, sa lin ity , and/or lo ss  o f  b io lo g ica l d iv e rs ity .120 T y p ica lly  the 
ca u ses o f  these  issu es inclu de fertilizer  and p estic id e  rn o f f  from  m ultip le farm s, broad sca le  land c learing  
or other poor  agricultural practices . D esp ite  these  s im ilar ities w ith urban seco n d  generation  p rob lem s, 
natural resource issu es have their o w n  unique environ m en ta l govern ance  h istory.
Indeed , C A C  has rarely been used  to govern  natural resource prob lem s, not least b eca u se  it intrudes on  
“sacred” private property rights o f  fa rm ers.121 Rather, g o v ern m en t intervention has largely  sou ght to assist 
producers to “do the right th in g” rather than p o lic in g  th e m .122 In the earliest d a y s , regu lation  o f  agriculture  
in fact fo cu sed  on the prom otion  and d ev e lo p m en t o f  the ind ustry .123 E ven w h en  environm ental concerns  
w ere ev en tu a lly  raised , g overn an ce  has typ ica lly  taken a “ w in  w in ” route (i.e . enhan cin g  environm ental 
m anagem en t, w h ile  a lso  d e liv er in g  co sts  sav in g s). T y p ica lly  this has been  characterised  by “so fter” 
approaches such as inform ation p ro v isio n , education  support, se lf-reg u la tio n , voluntarism  and 
p ersu a sio n .124
H o w ev er  even  in this p o licy  area the g o v ern an ce  o f  natural resources has seen  a com parative  sh ift aw ay  
from  its traditionally so le  re lian ce  on s e lf  regu lation , in form ation  and v o lu n ta r ism .125 T his occurred for a 
num ber o f  reasons, inclu d ing  the fact that (i) se lf-reg u la tio n  has tended to lack cred ib ility  w ith  
stakeholders; (ii)  inform ation and education  genera lly  fa iled  to bring about substantial ch an ge  in 
m anagem en t attitudes b ecau se  o f  the d iv erg en ce  b etw een  farm ers’ short-term  e co n o m ic  interests and 
environ m en ta l needs; and (iii)  volun tarism  w as largely  lim ited  to situations w h ere  there w ere m anifest
120 NLW RA, Australia’s Natural Resources: 1997-2002 and Beyond (NLW RA, 2002); Gunningham N, “Incentives 
to Improve Farm Management: EMS, Supply-Chains And Civil Society” (2007) 82 Journal o f  Environmental 
Management 302 at 302.
121 For further on CAC limitations see: Farrier D, n 12 at 326, 352-389; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 81, p 7-9.
122 Gunningham, n 120 at 303.
123 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 81, p 7-9.
124 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 81, p 7-9.
125 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 81, p 7-9.
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“w in w in ” opp ortu nities in environ m en ta l im provem ent and the e co n o m ic  d iv id en d s these  provided  w ere  
very short-term  in natu re.126
D esp ite  so m e  recen t da llian ces w ith  C A C ,127 the predom inant trend for govern in g  natural resou rces has 
been a sim ilar  sh ift toward N E G . In deed , natural resource m anagem en t (N R M ) exp erim en ts increasingly  
in v o lv e  m u lti-stakeholder participation , deliberation  and collaboration  at d ecen tra lized  b io p h y sica l  
catch m ent and reg iona l sca les  to p lan , im p lem en t, and m onitor adaptive resource m anagem en t  
s tra teg ie s.128 T his approach has been id en tified  in program s such  as integrated ca tch m en t m anagem en t  
and reg ional natural resource m an agem en t in A u stra lia ,129 the C h esapeake B ay program  in the U S A 130 and 
sim ilar d ecen tra lisation  in N R M  around the w o r ld .131 V ital here is not o n ly  the w isd o m  o f  e co sy stem  and 
adaptive m anagem en t but a lso  attem pts by govern m en ts to respond to in tern ation al,132 n a tio n a l133 and 
sta te134 d isc u ss io n s  and p o lic ie s  on  “su sta inab le  d ev e lo p m en t” , 135 and their associa ted  em p h a ses on public  
partic ip ation 136 and the precautionary p r in c ip le .137
Box 1.3: Natural Resources -  From Self Regulation, Information and Voluntarism to 
NEG.
To sum up the above discussion, there have been some broad shifts that have occurred in 
environmental governance in recent history.138 As we saw, the limitations and failings of more 
traditional approaches to environmental governance, particularly command and control and 
markets, have seen governments, citizens and industry increasingly turn toward NEG. The three 
illustrations made clear that this shift is occurring across disparate environmental policy areas,
'26 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 81, p 7-9; Farrier D, n 12 at 326.
127 McGrath C, “Editorial comment - End o f  Broadscale Clearing In Queensland” (2007) 24 EPLJ 5; Note there have 
also been innovative proposals to reform delivery in this context through strategic planning. See for example: Farrier 
and Whelan, n 81, p 30, 47; Farrier, n 62 at 105.
128 Head B, “Regional NRM Planning Arrangements: Evaluating Through the State Lens” in Bellamy J, (ed), 
Regional Natural Resource Management Planning (DNRM/CSIRO, 2005) p 19.
129 Ewing S, “Catchment Management Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), M anaging Australia’s 
Environment (Federation Press, 2003).
130 See Head, n 6, p 137; Karkkainen, n 18.
131 Ribot J, Democratic Decentralization o f Natural Resources: Institutionalising Popular Participation (World 
Resources Institute, 2002).
132 Bruntland, n 49.
133 COAG, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (Canberra, 1992): See Head B and Ryan N, “Working 
With Non-Government Organisations: A Sustainable Development Perspective” (2003) 25(1) Asian Journal O f 
Public Administration 31 at 33, 35.
134 Discussing Queensland: Head and Ryan, n 133 at 33.
135 Head, n 6, p 140.
136 See for example: Bellamy J, McDonald G, Sym e G and Butterworth J, “Evaluating Integrated Resource 
Management” (1999) 12 Society and Natural Resources 337 at 339- 341.
137 See for example Farrier D, “Factoring Biodiversity Conservation Into Decision-Making Processes: The Role O f 
the Precautionary Principle” in Harding R and Fisher E (eds), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle 
(Federation Press, 1999) p 100-104.
138 John, n 99, p 229.
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and is leading to a degree of convergence across these areas toward a more collaborative, 
decentralised, multi party, participatory, adaptive approach to governance. As a number of 
scholars have argued, this convergence toward NEG139 suggests that something big is going in 
environmental governance.140
It may indeed be that we are standing at a moment of critical renewal, reinvention and 
reorientation which will ultimately lead to a new and better way of governing.141 The next 
section turns to flesh out scholars’ views on this question by introducing the current state of 
NEG scholarship, outlining some of the key gaps and questions in the literature that the thesis 
responds to, and detailing the specific research questions of this study.
1.4 NEG Scholarship and Empirical Questions
This section introduces the literature on NEG that will be explored in more detail in 
chapter 2. The discussion also introduces the links between the literature and the aims and 
research questions of this study. It commences by briefly defining NEG scholarship and 
clarifying this thesis’ understanding of this emerging body of work. It then outlines some of the 
key empirical questions and debates in the literature before turning to focus on this study’s 
research questions and how it responds to gaps and debates in the literature.
1.4.1 Introducing NEG Scholarship
This section introduces NEG scholarship and briefly explains why the study chose not to 
engage with each of the many fragmented and sometimes conflicting strands of NEG, but rather 
to maintain some theoretical coherence by embracing a more generalised understanding of 
NEG.
New governance scholarship is recognised as being broad in scope, but is now considered 
“a major field within socio-legal studies world-wide”.142 NEG itself can generally be defined as 
scholarship that is focused on innovative forms of public governance in the environmental arena
139 Furthermore, while the above examples suggest there is something o f a convergence in environmental governance, 
it is important to be clear that this union is occurring primarily at the level o f  broad principles, for example 
“collaboration and participation, contextualization, flexibility”. Most experiments tend to differ widely in their 
specific emphasis and design. For example, different initiatives may emphasise various levels o f  participation or may 
evidence different levels o f  resources and power sharing in their collaborative design.
140 Karkkainen, n 18 at 235; Having said that, the adoption o f the this orientation around NEG obviously is premised 
on an assumption (also made by many NEG scholars) that this shift is not only occurring, but that it w ill continue into 
the immediate future, and thus that there is value in examining both its potential and limitations; M cDonald, n 44 at 
197.
141 Lobel, n 37 at 343.
142 Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2.
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that meet some or all of the abovementioned new governance characteristics.143 It thus can 
encompass a wide range of theories and literatures that are diverse and separate in institutional 
and political approaches, as well as in the concrete environmental problems that they discuss.144
This broad field is most commonly identified with scholarship in the USA and Europe, but 
also increasingly in Australia. As we will see in chapter 2, these three groupings of NEG 
scholarship evidence a broad and diverse field encompassing many different schools of 
thought,145 that often utilise different terminologies to explain their conception of NEG. Some of 
this scholarship, such as strands of “democratic experimentalism” 146 or “collaborative 
governance”,147 tends to be idealised or normative in approach.148 Others such as the “new 
regional paradigm for NRM” ,49and “collaborative ecosystem governance” 130 offer a more 
explanatory understanding of NEG. There is an even greater diversity in the theoretical 
underpinnings that have influenced NEG theory ranging from pragmatism,131 to Giddens’ 
“Third Way” 152 to governmentality.153
Yet, despite this diversity, what binds these theories and this scholarship together is their 
engagement with forms of environmental policy that favour less rigid, less uniform, less 
prescriptive, and less hierarchical approaches to governing and which promise a new, innovative 
and arguably more effective means of addressing complex environmental challenges.154
In deciding to group such diverse theories together under the rubric of NEG scholarship, 
there is of course a risk of over generalisation and of obscuring important differences, debates, 
and divergent tendencies within the literature.155 However the thesis endeavours to remain alert 
to such differences in both its understanding of NEG and its analysis of case studies. The 
approach taken by the thesis is that, conscious of the risks of generalisation, there are 
nevertheless significant benefits to be gained from broadly grouping different theories and 
scholarship under an NEG framework.
Indeed, consistent with emerging understandings within the NEG literature itself, by 
adopting a generalised rubric of NEG (with apposite attention to differences) this thesis can
143 Karkkainen, n 3, p 472; Walker, n 14, p 21.
144 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 2.
145 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496; Lobel, n 23 at 499-501.
146 Dorf M and Sabel C, “A Constitution o f Democratic Experimentalism” (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267.
147 Freeman, n 40 at 31.
148 Karkkainen, n 3 at 472, 496.
149 See his discussion in: Head, n 128 p 19.
150 Karkkainen, n 3 at 472, 496.
151 Dewey J, The Public and its Problems (Gateway Books, 1946).
152 Giddens A, The Third Way. The Renewal o f  Social Democracy (Polity, 1998).
153 Karkkainen, n 3 at 4 7 2 ,4 9 6 ; Lobel, n 23 at 499-501.
154 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 2.
155 Karkkainen, n 3 at 472.
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follow a structured approach that can reach across and learn from the unique156 but yet broadly 
similar theoretical voices.157 More specifically, by linking and comparing theories in this broad 
way, it may be possible to test, build on and reformulate theory to help achieve collectively and 
separately a better understanding of what is occurring, and/or a better approach for normatively 
influencing the direction of this new approach to environmental governance.
In focusing the study around NEG scholarship and the generalized concept of NEG, it is 
also important to point out that there are already many other windows of scholarship and theory 
that have identified and discussed similar trends in governance. For example a host of 
governance theories emphasise “nodes”,158 “networks” 159 and “webs”,160 or focus on shifts in the 
regulatory state and what Osborne and Gaebler161 refer to as steering and rowing.162 However, 
very few of these theories and frameworks have focused on the unique trends in the 
environmental policy field. In contrast, new governance scholarship has been squarely rooted in 
such “third way” approaches to governing in this arena,163 making it a more suitable and apt 
framework for this thesis.
What then is the state of this NEG scholarship? What are some of its key debates and 
unanswered questions that this thesis seeks to tackle? These issues are examined in the next 
section.
1.4.2 Empirical Questions
Although the appearance of NEG has generated a flurry of scholarship heralding its 
potential to provide an alternative to traditional modes of governance, there has been 
surprisingly little investigation of whether, how or to what extent NEG institutions actually 
deliver their purported benefits in practice.'64 Despite some emerging empirical research, a 
substantial gap in NEG scholarship remains because most studies have been confined to a few 
institutional examples, or have lacked a grounding in NEG scholarship or related theories.165 As 
a result, there has been little corresponding evidence that NEG actually delivers on its normative
156 Karkkainen, n 3 at 472.
157 Lobel, n 23 at 502.
158 Burris et al, n 26.
159 See for instance: Pierre and Peters, n 25, p 1-2; Castells M, “Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network 
Society” (2000) 51 British Journal of Sociology 5; Rhodes R, n 24; Kooiman, n 25.
160 Braithwaite J and Drahos P, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge UP, 2000).
161 See for instance: Osbome D and Gaebler T, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is 
Transforming the Public Sector (Addison-Wesley, 1992).
162 See for instance: Braithwaite J, “The New Regulatory State and the Transformation of Criminology” (2000) 40 
British Journal of Criminology 222; Rose N and Miller P, “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government” (1992) 43 (2) The British Journal of Sociology 173.
163 See chapter 2.
164 Karkkainen, n 18 at 499-509.
165 See discussions above about collaborative NRM. Often they focus on ICM, watershed or HCPs.
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promises,166 or in particular that it demonstrably improves environmental outcomes (leading 
some to suggest they may be guilty of “all talk and no action”).167 These deficits in empirical 
research have also given rise to many disagreements about the impacts and effectiveness of 
NEG168 and left some theories that broadly advocate the benefits of NEG vulnerable to criticism.
While it is not possible to canvas the full range of empirical and theoretical disagreements 
here, some of the most heated debates and most fundamental questions have been raised in 
relation to 5 key characteristics of NEG, namely collaboration, participation, deliberation, 
learning and adaptation and “new” forms and mechanism of accountability. It is these 
characteristics that are the principal focus of this thesis. Some of the main debates and gaps 
relating to these characteristics are discussed below in broad terms to provide the reader with a 
flavour of main debates and gaps in the literature, as a precursor to their fuller examination in 
subsequent chapters.
One fundamental question that haunts the NEG literature concerns whether when, and how 
effective collaboration can be achieved without succumbing to collective action problems, 
excessive transaction costs and/or the likelihood of lowest common denominator solutions 
arising from consensus decision making processes.169 Others have also pointed to a “knowledge 
gap” 170 in the NEG literature on the challenges associated with sustaining successful 
collaborative organizations,171 including what happens to collaborative efforts when they have 
substantially achieved their goals.172
Regarding participation. a noted173 lack of empirical evidence on representation and 
participation patterns in different and varied NEG institutions has left NEG vulnerable to critics
166 Koontz and Thomas, n 15 at 113.
167 Lubell M, “Collaborative Environmental Institutions: All talk and No Action?” (2004) 23(3) Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 549 at 549-550; McCloskey M, “The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limit”. (1996) May
13 High Country News, www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 viewed 30 May 2008; Fadeeva Z, 
“Promise of Sustainability Collaboration -  Potential Fulfilled?” (2004) 13 Journal of Cleaner Production 165 at 168- 
169.
168 See overview in: Koontz and Thomas, n 15 at 113.
169 See Coglianese G, “Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy” in Orts E and Deketelaere K (eds), 
Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe 
(Kluwer, 2001).
170 See for example in: Bonnell J and Koontz T, “Stumbling Forward: The Organizational Challenges of Building and 
Sustaining Collaborative Watershed Management” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources 153 at 154.
171 See for example: Fung A and Wright E, ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and 
Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso,
2003) p 27; Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural 
Resources 135 at 141.
172 Koontz T, Steelman T, Carmin J, Korfmacher KS, Moseley C, Thomas C, Collaborative Environmental 
Management: What Roles fo r  Government? (Resources for the Future, 2004) p 183; Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, 
Focht W, Trachtenberg, Z , and Matlock M, “Conclusions and Recommendations” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, 
Trachtenberg, Z , Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed 
Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 294-295.
173 Fung and Wright, n 171, p 34; Steinzor R, ‘The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental 
Law Reporter 10909 fn 20 and 21, page 8 of “p d f’ (I note that I have referred to a “p d f’ copy here and throughout the 
thesis for transparency reasons as there was no page numbers on the electronic original to allow for citation. The 
“p d f’ copy referred to is with the author).
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who remain unconvinced that NEG can necessarily ensure “real participation”. 174 Many 
questions accordingly remain about what kinds and levels of participation, by what group of 
non-governmental actors are actually occurring in practice.175 Another concern for many 
scholars is the participation of environmental interest groups and their potential to “countervail” 
against background forms of pow er.176
Another important issue in the literature is when, how and to what extent NEG can meet 
the demands o f deliberation in practice. Two controversial issues for NEG relate to the danger 
that decision-making will be dominated either by (i) better resourced, knowledgeable or skilful 
non governmental parties such as industry; and/or (ii) those typically accustomed to influencing
• 177decisions such as bureaucrats and government agencies.
Regarding learning and adaptation. there has been little theorising, or research into the 
existence and operation of practical mechanisms for learning and adaptation, including 
approaches such as reflexive law, adaptive management and more systemic styles of 
pragmatist/systemic learning.178 Questions accordingly remain as to when, how and to what 
extent actors can gather, analyse and act on information about shortcomings in their practice.179
One final area of concern is the issue of “new” forms o f accountability. As with most 
approaches to governance in the western world accountability is vital to preventing the abuse of 
public authority, ensure that public resources are used appropriately, and secure performance 
expectations of governance endeavours.180 However, many critics of NEG suggest its unique 
features, particularly collaboration, and the provisionality and flexibility associated with 
learning and adaptation actually mean NEG is at substantial risk of being “captured” or 
perverted into a rent-seeking vehicle.181 Others claim NEG in fact offers opportunities for 
accountability to be secured and even enhanced through replacing or supplementing traditional 
accountability controls with a range of “new” forms and mechanisms of accountability, some of 
which expressly seek to capitalise on the involvement of third parties in NEG such as “mutual”
174 Tushnet M, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton UP, 2003) p 170; Farber D, “Models of Reinvention” (1999) 
October/November Boston Review 24 at 24; Steinzor, n 173 at 22 of “p df’.
17:1 Leach W, “Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western Watershed Partnerships”
(2006) December Public Administration Review 100 at 108; Collaborative Democracy Network, “A Call to Scholars 
and Teachers of Public Administration, Public Policy, Planning, Political Science, and Related Fields” (2006) 
December Public Administration Review 168 at 169; Karkkainen, n 18 at 239.
176 Fung A and Wright E, “Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 
286; Sturm S, “Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 331.
177 Abers R, “Reflections on What Makes Empowered Participatory Governance Happen” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) p 200; Farber, n 174 at 24; Steinzor R, “Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command To Self-Control” (1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
103 at 142.
178 Head, n 6, p 146; Karkkainen, n 18 at 243.
179 See discussions in: S Sturm, n 176, p 327, 328.
180 May P, “Regulatory regimes and accountability” (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 8 at 11.
181 Fung and Wright, n 171, p 37.
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accountability between collaborators182 and “professional” accountability of industries.183 
However, the efficacy of these and other new forms and mechanisms of accountability efforts 
have been under explored in practice.184
The sum of the above debates and concerns is that there is a widely recognised need for 
research into NEG in practice.185 Such research is needed not only to resolve the above 
disagreements and provide insights into many unanswered questions, but also to determine 
exactly what does and does not work at the levels of policy implementation.186
1.4.3 This Study
1.4.3.1 Research Questions
Recognising that many of the above questions can only be answered empirically, this study 
examines various dimensions of NEG, as they play out in practice. In doing so, it seeks to 
identify lessons and insights through a comparative evaluation involving three distinct NEG 
programs, its analysis being guided by a primary research question: under what conditions can 
“good” NEG be achieved?
“Good” is used here as a general descriptor'87 that in its ideal form would denote a model 
of NEG that successfully meets all abovementioned characteristics of NEG according to widely 
accepted standards and criteria laid out in the literature. Given time and space constraints this 
thesis obviously cannot address all aspects of NEG so it confines its understanding of “good” 
NEG to a sub set of specific characteristics, namely collaboration, participation, deliberation, 
learning and adaptation and new forms of accountability. It chose these characteristics not only 
because they are central to NEG’s approach but also because, as explained above, they are some 
of the most controversial and/or under explored.
“Good” NEG for the purposes of this thesis thus denotes a model of NEG that successfully 
meets accepted standards of collaboration, participation, deliberation, learning and adaptation 
and new forms of accountability.
182 Weber, n 98, at 453; Wondolleck J and Yaffee S, Making Collaboration work Lessons from Innovation in natural 
Resource Management (Island Press, 2000) p 238.
183 Freeman J, “The Private Role in Public Governance” (2000) 75 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 543 at 665; Freeman J, “The 
Contracting State” (2000) 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 at 198-201; Freeman, n 40 at 22, 96.
184 Fung and Wright, n 171, p 37.
185 Karkkainen, n 18 at233;Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2; Gunningham, n 19 at 1; Koontz and Thomas, n 15 at 
113.
186 Karkkainen, n 18 at 233; Lobel, n 23 at 499-509; Head, n 6.
187 There has been a great deal of normative and prescriptive discussions of the concept o f “good” as it relates to 
governance. Notions of what constitutes good governance accordingly tend to vary a great deal: UNDP (United 
Nations Development Programme), Management Development and Governance Division, Reconceptualising 
Governance, Discussion paper 2, (UNDP, 1997) at 1; Rhodes, n 24 at 49-50; Head, n 25 at 54- 55.
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For many of these characteristics there is often a broad consensus across NEG scholarship 
as to accepted criteria of “success”. For example, most theories accept similar standards of 
inclusiveness and representation relating to participatory aspirations, or emphasise similar 
conditions for deliberative decision-making (see further chapter 2). However, given the diverse 
and emerging nature of NEG scholarship,188 exactly what constitutes success in terms of 
meeting other characteristics of NEG can often depend on the theoretical commitment and 
focus. For example precisely what consists effective learning and adaptation will depend on 
what type of learning approach one is committed to (e.g. process based learning versus adaptive 
management). Given this, this thesis endeavors in chapter 2, as well as in the analysis chapters, 
to define and make clear the standards of “success” used when drawing conclusions regarding a 
specific defining feature of “good” NEG so as to facilitate transparency in its research and any 
subsequent efforts to learn from its insights into NEG.189
For present purposes, we can denote that some widely accepted normative standard is 
being employed in the thesis’ exploration of key characteristics of “good” NEG, by utilising a 
descriptive for each characteristic -  for example successful collaboration. This approach leads 
the thesis to break the overachieving research question down into 5 sub research questions each 
relating to key component of “good” NEG that will be answered in separate analysis chapters:190 
•what conditions foster the emergence of successful collaboration?
•what conditions contribute to sustaining successful collaboration?
•what conditions foster meaningful participation and deliberation?
•what conditions foster effective learning and adaptation?
•what conditions foster effective “new” forms of accountability?
It may well be asked, what is meant by the term “conditions”? The answer is that this 
concept is used as shorthand throughout this thesis to refer to institutional191 design and 
mechanisms,192 as well as background and contextual situations. For example, the conditions of 
interest to collaboration may relate to whether it provides funding to reduce transactions costs or 
whether it is implemented in a setting involving a small or large affected population.193
22
188 Conley A and Moote M, “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management” (2003) 16 Society and Natural 
Resources 371 at 376, 382.
189 Conley and Moote, n 188 at 376, 382.
190 Except for learning and accountability, which are considered together.
191 I use the term institution here to refer to the legal and policy structures of regulatory and governance programs.
192 For example, this could include issues such as whether a program is designed to employ a penalty default rule, or 
whether a program imposes procedural mandates for representation and decision making in collaborative groups.
193 This could include matters such as the presence of countervailing powers, levels of trust between collaborators, or 
differences in power among stakeholders.
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1.4.3.2 Case Studies
Leaving definitional issues to one side, the above sub research questions are answered by a 
comparative analysis of 12 case studies drawn from three leading NEG programs in Australia, 
each relating to either natural resource issues, “second generation” urban problems or point 
source pollution control.
The first program is a far-reaching new approach to Regional Natural Resource 
Management (RNRM). The federal government pioneered RNRM in 2000/2001, but did so in 
collaboration with the states, including Queensland, which is the “on ground” focus of RNRM 
for this thesis’ research. Through almost $3 billion dollars of government funding194 provided 
under the National Heritage Trust (NHT) and the National Action Plan on Salinity and Water 
(NAP),195 NRM decision-making power is being devolved to 56 NRM regions across Australia. 
Multistakeholder regional bodies have been given decison making and implementation powers 
within each region for undertaking NRM consultation, planning and priority-setting. They must 
each develop a regional plan and regional investment strategy and implement these under a 
collaborative decision-making process.196 However, these bodies are nevertheless subject to 
performance indicators and other controls imposed by collaborative government oversight 
bodies and committees, which continue to hold the purse strings.
The second program examined by this thesis relates primarily to urban second generation 
environmental problems and is known as the Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan 
(NEIP). The NEIP was developed in 2001 by one of the most innovative state environmental 
protection agencies in Australia, namely the Environment Protection Authority Victoria 
(VEPA).197 Abandoning all manner of command and control, the NEIP has been designed to be 
explicitly participatory, deliberative and collaborative, involving multiple non government and 
public stakeholders managing complex environmental problems at a 
“neighbourhood’Vcatchment scale.198
The NEIP and RNRM reforms are largely at the vanguard of experimentation in NEG. 
However, broadly similar NEG reforms were occurring at an early stage, both in Australia, and 
elsewhere. One of the first and arguably most important examples in Australia was the 
Environment Improvement Plan (EIP).199 This instrument was pioneered by the VEPA during 
1990s as an instrument to address point source pollution problems. Departing from a traditional 
bipartite approach, it relies on a tripartite, deliberative approach, involving the participation of
194 http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/funded.html.
195 See http://www.nrm.gov.au.
196 Head, n 128.
197 See: http://www.epa.vic.gov.au.
198 Gunningham et al, n 112.
199 Holley and Gunningham, n 5 at 448.
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local communities in the regulatory process to generate co-operative and innovative processes 
for addressing the environmental challenges confronting large industrial enterprises.200
The thesis’ examination of these three programs is intended to ensure a comparative 
analysis along a range of dimensions. Indeed, the three programs and their respective 12 case 
studies were selected to ensure they (i) involved different environmental problems; (ii) occurred 
at different scales of action; (iii) incorporated different types, ratios and roles for government 
and non government stakeholders, (iv) were different in maturity and development, (v) involved 
different policy contexts; and (vi) different degrees of complexity.
The reasons and basis for selection are discussed further in the research methodology in 
Chapter 3, where details are also given on the thesis’ qualitative analysis approach and its use of 
both an “adaptive theory”201 and a collective case study strategy of inquiry.202
Notably, the qualitative focus of this thesis means it does not attempt to directly measure 
environmental outcomes achieved by NEG or the case studies. Like some NEG research, it does 
draw on respondents’ perceptions of environmental change to reflect on some of the 
environmental achievements made in the cases. However beyond this, it is also difficult to 
analyse whether environmental outcomes have been achieved because like many NEG 
experiments, most of the case studies203 were yet to progress sufficiently into implementation 
and/or often lacked sufficient monitoring data to allow firm conclusions to be drawn on this 
issue.
1.4.3.3 Contribution
Following the above methodological approach, the study centres on the interaction 
between existing NEG theory and ideas derived from an empirical examination of the cases.204 
This methodological orientation ensures the thesis is able to make a number of valuable 
contributions to both NEG scholarship and policy in practice.
First, the thesis goes beyond the majority of previous limited empirical work that consisted
2 0 5  , . . . 206
of anectodatal reporting on single case studies, or partial institutional examples, to compare 
and contrast multiple and different NEG institutions in different environmental policy areas,207
200 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) p 1.
201 Layder D, Sociological Practice Linking Theory and Social Research (Sage Publications, 1998).
202 Yin R, Case Study Research Design and Methods (3rd Ed, Sage Thousand Oaks, 2003).
203 The EIP case is the exception as will be discussed further in the thesis.
204 Layder, n 201, p 1,5.
205 Lubell et al, n 172 p 294.
206 See Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, “Collaborative Approaches to 
Watershed Management” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), 
Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 11.
207 Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2.
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to enable present understandings of NEG in practice to be illuminated.208 In this light, the thesis 
may be seen as a step in the evolution of research into NEG that contributes to closing the gap 
between theory and practice.209
Second, although its comparative analysis precludes an investigation of a number of 
specific empirical questions raised for programs like RNRM,210the thesis makes a significant 
contribution to policy making by conducting a novel empirical analysis of the successes and 
failures of three unique NEG configurations that have received either little211 or no212 analytical 
attention.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the thesis tests various explanatory claims in NEG 
scholarship, allowing it to confirm, reformulate, add to or qualify the explanatory scope and 
domain of the original theoretical materials,213 as well as develop a number of new insights from 
analysis of empirical research that may have been overlooked by the still developing and 
nascent NEG theory. Doing so, the thesis seeks to close the gap between theory and empirical 
research and advance theory by at least partially resolving normative disagreements, by better 
clarifying points of divergence that currently still characterise much of NEG’s defining 
features,214 and (most importantly) by contributing to the development of a more coherent theory 
about the conditions under which NEG can be successfully implemented in practice.
Beyond the above empirical contributions, the thesis also provides insights into some 
broader theoretical themes in the NEG literature. For example, how does the “new” governance 
interact with law and “older” conventional forms of governing? This question raises both 
descriptive and normative issues regarding the relationship between the two approaches.215 One 
recent study suggests there are at least three competing theses on the nature and role of 
traditional law in new governance, namely that old forms of governing either remain impervious 
to, form hybrids with, or are being “reshaped” by these new ways of governing.216
208 Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2.
209 Karkkainen, n 18 at 233; Lobel, n 23 at 499-509; Lubell et al, n 172 p 261; Head, n 6.
210 Head, n 6.
211 There is some limited emerging research on RNRM (e.g. Farrelly M, “Régionalisation of Environmental 
Management: a Case Study of the Natural Heritage Trust, South Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393; 
Whelan J and Oliver P, “Regional Community-Based Planning: The Challenge of Participatory Environmental 
Governance” (2005) 12 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 126); Individual aspects of the Victorian 
EIP have also received previous academic attention (Wills I and Fritschy S, “Industry-community-regulator, 
Consultation in Improving Environmental Performance in Victoria” (2001) 8 Australian Journal of Environmental 
Management 158; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 71, Ch 8.). As explained in chapter 2, this thesis connects the EIP to 
NEG theory, unlike earlier research.
212 To the best of the researcher’s knowledge the NEIP has never received any specific academic scrutiny.
213 Layder, n 201, p 167-168.
2,4 Karkkainen, n 18 at 233; Lobel, n 23 at 499-509.
215 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 3-10; Trubek and Trubek, n 15 at 1-2.
216 De Burca and Scott, n 19, p 4-9.
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Another area of concern in the NEG literature relates to theories of the State, and the 
relation between State and civil society.217 New governance’s collaborative, participatory and 
deliberative nature appears to blur the familiar sharp boundaries that separate "the State" from 
the institutions of civil society.218 This raises a range of questions about the role of State, and 
role of non-government actors and how governance ought to work.219 Some scholars suggest 
that the key feature of new governance is an “active” state.220 To what extent does this occur and 
what are its impacts? To what extent can some of the State’s “functions” be taken over by other 
actors? Does the State play certain unique roles and if so what are they?221 The thesis returns in 
chapter 9 to consider some of these broader themes.
Before embarking on detailed analysis it is pertinent to provide an overview of the thesis.
1.5 Outline
The remainder of the study is divided into 8 chapters and is organised as follows. Akin to 
this introduction, Chapters 2-4 provide a background to the study, the relevant literature and its 
methodological orientation. Chapter 2 draws on new governance scholarship to consider key 
NEG theories, pointing out how they are linked and how they differ, before fleshing out in more 
detail the defining properties of NEG. It also identifies more clearly the links between the 
research questions that guide this thesis and NEG scholarship.
Chapter 3 focuses on methodology and orientates the study within a qualitative approach to 
research that utilises adaptive theory and collective case study methodology. It also points out 
the study’s associated methods of case selection, data collection and analysis.
Chapter 4 then fleshes out details of the three programs, outlining their background and 
investigating how and to what extent each case embraces the properties of NEG. This provides 
the necessary background to evaluate and compare each program relevant to the characteristics 
of “good” NEG.
Chapters 5-7 provide comparative analysis of the cases with respect to the 5 sub 
research questions. Consistent with the focus of the thesis on the conditions of “good” NEG, 
and acknowledging there is often a difference between aspirations and mechanisms designed to 
achieve them, each chapter initially investigates the institutional design of each case to identify 
the relevant conditions that may impact on the achievement of these goals in practice. The
2,7 Karkkainen, n 18 at fnl 11.
218 Karkkainen, n 18 at 238.
219 Karkkainen, n 18 at 238.
220 Lobel, n 23 at 502.
221 Mol A, “Bringing the Environmental State Back In: Partnerships in Perspective” in Glasbergen P, Biermann F and
Mol A (eds), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development, (Edward Elgar, 2007); Head, n 25, p 56-57; 
Karkkainen, n 18 at 239.
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chapters then turn to consider the findings of each program of NEG, before outlining the 
implications for policy and scholarship regarding each feature of NEG.
Chapter 5 commences this analysis with an examination of the emergence of 
collaboration to reveal a number of lessons as to the conditions that appear to increase the 
likelihood of successful collaboration emerging in practice. Chapter 6 examines “meaningful” 
participation and deliberation across the cases, pointing to the very real difficulties NEG 
experiments face in meeting these aspirations, and suggesting some modifications for designing 
experiments to achieve these goals.
Chapter 7 explores approaches to effective accountability and learning, reflecting on, inter 
alia, monitoring processes, “professional” and “mutual” accountability, adaptive management 
and systemic information sharing. Chapter 8 then rounds out the analysis chapters by reflecting 
on the mechanisms and design of NEG to contribute to sustaining successful collaboration 
overtime.
Finally, Chapter 9 steps back to draw together the findings and reflect on the broader 
insights for NEG literature. It explores the likelihood of NEG achieving effective environmental 
outcomes, and argues that there are a number of key “pillars” vital to achieving “good” NEG. 
The chapter also revisits broad theoretical themes and debates in the literature. This involves 
reflecting on normative debates regarding NEG. The unsurprising finding is that NEG is neither 
as perfect as proponents may suggest nor is it abysmal, as critics have argued. It then revisits the 
interaction between new governance and law. Here the thesis findings argue the case that 
hybridity descriptively captures this relationship. The chapter also argues that the State remains 
strong and active, but points out the need for normative theories to better address the thesis’ 
findings regarding the risks of State authority. The chapter also reflects on the role of non 
governmental actors, suggesting significant variations among different groupings of players. To 
finish, the chapter provides suggestions for further research in NEG scholarship.
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Chapter 2: New Environmental Governance 
Theory -
Distinctive visions, common features, and the conditions 
for creating “good” governance
2.1 Introduction
For this thesis to examine the conditions under which “good” New Environmental 
Governance (NEG) can be achieved a number of important questions need to be asked: What 
are the key theories of NEG scholarship and how do they differ? What features and 
characteristics identified in NEG scholarship actually define NEG as an approach to governing 
environmental problems? What normative claims are made in NEG scholarship for why NEG is 
a “good” way of governing environmental problems?1 What conditions have been identified or 
proposed by NEG theories and research as vital to successfully executing NEG’s approach to 
governing in practice? These questions are answered in the remainder of this chapter.
Mindful that the emerging and evolving scholarship on NEG encompasses many different 
schools of thought,2 section 2.2 of the chapter sets the context by outlining some of the key 
theories and their theoretical underpinnings. It does so by focusing on three leading areas of 
NEG, namely the United States of America (USA), Australia and Europe.
This largely descriptive section provides a background for section 2.3, which identifies 
some of the defining features of an “NEG approach”3 and examines associated normative claims 
as to why this approach is a better way of governing than traditional methods of regulation.
Section 2.4 then turns to examine some of the key conditions that scholars identify as vital 
to the success of NEG. In particular, this section extricates some of the debates and specific 
unanswered questions in the literature regarding these conditions and links them to the focus of 
investigation throughout the remainder of the thesis. The chapter then concludes in section 2.5.
2.2 Key Theories in NEG Scholarship
This section sets the background for the remainder of the chapter by outlining NEG 
scholarship in the USA, Australia and Europe, and highlighting key theories and their 
theoretical underpinnings.
1 Karkkainen B, ‘“New Governance’ In Legal Thought And In The World: Some Splitting As Antidote To 
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471 at 496.
2 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496; Lobel O, “Setting the Agenda for new governance research” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law 
Review 498 at 499-501.
3 Karkkainen, n 1; Lobel, n 2 at 506, 508.
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2.2.1 NEG Experiments and Scholarship in the USA
Over the last 15 years, the United States has been host to a range of NEG “experiments”. 
Examples of these are summarised in Table 2.1 below.
General Focus Examples
Environmental standard setting and pollution 
control initiatives.4
•Regulatory Negotiation.5 
• Project XL.6 
•Toxic Relief Inventory.7 
•Brownfields.8
Natural resource and ecosystem management 
initiatives.9
•Watershed Management.10 
• “CALFED” Bay Delta Program.11 
•Chesapeake Bay Program.12 
•Habitat Conservation Plans.13
Table 2.1: Illustrations of NEG Experiments in USA.
There is great variation across these experiments. Some arise from the “grass roots”, while 
others are driven by state and federal government policy.14 Some are more mature than others.
4 For some further examples see Sabel C, Fung A and Karkkainen B, “Beyond backyard environmentalism” (1999) 
October/November Boston Review 1 at 6.
5 See for example: Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” (1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 
1.
6 See for example: Hirsch D, “Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA’s Untold Success Story” (2001) 26 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 219 at 220-221; Freeman, n 5 at 61-82.
7 See for example: Sabel et al, n 4 at 5-6; Karkkainen B, “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and 
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?” (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 257.
8 See for example: Shutkin W, “Realizing The Promise Of The New Environmental Law” (1999) 33 New England 
Law Review 691 at 692, 697.
9 For further examples see John D, “Civic Environmentalism” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 229; John D and Mlay M, “Community-Based 
Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic Environmentalism” in Sexton K, Marcus A, William Easter K and 
Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental Decisions Strategies for governments, Businesses and Communities (Island 
Press, 1999); Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great Lakes” (2006)
19 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209.
10 See generally Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming 
Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005); Tarlock D, “Putting Rivers Back In 
The Landscape: The Revival Of Watershed Management In The United States” (2000) 6 Hastings West-Northwest 
Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 167.
" See for example: Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795.
12 See for example: Karkkainen B, “Post Sovereign Environmental Governance” (2004) 4(1) Global Environmental 
Politics 72 at 81-86.
13 For a useful background to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and Habitat Conservation Plans in USA see Farrier 
D, “Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations?” 
(1995) 19 Harvard Environmental Law Review 303 at 372-389; For specific detail on Habitat Conservation plans see 
Thomas C, “Habitat Conservation Planning” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003); Karkkainen B ‘Toward Ecological Sustainable 
Democracy” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered 
Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003).
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Many address large ecosystem scale problems while others focus on improving the 
environmental performance of a single firm. Given this variation, it is unsurprising that a 
diverse and multidisciplinary scholarship on these NEG phenomena has emerged.15 Some 
scholars focus exclusively on USA experiments,16 while others engage in international 
comparisons.17 Some have limited their investigations to developments in environmental18 or 
natural resource management (NRM)19 areas, while others have conceptualised common trends 
across both areas.20
The result of this assortment of methodological and conceptual approaches has been a 
diversity of nomenclatures and theoretical proposals on NEG21 that range from “contract” 
derived theories,22 to “grass roots ecosystem management”.23 Space precluded a detailed 
discussion of the entire range of NEG theories in USA. Rather, to enable the empirical 
component of this thesis to be effectively located within the broad field of NEG scholarship, six 
of the more prominent lines of NEG theory and research will be further explored below.
The first and arguably the most influential NEG vision is “democratic experimentalism”.24 
Originally advanced in the late 1990s,25 later contributors such as Karkkainen,26 Fung27 and their 
collaborators have built on and extended this vision in a range of more nuanced strands of 
“democratic experimentalist” thinking. Notwithstanding that these writers examine a number of
14 Conley A and Moote M, “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management” (2003) 16 Society and Natural 
Resources 371 at 372-373.
15 Moore E and Koontz T “A Typology of Collaborative Watershed Groups: Citizen based, Agency based and Mixed 
Partnerships” (2003) 16 Society and Natural Resources 451 at 453.
16 See for example Wondolleck J and Yaffee S, Making Collaboration Work Lessons from Innovation in Natural 
Resource Management (Island Press, 2000).
17 Karkkainen’s work is exemplary here. See for example: Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: 
Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189.
18 See for example Freeman, n 5.
19 See for example contributions in Sabatier et al, n 10; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16.
20 Perhaps the best example of this mix is democratic experimentalist theory, which touches on a range of 
environmental and natural resource issues, evidenced most particularly in the various empirical cases they suggest 
offer glimpses, albeit imperfect ones, o f elements of their wider ideal. See for example: Dorf M and Sabel C, “A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”(1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267 at 357, 371-388; Sabel et al, n 4 
at 4-10.
21 Others include “modular regulation”, (Freeman and Farber, n i l )  “collaborative environmental management”, 
(Koontz T, Steelman T, Carmin J, Korfmacher K, Moseley C and Thomas C, Collaborative Environmental 
Management: What Roles fo r  Government? (RFF, 2004)) “collaborative natural resource management”, (Conley and 
Moote, n 14; J Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16). For a discussion of some other developments see Fiorino D, 
“Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance” (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441 
(examining reflexive law, social-political governance, and policy-learning); Stewart R, “A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?” (2001) 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 21.
22 Dana D, “The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) U. 111. L. Rev. 35 at 59; 
Freeman J, “The Contracting State” (2000) 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 at 198-201; Farrier, n 13 at 327-342.
23 Weber E, “A New Vanguard for the Environment: Grass-roots Ecosystem Management as a New Environmental 
Movement” (2000) 13(3) Society and Natural Resources 237.
24 See Karkkainen B, Fung A and Sabel C, “After Backyard Environmentalism Toward a Performance Based Regime 
of Environmental Protection” (2000) 44(4) American Behavioural Scientist 690.
25 Dorf and Sabel, n 20; Cohen J and Sabel C, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3 Euro L J 313.
26 Karkkainen et al, n 24.
27 Fung A and Wright E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), 
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003).
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concrete examples of NEG, their respective theories are ultimately “idealised” constructs, 
whose intellectual roots are quite diverse.28 Of these, perhaps the most influential29 has been the 
philosophical tradition of pragmatism.30
At its core pragmatism emphasises that knowledge does not rest on any certain foundation. 
Rather knowledge claims are vindicated by the norms of rational inquiry, which are themselves 
subject to rational criticism.31 Democratic experimentalist authors have drawn particularly on 
pragmatist thinker John Dewey and his ideas on the “experimental method” of inquiry, which
• 32emphasises the importance of embracing change and continually learning from experience. 
Dewey’s view of democracy is also an important inspiration, particularly its emphasis upon 
local knowledge,33 communities,34 and social communication.35
Following these pragmatist ideas, key strands of democratic experimentalist thinking reject
36the possibility of immutable principles. For that reason, they view traditional regulation’s
preference for centralised knowledge and largely fixed rules/caps/taxes as incapable of dealing
37with the change and uncertainty that characterise modem social and environmental problems.
28 Besides those discussed in main text, others intellectual roots include participation scholarship (see for example 
Mansbridge J, Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago Press, 1980/1983) p xi); radical and deliberative democratic 
thought (see for example Cohen J, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in Bohman J and Rehg W (eds), 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (MIT Press, 1997); Cohen J and Rogers J, “Power and 
Reason” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) p 238-239); James Madison’s 
treatise on the separation of powers and senatorial deliberation (The Federalist No. 10 The Utility of the Union as a 
Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, Daily Advertiser Thursday, November 22, 1787 [James 
Madison] available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federalO.htm viewed 10 May 2008); and civic engagement 
literature (Tocqueville A. de, Democracy in America (1835, 1840) Maier J(ed) translated by Lawrence G, (Anchor, 
1969)).
29 See for example: Dorf and Sabel, n 20 at 284; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 693-694, 696; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 21, 
28, 32; Sabel et al, n 4.
30 Like most philosophical traditions, it is not without varying interpretations, promoters and critics. For a general 
introduction see Festenstein M, Pragmatism and Political Theory (Chicago UP, 1997) p 2-3; Bernstein R, “The 
Resurgence of Pragmatism” (1992) 59(4) Social Research 813.
31 Festenstein, n 30, p 5.
32 While space prevents a discussion of Dewey’s ideas in full, the following quote provides an illustration of his 
thinking regarding the importance of learning from experience and the experimental method: a person “does not 
expect any amount of aloof scrutiny to reveal to him any secrets...He proceeds to do something, to bring some 
energy to bear upon the substance to see how it reacts...[he] no longer tries to find some fixed form or essence behind 
each process of change...the thing to paid heed to is not what is originally given but that which emerges after the 
thing has been set under a great variety of circumstances in order to see how it behaves. ..Since changes are going on 
anyway, the great thing is to learn enough about them so that we be able to lay hold of them and turn them in the 
direction of our desires”; Dewey J, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Beacon Press, 1920, 1948) p 113-114, 116.
33 As Dewey puts it: “the man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert 
shoemaker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied”; Dewey J, The Public and its Problems (Gateway 
Books, 1946) p 207.
34 As Dewey explains: “Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly community...Unless local 
communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its most urgent problem, to find and identify 
itself...While local, it will not be isolated.”; Dewey, n 33, p 213, 216-217; Festenstein, n 30, p 94.
35 As Dewey emphasises: “the essential need...is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion and persuasion...this improvement depends essentially upon freeing and perfecting the processes of 
inquiry and of dissemination of their conclusions”; Dewey, n 33, p 208; Dewey J, “Democracy and Educational 
Administration” (1937) in Dewey J, The Later Works 1925-1953 vol. 11 Boydston J (ed) (Southern Illinois UP, 1981- 
1990)p 219.
36 Karkkainen et al, n 24, at 693-694.
37 Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 323, 331; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 693-694.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
32
Instead, their experimentalist vision seeks to better deal with inevitable uncertainty and change 
by fostering the continual flow of information and learning through a network of local 
participatory and deliberative problem solving groups that are explicitly experimental in 
nature.38 These groups are minimally directed by a “new” central body whose role is primarily 
to monitor and coordinate local experiments to facilitate horizontal diffusion of best practice
39and continual improvements in management techniques and the design of institutions (see 
Table 2.2 below for more detail).
Core
Institution
Overview
Local
institutions
• Whilst the precise form of these decentralised participatory institutions 
varies,40 they often involve a collaborative effort of government, citizens and 
businesses that deliberate together to solve local problems.
• These locales are to be given autonomy as problem-solving institutions to self 
assess and self adjust their problem solving. Such adjustments/adaptation are 
based on their own assessment and on a benchmarking process using the 
information periodically received from central agencies about similarly located 
institutions.41
Central
government
body
• The chief purposes of these bodies include assisting the state and local 
institutions in experimentalism by reducing the costs of information flow and 
fostering local benchmarking processes by assisting different governing 
locales to determine which locales are similarly situated, what projects those 
bodies are pursuing and what modifications of the project might be needed 
under local conditions.
• In consultation with local actors, the central agency uses the locally reported 
data to periodically reformulate and progressively refine minimum 
performance standards, desirable targets, and preferred means to achieve 
them.42
Table 2.2: Overview of Some of the Core Institutions in Democratic Experimentalism.
38 Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 693-694; Karkkainen, n 1 at 494.
39 This is what Karkkainen et al refer to as a “rolling rule regime” that they explain as follows: “regulators use reports 
on proposals and outcomes to periodically reformulate minimum performance standards, desirable targets, and paths 
for moving from the former to the latter. In pursuing these targets as they see best, local actors provide the 
information necessary for regulators to revise their standards and goals, and receive information on the performance 
of others that guides further experimentation. Thus the new framework forces continuous improvements in both 
regulatory rules and environmental performance while heightening the accountability of the actors to each other and 
the larger public”; Sabel et al, n 4; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691 ; Karkkainen, n 1 at 494; Dorf and Sabel, n 20 at 396.
40 They can include locally based governance councils, bodies o f collaborating service providers and citizens, firms, 
local governments, local representatives of federal agencies, or collaborative ecosystem governance institutions; Dorf 
and Sabel, n 20 at 319-20; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691.
41 Karkkainen, n 1 at 494; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691, 704.
42 Scheuerman W, “Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical reflections o f Directly- 
Deliberative Polyarchy” (2004) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 101 at 115; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 
691.
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A second closely related, but more explanatory, NEG theory has been advanced by 
Karkkainen under the banner of “collaborative ecosystem governance”.43 This theory points to 
the emergence of hybrid public-private governance structures, that stress information-sharing, 
systematic performance monitoring, and collaborative problem-solving among parties 
representing diverse interests at multiple, nested spatial scales.44 These structures seek to 
respond to the increasing acceptance of the following two ideas in environmental governance:
•ecosystems are dynamic, complex, systems that must be managed in a holistic and 
integrated way (“ecosystem management”) ;45 and
•management interventions in ecosystems should be treated as experiments from which 
managers and science can learn and adapt (“adaptive management”).46
As Karkkainen points out, adaptive management is roughly akin to Dewey’s experimental 
method.47
A third prominent line of NEG theory in the USA has been developed by Freeman48 who 
has advanced a normative theory of “collaborative governance” that she claims can produce 
more effective problem solving than traditional regulatory approaches and also has particular 
democratic value.49 Predominantly focused on environmental standards and pollution control, 
Freeman’s theory comprises a number of principles, including collaborative problem solving, 
participation, a civic republicanism50 style preference for face-to-face negotiation,51 “new”
43 This theory has been based, in part, on Karkkainen revisiting in greater depth some of the original NEG examples 
used to support elements of his democratic experimentalist work. Karkkainen has also widened his focus to new NEG 
experiments. See for instance: Karkkainen, n 13; Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem Management And Regulatory 
Penalty Defaults: Toward A Bounded Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 943 (both articles discussing 
HCPs); Karkkainen, n 7 (focusing on toxic release inventory); Karkkainen, n 12 (discussing Chesapeake Bay and 
Great Lakes); Karkkainen, n 17 at 224 (discussing HCPs, Florida’s everglades, Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes, 
watershed approaches in Western USA, Baltic sea and other international collaborative efforts); Karkkainen, n 9 
(comparing Great Lakes with other leading ecosystem governance experiments).
44 Karkkainen, n 17 at 193-194; Karkkainen, n 13 at 219-221.
45 The ecosystem concept itself was originally popularised by Eugene P Odum (Odum E, Fundamentals of Ecology 
(Saunder, 1953) p 9) and has since been extended by others; Karkkainen, n 17 at 194; Karkkainen, n 43; Ruhl J, “A 
Manifesto for the Radical Middle” (2002) 38 Idaho Law Review 385 at 395; Karkkainen, n 13 at 219.
46 Originally developed by Holling (Holling C, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (John Wiley, 
1978)), he has since extended the concept in later works (Gunderson L and Holling C (eds), Panarchy:
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Island Press, 2001)). See also: Lee K, Compass and 
Gyroscope (Island Press, 1993); Walters C, Adaptive Management o f Renewable Resources (McMillan, 1986); 
Dovers S, “Processes and Institutions for Resource and Environmental Management: Why and How to Analyse?” in 
Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 4; Karkkainen, n 43.
47 See Karkkainen, n 43 at 956-960.
48 Freeman J, “Private Role in Public Governance” (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 543; Freeman, n 22; 
Freeman, n 5.
49 More recently Freeman has extended the features of her collaborative model writing with Dan Farber, another 
author who has developed his own pragmatism inspired theories (Farber D, Eco-Pragmatism: Making Sensible 
Environmental Decisions in an Uncertain World (Chicago UP, 1999)). See Freeman and Farber, n i l .
50 Note that Freeman criticises the broader approach of civic republicanism; Freeman, n 5 at 19-21.
51 Freeman, n 5 at 22-23, fn 58, 59; Shapiro S, “Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith 
in Pragmatic Government” (2000) 48 University of Kansas Law Review 689 at 730.
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forms of accountability and a pragmatist/adaptive management inspired approach that accepts 
provisional solutions.52
A fourth line of theory is “civic environmentalism”. Coined in the early 1990s by Dewitt 
John, the concept of civic environmentalism has since been developed by a range of authors 
including William Shutkin,53 Marc Landy54 and John'’5 him self.56 Although their theories are 
different,57 and draw on distinct empirical observations and theoretical inspirations, they all 
share an intellectual tradition rooted in (i) Thomas Jefferson’s philosophical preferences58 for 
limited government and the egalitarian culture of agricultural communities;59 and (ii) a 
preference for local, associational activity as promoted by Alexis de Tocqueville60 and more 
modern civic engagement literature.61
Following both Jefferson and Tocqueville, most civic environmentalists share a general 
preference for restricting the role of governmental top down ru les.62 Rather, greater
52 Freeman, n 5 at 28-29, 31-32 fn 72, 77.
53 See for example: Shutkin W, The Land that Could Be: Environmentalism and Democracy in the Twenty First 
Century (MIT, 2000); Shutkin, n 8.
54 See for example: Landy M and Rubin C, Civic Environmentalism: A New Approach to Policy (Marshall Institute, 
2001).
55 John, n 62; John D, Civic Environmentalism Alternatives to Regulation in States and Communities (Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1994); John, n 9.
56 See discussion of the term in Dagger R, “Stopping Sprawl for the goof of all - The Case for Civic 
Environmentalism” (2003) 34(1) Journal of Social Philosophy 28 at 41.
57 For discussions and comparisons o f this work see: John, n 9, p 242-249; Karkkainen, n 1, 489 to 496.
58 There are a range of scholarly debates regarding Jefferson’s ideological roots, including republican versus liberalist 
interpretations and environmentalist versus exploitation/capitalist; For an overview of many of these debates and 
relevant references see Onuf P, “The Scholars’ Jefferson” (1993) 50(4) The William and Mary Quarterly 671 at 675- 
684; Ling P, “Thomas Jefferson and the Environment” (2004) 54(1) History Today 48 at 48; Browers M, “Jefferson’s 
Land Ethic: Environmentalist Ideas in Notes on the State of Virginia” (1999) 21 Environmental Ethics 43 at 43.
59 Jefferson, among things, promoted limited government (it is “by placing under every one what his own eye may 
superintend, that all will be done for the best”) and saw morality and humanity as being bound with land use 
(“cultivators o f the earth are the most valuable citizens...the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, 
and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberty and interests, by the most lasting bonds”). See Thomas 
Jefferson Writings to Joseph C. Cabell, 1816 in Coates E, “Favorite Jefferson Quotes” (1996) 
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
ieffquot?specfile=/web/data/iefferson/quotations/www/ieffquot.o2w&act=text&offset=1340385&textreg=0&querv=f 
arm viewed 10 May 2008; Browers, n 58 at 49; Shutkin, n 8 at 696.
60 Tocqueville’s pioneering study of American society and politics saw him conclude that the “key to American 
politics and society” was the “American’s readiness to organise themselves spontaneously and informally to tackle 
local problems”. Such local, associational activity was valued by Tocqueville as a means to transform self interested 
individuals into community-minded citizens; Tocqueville A de, Democracy in America vol 2 (Random House, 1990) 
p 103-4 cited in Ehrenberg J, “ Equality, Democracy, and Community from Tocqueville to Putnam” in McLean S, 
Schultz D and Steger M, Social Capital Critical Perspectives on Community and “Bowling Alone" (New York UP,
2002) p 56; see generally, Tocqueville, n 28.
61 For discussions of Jefferson: Landy and Rubin, n 54 p 8; Shutkin, n 8 at 696; Shutkin, n 53, Chapter 1; John, n 9, p 
226; John and Mlay, n 9, p 355. For discussion of Tocqueville: John, n 9, p 226; Landy and Rubin, n 54, p 9-10; 
Shutkin, n 53, Chapter 1.
62 See for example Shutkin, n 8 at 695-696; Shutkin W, “From Pollution Control to Place Making” in Ben-Joseph E 
and Szold T (eds), Regulating Place Standards and the Shaping o f Urban America (Routledge, 2005) p 254-255; 
Knopman D and Landy M, “A New Model of Governance” September 1 (2000) DLC Blueprint Magazine available 
at http://www.ndol.org/ndol ci.cfm?contentid=2125&kaid=l 16&subid=151 viewed 10 May 2008; John D, “Civic 
Environmentalism” (1994) 10(4) Issues in Science and Technology 30 at 30.
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responsibility for environmental goverance is to be devolved to “localised” levels and the 
engagement of citizens in decision-making and action is to be fostered.63
The fifth key line of theory falls under the concept of “reflexive law”. Influential here is 
the German theorist Teubner’s concept of autopoietic systems.64 Teubner’s basic contention is 
that any regulatory intervention that directly seeks to change a so-called self-organising and 
regulating system will produce a “regulatory trilemma”65 and essentially fail.66 Rooted in these 
ideas, reflexive law theories in the environmental context in the United States,67 such as that 
developed by Eric Orts, suggest law should instead be used to set up processes (eg. 
environmental management systems) which encourage institutional self regulation and self- 
reflective thinking and learning about environmental effects.68
A sixth line of inquiry involves mostly empirical research on watershed management and 
NRM in the USA. This “collaborative NRM” literature seeks to understand the increasing trend 
of diverse public and private stakeholders working together to resolve shared NRM dilemmas 
though a holistic, catchment or ecosystem focused approach.69 This literature explores trends in 
USA water, pollution and land management policy and the emergence of the concept of 
“sustainability” in seeking to understand this “collaborative turn”.70 With few exceptions,71 this 
literature is dominated by studies of individual cases of collaborative NRM that are not well 
grounded in a coherent body of theory.72
63 See general discussions in Sirianni C and Friedland L, Civic Innovation in America (California UP, 2001) p 85-86; 
Karkkainen, n 1 at 491.
64 Teubner G, “Introduction to Autopoietic Law” in Teubner G (ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and 
Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) p 3. This work is built on Luhmann’s system theory, see: Luhmann N, “The Self 
Production of Law and its Limits” in Teubner G (ed), Dilemmas o f Law in the Welfare State (de Gruyter Berlin, 
1985).
65 The trilemma involves either the destruction of the target system, indifference of the target system to the 
intervention, or the destruction of the intervening system. Teubner G, “Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, 
Solutions” in Teubner G (ed), Juridification o f Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, 1987) p 408; Black J, “Critical 
Reflections on Regulation”(2002) 27 Australian Journal of Philosophy 1 at 7; Parker C, Scott C, Lacey N and 
Braithwaite J, “Introduction” in Parker C, Scott C, Lacey N and Braithwaite J (eds), Regulating Law (Oxford UP,
2004) p 10.
66 Black, n 65 at 7; Parker et al, n 65, p 10.
67 Gaines S, “Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development” (2002/2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 19-23; Lobel O, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall Of Regulation And The Rise Of 
Governance In Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342 at 361-366.
68 Orts E, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227 at 1233, 1253-1254.
69 See overview in Heikkila T and Gerlak A, “The Formation of Large-scale Collaborative Resource Management 
Institutions: Clarifying the Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions” (2005) 33(4) Policy Studies Journal 583 
at 583.
70 See for example Koontz et al, n 21 at 1-18; Sabatier et al, n 10; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16 at 3-16; Weber E, 
‘The Question of Accountability in Historical Perspective: from Jackson to Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem 
Management” (1999) 31(4) Administration and Society 451 at 456, 461; Sherman D, “Book Review Collaborative 
Environmental Management: What Roles fo r  Government?” (2005) 38 Policy Sciences 201.
71 See for example: Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16; Sabatier et al, n 10; Conley and Moote, n 14.
72 See discussions in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, “Collaborative 
Approaches to Watershed Management” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock 
M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 11; Moore and 
Koontz, n 15 at 453.
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2.2.2 NEG Experiments and Scholarship in Australia
Like NEG experiments in USA, Australian examples of NEG vary in maturity and 
problem focus (see Table 2.3 below for some illustrations).
General Focus Examples
Environmental standard setting and pollution 
control initiatives.
• Environment Improvement Plans.
• “Share the noise” solution, Sydney airport.73
• Neighbourhood Environment Improvement 
Plan (can also be used in rural natural resource 
management contexts).
Natural resource and ecosystem management 
initiatives.74
•Murray Darling Basin initiative.75 
•Natural Heritage Trust program.76 
•Regional forestry agreement.77 
•Regional Natural Resource Management. 
•Integrated Catchment Management. 
•National Landcare Program.
Table 2.3: Illustrations of NEG Experiments in Australia.
Experiments of particular relevance to the thesis include the Environment Improvement 
Plan; Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan; and Regional Natural Resource 
Management and its antecedents, integrated catchment initiatives, and the National Landcare 
Program.
While the recent Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan initiative remains 
unstudied, the other experiments have been the focus of a diverse scholarship that is primarily 
empirically focused, yet typically grounded in a broader body of regulation or governance 
theory.
For example, the Environment Improvement Plan (EIP) experiment has attracted 
significant academic attention in the form of policy focused empirical studies.78 However, these
73 Stewart J and Jones G, Renegotiating the Environment (Federation Press, (2003) at 4.
74 See for example studies into forestry agreements, the Reef Plan and various other environmental and natural 
resource approaches in Lane M, “Decentralization or Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest Conflict 
and Bioregional Assessment in Australia” (2003) 19 Journal o f Rural Studies 283 at 284; Head B and Ryan N, 
“Working With Non-Government Organisations: A Sustainable Development Perspective” (2003) 25(1) Asian 
Journal Of Public Administration 31 at 37-48; Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment 
(Federation Press, 2003).
75 See generally Crabb P, “Straddling Boundaries: Inter-governmental Arrangements for Managing Natural 
Resources” in Dovers S and Wildriver S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003).
76 Crowley K, “Effective Environmental Federalism? Australia’s Natural Heritage Trust” (2000) 3 Journal of 
Environmental Policy and Planning 255.
77 Stewart and Jones, n 73, p 4.
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studies were undertaken some considerable time ago soon after EIPs were introduced, and 
indeed at a time when NEG scholarship was barely on the intellectual horizon.79 Unsurprisingly 
therefore, they were not tied to NEG debates per se, but rather loosely conceptualised EIP’s 
tripartite nature80 (non government stakeholders, industry and a regulator agreeing to and 
monitoring environmental standards) as an example of “regulatory flexibility” 81 and 
“community participation”.82 Some authors went further, suggesting that the EIP agreement 
between the parties should be seen as a form of “process based regulation” - an approach much 
like reflexive law that seeks to influence management practices and encourage greater self 
regulation and reflective management.83 Even these however did not locate the EIP initiative 
within the then embryonic NEG literature.
Turning to NRM based NEG experiments, Australian scholarship typically characterised 
these experiments as a response to discussions and policies84on “sustainable development”.85 
Against this backdrop, two important natural resource management experiments emerged in 
Australia during the 1980s and 1990s, namely Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) and 
Landcare. An overview of each initiative is provided respectively in Boxes 2.1 and 2.2 below.
78 See for example Wills I and Fritschy S, “Industry-community-regulator Consultation in Improving Environmental 
Performance in Victoria” (2001) 8 Australian Journal o f Environmental Management 158; Gunningham N and 
Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002), chapter 8.
7y That is, these discussions were not generally tied to broader NEG theory theoretical debates and questions. More 
recently, in the light o f comparatively more mature NEG scholarship, the EIP has drawn comparisons with 
contractarian NEG theories. See: Karkkainen B, “Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” 
in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 2006) p 293-294.
8(1 Resonating with responsive regulation’s concept of “tripartism” and “the enforcement pyramid”; Ayres I and 
Braithwaite J, Responsive Regulation Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford UP, 1992).
81 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78, p 158-159, 179-187.
82 See Wills and Fritschy, n 78 at 158, 165-166.
83 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78, p 158.
84 Bruntland G, Our common future -  The Report to the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(Oxford UP, 1987); United Nations, Agenda 21 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (UN, 
1992).
85 Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R 
and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 140; Eversole R and 
Martin J, “Participation and the Governance of Natural Resources” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation 
and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 117. The related concept of the “precautionary 
principle” has also been an important influence. See Farrier D, “Factoring Biodiversity Conservation into Decision- 
Making Processes: the Role of the Precautionary Principle” in Harding R and Fisher E (eds), Perspectives on the 
Precautionary Principle (Federation Press, 1999) p 100-104.
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INTEGRATED CATCHMENT MANAGEMENT
Amid growing concerns about the lack of holistic and coordinated approaches to managing natural 
resources, a key experiment at the state level was the “formal”86 Integrated Catchment Management 
approach. Institutional arrangements for ICM varied between states but all involved a more 
participatory, collaborative, integrated and holistic approach to managing natural resources than had 
previously been contemplated in Australia.87 Mirroring similar developments around the world,88 ICM 
typically involved public and community partnerships, enhanced geographical integration (eg. focusing 
on a catchment or ecosystem as a management unit) and the development and implementation of 
catchment plans.89 Much o f the literature on ICM is ensconced within legal, socio-legal90 or resource 
management fields, rather than NEG.91 However this research has delivered useful insights into both 
the strengths o f ICM (eg. more holistic management) and common shortcomings in practice (eg. 
inadequate funding and mandates),92 notwithstanding that many state based ICM initiatives are now 
subsumed or at least partially transformed by the more recent RNRM program discussed below.
Box 2.1: Overview of Integrated Catchment Management in Australia.
86 In some cases, catchment management has arisen through informal cooperative initiatives where local people have 
established catchment groups and committees independent of governments, but subsequently invited government 
representation as technical advisors. Carr A, Grass Roots and Green Tape (Federation Press, 2002) p 109; Stewart 
and Jones, n 73, p 145.
87 In addition to sustainability influences this approach emerged from an increasing recognition of ecosystem 
management, adaptive management and concerns about the lack o f a coordinated approach to resource degradation, 
and increasing expectations o f civil society participation in decision making approach; Ewing S, “Catchment 
Management Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation 
Press, 2003) p 393-395, 403; Bellamy J, Ross H, Ewing S, and Meppem T, Integrated catchment management: 
Learning from the Australian Experience fo r  the Murray-Darling Basin (CSIRO, 2002); Bellamy J, McDonald G, 
Syme G and Butterworth J, “Evaluating Integrated Resource Management” (1999) 12 Society and Natural Resources
337 at 339-341.
88 For similar experiments see Ewing, n 87, p 393; Margerum R, “Integrated Environmental Management: the 
Foundation for Successful Practice” (1999) 24(2) Environmental Management 151 at 157.
89 Ewing, n 87, p 394; Bellamy et al, n 87, p 5-6.
90 See for example Farrier D, “Fragmented Law in Fragmented Landscapes: the Slow Evolution of 
Integrated Natural Resource Management Legislation in NSW” (2002) 19(2) Environmental And Planning Law 
Journal 89 at 105.
91 See for example Curtis A and Lockwood M, “Landcare and Catchment Management in Australia: Lessons for 
state-sponsored Community Participation” (2000) 13 Society and Natural Resources 61.
92 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage, Coordinating Catchment 
Management: Report of the Inquiry into Catchment Management, (Cth, 2000) p viii; Bellamy et al, n 87, p 2-3; 
Margerum, n 88 at 157.
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LANDCARE
Around the same time as ICM was becoming popular, the federal government rolled out the 
National Landcare Program. This long running93 initiative originated in Victoria from the 
innovations of conservationists, farmers and government agents enlivened by rural 
development ideas such as public participation, self-help supported by change agents, and 
local community cooperation. The national program that subsequently emerged in 1989, was 
designed to be catalytic in nature and involve limited government funding ($360 million) for 
eduction and demonstration activities. The intention was to engage a significant proportion of 
the rural population to create more sustainable practices, instil stewardship ethics and produce 
more informed and skilled land managers.
In 1996-1997 the National Landcare Program expanded its focus to on ground work on 
private land where there were conservation benefits.94 It did so through increased program 
funding obtained under a new five year federal government program known as Natural 
Heritage Trust.95 This program was based around a $1.25 billion reserve from the partial sale 
of a national communications carrier96 and focused primarily97 on funding on-ground 
conservation works in addressing water, seas, coasts, sustainable agriculture, and natural 
resources management (for further see chapter 4).98
Under the Natural Heritage Trust, the Landcare program involved landholders working 
together in volunteer “Landcare groups” utilising government funding obtained through a 
competitive grants scheme for activities mostly on privately owned or leased land (but 
sometimes public land).99 This “landcare experience” has been reviewed extensively in 
resource management scholarship,100 rural development and sociology101 and there are well 
defined lessons relating to both its successes (such as enagaging a large cross section of the
93 The history of the NLP is now well documented in the literature, see for example Curtis A, “The Landcare 
Experience” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 447.
94 Curtis, n 93, p 443,446.
95 Natural Heritage Trust Act 1997 (Cth); Curtis, n 93, p 446; Crowley, n 76.
96 This was later expanded to $1.5 billion over six years; Curtis, n 93, p 454.
97 The monies invested in the NHT Reserve also provided funding for a National Land and Water Resources Audit 
that collected and collated data and information related to Australia's natural resources and their management. See 
http://www.nlwra.gov.au/ viewed 10 May 2008.
98 Section 3 o f the Natural Heritage Trust o f  Australia Act 1997 (Cth); Moore S, “Regional Delivery of Natural 
Resource Management in Australia: Is it democratic and does it matter?” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), 
Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 123.
"For example, education, farm and catchment planning, tree planting, and demonstrations and trials of new farming 
practices; Lockie S, “Collective Agency, Non-human Causality and Environmental Social Movements: A Case Study 
of the Australian ‘Landcare Movement’” (2004) 40(1) Journal o f Sociology 41 at 43-44; Curtis, n 93, p 446; Carr, n 
86, p 107.
1(10 Curtis and Lockwood, n 91, at 6; Curtis, n 93, p 446.
101 Higgins V and Lockie S, “Re-discovering the Social: Neoliberalism and Hybrid Practices o f Governing in Rural 
Natural Resource Management” (2002) 18 Journal o f Rural Studies 419 at 423; Lockie, n 99, at 43-44
102 See generally discussion and references in Curtis, n 93, p 452-453, 447, 449; Curtis and Lockwood n 91 at 63; 
Higgins and Lockie, n 101 at 423.
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rural community) and weaknesses (such as government cooption of landcare groups).102
Box 2.2: Overview of Landcare in Australia.
Since the introduction of ICM and Landcare, non government partners in both programs 
have remained active in the delivery of the more recent dual federal programs that comprise 
Regional Natrual Resource Management (RNRM).103 These programs are an extended, but 
adjusted, Natural Heritage Trust program and a new federal program known as the National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, both of which are examined in some detail in 
chapter 4. Together they involve the federal and state governments committing billions of 
dollars of public funding to the regional delivery of NRM through mulitstakeholder regional 
groups who have responsibilities for planning and adminsistering programs to achieve 
improvements in natural resource conditions.104
Brian Head, one of the leading scholars to focus on this RNRM program, has offered a 
largely explanatory theory of an emerging “new regional paradigm for NRM”.105 Drawing broad 
links between the emergence of RNRM and NEG developments in the USA,106 Head’s ideas are 
primarily underpinned by an early empirical analysis of RNRM ,107 his own extensive work on 
shifts in Australian governance,108 and a wider literature on collaborative partnerships.109 The 
“new regional paradigm” 110 is said to be characterised by at least six dimensions: multi­
stakeholder participation of NGOs, engagement of land-managers, ‘regions’ as biophysical 
catchments, mobilisation of biophysical and social sciences, monitoring and evaluation, and the 
formalisation of regional NRM planning bodies.111
103 Curtis, n 93, p 446-447.
104 Moore, n 98, p 121.
105 Head B and Ryan N, “Can Co-Governance Work? Regional Natural Resource Management In Queensland, 
Australia" International Symposium On Public Sector Management VIII, 31 March - 2 April 2004, Budapest, p 3-5; 
Head B, “The New Regional Governance Paradigm for NRM” (2004), Regnet Conference, Canberra 6-8 December 
2004; Head B, “Letting the Locals Lead” (2004) 122 ECOS magazine (CSIRO) 30 at 31.
106 See Head, n 85, p 139.
107 Head B, “Regional NRM Planning Arrangements: Evaluating Through the State Lens” in Bellamy J (ed), Regional 
Natural Resource Management Planning (DNRM/CSIRO, 2005); Head, n 85, p 138-139.
108 See for example Head B, “Corporatist Analysis” in Parkin A, Summers J and Woodward D (eds), Government, 
Politics, Power and Policy in Australia, (Longman, 1994); Head B and Bell S, “Understanding the Modem State” in 
Bell S and Head B (eds), State Economy and Public Policy in Australia (Oxford UP, 1994); Head B, ‘The Changing 
Role of the Public Service: Improving Service Delivery” (1999) 94 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1 at 2; 
Head B, “Governance” in Saunders P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and Influence Social Science and Public Policy in 
Australia (UNSW Press, 2005).
109 See for example Kemaghan K, “Partnership and Public Administration” (1993) 36(1) Canadian Public 
Administration 57.
110 Head, n 85, p 137; Head, n 105.
Head, n 107, p 19.
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Head and other RNRM commentators112 such as Lawrence and his collaborators,113 see the 
potential for the regional paradigm to be an effective approach to NRM governance while also 
recognising the significant challenges it faces, not least the tendency of centralised rule to 
undermine effective collaboration.114
Lawrence et a l115 develop their own ideas on regional environmental governance, and 
identify parallels between their work and that of Karkkainen.116 However the former’s ideas are 
rooted more in work on “regionalism” (which emphasises organisation to secure sustainable 
livelihoods at the regional level)117 and in the governmentality literature (which emphasises the 
emergence of a “neo-liberal” 118 state that rules indirectly by using and shaping individuals and 
communities).119 Drawing on these inspirations, Lawrence et al suggest that Australia is 
currently in a period of regional governance characterised by, inter alia, a bioregion focus for 
decision-making, state/community partnerships, and strategic state investment in RNRM.120
Beyond these and other more theoretical treatments of RNRM ,121 there has been a growing 
but as yet still limited body of academic empirical research into RNRM.122 This research has 
been conducted from many different angles and focused primarily on early planning efforts and 
representative structures in the unique state contexts of Victoria, Western Australia and South 
Australia,123 with some focus on a limited number of regions in Queensland.124
112 Lane M, “Critical issues in regional natural resource management”, Paper prepared for the Australian State of the 
Environment Committee 2006 (DEH, 2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/nrm- 
issues/pubs/nrm-issues.pdf viewed 20 May 2008.
113 Lawrence’s work is discussed below. See also other RNRM theories such as: Bellamy J, “Adaptive Governance: 
The Challenge for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Brown A and Bellamy J (eds), Federalism and 
Regionalism in Australia New Approaches, New Institutions? (ANU EPress, 2007) at 95, 108-109.
114 Head, n 85, p 137.
115 Lawrence G and Cheshire L, “Managing Nature: The Promises and Problems of Regional Environmental 
Governance in Australia” Plenary Address at the Ecopolitics XV Conference Environmental Governance: 
Transforming Regions and Localities, Macquarie University, Sydney 12-14, November 2004 at 13.
116 Lawrence G, “Promoting Sustainable Development: the Question of Governance” Plenary Address XI World 
Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim Norway, 25-30 July 2004 at 10.
117 See for example Lawrence G, “Sustainable Regional Development: Recovering Lost Ground” in Pritchard B, 
Curtis A, Spriggs J and Le Heron R (eds), Social Dimensions o f the Triple Bottom Line in Rural Australia (BRS, 
2003).
118 For a discussion on neoliberal political philosophy see Beeson M and Firth A, “Neoliberalism as a Political 
Rationality: Australia Public Policy Since the 1980s” (1998) 34(3) Journal of Sociology 215.
119 See for example Rose N, “The death of the social? Re-configuring the territory of government” (1996) 25(3) 
Economy and Society 327 at 334, 352; Rose N and Miller P, “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government” (1992) 43 (2) The British Journal of Sociology 173.
120 Everingham J, Cheshire L and Lawrence G, “Regional renaissance? New forms of governance in non-metropolitan 
Australia” (2006) 24(1) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 139; Lawrence, n 116 at 16.
121 See for example Lane discussing what he terms “civic regionalism”; Lane, n 112.
122 Whelan J and Oliver P, “Regional Community-Based Planning: The Challenge of Participatory Environmental 
Governance” (2005) 12 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 126 at 128; Moore, n 98, p 127-128.
123 Farrelly M, “Regionalisation of Environmental Management: a Case Study of the Natural Heritage Trust, South 
Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393; Moore S and Rockloff S, “Organizing Regionally for Natural 
Resource Management in Australia: Reflections on Agency and Government” (2006) 8(3) Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning 259; Patón S, Curtis A, McDonald G and Woods M, “Regional Natural Resource Management:
Is It Sustainable” (2004) 11 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 259.
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To summarise, while the Australian literature contains few identifiably cohesive lines of 
theory (compared to the USA literature), this collection of work is an emerging and promising 
field where empirical insights and diverse explanatory theories usefully provide a “different 
vantage point” from which to view some of the more spatially and institutional unique NEG 
experiments occurring around the world.
2.2.3 NEG Experiments and Scholarship in Europe
The final category of relevant NEG scholarship developed in Europe, with a particular 
focus at the level of the European Union (EU). Considerable attention has been paid to the so- 
called “soft law” approach (eg. open-ended guidelines and no formal sanctions) of the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) which is proving increasingly popular across a variety of areas 
of public policy as a means of accommodating the diverse governance approaches of member 
countries. In general terms, the OMC operates in pursuit of broad EU objectives using a 
decentralised system that respects the diversity and context of member countries by allowing 
them to set and pursue their own national/regional targets, but seeks to coordinate, discipline 
and take advantage of this diversity by requiring countries to conduct regular reporting, 
multilateral surveillance and exchanging and comparing best practice and performance.125 NEG 
at the EU level follows a similar approach which is generally characterised by increased 
flexibility in the setting of EU Community norms, and a “proceduralisation” of Community law 
that constrains the design of implementation processes by Member states, but does so in respect 
of increasingly open-ended environmental standards (as well as an increased role for multiple 
stakeholders in decision-making processes).126 Such characteristics are evident in environmental 
policy integration strategies,127 environmental assessment and framework directives (eg. water
5 128framework) and the collaborative “common implementation strategy”.
124 See for example Head and Ryan, n 105; Whelan and Oliver, n 122; Paton et al, n 123; McDonald G, Taylor B, 
McAlpine C and Vagg A, “Evaluating regional resource management plans” in Bellamy J (ed) Regional Natural 
Resource Management Planning: the Challenges o f Evaluation as Seen Through Different Lenses (DNRM/CSIRO, 
2005), chapter 3.
125 See Trubek D and Trubek L, “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open 
Method of Co-ordination” (2005) 11(3) European Law Journal 343 at 344; Scott J and Holder J, “Law and New 
Environmental Governance in the European Union” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in 
the EU and the US (Hart, 2006) p 212; Porte C, “Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising 
Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas” (2002) 8(1) European law journal 38 at 38
126 Scott J and Trubek D, “Mind the Gap” (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 1 at 3.
127 These seek to ensure the horizontal integration of environmental policy objectives into definitions and 
implementation of other areas of community policy in efforts to foster sustainable development; Lenschow A, “New 
Regulatory Approaches in ‘Greening’ EU Policies” (2002) 8(1) European law journal 19 at 19; Scott and Trubek, n 
126 at 5.
128 Scott and Holder, n 125, p 210, 213, 224; Sabel C and Zeitlin J, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture 
of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union” (2007) European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No C-07-
02 at 42-46 at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf viewed 10 May 2008.
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The emergence of NEG experiments within particular member states has also been 
discussed, including environmental agreements and environmental covenants between 
government and industrial groups/firms,129 and pollution control initiatives in the United 
Kingdom (UK).130
While many of these NEG experiments typically have their own unique, country specific 
history and influences (see, for example, the discussion below on the UK),131 much of the NEG 
scholarship characterises Europe’s NEG experiments as emerging from at least the following 3
factors:132
•an increasing distrust of ‘distant’ and faceless governmental institutions;133
•subsidiarity doctrines as an environmental policy principle and as a general principle of 
action within the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty;134 and
•increasingly complex and uncertain problems (e.g. transboundary environmental 
problems) on the Union’s agenda that do not allow for uniform solutions.135
Scholarship on the resulting NEG experiments has been led by authors such as Scott136 and 
Trubek who have focused on a range of new governance mechanisms and point to a number of 
dimensions that characterize these experiments, including greater participation by non 
government actors, power-sharing through collaborative style mutual problem solving, diversity 
and decentralisation, deliberation among stakeholders and experimentation.137
Other authors have drawn on a range of theories to conceptualise various NEG and wider 
new governance in EU. These theories include democratic experimentalism138and reflexive 
law.139 As with some NEG experiments in the USA, contractual ideas have also informed a
129 Orts E and Deketelaere K, “Introduction: Environmental Contracts and Regulatory Innovation” in Orts E and 
Deketelaere K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United 
States and Europe (Kluwer Law, 2001) p 5; Heritier A, “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy Making 
without Legislating?” (2002) 81 Political Science Series Institute for Advanced Studies 1 at 13-14.
130 Craig G, Taylor M and Parkes T, “Protest or Partnership? The Voluntary and Community Sectors in the Policy 
Process” (2004) 38(3) Social Policy and Administration 221 at 223.
131 Orts and Deketelaere, n 129, p 5; Scott and Trubek, n 126 at 6; Rauschmayer F, Wittmer H and Paavola J, “Multi­
level Governance of Natural Resources: Tools and Processes for Water and Biodiversity Governance in Europe”
(2007) UFZ-Discussion Paper 3/2007 -  GoverNat 1 at 5-6.
132 For other factors see Holzinger K, Knill C and Schafer A, “Rhetoric or Reality? The ‘New Governance’ in EU 
Environmental Policy” (2006) 12(3) European Law Journal 403 at 409; Scott and Trubek, n 126 at 6-8;
133 Scott and Trubek, n 126 at6-8; Lawrence, n 116 at 6.
134 Holzinger et al, n 132 at 409; Scott and Trubek, n 126 at6-8; Lawrence, n 116 at 6.
135 Scott and Trubek, n 126 at 6-8; Holzinger et al, n 132 at 409.
136 Scott and Holder, n 125 p 212.
137 Scott and Trubek, n 126 at 5-6; De Burca G and Scott J, “Introduction: New Governance, Law and 
Constitutionalism” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US, (Hart, 2006) p
3 defining relatively similar principles.
138 See for example Sabel and Zeitlin, n 128 at 3; Eberlein B and Kerwer D, “New Governance in the European 
Union: a Theoretical perspective” (2004) 42(1) JCMS 121 at 123, 131.
139 Orts, n 68 at 1233, 1339.
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discussion of EU environmental agreements and covenants.140 Others, drawing on economic 
analysis of private contract, suggest that status quo environmental regulation can be viewed as a 
“default rule” that regulated entities can elect to avoid by entering into contracts with regulators 
and/or beneficiaries.141 On an economic analysis of law, these contracts are seen to offer a 
number of potential efficiency benefits for regulation. For example, negotiations between a 
regulator and industry may provide a poorly informed agency with vital information about risks 
involved and techniques available to reduce them, which can be used to tailor the resulting 
regulation to the specific situation of the industry and thus “mimic” a market solution.142
In the UK context, some NEG scholarship has focused on the notion of “community” in 
governance. While international sustainability discourses and other trends have meant the 
resurgence of “community” is not entirely limited to governance in the UK,143 it took on a 
particular prominence here as a result of Anthony Giddens’ writings on “Third Way” politics.144 
Embraced by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Giddens’ “Third Way” is post socialist 
in nature, emphasising less national and central government, and greater local governance over 
local processes. 145 The subsequent range of community empowerment initiatives in 
environmental as well as wider social and welfare governance in UK have been the subject of 
extensive analysis by scholars such as Marilyn Taylor who has focused on, inter alia, the 
contribution of community governance, and conditions for achieving greater participation, 
representation, and sustainable collaboration.146
2.2.4 Summary
To sum-up the above discussion, the three groupings of NEG scholarship evidence a broad 
and diverse field containing many different terminologies and theoretical vantage points on
140 Holzinger et al, n 132; Orts and Deketelaere, n 129, p 8-10.
141 This discussion is based on contracts in USA but the principles are often similar. The status quo environmental 
regulation is conceptualised as a default rule, which regulated entities contract around with regulators and 
beneficiaries; Orts and Deketelaere, n 129, p 21; Johnston J, “The law and Economics of Environmental Contracts” in 
Orts E and Deketelaere K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the 
United States and Europe (Kluwer Law 2001) p 286; Karkkainen, n 79, p 294.
142 Faure M, “ Environmental Contracts: a Flemish Law and Economics Perspective” in E Orts and K Deketelaere 
(eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in United States and Europe 
(Kluwer Law International, London) p 168; Orts and Deketelaere, n 129, p 8-9; c.f. Farrier, n 13 at 342 (discussing 
weaknesses in “contractual agreements” in the context of voluntary government programs in the USA for the 
conservation of biodiversity, suggesting these have the disadvantages associated with command and control, 
including landholder hostility and enforcement problems).
143 Reddel T, ‘Third Way Social Governance: Where is the State?” (2004) 39(2) Australian Journal of Social Issues 
129; Moore, n 98.
144 Giddens A, The Third Way and its Critics (Polity, 2000) p 5.
145 Basically seeking to avoid the excess of individualism of the market and the excessive collectivism of the state by 
combining social solidarity with a dynamic economy. It also seeks to open out to the international community; 
Giddens, n 144, p 5; Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave, 2003) p 2.
146 Taylor, n 145, p 2, 9-11; Craig et al, n 130 at 223; Taylor M, Wilson M, Purdue D and Wilde P, Changing 
Neighbourhoods Lessons from the JRF Neighbourhood Program (Policy Press, 2007) p 76.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
45
NEG developments. Some NEG scholarship is more idealised or normative, such as democratic
experimentalism or collaborative governance respectively.147 Others are more explanatory, such
as the “new regional paradigm” or “collaborative ecosystem governance”.148 While there are
some predominantly empirical focused lines of research (eg. collaborative NRM, ICM), there is
also a great diversity of theoretical roots that animate NEG thinking, ranging from pragmatism
149to governmentality. There also appears to be the beginning of an integration of NEG 
scholarship, with some versions of US theories such as Karkkainen’s and his colleagues’ work 
being drawn on in both Australian and European NEG scholarship.
Such nascent integration is arguably attributable to the fact that despite extensive variation, 
at a broad level there are some characteristics that are common across many NEG experiments 
and theories. These commonalities form the focus of the next section.150
2.3 The Defining Elements of NEG
Having introduced a number of the key NEG theories, this section builds on emerging 
meta-analysis in new governance scholarship. It identifies some of the characteristics common 
to NEG that define it as a unique approach to governing environmental problems when 
compared with more conventional governance mechanisms. Focusing on each characteristic, the 
discussion builds on the above overview to point to some key points of theoretical divergence 
and convergence under each of these broad characteristics. Concise attention is also given to 
general normative claims attached to each defining characteristic as to why it offers advantages 
over traditional approaches and fosters a “good” way of governing environmental problems.151
2.3.1 Defining Characteristics of NEG
The concept and features of new governance are still at early stage of analysis. However, 
in general, new governance is identified as encompassing a cluster of criteria that researchers 
internationally regard as necessary to counter the perceived pathologies of conventional forms 
of environmental regulation.152 For the purposes of this thesis, some of the most crucial
147 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496.
148 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496.
149 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496; Lobel, n 2 at 499-501.
150 See for example discussions and clarifications in: Lobel, n 67 at 371-404; Lobel, n 2 at 499-501; Karkkainen, n 1 
at 472,496; De Burca and Scott, n 137, p 3.
151 Karkkainen, n 1 at 496.
152 Some common characteristics cited by Karkkainen (Karkkainen, n 1 at 473-474) include “collaborative, multi­
party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving” unpinned by aspirations to be more “open-textured, participatory, 
bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and pragmatic...and adaptive”. Others such as Lobel 
have argued that new governance is characterised by 8 clusters of approaches, namely “Participation and Partnership, 
Collaboration, Diversity and Competition, Decentralization and Subsidiarity, Integration of Policy Domains,
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characteristics of new governance include (i) collaboration; (ii) participatory and deliberative 
aspirations; (iii) adaptability and learning; and (iv) “new” forms of accountability.153
2.3.1.1 Collaboration
Most NEG experiments and theories share a commitment to some form of “collaborative” 
processes between multiple stakeholders.154 The precise nature of these collaborative processes 
can vary across experiments and theories. For example, some collaborative processes are largely 
“once-off” events, where agencies formally negotiate with representatives from clearly defined 
public interest groups over terms of a proposed regulation.155 However the term collaboration is 
also used to refer to ongoing cooperative relationships that involve mixes of higher-level 
agencies and local level actors actively negotiating rules, implementing activities and 
monitoring natural resources over the longer term .156
Despite this variation, it is common in the NEG literature to associate collaborative 
arrangements with "consensus" processes that seek to move towards some agreement among 
parties.157 Closely related notions of partnerships158 and cooperation159 sometimes also describe 
collaboration. Other NEG theories offer more specific definitions of “collaboration”. 160 For 
example, many authors in collaborative NRM and RNRM literature161 have drawn on 
organisational theorist Barbara Gray’s definition of collaboration to define it as a process where
Flexibility and Noncoerciveness (or Softness-in-Law), Fallibility, Adaptability, and Dynamic Learning, Law as 
Competence and Orchestration” (Lobel, n 67 at 371-404). See also Gunningham (defining new governance as 
“participatory dialogue and deliberation, devolved decision-making, flexibility rather than uniformity, inclusiveness, 
transparency, institutionalised consensus-building practices, and a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy” (Gunningham 
N, “The New Collaborative Environmental Governance” (2007) Paper for the International Meeting on Law and 
Society in the 21 Century, Humboldt University, Berlin, 25-28 July 2007).
153 Unlike the other characteristics of “good” NEG, the feature of “new” forms of accountability has not specifically 
been raised in any meta-analysis of new governance thus far. Nevertheless, this feature arguably warrants inclusion as 
a common characteristic of NEG, both because it is an explicit feature of some individual NEG theories and, as 
discussed below, “new” forms o f accountability are recognised as central to NEG’s unique approach to governing.
See for example Lawrence, n 116 at 17-18; Freeman, n 5 at 30; Freeman, n 48 at 664-666; Lane, n 112 at 4-5.
154 See Karkkainen, n 1 at 473; Lobel, n 67 at 376-379.
155 Coglianese G, “Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy” in Orts E and Deketelaere K (eds), 
Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe 
(Kluwer, 2001) p 93, 96; Karkkainen, n 17 at fn 116; Freeman, n 5 at 33-55.
156 Karkkainen, n 17 at 222-225; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16 p 71-73,117.
157 O’Malley R and Janetos A, “Consensus on Consensus?” (2004) 46(6) Environment 11 at 11-12; Karkkainen, n 17 
at 240; Stewart and Jones, n 73, p 12.
158 Terminology such as partnership and cooperation are sometimes used interchangeably with, but other times 
distinguished from, the term collaboration. See for example Whelan and Oliver, n 122 at 129; For a review of 
literature on partnerships see for example Brinkerhoff J, “Government-non-profit partnership: a defining framework” 
(2002) 22 Public Administration and Development 19.
159 See for example Ostrom E, Governing the Commons (Cambridge UP, 1990).
160 See for example Head who uses Kemaghan’s work on partnerships to distinguish various collaborative processes. 
In this definition, “genuine collaborative partnerships” refers to a robust relationship where each party shares in 
decision making power, gives up some autonomy, becomes mutually dependent and contributed resources; See 
Kemaghan, n 109; Head, n 85, p 138.
161 See for example: Whelan and Oliver, n 122 at 129; Koontz et al, n 21, at 6-9; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16 at 16-
17.
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two or more stakeholders pool appreciations, and/or tangible resources, (e.g. information, 
money, labour etc), to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.162
However one defines the process, at a broad level collaboration is seen to offer a range of 
benefits over traditional regulatory approaches, particularly when facing intractable, volatile, 
diverse and complex problems (e.g. “second-generation” environmental issues).163 These 
benefits are outlined in Box 2.3 below.
BENEFITS OF COLLABORATION
As discussed in chapter 1, both command and control (CAC) and market based instruments (MBIs) are 
perceived to be largely unsuited to dealing with complex issues. For example, the CAC approach can 
allow many complex problems to “fall through the cracks” between different tiers o f government or 
different government agencies which allocate jurisdictional responsibility along ecologically uninformed, 
human-defined boundaries.164 MBIs face their own application limits due to difficulty in identifying 
tradable units when dealing with complex problems like habitat loss or biodiversity. Both also place a 
heavy and arguably unattainable demand on centralised knowledge to set suitable standards or caps/taxes. 
In contrast, NEG’s collaborative arrangements are seen to avoid or overcome many o f these issues, as 
well as offer additional benefits, including:
•contributing to a rich understanding of and capacity to solve complex problems by harnessing the 
unique information, resources and capacities o f diverse public and private actors;165 
•fostering more integrative and adaptive approaches to planning and implementation by bringing together 
agencies and stakeholders who are close to the problem;166 
•reducing existing conflict, enhancing ownership and thus increasing cooperation in implementation by 
contributing to the formation o f some form of consensus among parties regarding the problem being 
faced and the solutions;167 and 
•enhancing democracy by allowing citizens and other non-government actors to interact and work 
together cooperatively, build social capital and/or promote civic behaviour.168 
Box 2.3: The Benefits of Collaborative Governance.
162 Gray B, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems (Jossey-Bass, 1989) p 10; Gray B, 
“Conditions Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration” Human Relations 38 (1985) 912 at 912
163 These types of problems have sometimes been characterised as problems of failed collaboration, in which mutual 
gains are available, but different parties are unable to come to terms in a way that captures those gains. Collaborative 
processes are accordingly seen to provide one way to address these problems by offering a more effective 
arrangement for collective choice. Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 323-324; Head, n 85, p 138.
164 VEPA, Annual Report 2001-2002 (Publication 870, VEPA, 2002) p 35.
165 Karkkainen, n 9 at 228-229; Coglianese, n 155, p 102-105; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16 for why collaboration in 
NRM can produce better decisions.
166 See discussions in Karkkainen, n 17; Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and Matlock M, 
“Conclusions and Recommendations” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M 
(eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 286- 
287; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 877; Morrison T, McDonald G and Lane M “Integrating Natural Resource 
Management for Better Environmental Outcomes” (2004) 35(3) Australian Geographer 243 at 248; ; Karkkainen, n 9 
at 228-229.
167 See for example Coglianese, n 155, p 98-102; Karkkainen, n 9 at 228-229.
168 See Fung and Wright, n 27, p 15; Lubell et al, n 166, p 286-287.
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2.3.1.2 Participatory and Deliberative Aspirations
The participatory and deliberative aspirations that characterise many new governance 
experiments and theories are intertwined with ideas of enhancing “democracy”.169 Certainly, 
some NEG reforms are more radical in their democratic visions,170 and are more “participatory” 
171 and “deliberative” than others.172 Variations are also evident in where participation of non­
government actors actually occurs, some focusing on local citizens and others on international 
NGOs.173 Styles of deliberative decision-making also vary,174 often following either deliberative 
democracy ideals175 or negotiation (as favoured by civic republicanism176 or dispute resolution 
theory).177
One of the most common vehicles for realising these various participatory and deliberative 
aspirations in NEG is the multistakeholder collaborative group, which aspires to provide a 
framework for participation by non-government actors, and an opportunity for them to engage 
in decision-making.178 Fulfilling the ideal of a more participatory and deliberative approach to 
governance typically sees groups applying and following some form of procedural criteria, such 
as participation that is inclusive and/or representative of affected interests,179 and decision 
making that adheres to conditions laid out by deliberative ideals (discussed further below).
As Box 2.4 illustrates below, there are a number of normative arguments for why the 
participatory and deliberative aspirations of NEG may better contribute to the central ideals of
169 Karkkainen, n 1 at 473, 474; Mansbridge, n 28, p 299.
170 Fung and Wright, n 27; Cohen and Rogers, n 28.
171 For a discussion of different sorts of “participation” in NEG and wider literatures see for example: Collaborative 
Democracy Network, “A Call to Scholars and Teachers of Public Administration, Public Policy, Planning, Political 
Science, and Related Fields” (2006) December Public Administration Review 168 at 168; Fung A, “Varieties of 
Participation in Complex Governance” (2006) December Public Administration Review 66 at 67; Ross, H, Buchy M 
and Proctor W, “Laying Down the Ladder: a Typology of Public Participation in Australian Natural Resource 
Management” (2002) 9 December Australian Journal of Environmental Management 205 at 205.
172 For example, some reflexive law variants arguably overlook “wider” participation (beyond regulated entities), and 
pay little attention to ideals of democracy and discourse (See Gaines, n 67 at 23-24) c.f. Orts, n 68 at 1336). In 
distinct contrast, democratic experimentalist theory extends Dewyian ideas on publics as a model for wide ranging 
participation and expansive systems of deliberation (see for example Fung and Wright n 27).
173 See for example Lobel, n 67 at 371-376.
174 Some strands of democratic experimentalist theory appear to emphasise deliberative concepts that draw on 
pragmatist theory; Dorf and Sabel, n 20 at 284; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 693-694, 696.
175 See for example Fung and Wright, n 27, p 15, 17-20, fn 16; Scott and Holder, n 125, p 218; Moore, n 98, p 130.
176 See for example Freeman, n 5 at 82; Shutkin, n 53, p 28.
177 See for example John, n 9, p 235-236.
178 My analysis and ideas on these three criteria draw on somewhat similar analysis in Trachtenberg Z and Focht W, 
“Legitimacy and Watershed Collaborations: The Role of Public Participation” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, 
Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed 
Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005); Leach W, “Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from 
Western Watershed Partnerships” (2006) December Public Administration Review 100 at 100-104.
179 Note also that consultation or other forms of soliciting views of affected interests may also act as way to ensure 
fair consideration of stakeholders concerns; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 60-61.
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dem ocratic p o litics (eg. in volvem ent o f  citizenry and politica l con sensu s) than traditional 
m ethods o f  regu lation .18
BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION AND DELIBERATION
Rather than rely on representative democracy, technocratic bureaucracies and participation through 
“notice and comment” or consultation, participatory and deliberative features of NEG seek to ensure 
citizens and non-governmental interests obtain greater control and power over issues that are important to 
them and the public.181
As such, NEG may offer a path that (i) better fosters the political development of individuals through 
their engagement in governance;182 (ii) enhances autonomy by focusing on participation in determining 
the structure of law;183 and (ii) improves equity by allowing marginalised citizens or groups to participate 
more directly in decisions that affect their lives.184
NEG’s participatory and deliberative aspirations are also seen to have effectiveness benefits over 
traditional approaches. For example, participation of citizens and other non-government stakeholders can 
readily secure the use of local and contextualised knowledge in seeking to understand a problem and 
develop a solution. Such knowledge is often missing from centralised decision-making associated with 
CAC and MBI approaches, but is vital to handling environmental issues185 and to providing better 
feedback on decisions.186
Deliberation can also arguably foster better use and disclosure of unique information through the use of 
“voice” in face to face deliberative discussion, producing innovative ideas and allowing alternative 
solutions to be considered more deeply (as opposed to science in CAC or price, competition and the 
efforts of professionals in markets).187 Participation and deliberation may also have instrumental value 
when compared to more coercive approaches such as CAC because they can contribute to ideals of 
fairness in decision-making process, increase the acceptability of decision outcomes and thus reduce the 
costs of enforcing compliance.188
Box 2.4: The Benefits of Participation and Deliberation.
180 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 3.
181 See generally Amstein S, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (1969) 35 American Institute of Planners 216 at 217; 
For a recent discussion, advancements and critiques see Ross et al, n 171 at 205; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 3.
182 See for example: Dorf and Sabel, n 20 at 288-289; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 29; Landy and Rubin, n 54 p 1; John, 
n 9, p 247.
183 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 179, p 55.
184 Lane, n 74 at 284; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 3 26; Fung A, “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight 
Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences” (2003) 11(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 338 at 342.
185 Lawrence and Cheshire, n 115 at 13; Taylor, n 145 p 9-11. Ribot J, Democratic Decentralization o f Natural 
Resources: Institutionalising Popular Participation (World Resources Institute, 2002) p 4-5, fn 10.
186 Lane, n 74 at 284; Ribot, n 185, p 4-5; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 25-26; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691; Freeman, n
5 at 27.
187 Fung A, Empowered Participation Reinventing Urban Democracy (Princeton UP, 2004) at 10.
188 See for example Trachtenberg and Focht, n 179, p 55; Parkinson J, “Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative 
Democracy” (2003)51 Political Studies 180 at 182-183.
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2.3.1.3 Learning and Adaptation
The third characteristic common to many NEG theories is learning and adaptation. These 
features seek to ensure that NEG can grapple with the well-recognised uncertainties and 
dynamic nature that characterise many environmental problems.189
The terms learning and adaptation have been variously defined, and the degree to which 
they have been emphasised in NEG theory does vary.190 However three of the more prominent 
forms of NEG learning and adaptation emerge from the distinct rationales of “adaptive 
management” 191 “pragmatism” 192 and “reflexive law”.193
The adaptive management concept194 is evident across a range of NEG theories, 
particularly those focused on NRM problems.195 However, while the original idea of adaptation 
proposed by its founder CS Holling was focused on specific ecosystem situations and “active” 
scientific hypothesis testing in the field, the concept has since been applied more broadly to 
policy processes.196 It can also take a more “passive” form, involving less focus on active testing 
and more on heightened monitoring of key indicators and subsequent adjustments in policies in 
light of what may be learned.197
As noted above, adaptive management shares similarities with pragmatist thinker John 
Dewey’s “experimental method”. 198 As applied by NEG theories199 such as democratic 
experimentalism, pragmatism necessitates an approach to governing that involves adaptation
189 As Ruhl has generally pointed out “it is almost universally the case that advocates of regulatory innovations also 
advance the method of implementation known generally as adaptive management (Ruhl J, “Regulation by Adaptive 
Management—Is It Possible?” (2005) 7 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech 21 at 28); Karkkainen, n 43 at 959-960; Freeman, n 5 
at 28-29.
190 Learning for example can range across social, technical and policy perspectives. See: Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 
883-888; Lobel, n 67, 395, 399. Fiorino, n 21 at fn 80, 81.
191 Holling, n 46; Lee, n 46; Walters, n 46.
192 Dewey, n 32, p 113-114; Karkkainen, n 43 at 957-960.
193 Orts, n 68 at 1254.
194 Recently, Holling and his colleagues have focused on adaptive change cycle and what they term Panarchy 
involving a continuous loop or cycle that involves four phases of exploitation, conservation, release, and 
reorganization; Gunderson L, Holling C and Peterson G, “Surprises and Sustainability: Cycles of Renewal in the 
Everglades” in Gunderson H and Holling S (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural 
Systems (Island Press, 2001) p 327; Holling C and Gunderson L “Resilience and Adaptive cycles” in Gunderson H 
and Holling S (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Island Press, 2001) 
p 327 p 34; Karkkainen B, “Panarchy And Adaptive Change: Around The Loop And Back Again“ (2005) 7 
Minnesota Journal o f Law, Science & Technology 59 at 62.
195 See for example Bellamy J, “Adaptive Governance: The Challenge for Regional Natural Resource Management” 
in Brown A and Bellamy J (eds), Federalism and Regionalism in Australia New Approaches, New Institutions? 
(ANU EPress, 2007) at 95, 108-109; Karkkainen, n 43 at 948-965.
196 Dovers, n 46, p 4; Karkkainen, n 194 at 73-77.
197 Karkkainen, n 194 at 70-72.
198 Dewey, n 32, p 113-114; Karkkainen, n 43 at 956-960.
199 See also Shapiro, n 51 at 742-748; Farber D, “Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism and the 
Environmental Prospect” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 851.
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and learning by “local” problem solving groups, as well as a style of “systemic learning”.200 
That is, the sharing of information and innovations between local collaborations that follow 
“experimental”/“adaptive management” methods201 and the continual adaptation of explicitly 
provisional government policy determinations (see Table 2.2 above for further details on this 
form of learning).202
The third and final line of learning and adaptation in NEG arises from ideas of reflexive 
law.203 As Eric Ort’s theory of reflexive environmental law illustrates, reflexive approaches seek 
to use law to set up processes that encourage institutional self-reflective thinking and learning 
about environmental effects.204
This approach hinges around encouraging regulated actors, such as industry, to take greater 
internal responsibility by requiring it to follow a systematic approach of identifying significant 
environmental aspects of its activities, setting objects and targets, establishing a management 
program, developing procedures for achieving the targets, and arranging monitoring techniques 
to ensure that they are reached.203 By systematically examining its environmental impact and 
means of reducing it, the learning and adaptability intent is that these processes will stimulate a 
routine and methodical search within the organization for environmental impacts that fall 
outside of current regulation.206 Motivated by benefits that resolving such impacts may deliver 
(eg. cost savings), industry will ideally adapt its operations and management systems and pursue 
continuous improvement.
While these three approaches are all clearly different,208 normatively, they all claim to offer 
an alternative and potentially better approach than conventional regulation for recognising and 
dealing with the inevitability of change and the dynamism that characterise environmental 
problems. These benefits are briefly outlined in Box 2.5 below.
200 Karkkainen, n 17 at 243.
201 Such “systemic” learning has also been recognised outside of the pragmatist paradigm. See for example: Paton et 
al, n 123 at 262.
202 This is facilitated at the macro-institutional scale where information is to flow from local to centre and back again 
via a central monitoring and information pooling and linkages among local collaboration and that allow local groups 
to learn from one another, and foster periodic revision of minimum standards, targets and measures; Karkkainen, n 17 
at 243; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691; Karkkainen, n 1 at 484.
203 Orts, n 68 at 1254; See also Gaines, n 67 at 23.
204 Orts, n 68 at 1253-1254.
205 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78 at 180; Fiorino D, “Flexibility” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O’Leary R (eds), 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 415.
21,6 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78 at 180, Fiorino, n 205, p 415.
2,17 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78 at 180, Fiorino, n 205, p 415.
208 For a discussion of differences between reflexive law and pragmatism see Karkkainen, n 1 at 484.
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BENEFITS OF LEARNING AND ADAPTATION
All three approaches to learning and adaptation share a number of key characteristics that 
arguably assist NEG to deal with dynamic environmental issues in a more effective manner than 
traditional approaches. Not least, all three learning approaches reduce, to different extents, the 
over-reliance on panoptic knowledge characteristic of CAC and MBIs, by developing 
alternative infrastructures to "learn" more easily from changing circumstances “on the 
ground".209
For example, reflexive law attempts to employ regulation to engender learning and problem 
solving primarily at the level of the regulated entities (unlike most markets or command and 
control approaches that rely on scientific learning about the environment).210
The provisionality, continuous monitoring and adaptation common to adaptive management and 
pragmatism is similarly claimed to be better suited to dealing with the complex, multifaceted, 
and dynamic nature of environmental and ecosystem problems than either CAC (which is 
particularly ossified in nature)211 or MBIs (where significant post-hoc program corrections to 
pollution levels and permits set from the centre becomes very difficult without undermining the 
security of ownership rights on which the market itself depends).212
Further, the systemic learning central to the pragmatist inspired experimentalist vision is 
claimed to have greater capacity than MBIs or CAC to continually enhance the performance of
regulatory regimes by diffusing innovation and developing the capacities of individuals, groups
213and the system to solve problems.
Box 2.5: The Benefits of Learning and Adaptation in Governance.
2.3.1.4 “New” Forms of Accountability
From the perspective of this thesis, a final defining feature of “good” NEG is “new” forms 
of accountability. The term “new” is used to distinguish accountability in NEG from 
conventional concepts and means of accountability as used in public law literature and 
traditional regulatory scholarship. Accountability was narrowly drawn and chiefly focused on 
elected officials and their appointees being accountable to citizens for governmental 
performance.214 Central to this discussion was the concept of “principal/agent accountability”.215
209 Orts, n 68 at 1238.
2,0 Orts, n 68 at 1253-1254.
211 Orts, n 68 at 1238.
212 Sabel et al, n 4 at 3.
213 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 21-22; Sturm S, “Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning” in De Burca 
G and Scott J (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 326-327; Freeman, n 5 
at 28-29.
214 Posner P, “Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government” in Salamon L (ed), The Tools o f Government a 
Guide to the New Governance (Oxford UP, 2002) p 524; May P, “Regulatory Regimes and Accountability” (2007) 1
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This understanding emphasises a formal, largely hierarchical relationship within which a 
person, body or forum (eg. law making sovereign) confers on another actor (eg. agency) 
responsibility for the performance of particular tasks, with a duty to explain and justify their 
actions.216 If an actor shirks or abuses such responsibilities, they may accordingly face
217consequences via legal or administrative mechanism (eg. judicial review).
In NEG scholarship, as well as in other areas of regulation, administration and 
governance,218 these traditional concepts have increasingly been supplemented and/or altered by 
“new” understandings, formations and mechanisms of accountability that seek to make NEG 
institutions responsive to their various publics and associated expectations of performance.219
One of the primary reasons for these developments has been the need to address and
account for the increased involvement and collaboration of multiple public, private and non-
220government actors in NEG’s approach to environmental governance.
Indeed, a narrow assumption of a single principal with well-defined preferences is 
arguably too simplistic to capture the dynamic of multiple principals and preferences in a 
multiagency, multistakeholder NEG collaboration.221 Further, rather than a solely hierarchical 
relationship, accountability in a collaborative group may take on various horizontal forms (such 
as mutual accountability between collaborators who check each others behaviour) as well as
downward relationships (such as stakeholders being accountable to their respective sectors or
222groups).
Relying purely on traditional mechanisms of accountability in NEG processes is also 
claimed to be largely incapable of capitalising upon, and may even be detrimental to, the 
contributions of non government actors and multiagency collaborations that are central to 
NEG.223 Further, traditional accountability approaches that typically constrain the discretion of
Regulation & Governance 8 at 11; Freeman, n 5 at fn 5; Scott C, “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 
27(1) Journal of Law and Society 38 at 40-41.
215 Sabel C and Simon W, “Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 398-399.
216 Stewart and Jones, n 73, p 123; Scott, n 214 at 40; Bovens M, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A 
Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 447 at 450.
217 Bovens, n 216 at 450.
218 Posner, n 214, p 524-528; Scott, n 214 at 39; Braithwaite J, “Accountability and Governance Under the New 
Regulatory State” (1999) 58(1) Australasian Journal of Public Administration 90.
219 Freeman, n 5 at 96; Posner, n 214, p 524; May, n 214 at 11; Stewart and Jones, n 73, at 123.
220 Of course private actors have long played a role in governance. See: Freeman, n 48 at 547.
221 Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 904.
222 See also discussions of alternative “separation of power” doctrine that seeks to account for the role of private 
actors in governance: see Braithwaite, n 218 at 91; Karkkainen et al, n 24.
223 Freeman, n 48 at 575; Fisher E, “The European Union in the Age of Accountability” 2004 (24) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 495 at 497.
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actors may lack the necessarily flexibility for incremental and provisional decision making 
central to NEG’s approach of adaptation and learning.224
Accordingly, some authors have proposed extensive reforms to traditional political, 
administrative and legal forms of accountability, such as replacing principal agent relationships 
with mutual accountability and so called “peer review” process. 225 Others suggest that 
traditional mechanisms should be supplemented with a variety of “new” approaches to 
accountability in which there is greater deference to agency and stakeholder decision making.226 
For instance, statutes that announce general goals without dictating the means of achieving them 
are often recommended as a means to afford agencies and stakeholders the latitude and 
discretion to devise more locally tailored and innovative solutions.227 Beyond a focus on 
discretion, authors have proposed that accountability can be ensured through a range of “new” 
mechanisms of accountability in which private actors and institutions play more active roles. 
For example, the use of contractual agreements;228 horizontal “mutual” accountability between
9 9 0  9 ^ n  •collaborators; “professional” accountability of firms; third-party certification or internal 
procedural rules for industry.231
One important distinction in how these “new” approaches and forms of accountability are 
applied in NEG relates to experiments that focus on accountability through process based 
approaches and those that emphasise accountability based on performance. While these two 
approaches are not mutually exclusive, for heuristic purposes, it is helpful to treat them 
separately.
For process based approaches, such as aspired to by some reflexive schools of thought, 
accountability tends to be focused exclusively on ensuring regulated entities are accountable for 
developing and following processes (eg. management systems) rather than achieving particular 
performance goals.232 Important here is industry’s professional accountability (derived from 
“internalised” sources based on professional norms), third-party certification of systems and 
independent audit.233
224 Freeman, n 48 at 575; Fisher, n 223 at 497.
225 See Sabel and Simon, n 215, p 400; Freeman, n 5 at 2, 96; Dorf and Sabel, n 20 at 288, 389-390.
226 Freeman, n 5 at 2, 96; Posner, n 214, p 524; May, n 214 at 11.
227 Freeman, n 5 at 92-94; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 241; Karkkainen, n 43 at 963.
228 Freeman, n 22 at 198-201, 207.
229 Weber, n 70 at 453; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 238; Lobel, n 67 at 378, 432; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 
905-906, 908.
230 May, n 214 at 12.
231 Freeman, n 48 at 665; Freeman, n 22 at 198-201; Weber, n 70 at 455; Freeman, n 5 at 22, 96.
232 Fiorino, n 205 at 413-416; May, n 214 at 11.
233 Freeman, n 5 at 30, 96; May, n 214 at 11,13.
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For many other NEG theories, accountability is sought through the setting of performance 
standards or through outcome orientated statutes (as discussed above) 234 which give 
collaborators and regulated actors flexibility in deciding how to achieve those outcomes.235 Here 
a variety of “new” forms of accountability may be employed.236 These typically rest on self 
monitoring and reporting of the collaborative group regarding adherence to goals, and may 
include accountability to an oversight agency, horizontal mutual accountability between the 
collaborators, different forms of government or third party/public oversight of the collaborative 
group, as well as accountability of public and private collaborators back to their own groups or 
agencies.237
Regardless of whether “new” forms of accountability are applied in a process or 
performance based approach, they are seen by a number of NEG authors to have key normative 
benefits over traditional mechanism and approaches to account giving (See Box 2.6).
BENEFITS OF “NEW” FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
At one level, the benefits of “new” forms of accountability are partially inherent.238 That 
is, seeking to ensure accountability in any governance approach is seen to be vital to “good” 
governance per se, not least because it can control the abuse of public authority, ensure that 
public resources are used appropriately, and secure performance expectations of governance 
endeavours.239 However, the specific advantage of these “new”, as opposed to traditional, forms 
of accountability is that cooperative frameworks and new horizontal networks may enhance and 
expand accountability, while reducing government expenditure by mobilising others in 
monitoring and enforcement roles.240 Further, they potentially permit NEG to benefit from the 
unique contributions made by citizens and stakeholders through collaboration, participation, 
adaptation and learning, while still ensuring public and non government actors meet 
performance expectations and do not collude to undermine wider societal and environmental 
standards.241
234 Freeman, n 5 at 92-94; Doremus H, “Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional 
Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection” (2001) 41 Washburn L.J. 50 at 87- 88.
235 Steinzor R, “The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10909 at page
15 of “p d f’.
236 Perhaps the broadest and boldest vision of accountability in a performance based regime arises from one strand of 
democratic experimentalist theory. See Karkkainen, n 79, p 296, 298.
237 See for example Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 238-244; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 905, 906; Freeman, n 5 at
22.
238 Posner, n 214, p 524; May, n 214 at 11; Bovens, n 216 at 462.
239 Bovens, n 216 at 463-464; May, n 214 at 11; Head B, “Governance” in Saunders P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and 
Influence Social Science and Public Policy in Australia (UNSW Press, 2005) p 48, 54-56.
240 Weber, n 70 at 458.
241 Freeman, n 5 at 31, 83-87; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 893-894; Homstein D, “Complexity Theory, Adaptation 
and Administrative Law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913 at 949, fn 197; Doremus, n 234 at 52, 88; Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, n 16 p 252; Karkkainen, n 43 at 963.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
56
Box 2.6: The Benefits of “New” Forms of Accountability.
2.3.2 Summary
The above discussion has focused on the characteristics of NEG that are common to all or 
most such experiments and theories. It does not however, purport to provide a definitive picture 
of what NEG ‘is’ or can be. New governance is still an emerging and evolving field and its key 
tenets will no doubt be subject to further refinement.242 Even so, from the perspective of this 
study, the four groupings of approaches discussed above are arguably the most central and 
defining features of NEG as an approach to governing the environment.
Rather than top down, centralised, government exclusive approaches backed by 
representative democracy common to CAC, or MBI’s decentralised system involving 
competition, price mechanisms, and fungible commodities, NEG’s unique approach to 
governing the environment relies on broad processes of collaboration, participation, 
deliberation, learning, adaptation and “new” forms of accountability.
As I have pointed out, there are some specific variations and/or debates within NEG 
scholarship regarding all these broad features. However each stands as a key pillar in NEG’s 
response to the recognised shortcomings of the orthodoxies of CAC and MBIs.243 Indeed, the 
collective normative claims made about each of NEG's four approaches broadly suggest that 
NEG offers a “new” vision for “good” environmental governance that can deliver effectiveness, 
legitimacy and democratic benefits largely beyond the reach of either MBIs or CAC.
Yet, despite generating much hype as to its potential as an effective alternative to 
traditional approaches to regulation, there has been surprisingly little investigation of whether or 
to what extent NEG institutions actually provide these benefits in practice.244 This has given rise 
to many disagreements about the impacts and effectiveness of NEG,245left some key theories 
vulnerable to criticism246 and left far more questions than answers regarding the real world 
conditions needed for successfully designing and implementing NEG as an approach to 
governing environmental problems.247 Some of these key debates and questions are discussed in 
the following section regarding each of NEG’s broad defining approaches to governing.248
242 Lobel, n 2 at 501.
243 Lobel, n 2 at 502.
244 Karkkainen, n 17 at 233; Lobel, n 2 at 499-509.
245 See overview in Koontz T and Thomas C, “What Do We Know and Need to Know About the Environmental 
Outcomes of Collaborative Management” (2006) December Public Administration Review 111 at 113.
246 See for example questions raised regarding strands of democratic experimentalism, civic environmentalism and 
collaborative governance theories in Steinzor, n 235 at p 21-22 of “pdf’; See also contributions in “Beyond Backyard 
Environmentalism” (1999) October/November Boston Review 1.
247 Lobel, n 2 at 499-503.
248 Karkkainen, n 17, at 233; Lobel, n 2 at 499-509.
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2.4 NEG Questions and Debates
This section focuses on each of the four groupings of approaches characteristic of 
NEG249and extricates some of the associated debates and specific unanswered questions in the 
NEG literature regarding the conditions under which each may be successfully realized in 
practice. These questions and debates form the framework and focus for the remainder of this 
study.250
2.4.1 When and how can NEG achieve successful collaboration?
Questions and debates regarding NEG’s collaborative approach to governing arise from 
many different angles. Some relate to issues of power relations and differences in capacities 
between collaborative parties.251 These are important concerns, but for present purposes they are 
seen to be more relevant to the “participatory and deliberation” characteristics of NEG and are 
accordingly addressed under that heading below.
More relevant here are the questions and debates raised regarding two other issues. The 
first issue relates to the conditions that enable the emergence of successful collaboration in 
initial planning and implementation efforts. The second issue relates to matters of 
“persistence” ,252 specifically the conditions that affect the longer-term survival of collaboration, 
as they progress through implementation, monitoring, and adaptive management. These two 
issues are addressed in turn below.
2.4.1.11ssues regarding the emergence of successful collaboration
Challenges of collaboration
253A variety of commentators have questioned the faith placed in “collaboration” by NEG, 
suggesting collaborative efforts will come up against extensive, if not insuperable, difficulties in 
practice. Such difficulties they suggest will mean that many of the purported benefits of 
collaboration are unlikely to be achieved in many “real world” situations.
249 Lobel, n 2 at 499-503.
250 Karkkainen, n 17 at 233; Lobel, n 2 at 499-509.
251 Head, n 239, p 56-57.
252 See for example Dovers, n 46, p 6.
253 See for example: Steinzor, n 235 at p 1 of “pdf’; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 833; Gaines, n 67 at 15; 
Scheuerman, n 42 at 121; Nickelsburg S, “Mere volunteers? The promise and limits of community-based 
environmental protection” (1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1371 at 1373, 1406-1409.
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The root of such problems, some of these theorists argue, is the fact (or so they would 
assert) that people are self-interested beings whose interests make it more rational to behave in a 
competitive rather than a cooperate manner.254 This rational, self-interested actor rears its head 
in at least three well worn “cooperation dilemma” constructs - the tragedy of the commons, the 
prisoner’s dilemma253 and Mancur Olson’s256 collective action problem. As the logic underlying 
these three constructs is similar, exploring the tragedy of the commons will be sufficient for 
present purposes.
The tragedy of the commons, as expounded by Garrett Hardin, and others,257 was one of 
the first works to theorise the problems potential collaborators are likely to face in coming 
together to voluntarily cooperate. Hardin explains the tragedy using the example of cattle 
herders and their use of pasturelands left open to many herds of cattle.258 As Hardin sees it: “the 
rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another; and another...But this is the conclusion reached by each and 
every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a
259system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited”.
Common to this tragedy and the other two “cooperation dilemma” constructs is the issue of 
free riders. That is, whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others 
provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the collaboration but to “free ride” on the 
labours of others.260 Accordingly, if some or all participants choose to free ride, the decision 
making process will result in either a less than optimal level of provision or no collective benefit 
being created at all.261
254 Steinzor, n 235 at page 1 of “p d f’; Gaines, n 67 at 15; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 48-49.
255 The prisoner’s dilemma game has been described by a number of authors using various social examples that build 
on the original form described by Albert Tucker: The dilemma is as follows: two men are held separately by the 
police but charged with jointly violating the law. If both confess each will be fined 1 penalty unit (eg. $1000), if only 
one confesses and the other does not, the former will be rewarded $1000 and the latter will be fined $2000, while if 
neither confess there is good reason to believe both prisoners will be let go or receive only a minor penalty.
According to this model, even though the “optimal” choice is for neither to confess, both prisoners will confess 
because as rational beings who are unable to communicate, neither will want to take the risk of not confessing in case 
the other prisoner comes clean. The game itself is credited to the work by Dresher and formalised by Albert Tucker in 
1950 during a lecture at Stanford University; See Dresher M, The Mathematics o f Games o f Strategy: Theory and 
Applications (Prentice-Hall, 1961); Tucker A, “The Mathematics of Tucker: A Sampler” (1983) 14(3) The Two-Year 
College Mathematics Journal 228; Ostrom, n 159, p 3-5; Karkkainen, n 17 at 226-227.
256 Mancur Olson’s collective action problem argues that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, 
or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational 
self-interest individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests...”; See Olson M, The Logic o f 
Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory o f Groups (Harvard UP, 1965 and 1971), p 2, 9, 44, 49-50; 
Nickelsburg, n 253 at 1378.
257 See for example Scott A, “ The fishery: The objectives o f sole ownership” (1955) 63 Journal of Political Economy 
116.
258 Hardin G, “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 (3859) Science 1243 at 1244; Ostrom, n 159, p 3.
259 He continues: “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” Hardin, n 258 at 1244.
260 Ostrom, n 159,p6.
261 Ostrom, n 159, p 6.
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In short, what these three models all suggest is that individually rational strategies may 
bring about collectively irrational outcomes.262 The common solution proposed for these 
dilemmas- fiat or market based mechanisms - are the very understandings and structures of 
environmental governance which NEG suggests are often inapposite.263
It is unsurprising then that the cooperation dilemma is seen as a “theoretical thorn in the 
side” of NEG’s unique collaborative approach to governing.264 However, a growing number of 
NEG scholars265 have sought to counter such claims by drawing on a range of literatures266 that 
suggest more sanguine possibilities for co-operation under certain conditions.267 For example, 
Elinor Ostrom’s research on the effective and sustainable co-management of common pool 
resources (CPR) 268 has identified a range of conditions 269 associated with an increased 
likelihood of collaboration in CPR contexts.270
Furthermore, some NEG authors point to the fact that many purportedly “unconventional 
and counterintuitive” collaborative NEG institutions exist in practice (see above in section 2.2 
for examples of NEG experiments in USA, Australia and Europe), and suggest that this in itself 
means that collaboration is not a wholly impossible ideal.271
In the face of such evidence and arguments, some sceptics still charge that Ostrom’s 
conditions, and those under which many existing NEG institutions have arisen, are either unique 
or limited to such specific circumstances that wider replicability is highly unlikely.272 For some
273of these sceptics, NEG may have value in only the most narrowly constrained circumstances. 
Others also suggest that even if collaboration is possible, the considerable cooperative effort 
involved is likely to be both messy and uncompromising, introducing new sources of conflict
262 Ostrom, n 159, p 5.
263 Ostrom, n 159, p 182.
264 Homstein, n 241 at 952.
265 Lubell M, Schneider M, Scholz J and Mihriye M, “Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective 
Action Institutions” (2002) 46(1) American Journal of Political Science 148; Sabatier P, Leach W, Lubell M and 
Pelkey N, “Theoretical Frameworks Explaining Partnership Success” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg 
Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management 
(MIT Cambridge, 2005); Homstein, n 241 at 951-952; Karkkainen, n 17 at 226 -233; Karkkainen, n 43 at 966, fn 75.
266 Including Robert Axelrod’s use of game theory: Axelrod R, The Evolution o f Cooperation (Basic Books 1984).
267 Thomson A and Perry J, “Collaboration Processes: Inside the Black Box” (2006) December, Public 
Administration Review 20 at 21.
268 CPRs are natural or human made resource systems that are sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not 
impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from their use. Typical examples are forests, or 
irrigation and fishery systems; Ostrom, n 159, p 30-31; Schlager E, “Common Pool Resource Theory” in Durant R, 
Fiorino D, and O’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 147.
269 Some of these conditions are discussed in later chapters. For a full list see: Ostrom E, “The Danger of Self 
Evident Truths” (2000) 33(1) Political Science and Politics 33 at 39-40.
270 For a relatively recent overview of this literature see Schlager, n 268; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 175.
271 Karkkainen, n 17 at 226.
272 Gaines, n 67 at 17; See discussion in Karkkainen, n 1 at 476-477.
273 Cannon J, “Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management”, (2000) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev
379 at 428; Gaines, n 67 at 17; See also discussion in Karkkainen, n 1 at 476-477.
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and creating additional problems in the policy process, including increased time and
274resources.
As Karkkainen has argued, such dismissals of NEG on what are largely theoretical grounds 
(including assumptions about human nature) discount the possibility that it is the critics’ theory, 
and not reality, that is flawed.275 Yet the limited empirical evidence on collaborative governance 
is far from conclusive and what is needed first and foremost, Karkkainen contends, is a rigorous 
and comparative analysis of emerging institutions to better discern the deep structure of these 
arrangements and their relative effectiveness.276
To date, NEG empirical research into conditions that enable the emergence of successful 
collaboration has been dominated by a handful of institutional structures in the USA context,277 
with some of the most extensive analysis being conducted on localised collaborative NRM 
initiatives.278 However even here, a tidy theoretical consistency is yet to be achieved.279 
Accordingly many important questions and issues remain to be resolved including conditions 
for overcoming transaction costs, the role and importance of trust in achieving successful 
collaboration, and the nature and impact of consensus decision-making on fostering successful 
collaborative processes.
Conditions for overcoming transaction costs
Transaction costs (eg. time, resources and travel expenses associated with building trust, 
negotiating, sharing information and reaching “consensus”) are seen to be a major barrier or 
limiting factor to collaboration.280
Some authors argue that the large size and heterogeneity of affected stakeholders and the 
scale of the environment problem will cause unbearably high transaction costs.281 However
274 Lane, n 112 at 4-5; Coglianese, n 155, p 113; See discussion in Karkkainen, n 12 at 91; Karkkainen, n 17 at 225.
275 Karkkainen, n 17 at 225-226.
276 Karkkainen, n 17 at 226.
277 Studies have tended to focus on Habitat Conversation Plans, the Chesapeake Bay Program and the CALFED Bay- 
Delta Program. See for example: Raymond L, “Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming Collective Action Barriers to 
Endangered Species Protection” (2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37; Heikkila and Gerlak, n 69 at 584. 
However, there have been more extensive studies into forestry and natural resource management approaches in the 
USA (e.g. Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16) as well as research on collaboration internationally (e.g. Whelan and Oliver, 
n 122).
278 See for example Lubell et al, n 265; Sabatier et al, n 265; Lubell et al, n 265; Lubell M, “Do Watershed 
Partnerships Enhance Beliefs Conducive to Collective Action?” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, 
Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT 
Cambridge, 2005).
279 Sabatier et al, n 265, p 183; Heikkila and Gerlak, n 69 at 584; Raymond, n 277 at 39.
280 See for example: John D, “Good Cops, Bad Cops”(1999) October/November Boston Review 19 at 19; Dana, n 22 
at 54; Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural 
Resources 135 at 135, 137; Coglianese, n 155, p 106, 110; Gaines, n 67 at 17; Karkkainen, n 12 at 91.
281 See for example Gaines, n 67 at 17. See also discussions by John where it is argued that successful collaboration is 
more likely to emerge when the extent of the environmental issue is small enough (100 sq miles) for key leaders to 
drive to evening meetings (John, n 9, p 231).
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
61
much of the NEG literature asserts that collaboration can be effective regardless of such 
barriers, and that institution design or governmental action can aid in sufficiently reducing 
transaction costs.
For example, some NEG theorists suggest that transaction costs may be reduced or 
overcome by conditions such as:
•“leaders” 282 such as government officers who are willing to use their own resources to try 
and persuade other stakeholders that they collectively have more to gain through 
collaborating;283
•government funding and/or agency assistance for relevant capacity building and 
information provision; and/or284
•the existence of harsh “default” rules285 (or indeed other forms of social or economic 
pressure from third parties)286 that can alter incentives of actors to make transaction costs 
of collaboration potentially more attractive than bearing the costs imposed by the default 
rule.287
For others, nested institutional structures (i.e. developing different institutions such as 
government, stakeholder, citizens and/or mixed varieties at different levels such as local, 
regional and state) may be used to overcome transaction costs. 288 This is claimed to be effective 
both where geographic scale is larger (by allowing collaborative groups to divide a region into 
smaller areas and groups to reduce the costs and time associated with collaborating across the 
whole region), 289 and at more local levels (allowing local groups to also operate at regional 
scales to share information and interact with agencies in a more structured single forum rather 
than in an ad hoc, once off manner).290
282 Rose C, “Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory” (1990) 2 
Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 37 at 48-53, 54-56.
283 See for example Freeman, n 5 at 31-32; Raymond, n 277 at 42; Stewart and Jones, n 73,p 134-138.
284 John and Mlay, n 9 p 362-363; Nickelsburg, n 253 at 1380-1381; John, n 9, p 230-242; Freeman, n 5 at 31; 
Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 890; Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 334.
285 Karkkainen, n 79, p 296, 298, 321 ; Karkkainen, n 17 at 241 ; Karkkainen, n 43 at 944. Note however that some 
authors have questioned the role of default rules in NEG, see: Ruhl J, “Default Rule Opt-outs and Interest Group 
Shut-Outs: Citizen Participation and Contractarian Innovation in Environmental Law” (2006) 33 Florida State 
University Law Review 903.
286 See generally Gunningham N, Kagan R and Thornton D, Shades o f Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment 
(Stanford UP, 2003); Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78 at 149.
287 Karkkainen, n 17 at 241; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 78 at 149; Farrier, n 13 at 350, 390-391; Koontz et al, n 21, 
p 166-167; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 240-241.
288 Margerum, n 280 at 144-146; Karkkainen, n 17 at 209; Karkkainen n 13, p 221 (identifying that nested scales of 
management are evident in some of the most successful ecosystem governance arrangements); John, n 9, p 236-237.
289 Bonnell J and Koontz T, “Stumbling Forward: the Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining 
Collaborative Watershed Management” (2007) 20(2) Society and Natural Resources 153 at 161, 163.
29(1 For further see: Margerum, n 280 at 144-146.
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While this nested approach is thought to have the potential to reduce transaction costs 
greatly, some authors hypothesise that various parts of this structure may impose additional 
challenges,291 such as achieving power sharing between agencies/governments at higher regional 
or state scales.292 How much conflict and cooperation is actually evident between different 
agencies and levels of government in NEG accordingly remains an important focus for NEG 
research.293
Trust
A second issue where empirical insights and clarification is much needed in NEG’s theory 
of collaboration relates to the issue of trust. Trust294 and reciprocity295 have been widely claimed 
as important to successful collaboration296 - potentially reducing transactions costs, making 
collective action easier and increasing the likelihood of parties reaching and implementing 
agreements.297 In a manner reminiscent of Robert Axelrod’s famous use of game theory,298 
repeat play (rather than static) approaches and communicating mechanisms such as ongoing 
face to face negotiation and/or deliberation is seen by many NEG scholars to be particularly 
important to building necessary trust and reciprocity to ensure successful collaboration.299
291 Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 161, 163.
242 Margerum, n 280 at 144-146; Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 161, 163; Lane, n 112 at 5-6.
293 Notably, this is an important issue for both the formative and implementation stages of NEG programs (Head, n 85, 
p 145). Note also that RNRM researchers in Australia have already begun to highlight problems of intergovernmental 
and interagency politics (as well as other “turf wars” between existing sub regional groups and new regional entities). 
See Farrelly, n 123 at 400; Paton et al, n 123 at 263.
294 Trust can generally be understood as referring to confidence that people will keep their promises, treat others fairly 
and show some concern for other’s welfare. Ideas of making “good-faith” efforts to behave in accordance with any 
commitments, being honest in negotiations and not taking excessive advantage of another are prevalent here. Sabatier 
et al, n 265, p 187. Thomson and Perry, n 267 at 28.
295 The norm of reciprocity is generally understood as a willingness to initiate and return favours -  an “I will if  you 
will” mentality - based on a perceived degree of obligation (eg. where one partner is willing to bear initial 
disproportional costs because they expect another will equalise the cost and benefit distribution over time out of a 
sense of duty); Thomson and Perry, n 267 at 27; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 187.
296 As discussed further in chapter 5, a range of different literatures see trust as central to collaborative processes. See 
for example: social capital literature (Putnam R, Leonardi R and Nanetti R, Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in M odem Italy (Princeton UP, 1993)), alternative dispute resolution literature (O’Leary R, Nabatchi T 
and Bingham L, “Environmental Conflict Resolution” in R Durant, D Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental 
Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004)) and literature on “advocacy coalition frameworks” (Sabatier P and Jenkins- 
Smith H, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Westview Press, 1993)). For a brief 
overview of these literatures see Heikkila and Gerlak, n 69 at 587-588; Raymond, n 277 at 40-41, 54; Sabatier et al, n 
265, p 186, 189.
297 Stewart and Jones, n 73 at 128-129; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 186-189.
298 One of the central contentions from this work is that if individuals can be made to believe that others are inclined 
to contribute to public goods (i.e. through communication), then they can be induced to contribute rather than free 
ride, prompting subjects to make larger contributions, and move toward the social optimum as they observe others 
doing the same; Axelrod, n 266; Kahan D, “The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law” (2003) 102 
Mich.L. Rev. 71 at 71, 88-89.
299 In general terms, such processes can resolve conflict, while also allowing participants to show respect for each 
other and be assured that others are willing to contribute their fair share to dealing with the problem; Kahan, n 298 at 
88-89. See for example John, n 9, p 235; Freeman, n 5 at 23-24, fn 59; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 15-18; Cohen and 
Sabel, n 25 at 323.
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However, in contrast to such claims, a handful of emerging empirical research in NEG has 
challenged the view that trust and reciprocity are essential or even favourable to successful 
cooperation. Some research has made what one scholar has termed the provocative and 
“somewhat controversial” claim that trust is largely irrelevant to successful collective action in 
many settings.300 For example, recent research suggests agreements in “must do something 
soon” situations such as a flooding crisis have been made in the face of significant distrust,301 
Further insight is accordingly needed into this debate on the importance of trust as a condition 
for the emergence of successful collaboration.
Consensus rule
The final issue relating to the emergence of successful collaboration relates to consensus 
decision rules. It has been suggested that the formation of a successful collaboration depends in 
part on a consensus decision rule, often one that grants a veto power to all parties.302 By doing 
so, the hope is that parties will be more satisfied with the agreement reached and accordingly 
refrain from undermining the collaboration (eg. legal action) in the future.303 Commentators 
such as Coglianese, however have taken issue with this strict form of consensus.304 These 
authors suggest that strict consensus rules result in substantial transaction costs, lowest common 
denominator and/or the most tractable solutions and strategic self-interested bargaining.305
Coglianese’s analysis has stimulated a number of NEG scholars to question whether 
broadly consensus based approaches to environmental decision-making will suffer from the 
same problems.306
In part, this concern arises because collaboration in NEG literature is often described as 
involving "consensus" processes.307 However there is little agreement or in some cases a noted
300 See Raymond, n 277 at 37; Leach W and Sabatier P, “Are Trust and Social Capital the Keys to Success?
Watershed partnerships in California and Washington” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg, Z , Vedlitz A 
and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge,
2005); Cook K, Hardin R and Levi M, Cooperation Without Trust? (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).
301 Lubell et al, n 166, p 275.
302 O’Leary et al, n 296, p 330-331, 334-335; Susskind L, “Building Consensus” (1999) October/November Boston 
Review 22 at 22-23; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 195-197; Stewart and Jones, n 73, p 12; Innes J, “Consensus Building: 
Clarifications for the Critics” (2004) 3(1) Planning Theory 5 at 7, fn 4.
303 Sabatier et al, n 265, p 196.
304 Coglianese, n 155, p 96; Coglianese C and Allen L, “Does Consensus Make Common Sense?” (2004) 46(1) 
Environment 10; Coglianese C “The Limits o f Consensus: The Environmental Protection System in Transition: 
Toward a More Desirable Future” (1999) 41(3) Environment 28; Coggins G, “Of Califomicators, Quislings and 
Crazies” (1998) 2 Chronicles of Community 27.
305 Coglianese, n 155, p 96, 106,110; Karkkainen, n 12 at 91.
306 O’Malley and Janetos, n 157 at 11-12 (commentating on Coglianese and his colleagues, note that “we are 
concerned that the authors have, by condemning consensus-based approaches in all circumstances, overgeneralized 
their results”); Karkkainen, n 12 at 91; Karkkainen, n 17 at fn 116; Leach, n 178 at 104; Karkkainen, n 17 at fn 116.
307 Karkkainen, n 17 at 240.
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imprecision when describing the meaning of a consensus decision rule308 -  some seemingly 
implying that strict consensus rules are essential, others offering no specific definition of the 
term, while some authors provide vaguer notions such as “substantial consensus” or “broad 
consensus support”.309
This ambiguity and disparity of views has led to a need to clarify what decision rules are 
actually employed in various collaborative new governance processes and to explore which 
decision rules are most likely to avoid pathologies in the collaborative process.310 In the NEG 
literature Karkkainen has begun this work. He has suggested a three fold classification of 
consensus rules -  “hard” (unanimity/veto based), “soft” (no absolute veto but agreement 
substantially beyond a majority vote is necessary) or “mixed” (power is distributed somewhat 
unequally, with some senior parties (e.g. major government agencies) holding something close 
to a veto, while other junior parties hold a weaker hand (e.g. cajole, persuade, public uproar).311
Chapter 5 will return to examine the nature and impact of decision rules, as well as issues 
of trust, transaction costs and preconditions of collaboration as they played out in the three case 
studies of this thesis. In doing so, it provides a range of insights for NEG theory as regards the 
above questions and debates, and contributes to developing a better understanding of the 
conditions under which NEG can achieve the emergence of successful collaboration.
2.4.1.2 Issues regarding the survival of collaboration
Related to the emergence of successful collaboration is the equally challenging issue of its 
ongoing maintenance and survival.312 These issues are interrelated because the conditions that 
contributed to the emergence of collaboration can also contribute to its maintenance and 
survival.313 For example some may argue that a strict consensus rule that gives participating 
parties a veto can ensure ongoing collaboration and implementation because the parties are 
more likely to be satisfied with the negotiated agreement, and avoid pursuing venues of appeal 
to undermine the collaboration.314 Even so, the conditions that affect the survival of 
collaboration are also broader than those relating to its formation. A simple example is the
308 See discussions in Bingham L and 0 ‘Leary R, “Conclusion: Parallel Play, Not Collaboration: Missing Questions, 
Missing Connections” (2006) December Public Administration Review 161 at 165; Karkkainen, n 17 at 240-241.
309 See Leach W, “Theories about consensus” (2005) 20 (2) Conservation Biology 573 at 574-575; Lubell M, 
“Collaborative Environmental Institutions: All Talk and No Action?” (2004) 23(3) Journal o f Policy Analysis and 
Management 549 at 551 ; Karkkainen, n 9 at 220, 228-229; Karkkainen, n 12 at 76.
310 Leach, n 309 at 574-575; O’Malley and Janetos, n 157 at 11-12; Karkkainen, n 17 at 240-241, fn 116.
311 Karkkainen, n 17 at 240.
312 Ostrom, n 159, p 90.
3,3 Sabatier et al, n 265, p 184.
314 Sabatier et al, n 265, p 189, 192, 198. Innés, n 302 at 16.
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availability of long-term resources and capacities to support the maintenance of the 
collaborative group over time.
Of course, sustaining a collaborative effort may not be a central issue to all NEG 
collaborations (eg. once off, short term collaborative efforts focused on specific tasks).315 
However, many NEG collaborative institutions are designed to involve significant long-term 
commitments including implementation, monitoring and adaptive management roles necessary 
to tackle intractable or complex issues.316 In these situations an effective and sustainable 
collaborative group is vital.
As with the NEG literature on the emergence of successful collaboration, there has been 
some emerging NEG research and attempts to draw on wider literatures regarding sustaining 
collaboration.317 Again, Ostrom’s work in CPR context is a relevant touchstone, where eight 
design principles have been identified under which collaborative institutions are more likely to 
succeed over the long term (see Table 2.4 below).318
Design Principle Description
1 Clearly defined boundaries There must be clear definitions o f  the boundaries o f the CPR 
resource, and those individuals or groups who have a distinct right 
to withdrawn units from that CPR.
2 Congruence between 
appropriation and provisions 
o f  rules (i.e. effectively 
assign costs o f managing 
resource proportionate to 
benefits received from the 
collaborative process)
Rules governing appropriation (eg. the time, place, technology and 
or quantity o f  resource units appropriated) relate to local conditions 
and to the rules governing the building, restoring or maintaining the 
resource system via labour, material and or money.
3 Collective Choice 
arrangements
Nearly everyone affected by the operational rules can participate in 
modifying the operational rules.
4 Monitoring Monitors actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour 
and are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.
5 Graduated sanctions Violation o f  operational rules by an appropriator is likely to result 
in graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context o f  
the offence) being imposed by other appropriators, officials 
accountable to appropriators or both.
6 Conflict resolution 
mechanisms
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local 
arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between 
appropriators and officials.
7 Minimal recognition o f  
rights to organise
The rights o f appropriators to formulate their own institutions are 
not challenged by external governmental authorities.
315 Head, n 239, p 57.
316 Head, n 239, p 57; Margerum, n 280.
317 Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 154; Lubell et al, n 166, p 294-295; Freeman and Färber, n 11 at 870, 903; Fung and 
Wright, n 27 (and related contributions in the same volume); John, n 9, p 233, 241; Dovers S, “Reflecting on Three 
Decades: a Synthesis” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press,
2003) p 518-519; Ewing, n 87, p 405-406. See also Karkkainen, n 9 at 227-228 (identifying features of the most 
successful institutions of collaborative ecosystem governance).
318 Ostrom, n 159, p 90; Varughese G and Ostrom E, “The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: 
Some Evidence From Community Forestry in Nepal” (2001) 29(5) World Development 747 at 763.
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For CPRs that are part o f  
larger systems, nested 
enterprises
Appropriation, maintenance o f  stock, conflict resolution, 
monitoring and other governance activities are organised in 
multiple layers o f  nested enterprises. Institutions for managing very 
large systems need to ensure considerable authority devolved to 
small components to give them flexibility and some control over 
their fate.
Table 2.4: Design Principles for Long-Term Cooperation.319
Despite these insights, in general far more questions than answers have been raised in the 
NEG literature regarding conditions and issues pertinent to the survival of successful 
collaboration. Some authors in fact suggest there is a “knowledge gap” in the NEG literature on 
the challenges and conditions associated with sustaining successful collaborative 
organizations.320 Some of the important questions that remain to be answered relate to matters of 
volunteerism,321 government support, as well as what happens to collaborative efforts when they 
have substantially achieved their goals.322
Volunteerism
Echoing Ostrom’s design principle number 2 (see above), some authors hope that 
volunteer collaborators will bear the ongoing costs of collaborating and sustain their 
involvement because of the benefits they receive from (i) having a voice over issues which they 
may care about; and (ii) the opportunity to potentially work with or influence governmental 
decisions. 323 Reciprocally, government agencies or other typically powerful groups may 
continue to participate as they come to rely on the knowledge and assistance of non­
governmental stakeholders.324
Others stress that collaborative institutions are likely to survive where they demonstrate 
success in addressing environmental problems.325 Minimal or poor environmental improvements 
are likely to be worth less than the transaction costs required to obtain them and collaborators 
would accordingly begin to withdraw from the collaboration.326
319 Ostrom, n 159, p 90; Schlager, n 268, p 154-162; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 184.
320 See also Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 154; Lubell et al, n 166, p 294-295; Koontz et al, n 21, p 183; Margerum, n
280 at 141; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 38; Head, n 239, p 145-146 ;Homstein, n 241 at 946, 959-960.
321 While the issue of maintaining the involvement of non-government collaborators overlaps with the participation 
characteristic of NEG, for present purposes it is treated as a factor o f sustaining collaboration. Indeed, as most 
collaborations involve a mix of public and private actors, sustaining non-governmental involvement is vital to their 
very existence.
322 Koontz et al, n 21, p 183; Lubell et al, n 166, p 294-295; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 27.
323 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 27.
324 See for example Lobel, n 67 at 463-464.
325 Isaac T and Heller P, “Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Karalla” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p at 
93, 101; John, n 9, p 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 166, p 288.
326 Lubell et al, n 166, p 288.
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However over the longer term a number of problems can arise. In particular non­
governmental collaborators’ enthusiasm may be quelled by the practical demands of 
collaborative institutions, resulting in burnout or high turnover.327 These are experiences aptly 
demonstrated in the Landcare Program 328 and in Integrated Catchment Management in 
Australia,329 as well as with neighborhood renewal in UK.330
In response to these challenges, authors have speculated that collaborations may be more 
likely to be sustained where the following conditions are exercised:
•encouraging and fostering broader associational participation, such as local 
environmental organisations;331
•governments providing small amounts of money with no strings attached to allow 
collaborative groups to reach and “renew” non government collaborators through initiates 
such as community events;332
•providing direct rewards to collaborative participants (e.g. new knowledge, social and 
professional networks and grant money).333
An important area for further research is accordingly whether, and to what extent, these or 
other conditions are able to successfully support the continuing engagement of volunteer 
collaborators.334
Government support
The provision of governmental funding or support, both as suggested in the latter 
conditions above and more generally for the purpose of supporting basic administration and 
organisation tasks of a collaborative group, is seen to be particularly vital to the survival of 
successful collaboration.335 Given trends of agency load shedding, and the limits of scare 
governmental resources, this is a challenging condition to satisfy.336 However emerging 
empirical research has demonstrated that without adequate financial support, small collaborative
327 Margerum, n 280 at 141 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 38; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 870; Steinzor, n 235 at page 20 
of “p d f’; John, n 280 at 19; Lawrence, n 116 at 13-14.
328 Curtis, n 93, p 447; Lawrence and Cheshire, n 115 at 1-6, 9.
329 Ewing, n 87, p 393, 405-406; Bellamy et al, n 87, p 3-5.
330 Taylor et al, n 146, p 76.
331 Fung A and Wright E, “Countervailing power in empowered participatory governance’ in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 
264.
332 Taylor et al, n 146, p 76.
333 Sabatier et al, n 265, p 184; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 32, 37-38.
334 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 38.
335 Margerum p 141; John, n 9, p 239; Dovers, n 317, p 519.
336 See generally Beeson and Firth, n 118.
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groups can easily be overwhelmed, spending more time and resources trying to sustain their 
group than in addressing environmental issues.337
Part of the problem is the fact that sufficient funding can be especially difficult to obtain.338 
Indeed, funding is often reported as being too short term in nature to allow collaborative groups 
to effectively sustain their activities,339 or too difficult for small community based organisations 
to obtain and manage effectively.340
A range of authors have nevertheless begun to propose solutions to these issues. Design 
conditions such as nested arrangements (akin to Ostrom’s design principle number 8) have been 
suggested as one avenue to obtain more apposite funding for local collaborations. Here, higher 
regional levels can attract additional grant funding for the lower local level collaborations and 
allow pooling of resources.341 Of course this requires the nested model to overcome the inherent 
challenges mentioned above,342 such as achieving power sharing between agencies/governments 
at higher regional or state scales.343
A similar role to assist groups to obtain funding has been identified by John who suggests 
an outside “sponsor” in the form of a top agency manager or elected official can act to facilitate 
funding and information to support the collaborative process.344
Outside of NEG literature, work on collaborative governance in security by Shearing and 
his collaborators has demonstrated that the use of block grant funding to local community-based 
institutions can, among other things, be an effective means of resourcing and sustaining such 
initiatives.345 Such an arrangement can involve government (or some other source) granting 
collaborative groups a “lump” sum of money. A small percentage of the grant can be earmarked 
for the work and administration of the partners, and the remainder could be made available to 
support activities of the group as a whole.346
Overall, the success of these proposals in sustaining different NEG groups remains an 
under examined issue, and there is an acknowledged need for further investigation of
337 Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 163.
338 Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 870, 903; John, n 280 at 19; John, n 9, p 239, 241 ; Steinzor, n 235 at p 20-22 of “pdf’.
339 Margerum, n 280 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 159; Taylor et al, n 146, p 79.
340 Taylor et al, n 146, p 79.
341 Margerum, n 280 at 141.
342 Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 161, 163.
343 Margerum, n 280 at 144-146; See also Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 161, 163.
344 John, n 9, p 239, 241-242.
345 Bayley D and Shearing C, “The Future of Policing” (1996) 30(3) Law and Society Review 585.
346 Wood J and Shearing C, “Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New Denizens” (2003) 30(3) Journal o f Law 
and Society 400 at 414; Johnston L and Shearing C, Governing Security Explorations in Policing and Justice 
(Routledge, 2003) p 149-150.
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institutional design and forms of government assistance that might best address organisational 
challenges that groups face over the long term.347
What happens to groups as they achieve their goals?
The relationship between survival and outcomes achieved by collaborative group also 
remains a controversial and under explored issue.348 As noted above, successfully improving the 
environment is often said to be one of the most important factors in ensuring benefits outweigh 
the costs for volunteer collaborators, and thus ensuring that they maintain their involvement. 
However even when collaborations are successful in achieving results, it also possible that 
returns from these gains may diminish over time, and non government collaborations may find 
the experience less rewarding than they had imagined.349 Engagement may consequently dim 
from exhaustion and disillusionment.350
Indeed, the challenge of maintaining collaborative momentum once many of the initial 
objectives have been substantially achieved raises broader policy questions of whether it is 
desirable for NEG collaborations to be sustained per se.351
On the one hand, from a cost benefit perspective it could be argued that sustaining a 
particular collaborative group that has achieved most of its initial objectives is undesirable, not 
least if the collaboration relies on continued support of scarce governmental resources that could 
be far better spent addressing other more serious environmental problems.352
However as suggested above, for others in the literature sustaining collaboration may be 
desirable for the purposes of ongoing adaptive management, and because collaborative 
institutions that engage citizens can act as a means of building civic capacities, enhance 
democracy and provide active networks for addressing other problems and environmental 
issues.35
These issues have led to a range of questions being identified in the literature that demand 
further research, including what happens to the participants when a collaborative initiative has
347 Head, n 85, p 145; Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 165.
348 Koontz et al, n 21, p 183; Lubell et al, n 166, p 293.
348 Lubell et al, n 166, p 293.
349 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 38.
350 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 38.
351 Lubell et al, n 166, p 295; Dovers, n 317, p 518.
352 See broad arguments made from a cost benefit perspective by Sunstein: Sunstein C, “Consequences?” (1999) 
October/November Boston Review 28 at 29.
353 Koontz et al, n 21, p 183; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 27-29.
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achieved its goal? How long do collaborative institutions generally survive and how long should 
they survive to be useful? How and why do collaborative efforts end?354
These and the other issues raised above are revisited in Chapter 8, where an investigation 
of three NEG case studies reveals a number of key lessons for NEG theory into the conditions 
for sustaining successful collaboration.
2.4.2 Issues regarding NEG’s Participatory and Deliberative 
Aspirations?
Like the issue of collaboration, NEG theory on successfully designing and implementing 
participatory and deliberative approaches to governing environmental problems has raised a 
range of important and complex theoretical and empirical questions.355 Many of these questions 
are raised in the context of non-government participation and deliberation in collaborative 
groups. As noted above, non-government involvement in collaborative groups is commonly 
expected to meet procedural criteria such as participation that is inclusive and/or representative 
of affected interests, and decision-making that adheres to conditions laid out by a deliberative 
ideal. As I now turn to explain, there are similarities and variations in these specific criteria, as 
well as the conditions proposed for securing them, with many of the later remaining 
contentious.356
Inclusiveness
357The criterion of inclusiveness relates to the issue of who is eligible to participate? 
Commonly, this is taken to be all those non-governmental actors who are affected.358 Of course 
this begs the question: who is “affected”, and different definitions are adopted in the NEG 
literature, such as “stakeholders”,359 those “most affected”360 or those within a defined “place”
354 Bonnell and Koontz, n 289 at 154; Lubell et al, n 166, p 294-295; Koontz et al, n 21, at 183; Fung and Wright, n
2 7 ,p 27.
355 Some relevant empirical issues are raised in the discussion below. Some of the key theoretical questions relate to 
ideas of “democracy” and theories of “democratic legitimacy”. See for example: Karkkainen, n 17 at 239 (asking “if 
a distinctive new flavor o f participatory democracy is emerging here, by what theory of democratic legitimacy can it 
be justified, evaluated, and held accountable?”); Sabel and Simon, n 215, p 403 (noting that issues of accountability 
have allowed the discussion of democratic legitimacy to be deferred, and that new governance in the end, will 
“require us to rethink the very ideas of democracy on which our inveterate ideas of accountability are founded”).
356 Moore, n 98, p 127.
357 Fung, n 171 at 67.
358 As De Burea and Scott put it, “new governance processes generally encourage or involve the participation of  
affected actors (stakeholders)”; De Burea and Scott, n 137, p 3.
359 See for example: Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 895; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 57, 29; Head, n 85, p 148
360 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 16, 18.
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or “community”.361 Others suggest a broader interpretation that includes future generations, 
non-human objects and those affected outside a specific geographic boundary.362
Within these various criteria, the common conditions imposed for a given collaborative 
forum is that its institution place few restrictions on which non-government actors can 
participate (eg. “open door” policy for all who are “affected”),363 or that those likely to be 
“affected” by a decision should at least be represented in the decision-making364 (as discussed 
below).
Representation
The second criteria of representativeness overlaps with the first and recognises that 
constraints on group size and differences in power and capacity mean that not everyone who is 
affected may or can participate.365 This means concepts of “representativeness” are often drawn 
upon. While some authors remain abstract,366 or overlook the role of representation in their 
visions of more direct participatory democracy,367 many NEG theories emphasise representation 
in either a “principal agent sense” or more commonly, but overlapping, in a form of “descriptive
The former emphasises representation where participants are spoke-persons/agents and are 
accountable to particular affected interests/principals.369 Debates exist about the conditions for 
securing a reliable principal/agent relationship, with some scholars suggesting only formal
370mechanisms such as direct elections of representatives will be effective. Others propose
361 Cannon, n 273 at 379.
362 See for example Moore, n 98, p 127-128; Lawrence, n 116 at 11; For further see: Dryzek J, Deliberative 
Democracy and Beyond (Oxford UP, 2000) p 152-153.
363 See for example: Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 332-333 (“open to providers and parities affected by the extent and 
manner of provision...open meetings, with equal rights to participate in discussions and decision-making for all 
affected parties”); Karkkainen, n 12 at 75 (“the perceived legitimacy of the institutional arrangement rests in large 
measure upon its open and participatory character”); Freeman, n 5 at 22 (“Participation by interested and affected 
parties in all stages of the decision-making process”); Leach, n 178 at 101 ( providing a normative framework for 
assessing democratic merits of collaborative public management and noting that “an inclusive process places few 
formal restrictions on participation”).
364 Moore and Rockloff, n 123 at 259, 268 (noting that the “ideal o f democratic decentralisation” makes “normative 
statements regarding fairness and decision making” that include (i) in democratic societies, those likely to be affected 
by a decision should be involved (or at least represented) in the decision making”); See also Ribot J, “Representation, 
Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization” (2007) 50(1) Development 43 at 45; John, n 9, p
231-232,236,238.
365 Parkinson J, Deliberating in the Real World (Oxford UP, 2006) p 23; Parkinson, n 188 at 182-183.
366 See for example Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 332-333 ( noting “very little can be said in general terms about the 
requisite representational form...there is every reason to expect at least as much variation as we currently see in 
polyarchies”).
367 See for example Fung and Wright, n 27, p 24, 26, 33-34.
368 Parkinson, n 365, p 30.
369 Parkinson, n 365, p 30.
370 Seidenfeld M, “Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation” (2000)
41 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 411 at 487 -  500; Ribot, n 364 at 45; See also Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59; Moore 
and Rockloff, n 123 at 267-268.
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informal requirements, such as a volunteer, or appointed participants maintaining active 
communication with those they “represent”.371 At best it remains unclear as to when and which 
form of principal/agent representation can meet a normative criterion of ensuring
372representatives are legitimate proxies for the views of their constituents.
The second but overlapping form of representation, the descriptive form, requires that non 
government representatives ideally reflect divisions, perspectives and interests of those who are 
affected.373 Authors accordingly tend to emphasise a broad expectation of “equal” or roughly 
“balanced” representation, particularly sensitive to less powerful or marginalised groups.374 This 
includes, for some authors, environmental groups or government officers acting as proxy 
representatives of those that cannot represent themselves (eg. future generations and/or 
nature).375
The precise detail of this equal or balanced representation tends to vary with definitions of 
“affected” .376 However, regardless of how one defines and measures such “balance”, theories 
generally propose base conditions for meeting this criterion such as procedures of representative 
elections377 or more commonly, voluntary self selection in an open system of representation.378
The latter condition is seen by some commentators to pose a daunting impediment to 
NEG’s participatory and deliberative aspirations.379 This is because in a process of voluntary 
self-selection, it is typically only those who hear about the opportunity and have the time and 
resources to participate that are represented.380 Connected to this issue are concerns that citizens 
in contemporary developed societies are generally too apathetic and consumed with private life 
to put forth the time, energy, and commitment required.381 The corollary is that under conditions
371 Cohen J and Fung A, “Radical Democracy” (2004) 10(4) Swiss Journal of Political Science 23 at 30, (suggesting 
“democratic governments offer opportunities for any citizen to participate in direct deliberations, and at the same time 
that those who do participate are in networks with other citizens with whom they informally confer, even if those 
others are not directly involved in decision-making”); Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59; Mansbridge J, “Practice- 
Thought-Practice” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered 
Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 194.
372 Mansbridge, n 370, p 194; S Sturm (2006) “Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture o f Learning” in G De 
Burca and J Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US Hart Publishing , Oxford at 331.
373 Parkinson, n 365 at 30.
374 See for example: Karkkainen, n 12 at 75-76 (“Participants typically include all state and nonstate parties who 
believe they have a sufficient stake in the outcome to justify the necessary investment of time and other scarce 
institutional resources...“key actors are invited to join in the governance process, based on rough equality among 
participants”).
375 Moore, n 98, p 129.
376 For some examples of different criteria see Mansbridge, n 370, p 175-176, 193-194; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 
178, p 59; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 908.
377 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59; Ribot, n 185, p 3, 13.
378 Fung, n 184 at 342; Karkkainen, n 12 at 75; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59.
379 Lane, n 112 at 7- 8; Steinzor, n 235, page 19, 20 of “pdf’; Tushnet M, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton 
UP, 2003) p 170; Steinzor R, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: the Dangerous Joumey from Command to 
Self-control” (1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103 at 142.
380 Fung, n 184 at 342; Margerum, n 280 at 141.
381 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 37-38.
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of volunteerism, representation may end up skewed towards the richer, more educated people of 
an affected population382 or towards the same groups and “usual suspects” that have already had 
influence over decision making, rather than “ordinary citizens”. This is a particular concern for
383NEG theories that seek broader ideals of a more participatory and radical democracy.
Of course, the difficulties of volunteerism have been a long-standing issue for many
384governance initiatives and NEG scholars are fully conscious of the challenges it posses. 
Common responses, although not the only ones,385 are to suggest design conditions to overcome 
barriers that may prevent participation by ordinary citizens and/or achieve requisite balance of 
representatives in a collaborative institution or forum. These include the following suggestions 
derived from new governance theory and emerging, but limited, empirical work:
a) designing reasonable time, skills and resource demands of the NEG endeavour;386
b) designing the NEG approach to involve an appropriate incentive to foster 
representation of marginalised groups and ordinary citizens (i.e. designing the NEG 
experiment to address environmental issues and deliver outcomes that are acutely 
important to ordinary citizens);387
c) conducting education and community activities to broaden interest and engagement 
from wider affected interests;388
d) government agencies funding underrepresented interests, acting as proxy 
representatives or directly focusing their own financial and human resources to 
determine which parties ought to participate in which collaborative forums;389
e) organisers of the collaborative group ensuring appropriate representation,390 perhaps 
following government imposed procedural requirements on representation;391 and
f) legal frameworks that make funding to a collaborative forum conditional on meeting
392membership conditions.
382 Fung, n 184 at 342.
383 Abers R, “Reflections On What Makes Empowered Participatory Governance Happen” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) p 200; Sunstein, 351 at 29.
384 See for example, the experience of Landcare and ICM: Curtis and Lockwood, n 91 at 66; Curtis, n 93, p 452-453.
385 Given the difficulty of achieving full representation of non government stakeholders, some authors have suggested 
that if full representation is not achieved then those that are represented must consider the testimony and expressions 
of concern by the full range of non governmental stakeholders; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59.
386 Fung, n 184 at 342.
387 Fung, n 184 at 342.
388 Abers, n 383, p 200.
389 Freeman, n 5 at 31-32; Taylor M and Warburton D, “Legitimacy and the Role of UK Third Sector Organizations 
in the Policy Process” (2003) 14(3) International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 321 at 331; 
Moore, n 98, p 129; Moore and Rockloff, n 123 at 265; Leach, n 178 at 101-102.
390 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 59; John, n 9, p 231-232, 236, 238; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 908.
391 Lane, n 74 at 292.
392 See for example Cohen and Sabel, n 25 at 332-335.
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One particular but not insurmountable shortcoming with condition (f), at least in view of 
Taylor’s studies in the UK, is that the potential availability of funding is likely to attract 
representatives from organised interests who are seeking funding for their organisation, as 
opposed to “ordinary” citizens or other sought-after representatives.393
More generally, a noted394 lack of empirical evidence on representation and participation 
patterns in different and varied NEG institutions 395 has left NEG open to a range of 
commentators who remain unconvinced that the above conditions can necessarily ensure “real 
participation”.396 For that reason, there have been various calls in the literature for research into 
exactly what kinds of representation and participation are actually occurring in practice and 
what conditions caused these patterns.397 Particular questions also remain as to securing 
representation of environmental interests, a matter I return to discuss below.
Deliberative decision-making
In addition to concerns of inclusiveness and representativeness of collaborative forums, 
criteria of decision-making are also relevant. For present purposes it is not necessary to detail 
the specific variations between ideals of the deliberative398 or “negotiation” style decision 
making that typically inform NEG decision making processes.399 However it is relevant to note 
that both procedures generally require, inter alia,400 open and honest communication, all 
relevant information being available and utilised, and parties giving reasons, arguments, and
393 Taylor, n 145, p 185-186.
394 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 34; Steinzor, n 235 at fn 20 and 21, page 8 of “p d f’; Sunstein, n 351, at 28-29.
395 One of the most diverse studies at present relates to an examination of participants from 50 environmental 
programs managed by local governments (Abel T and Stephan M, “The Limits of Civic Environmentalism” (2000)
44 American Behavioral Scientist 614). Others have tended to focus on HCPs or watershed/NRM programs. See 
Thomas, n 13; Leach, n 178 at 108; Marshall B and Jones R, “Citizen Participation In Natural Resource Management: 
Does Representativeness Matter?” (2005) 25 (6) Sociological Spectrum 715; Bidwell R and Ryan C, “Collaborative 
Partnership Design: The Implications of Organizational Affiliation for Watershed Partnerships” (2006) 19(9) Society
& Natural Resources 827. See also the emerging analysis of participation in RNRM: Farrelly, n 123; Moore and 
Rockloff, n 123; Moore, n 98.
396 Farber D, “Models of Reinvention” (1999) October/November Boston Review 24 at 24; Steinzor, n 235, page 22 
of “p df’; Lawrence, n 116 at 11; Lane M and Corbett T, “The Tyranny of Localism: Indigenous Participation in 
Community-Based Environmental Management” (2005) 7 (2) Journal o f Environmental Policy & Planning 141 at 
152-155; Margerum, n 280 at 141 -142; Tushnet, n 378, p 170;
397 Collaborative Democracy Network, n 171 at 169; Leach, n 178 at 108; Karkkainen, n 13, p 222-223; Karkkainen, 
n 17 at 238-239.
398 See for example “ideal deliberative procedure (Cohen, n 28, p 74-75) or Habermas’s “ideal speech situation” 
(Habermas J, “Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence” (1970) 13 Inquiry 360).
399 For a good overview see O’Leary et al, n 296. See also Fisher R, Ury W and Patton B, Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving In (Penguin Books, 1991); Susskind L, Levy P and Thomas-Larmer J, Negotiating 
Environmental Agreements: How to Avoid Escalating Confrontation, Needless Costs, and Unnecessary Litigation 
(Island Press, Washington DC, 2000).
4(KI Procedures of negotiation and deliberation also typically emphasise the abovementioned necessity of including 
representatives from all relevant stakeholders and/or perspectives; Sabatier et al, n 265, p 195.
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principles to reach some form of mutual or workable agreement, rather than say relying on 
coercion, bargaining or an imbalance of power or resources.401
One of the primary concerns in the literature is that meeting these demanding conditions in 
practice may be difficult, if not impossible, given the reality of power and capacity imbalances 
among decision makers.402 Two of the more controversial issues arising from power disparities 
relate to the danger that decision-making will be dominated either by (i) more well resourced, 
knowledgeable or skilful non governmental parties such as industry;403 and/or (ii) those 
typically accustomed to influencing decisions such as bureaucrats and government agencies.404
In terms of the former, some authors remain concerned that most non-governmental actors 
will not have the capacity to match industry’s expertise in scientific and technical issues, or 
their ample resources.405 Leading NEG authors have accordingly tried to counter such concerns 
through suggesting the need for appropriate power balancing conditions. Some authors, for 
example, contend that harsh default rules406 or some form of government assistance is needed 
(eg. funding, technical assistance or other support) to ensure information is revealed and 
equality fostered.407 Steinzor, however, questions the latter, arguing that any such funding will 
be too small to be effective,408 and/or that direct assistance from government officers will be 
ineffective because the experts who work for industry will overwhelm government efforts.409
Such “assistance” also raises the second concern: potential dominance of the decision 
making process by government officials. This concern resonates with the long recognised 
criticism raised by Arnstein410 and others of supposedly participatory public fora that instead 
serve as spaces in which governments create the illusion of popular control, while still making 
the decisions (in the “back room” or through other subtler use of the levers of power which they 
control).4" This is a complex issue, given that most NEG approaches involve non-government
401 Hamilton J and Wills-Toker C, “Reconceptualizing Dialogue in Environmental Public Participation” (2006) 34(4) 
Policy Studies Journal 755 at 758; Trachtenberg and Focht, n 178, p 62-64; Fung, n 171 at 69; Fung and Wright, n 27, 
p 33-35; Craig A and Vanclay F, “Questioning the Potential of Deliberativeness to Achieve ‘Acceptable’ Natural 
Resource Management Decisions” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds) Participation and Governance in Regional 
Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 157-158.
402 Sturm, n 213, p 331.
403 Farber, n 396 at 24; Steinzor, n 379 at 142.
404 Abers, n 383, p 200; Head, n 239, p 54-57.
405 Steinzor, n 235 fn 41, 97 page 9 and 18 of “p d f’.
406 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 15, 23-24; Cohen, n 28, p 74.
407 See for example Freeman, n 5 at 32 (“In order to prevent well-resourced groups from dominating deliberative 
processes, the agency may provide technical assistance grants or other needed support to consumer or community 
groups”).
4(18 Steinzor, n 235, page 19 of “p d f’.
409 Steinzor, n 235, page 19 of “p d f’.
410 Arnstein, n 181 at 217; Ross et al, n 171 at 205.
411 Abers, n 383, p 200.
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actors deliberating or negotiating with professional government officers, who may dazzle the 
untrained or uninitiated and impose their preferences with little meaningful discussion.412
Perhaps the most promising condition for balancing power between government officials 
and citizens (or indeed industry and community members), is Fung and his collaborator’s ideas 
on “countervailing powers”.413 Akin to earlier notions of tripartism,414 the term countervailing 
power is used to describe a variety of mechanisms (such as public interest groups) that reduce, 
and perhaps even neutralize, the power-advantages of ordinarily powerful actors and thus yield 
the benefits of democratic governance.415
However the issue of generating countervailing power remains problematic. Fung and 
Wright do not yet have a theory as to the mobilization of countervailing power or how much is 
enough to achieve the democratic potential of new governance designs.416
The smooth conversion of current national or state environmental interest groups to 
collaborative forums is arguably prevented by issues of scale (eg. under resourced national or 
state public interest groups may struggle to engage in numerous localised collaborations) and 
their cognitive frames (i.e. adversarial public interest groups versus collaborative forums).417 
Fung and Wright accordingly speculate that appropriate collaborative countervailing power 
sources may include:
•locally organised adversarial organisations participating in collaborations; and
418•larger social movements with local affiliations participating in collaborations.
However, barriers may also remain regarding the willingness of these local organisations 
to collaborate. Like their national or state counterparts, they too may possess adversarial 
cognitive frames that may lead participants to be suspicious of proposals for collaboration.419 
Furthermore, the fact that their existence depends on “capricious factors” (eg. factors that give 
rise to social movements as well as lower barriers to collective action generally) may mean local
412 Fung, n 187, p 25; Steinzor, n 235 fn 41, page 9 o f “p d f’.
413 Fung and Wright, n 331; See also Liebman S and Sabel C, “A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The 
Emerging Model Of School governance And Legal Reform” (2003) 28 New York University Review of Law and 
Social Change 183 at 273.
414 Ayres and Braithwaite, n 80, p 84; Braithwaite, n 218 at 92.
415 Fung and Wright, n 331 p 260; Shane P, “Review Essay Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech 
Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy Reviewing Archon 
Fung And Erik Olin Wright, Eds., Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations In Empowered Participatory 
Governance (Verso, 2003)” (2005) 1(1) I/S: A Journal Of Law And Policy 147 at 154.
416 Fung and Wright, n 331 p 280-282; Shane, n 415 at 154.
417 Karkkainen, n 43 at 961-962; Fung and Wright, n 331 p 280-282. See also similar discussions in Seidenfeld, n 370 
at 474-475.
418 The basic rationale here is that more localised participation is apposite because they match to decentralised 
collaborative scale, and posses necessary organizational competencies (such as deep local knowledge, previous 
engagement in the issue) necessary to participate in collaborative governance. Seidenfeld, n 370 at 473-476; 
Karkkainen, n 43 at 961-962; Fung and Wright, n 331 p 266-267, 282-283 (they also identifying other sources of 
countervailing power, such as political parties and leaders (e.g. a politician supportive of participatory approaches).
419 Fung and Wright, n 331, p 283.
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environmental interest groups will be strong in some areas but weaker or non-existent in 
others.420
Even if the participation of local environmental interest groups is secured, some authors 
have cautioned that such countervailing groups may not necessarily act to further the interests of 
the general public, nor have the necessary political vision or expertise to countervail against 
wider dominant social and political powers.421 Questions also remain as to how they can 
simultaneously be harnessed through participation in NEG and yet remain sufficiently “outside” 
to perform their countervailing function.422
Sharing the above concerns, some authors have hypothesised that the adequacy of 
environmental or other interests’ representation in locally based collaborative processes may be 
improved by the introduction of nested sets of collaborative arrangements (i.e. local, regional, 
state and national).423 This can inject a larger scale from which to identify individuals and 
formal organisations to be represented in decision-making (eg. providing an avenue to bring in 
state environmental interests).424 The potential of this approach however remains largely 
untested in practice.425
Ultimately, the above doubts about national and local environmental interests meaningfully 
participating in collaboration have led some commentators to suggest that localised and “place 
based” collaboration will effectively disenfranchise stakeholders who favour environmental
426protection.
Facing these questions, Fung and Wright and others accordingly urge the need to study the 
roles, forms, and sources of political power in the distinctive structure and politics of 
collaborative approaches to governing.427 Chapter 6 responds directly to these calls and the other 
issues raised above, to examine through three case studies the conditions under which NEG can 
achieve meaningful participation and deliberative decisions making. Doing so, the findings in 
the chapter provide some vital insight into the conditions for achieving inclusive and
420 Fung and Wright, n 331, p 267, 283-284.
421 Defilippis J, Fisher R and Shragge E, “Neither Romance Nor Regulation: Reevaluating Community” (2006) 30(3) 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 673 at 684; Farber D, “Triangulating the Future of 
Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection” (2000) U. 111. L. Rev. 61 at 75; Seidenfeld, n 370 
at 477; McCloskey M, “The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limit”. (1996) May 13 High Country News, 
www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 viewed 30 May 2008 viewed 10 May 2008.
422 Some authors such as Taylor and her colleagues have used their research in the UK to suggest that so called 
“insider” and “outsider” strategies are dependent on each other and both types of approaches and organisations are 
useful and necessary; See Craig et al, n 130 at 233-236; Sturm, n 213 at 331.
423 Margerum, n 280 at 145, 148.
424 Margerum, n 280 at 145, 148.
425 Margerum, n 280 at 145, 148.
426 See McCloskey, n 42; McCloskey M, “What We Have Learned from William Leach’s Study of 76 Collaborative 
Watershed Projects in California and Washington” The Collaborative Edge, Winter 2004 -  05 
www.csus.edu/ccp/newsletter/2005AVinter/index.htm viewed June 25, 2007; Koontz and Thomas, n 245 at 113.
427 Fung and Wright, n 331, p 286; Collaborative Democracy Network, n 171 at 169; Koontz and Thomas, n 245 at 
113; Karkkainen, n 17 at 239; Shane, n 415 at 154-155; Sturm, n 213, p 331.
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representative NEG institutions and reveal some important empirical examples of relatively 
novel countervailing power arrangements that may be necessary for securing meaningful 
participation by less powerful groups in decision making.
2.4.3 When and how can NEG foster effective learning and 
adaptation?
There has been little theorising, or research into the existence and operation of practical 
mechanisms for learning and adaptation.428 This has left NEG open to criticism for paying 
insufficient attention to whether and how actors can gather, analyse and act on information 
about shortcomings in their practice.429
There are of course a range of different issues and debates associated with the three 
different learning and adaptation ideas under this third defining feature of NEG. Reflexive law 
approaches, for example, seek to set up processes for self-regulation that instill self-critical 
thinking, learning and adaptation. However some authors suggest its success may depend on 
additional conditions other than the processes themselves. That is, whether sufficient incentives 
exist to both drive regulated actors to improve environmental performance and/or ensure their 
commitment to using and following the process.430
In the case of pragmatism and adaptive management approaches, there is still very little 
known about the conditions and operating mechanisms under which collaborative groups will 
best conduct monitoring and evaluation processes to achieve effective learning and 
adaptation.431
The few studies that have explored these issues in the context of NEG approaches such as 
Habitat Conservation Plans432 and Integrated Catchment Management,433 have revealed that 
collaborators often lack the capacities, or support to ensure effective learning and adaptation. 
This and other research,434 suggest that effective learning and adaptation may depend on 
conditions including available monitoring and science technologies,435 penalty default rules to
428 Head, n 85, p 146; Karkkainen, n 17 at 243; Paton et al, n 123 at 262; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 32; Camacho A, 
"Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management" (2007) 55 UCLA Law Review 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=969676 viewed 10 May 2008.
429 Sturm, n 213, p 327-328; Thomas, n 13 at 154.
430 Fiorino,n 205, p 413-416.
431 Collaborative Democracy Network, n 171 at 169; Head, n 85, p 145; Thomas, n 13 at 154; Fung and Wright, n 27, 
p 31-32; Sturm, n 213, p 328; Dovers, n 317, p 522-523.
432 Camacho n 428; Karkkainen, n 13, p 218; Thomas, n 13, p 153-156. See also the questions raised by Karkkainen 
regarding whether the so called “adaptive management” approach o f HCP is more “contingency planning” than 
“adaptive management” per se; Karkkainen, n 194 at 70-72.
433 Ewing, n 87, p 407-408; Dovers, n 317, p 521-522.
434 Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 888-889; Karkkainen, n 9 at 229-231.
435 John, n 280 at 10; Weber, n 70 at 461.
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compel parties to take necessary action,436 and funding and information support.437 However, 
whether governments and/or collaborative groups will be able to source such technologies and 
funding for the likely extensive and costly ongoing monitoring of outcomes/trends required for 
complex environmental problems remains uncertain.438
Similar “knowledge gaps” exist regarding NEG approaches that seek more “systemic 
learning”. Beyond the architecture outlined by democratic experimentalism,439 and studies of the 
OMC in the EU,440 there have been few examples or investigations of NEG structures for 
systemic learning in practice.441 Accordingly, an important area for research is the investigation 
of conditions under which local experiments can be linked and central monitoring can be 
conducted successfully to foster systemic efforts to refine policy determinations, diffuse the 
most successful models, and to learn from the errors of the failures.442
One final challenge for fostering successful learning and adaptation in NEG is the 
conditions of accountability. Most learning structures require provisional decision-making, 
flexibility and discretion. These characteristics potentially expose NEG to abuses of discretion 
and power.443 However the paradox is that limiting discretion to lower the risk of such defects 
will likely frustrate the goals of learning and adaptation.444 The answer, according to many NEG 
scholars, may lie with successfully designing “new” forms of accountability.
Given this link between accountability structures and effective learning and adaptation, 
these two features of NEG are considered together in chapter 7. In particular, chapter 7 
examines both reflexive law and adaptive management approaches to learning and adaptation, 
as well as attempts at more systemic learning in practice. The findings reveal a range of relevant 
insights into the above debates and questions and point to some key conditions for NEG 
approaches to best promote learning and adaptation.
2.4.4 Issues regarding “new” forms of accountability
The final feature of NEG is “new” forms of accountability. Accountability itself is an issue 
that has raised numerous broader debates within the new governance literature, many of which
436 Karkkainen, n 43 at 978, 981.
437 Thomas, n 13 at 167, 169; John, n 9, p 239; Freeman and Färber, n 11 at 889.
438 Head, n 85, p 145.
439 Dorf and Sabel, n 20; Sabel et al, n 4 at 4.
440 See for example: Sabel and Zeitlin, n 128.
441 Camacho, n 428; Thomas, n 13 at 156-158; Karkkainen, n 13, p 218.
442 Head, n 85, p 146; Karkkainen, n 17 at 243; Paton et al, n 123 at 262; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 32.
443 Freeman and Färber, n 11 at 893-894; Hornstein, n 241 at 949, fn 197; Doremus, n 234 at 52, 88; Freeman, n 5 at 
83-87; Karkkainen, n 43 at 963.
444 Freeman, n 5 at 87-91; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 231-237.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
80
continue today.445 However, important empirical questions also remain. Investigating the 
operation of some specific “new” mechanisms and approaches to accountability raised in the 
NEG literature in practice is seen to have particular merit as it is rare within the new 
environmental governance literature to find empirical examination of the “is” of accountability 
as opposed to “the ought”.446
Accordingly, there is particular benefit in focusing attention on the structures and 
processes of accountability in a real world context and in exploring the conditions under which 
effective “new” forms of accountability are most likely to be achieved.447 One critical question 
is the extent to which NEG institutions can be perverted into rent-seeking vehicles and the 
efficacy of efforts to check this tendency.448 Another relates to performance of NEG in dealing 
with the uncomfortable dilemma raised in most debates over accountability, namely how to give 
sufficient autonomy to NEG groups for them to achieve their learning and implementation tasks 
while at the same time ensuring an adequate degree of consistency and control.449
Certainly the NEG literature contains a range of suggested conditions and “new” 
mechanisms for ensuring accountability, although there is little agreement on these issues and 
even less empirical research to assist in choosing between them.
Accountability in reflexive law inspired process-based approaches typically focuses on the 
features of the desired system and the adequacy of actual management systems.450 However, a 
noted shortcoming of ensuring accountability for process, rather than performance, is that there 
is no guarantee that results will be achieved. As with learning aspirations, its success may 
depend on whether sufficient conditions exist to drive industry to improve environmental 
performance and ensure their commitment to using the management system.451
Accountability for performance452 is usually sought through the setting of performance 
standards and many (but by no means all) theories have made concrete recommendations for 
how performance standards are to be set. For example, Karkkainen recommends setting 
continually refined regulatory bottom lines in the form of penalty default rules based on best 
available knowledge.453 Central here is recognition that actors will often need incentives to
445 Not least, questions remain as to whether the fragmentation of responsibility and involvement o f private and third 
parties in NEG serves to obfuscate and reduce (Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 906-907), add to (Freeman, n 48 at 665; 
Freeman, n 22 at 198-201; Weber, n 70 at 463-467) or transform NEG accountability (generally Sabel and Simon, n 
215).
446 Weber, n 70 at 454; Fung and Wright, n 27, p 37.
447 Weber, n 70 at 454; Karkkainen, n 17, at 237; Sturm, n 213, p 331-334.
448 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 37.
449 Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 235-237; Scott, n 214 at 39; May, n 214 at 23.
450 As noted above, professional accountability, third-party certification and independent auditors may all play an 
important accountability role; Freeman, n 5 at 30, 96; May, n 214 at 11,13.
451 Fiorino,n 205, p 413-416.
452 See for example Karkkainen et al, n 24; Karkkainen, n 43 at 992-997; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 240-241.
453 Karkkainen, n 43 at 993-997; Karkkainen, n 79, p 310-314.
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reveal information, and it is necessary to focus their attention on setting locally tailored and 
objectively measurable environmental performance targets.454 Doubts remain however whether 
government or collaborators will be able to meet the significant costs of generating data to set 
meaningful standards, given that establishing baseline conditions of the ambient environment 
and the implications of its contamination is often extremely demanding.455 If they cannot, 
holding groups accountable for performance becomes tenuous.456
If enough information can be generated to set meaningful performance standards, 
collaborations may be required (eg. by government) to identify indicators or methods of 
assessing performance, and then monitor and report on their adherence to performance goals.457 
However questions remain as to whether and under what conditions local collaborations are 
capable of being effective monitors and able to produce data on which their performance can be 
assessed. 5
Furthermore, an ongoing concern in the literature is whether externally imposed 
requirements for more self monitoring and reporting on implementation or the use of 
government grants will be too prescriptive, stringent or onerous, and thus stifle flexibility, 
learning and effectiveness at collaborative level.459
Assuming that a collaborative group is effective in monitoring and reporting on its 
performance, the information generated may be used by various forums to hold the group 
accountable for performance. While there are a range of questions and debates in the literature 
regarding different forums and their collective interaction, two important areas for research 
relate to conditions of effective government monitoring, and mutual accountability between 
collaborative groups.
Addressing these in turn, some authors suggest government agencies and officers can 
contribute to effective accountability by acting as the final decision maker, ensuring law is 
respected, limiting opportunistic behaviour and encouraging responsible practices among 
collaborators.460 Others remain sceptical of this approach, questioning whether agencies are 
likely to abuse what is often quite significant discretion in flexible adaptive management
454 Karkkainen, n 43 at 993-997; Karkkainen, n 79, p 310-314.
455 See Steinzor, n 235 page 15 o f “p d f ’; Steinzor R, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: Back to the Past by 
Way of the Future” (1998) 28 ELR 10361. Note that Karkkainen appears to recognise this problem (Karkkainen, n 43 
at 996).
456 Sturm, n 213, p 331-334.
457 Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 241; Karkkainen et al, n 24 at 691; Freeman, n 5 at 29-31.
458 Fung and Wright, n 27, p 31-32; Gaines, n 67 at 16; Sturm, n 213, p 333.
459 Lawrence, n 116 at 13-14; Head, n 85, p 146; Sturm, n 213, p 333; Fung, n 187, p 28; Freeman J, “Remarks by 
Professor Jody Freeman to Japanese American Law Society” (2005) 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1859 at 1871-1872, 1874; 
Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 235-237.
460 Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 238; Manring N, “The Politics of Accountability in National Forest Planning” 
(2005) 37(1) Administration and Society 57 at 77.
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approaches.461 Some also query whether cooperative relationships compromise the ability of 
government to maintain pressure for high levels of environmental performance.462 Here, access 
to courts for reviews of agency decision making and having the legislature guide and bound 
agency decision making through outcome orientated statues and regulatory bottom lines may 
help mitigate such problems.463
However as some authors suggest, setting such goals themselves may be problematic 
particularly balancing specificity and generality (too much specificity may impede creativity 
and local context in site specific agreements while too little may invite abuse or let them be 
ignored).464 Another method for ensuring regulated parties are not able to dominate decision 
making is suggested by the democratic experimentalist model, where a more independent, 
central government monitor of groups has a key disciplining and accountability role.465 Vital 
here is the use of an administrative “destabilisation right”466 - a right to intervene, destabilise 
and disentrench efforts that evidenced chronic underperformance relevant to expectation, 
problems of capture, distortions arising form bargaining or other procedural defect (eg. political 
blockage).467
Consistent with the ideal of experimentalism, this “destabilisation” would involve an 
agency offering a normative critique of the NEG group (rather than specifically prescribing new 
arrangements) that would fashion a fresh start.468 Monetary compensation or a requirement to 
offset adverse impacts may also be imposed.469 While an important and novel suggestion for 
fostering accountability, at present the effectiveness of this destabilisation right in NEG remains 
largely theoretical, with some authors questioning whether interventions justified by a group’s 
failure could thwart the necessary openness and engagement for collaborative problem solving 
to work.470
In terms of more horizontal avenues for ensuring accountability for performance, some 
authors suggest effective forms of mutual accountability471 require that environmental interests 
gain a foothold in the collaborative group to provide a form of countervailing power.472 This
461 Doremus, n 234 at 87 -88; Freeman, n 5 at 91-94.
462 Harlow C and Rawlings R, “Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: a network approach” (2007) 
13(4) European Law Journal 542 at 545.
463 Doremus, n 234 at 87 -88; Freeman, n 5 at 91-94; Karkkainen n 43.
464 Dana, n 22 at 53-53. May, n 214; Freeman, n 5 at 92-95; Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 241.
465 Kakkainen et al, n 24.
466 Karkkainen also discusses another more “bottom up” destabilisation right based on citizen suit provisions; 
Karkkainen, n 79, p 318-320.
467 Karkkainen, n 79, p 31; Karkkainen, n 43 at 980-981.
468 Karkkainen, n 79, p 317.
469 Karkkainen, n 43 at 980-981.
470 Sturm, n 213, p 333.
471 Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 16, p 238; Freeman and Farber, n 11 at 905-906, 908.
472 Fung and Wright, n 331 at 271; Karkkainen, n 43 at 961-962.
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raises questions noted above regarding the difficulty of environmental groups participating in 
NEG. Other authors however have questioned whether mutual interest473 in fact compromises 
the ability of collaborators to act as effective accountability mechanisms, particularly where 
localised collaborations favour more powerful “industry” interests under highly flexible and 
discretionary standards like those seemingly required for adaptive management.474
Chapter 7 responds and provides some insights into many of these questions and debates 
by examining in practice the operation of various “new” forms of accountability across the three 
case studies of this thesis.
2.5 Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been the emerging theory and research on NEG. Throughout 
the above discussion an ongoing tension between divergence and convergence in NEG 
scholarship has been at play. As we have seen, there are many diverse NEG experiments from 
across the globe that have been studied by scholars using a range of methodologies and applying 
a range of distinct theoretical rationales.475
It is apparent however that we can still acknowledge such diversity without losing 
ourselves amongst the metaphorical trees. Drawing on emerging attempts to synthesise new 
governance theory, the figurative “forest” that is NEG took shape around 4 key, but broad 
groupings of approaches common across many NEG experiments and theories. That is, 
collaboration, participatory and deliberative aspirations, learning and adaptability, and “new” 
forms of accountability. While there is some variation in how these broad approaches are 
conceived by individual theories, it was suggested that each can be seen as a vital feature that 
defines NEG’s unique approach to governing the environment.
As we saw from the general normative claims made in the NEG literature, each of these 
four approaches is seen to promise a generally more effective and more democratic form of 
environmental governance than other traditional approaches. Taken together, these 
characteristics of NEG offer a “new” way of thinking about and creating arrangements for 
“good” environmental governance.
However, exactly whether, when and how NEG’s approach to governing can be 
successfully achieved in practice is not immediately clear. The current dearth of research into 
NEG in practice and the diversity of NEG theories has given rise to a range of debates and 
questions about exactly how “good” NEG can be achieved.
473 See Harlow C and Rawlings R “Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: a network approach” 
European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 542 at 545.
474 McCloskey, n 421; Koontz and Thomas, n 245 at 113; Karkkainen, n 43 at 961.
475 Karkkainen, n 1 at 472, 496; Lobel, n 2 at 499-501.
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The chapter proceeded to highlight those debates, to identify unanswered questions and 
gaps in knowledge and to highlight a significant lack of empirical research regarding the 
conditions under which each of NEG’s defining approaches to governing may be successful 
secured in practice. As pointed out, subsequent chapters respond to these gaps and debates and 
seek to offer insights into developing better theory about the conditions under which NEG may 
best operate in practice.
Doing so it is guided by a primary research question: under what conditions can “good” 
NEG be achieved? More specifically, to answer this question five sub research questions are 
examined. These are:
•what conditions foster the emergence of successful collaboration?
•what conditions contribute to sustaining successful collaboration?
•what conditions foster meaningful participation and deliberation?
•what conditions foster effective learning and adaptation?
•what conditions foster effective “new” forms of accountability?
Before turning to investigate these questions, however, it is useful to outline the 
methodology of this research project and provide some background to the cases. These are the 
subjects of the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3: Methodology - examining the conditions of 
“good” NEG 
3.1 Introduction
From the previous chapter it will be apparent that much empirical research is still needed 
to understand what is working in NEG, what is not, and why.7 However, like most policy and 
governance processes, NEG is a complex phenomenon to study empirically, involving multiple 
public and private actors, and distinct institutions at local, regional, national and even 
international scales. There are also decidedly distinct views in the literature on appropriate 
methods,2 criteria/ and standards4 for effectively evaluating NEG. Indeed, the lack of any 
agreed methodology makes the limited NEG empirical research that has been conducted thus far 
difficult to compare, synthesize, and learn from because the evaluation criteria, theoretical 
orientation (if any)5 and the basis for the methods chosen were not always clear.6 Ideally, agreed 
common criteria, weightings, and methods should be used to study NEG so as to enable studies 
to be fairly compared to each other.7 However, such methodological consensus seems a long 
way off8 and in the meantime, the best that individual research can do is to make transparent its 
own assumptions, methodologies and measures so as to facilitate efforts to compare and learn 
from its insights into NEG.9
' Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great Lakes” (2006) 19 Pac. 
McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 209 at 212.
2 See the various discussions and approaches in: Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and 
Matlock M, “Conclusions and recommendations” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and 
Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 280; 
Conley A and Moote M, “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management” (2003) 16 Society and Natural 
Resources 371 at 380-381; Koontz T and Thomas C, “What do we Know and Need to Know about the Environmental 
Outcomes of Collaborative Management” (2006) December Public Administration Review 111 at 115-116; 
Coglianese C, “Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking” in O ’Leary R 
and Bingham L (eds), The Promise and Performance o f Environmental Conflict Resolution (RFF, 2003) p 69-86; 
Leach W, Pelkey N and Sabatier P, “Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative Policy Making: Evaluation Criteria 
Applied to Watershed Management in California and W ashington” (2002) 21(4) Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 645 at 654.
3 There are various criteria for assessing processes, environment outcomes, social outcomes and NEG experiments: 
Conley and Moote, n 2 at 375.
4 For example empirical studies have sought to illustrate ideals, test theories, evaluated collaborative efforts against 
its own goals, or against another NEG effort; Conley and Moote, n 2 at 377.
5 Bidwell R and Ryan C, “Collaborative Partnership Design: The Implications of Organizational Affiliation for 
Watershed Partnerships” (2006) 19(9) Society & Natural Resources 827 at 828; Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, 
Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, “Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management” in Sabatier P, 
Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative 
Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 11-12.
6 Sabatier et al, n 5, p 11-12; Conley and Moote, n 2 at 373.
7 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 376, 382.
8 See particularly discussions in Conley and Moote, n 2.
9 Conley and Moote, n 2, at 376, 382.
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Accordingly, it is essential that the logical basis of this empirical research project and its 
methods of data collection, interpretation and analysis be thoroughly explained.10 This is the 
purpose of the chapter, which will proceed in 5 main sections.”
Section 3.1 of this chapter begins by clarifying the theoretical perspectives and knowledge 
claims on which this study is founded. Initially, a brief overview of the differences between 
quantitative and qualitative analysis is provided. This overview informs a discussion of why a 
primarily qualitative approach was selected. The focus of the chapter then shifts to the issue of 
knowledge claims and theoretical perspectives, discussing the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of the research project.
Section 3.2 then introduces the strategies of inquiry used by this thesis, covering the 
process of and reasoning for the selection of this research project’s two strategies of inquiry, 
namely “adaptive theory” and a “collective case study” approach. Section 3.3 then focuses on 
key features of the research design, reflecting on its flexible and adaptable nature, before 
discussing how and on what grounds the cases and interviewees were selected.
Section 3.4 examines the methods of data collection and the process of data analysis used 
to answer this project’s research questions and explains how the thesis addresses a range of 
pertinent ethical and validity issues. Section 3.5 concludes by bringing together the three parts 
of this chapter and offering a summation of the project’s orientation, collection of data, 
interpretation and analysis of findings.12
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives and Knowledge Claims
This section seeks to lay bare the methodological foundations of the thesis. Specifically the 
theoretical perspectives and knowledge claims on which this study, its inquiry and methods are 
based. This involves outlining the reasons for selecting a primarily qualitative approach to 
analysis before turning to discuss its ontological and epistemological assumptions.
3.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research
10 McNeil P, Research Methods (Tavistock, 1985) p 14.
" To systematically and comprehensively achieve this purpose, the chapter has been divided into three main parts 
that broadly correspond to fundamental research design questions raised by Creswell J, Research Design: Qualitative, 
Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Sage, 2003) p 5 - (i) what are the knowledge claims and theoretical 
perspectives that were made? (ii) what are the strategies of inquiry that will inform the research procedures? and (iii) 
what methods of data collection and analysis will be used? The layout of the chapter also draws inspiration from 
Hendriks C, Public Deliberation and Interest Organisations: A Study o f Responses to Lay Citizen Engagement in 
Public Policy (ANU Thesis, 2004) Chapter 3.
12 McNeil, n 10, p 14.
Cameron Holley Ne w En vironmenta/ Go vernance
87
As outlined in chapter 2, this thesis’ research is focused on answering the question: under 
what conditions can “good” NEG be achieved? This general question is broken down into the 
following 5 sub research questions that correspond to key defining features of “good” NEG:
•what conditions foster the emergence of successful collaboration?
•what conditions contribute to sustaining successful collaboration?
•what conditions foster “meaningful” participation and deliberation?
•what conditions foster effective learning and adaptation?
•what conditions foster effective “new” forms of accountability?
These questions are all focused squarely on developing an understanding of the conditions 
that impacted on the workings and effectiveness of NEG processes in practice. This naturally 
requires the exploration of a number of issues. These include the context and institutional 
arrangements of NEG, the thoughts, views, attitudes and practices of participants in NEG 
experiments, particularly regarding which conditions were important, beneficial and/or 
detrimental for successfully fostering the key features of “good” NEG.13
A qualitative approach is accordingly well suited to answering these questions because 
qualitative research has the capacity to embrace issues of context while also pursuing a 
preference for understanding meanings and consciousness of actors and events in the social 
world.14
Generally speaking, qualitative research1^ can be characterised by a variety of methods16 
and traditions17 that study and collect empirical materials, resulting in textual or narrative 
descriptions or analyses of moments and meanings in individuals’ lives.18 This approach has
13 Hammersley M, What’s Wrong with Ethnography (Routledge, 1992) p 165; Silverman D, Doing Qualitative 
Research A Practical Handbook (Sage Publications, 2005) p 8.
14 Hammersley, n 13, p 165; Silverman, n 13, p 8; Neuman W, Social Research Methods : Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches (5th ed, Allyn and Bacon, 2003) p 166.
15 Qualitative research has been variously defined. For two quite different definitions see: Strauss A and Corbin J, 
Basics o f Qualitative Research Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (Sage Publications, 
1998) p 10-11; Denzin N and Lincoln Y, “Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research” in 
Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), Strategies o f Qualitative Inquiry (2nd ed, Sage Thousand Oaks, 2003) p 19-29.
16 For instance, field notes, interviews, conservations, photographs, observations, and memos; Denzin N and Lincoln 
Y, “The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), The Handbook o f  
Qualitative Research (2nd ed, Sage Thousand Oaks, 2000) p 3.
17 For an excellent summary of the variety o f traditions in qualitative research see: Creswell J, Qualitative Inquiry and 
Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Sage Thousand Oaks, 1998) p 6.
18 Denzin and Lincoln, n 15, p 5; Maxwell D, “Can Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Serve Complementary 
Purposes for Policy Research? Evidence from ACCRA” Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper 
No. 40 , (International Food Policy Research Institute, 1998) Washington p 4, 
http://www.ifpri.org/divs/fcnd/dp/papers/dp40.pdf viewed on 30 May 2008.
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sometimes been segregated and at odds19 with a more quantitative approach,20 characterised by 
numerical information and statistical analysis.21
Although a more quantitative approach (using methods such as surveys, structured 
observation etc) could have been adopted to collect and analyse the workings of NEG in 
practice, such an approach was considered inappropriate for this study. Statistics and 
numeration of quantitative data have noted difficulty accommodating the complex and dynamic 
nature of collaborative efforts, their contexts and institutional design22 and are unlikely to ‘fully’ 
capture the experience of the participants in terms of the successes or failures in studying all the 
elements of NEG.23
However, to the extent practicable quantitative data should be used to round out qualitative 
research,24 and for this reason the thesis does support its qualitative approach to researching 
NEG by utilising some limited quantitative data, albeit sourced from secondary documents and 
other sources.25 It does so particularly where qualitative research may be weaker or less 
appropriate than numerical and objective data (eg. numbers of participants, funding levels) to 
develop an understanding of the conditions that support the elements of NEG.26
3.2.2 Knowledge Claims and Theoretical Perspectives
Regardless of the mix of qualitative or quantitative approaches to research adopted, there 
are many ontological (an outlook of social reality) and epistemological (a belief about 
knowledge/what can be known about reality) bases from which a researcher can approach their 
project.27 Broadly speaking, these beliefs form the “worldview” that defines for its holder the 
nature of the world, the individual’s place in it and the range of possible relationships to that
19 Creswell, n 11, p 4.
20 Quantitative research is social research strategy that primarily analyses patterns of covariation across cases, using 
methods that engender numeric information and apply statistical tests and models; Silverman D, Doing Qualitative 
Research A Practical Handbook (Sage, 2000) p 3; Maxwell, n 18, p 4; Ragin C, Constructing Social Research (Sage 
Thousand Oaks, 1994) p 190; Bryman A, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Unwin Hyman, 1988) p 11-12.
21 Silverman, n 20, p 5, 7, 9-11; McNeil, n 10, p 14-15; Lewis J, “Design Issues” in J Ritchie and H Lewis (eds) 
Qualitative Research Practice A guide for social science students and researchers (Sage, 2003) p 51; Guba E and 
Lincoln Y, “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research theories and Issues” in Hesse-Biber S and Leavy P (eds), 
Approaches to Qualitative Research: A reader in Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2004) p 18-21.
22 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 379.
23 Indeed, a study that relied primarily on quantitative research techniques may have been more likely to be open to 
possibilities of concealing rather than revealing important conditions and factors relevant to success or failure of the 
elements of NEG; Silverman, n 20, p 8.
24 See for instance: Maxwell, n 18, p 1; Silverman, n 20, p 11; Neuman, n 14, p 139.
25 Neuman, n 14, p 166.
26 Neuman, n 14, p 139.
27 Creswell, n 17, p 74.
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world and its parts.28 This view of the world is typically referred to as a “paradigm”29 and has 
been discussed as forming a continuum that ranges from positivism at one end to constructivism 
at the other.30
The ontological and epistemological assumptions made by this thesis lie roughly in 
between these two extremes and have been greatly influenced by the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of Derek Layder’s “Adaptive Theory” approach (AT).31 As 
discussed in more detail below, AT is a strategy of inquiry that represents an amalgam of 
different influences and approaches to research, and specifically emphasises the interaction 
between existing theory and ideas derived from empirical examination.32
Guided by AT,33 this thesis’ ontology views social activity (perceptions and meanings) as 
conditioned and shaped by systemic phenomena (ideology, power, money, institutions), while 
acknowledging that the activity itself simultaneously serves to reproduce, sustain or transform 
these systemic features.34 Its epistemology incorporates the “internal” subjective point of view, 
which relates to social interaction. However, it also adopts a moderate (as opposed to a strict 
positivist) objective observer’s point of view35 to account for the fact that systems have their 
own “emergent properties” tied to the world of social interaction.36
These knowledge claims enable a balance to be struck between the more objective 
concerns of positivist paradigms and the more subjective concerns of interpretive paradigms and 
grounded theory.37 This balance seeks to incorporate emic views of participants in NEG 
processes, while allowing for structural insights as a central part of social research.38 As a result, 
this thesis examines features of “good” NEG such as effective collaboration, participation and 
accountability in relation to experience and perspectives of participants, while also paying close 
attention to the institutional design and other contextual factors of cases.
28 That is, the metaphysics that defines for its holder the nature of the world, the individual’s place in it and the range 
of possible relationships to that world and its parts; Guba and Lincoln, n 21, p 17, 21; Creswell, n 17, p 74-75.
29 Guba and Lincoln, n 21, p 17-24; Creswell, n 11, p 6; Neuman, n 14, p 68-94; Creswell, n 17, p 76-84; Silverman, 
n 20, p 77-78; Denzin and Lincoln, n 15, p 33-34.
30 For example, Guba and Lincoln identify “inquiry paradigms” that range through positivism, post positivism, 
critical theory (poststructuralism, postmodernism and a blending of the two) and related ideological positions (eg 
participatory inquiry, Feminism, materialism, neo-Marxism) participatory/cooperative and constructivism; Guba and 
Lincoln, n 21, p 17.
31 For an overview of Layder’s extensive work see one of his most recent books: Layder D, Sociological Practice 
Linking Theory and Social Research (Sage Publications, 1998).
32 Layder, n 31, p 1,5.
33 Layder, n 31, p 86, 110, 146; Carlsson defines Layder as a critical realist in: Carlsson S, “Advancing Information 
Systems Evaluation (research): A Critical Realist Approach” (2003) 6(2) Electronic Journal o f Information Systems 
Evaluation 11 at 12.
34 Layder, n 31, p 141.
35 Layder, n 31, p 140-141.
36 Layder, n 31, p 140-143.
37 Layder, n 31, p 143.
38 Layder, n 31, p 146.
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Focusing on interaction between meanings and structural factors is particularly important 
to this research project given that a critical focus on the influences of structural factors,39 such as 
power and domination, are often central considerations in understanding and achieving key 
elements of good NEG’s. For example, as we saw in chapter 2, a primary concern in the 
literature is whether, and if so when, NEG aspirations of meaningful participation and 
deliberation40 will be distorted by formal positions of authority, funding and other conditions 
that may give rise to power imbalances.41
In summary, the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this thesis have been 
influenced by AT and focus on the interweaving of system elements with micro features of 
social life.42 Now that the reader understands the worldview of this study the next section turns 
to address the strategies of inquiry and considerations relevant to designing the research 
process.
3.3 Strategies of Inquiry that Inform the Research
Project
The thesis’ primary strategy of inquiry is the AT approach to research. The following 
discussion provides a detailed overview of this approach and researches and discusses why it 
was selected. A second supporting strategy of inquiry which is also used by this thesis is then 
discussed, namely a “collective case study” approach.
3.3.1 Why Adaptive Theory?
The AT approach to research falls between deductive/theory-testing approaches and 
inductive/theory-generating approaches. 43 More specifically, AT adopts, modifies and 
simultaneously combines the spirit and practical implications of the deductive “middle range 
theory”44 approach. It also looks at prior theoretical ideas and models that feed into and guide
39 Neuman, n 14, p 81.
40 Layder,n 31, p 148-149.
41 Layder, n 31, p 148-149.
42 Layder, n 31, p 144.
43 Layder, n 31, p 5.
44 For a discussion of Middle range theory’s emphasis on “theory testing research” see: Layder, n 31, p 15-17; Layder 
D, New Strategies in Social Research (Polity Press, 1993) p 20-23.
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research and the more inductive “grounded theory”45 approach that focuses on generating theory 
from ongoing analysis of data.46
This synthesis offers an iterative strategy of inquiry that incorporates theory into research 
by using pre-existing theory to guide the study, while simultaneously generating theory from 
data analysis in the formulation and actual conduct of empirical research.47 In other words, AT 
facilitates the development of concepts and insights through adapting and shaping existing NEG 
theory to incoming evidence, while the data is simultaneously filtered through, and is thus 
adapted by, the NEG theory relevant to the analysis.48
This approach to research has particular resonance with this thesis’ purpose and 
methodological needs to develop better knowledge of conditions under which “good” NEG can 
be achieved. As we have seen, a significant portion of the limited empirical research into NEG 
often lacks a firm grounding in any one body of theory (with even fewer testing multiple 
theories).49 Furthermore, many key NEG theories are closer to ideals than descriptive or 
explanatory reflections of what works in practice.50 In view of this, AT’s emphasises on 
simultaneous anchorage in theoretical materials and empirical data offers a particularly apt 
approach to closing these gaps between theory and empirical research to advance NEG theory 
and our understanding of the conditions for achieving NEG’s vision of good governance.
The direct engagement with empirical material also aids in clarifying existing debates by
(i) testing out various explanatory claims; and (ii) reformulating, adding or qualifying the 
explanatory scope and domain of the original theoretical materials.51 Further, AT reinforces and 
enhances the capacity of the thesis to potentially develop new insights from analysis of 
empirical research that may have been overlooked by the still developing and nascent NEG 
theory.
Over and above these benefits, AT also remains open to other methodological approaches 
and can be employed alongside them.52 This is particularly relevant to this thesis which utilises a 
second supporting strategy of inquiry, namely a collective case study.53
45 For information on grounded theory see: Glaser B and Strauss A, The Discovery o f Grounded Theory (Aldine, 
1967).
46 Layder, n 31, p 19.
47 Layder, n 31, p 1 and 5.
48 Layder, n 31, p 3, 5.
49 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 377-379; Sabatier et al, n 5, p 11-13.
50 Cohen J and Rogers J, “Power and Reason” in Fung A and W right E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press,
2003) p 243; Karkkainen, n 1 at 212; Layder, n 31, p 169.
51 Layder, n 31, p 167-168.
52 Layder, n 31, p i.
53 Stake R, “Case Studies” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), Strategies o f Qualitative Inquiry (2nd Ed, Sage 
Publications, 2003) p 136-138.
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3.3.2 Why a Collective Case Study ?
Case studies are generally conducted and written to include either the simple presentation 
of individual cases or to arrive at broader generalisations based on case study evidence.54 In this 
regard, Robert Stake55 distinguishes between three types of case studies: (i) intrinsic case studies 
that are undertaken to gain a better understanding of the particular case; (ii) instrumental case 
studies that are undertaken mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalisation; 
and (iii) collective case studies, which involve jointly studying a number of cases in order to 
gain a better understanding, or better theorising, about a still larger collection of cases such as a 
phenomenon, population or general condition.56
For this thesis, a collective case study strategy of inquiry is particularly suited to57 
achieving the research project’s goal of developing a better understanding and providing 
insights into the conditions under which “good” NEG can be achieved.58 Indeed, a collective 
case study framework can go some way towards capturing the diversity of NEG theories and 
experiments by incorporating different types of NEG experiments as cases that represent the 
broader phenomenon of NEG writ large.59
As much of recent empirical scholarship on NEG has been limited to either individual case 
studies or studies within a single case setting,60 a comparative approach provides a valuable 
addition to the literature and can explore the effects that different features and variables have on 
NEG.61 In this sense, adopting a collective case study was deemed to improve the analytical 
benefits of the study, in particular allowing more comprehensive contrasts and comparisons to 
be made regarding NEG and its different forms and contexts.62 In addition, a collective case 
study approach may draw focus to complexities that require further investigation, as well as the 
limits of generalisability and NEG theory.63
The methodological orientation of a collective case study approach can differ in terms of 
its analytical strategy, including following theoretical assumptions of the overall study, looking 
for rival explanations or seeking to provide a case description. This thesis follows methodology
54 Yin R, Case Study Research Design and Methods (3rd Ed, Sage Thousand Oaks, 2003) p 15.
55 For an overview o f other classification systems see: Stake, n 53, p 136-138.
56 Stake, n 53, p 136-138.
57 It provides a concrete framework suited to addressing the multiple units o f analysis, namely the three NEG case 
studies; Lewis, n 21, p 52.
58 Stake, n 53, p -138, 156.
59 As discussed below the three cases being evaluated share enough characteristics typical of NEG to make this 
comparison meaningful; Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
60 Koontz T, Steelman T, Carmin J, Korfmacher K, Moseley C, and Thomas C. Collaborative Environmental 
Management: What Roles for Government? (RFF, 2004); Lubell, M, “Collaborative Watershed Management: A 
View from the Grassroots” (2004) 32 (3) Policy Studies Journal 341; Lubell et al, n 2, p 294.
61 Heikkila T and Gerlak A, ‘T he Formation of Large-scale Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: 
Clarifying the Roles o f Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions” (2005) 33(4) Policy Studies Journal 583 at 589.
62 Yin, n 54, p 53-54.
63 Stake, n 53, p 146.
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author Yin’s preferred approach by applying theoretical propositions that led to the case study, 
which in turn guide the study’s objectives, design, research questions and reviews of literature, 
analysis and propositions.64 This ensures that the empirical based findings, generalisations and 
insights generated from the collective case study remain firmly focused on NEG scholarship and 
theory from which the research questions and focus of this research study were drawn.65
Despite the benefits of the above case study approach, one of its primary challenges is that 
there will often be many more variables of interest than data points in the cases studied.66 
However the combination of the collective case study approach with AT serves to mitigate the 
complications that can arise from this challenge by ensuring that extant theory and its 
propositions are used to direct and steer research, data collection and analysis (while still 
incorporating the detailed empirical information gained from the case studies and remaining 
open to ideas that emerge from the data).67
Indeed, the application of these two complementary approaches to research facilitated this 
thesis to develop a robust research design, and also served to refine the process of case selection 
and methods of data collection and analysis. These steps are elaborated in the following
sections.68
3.4 Research Design and Process
This section discusses the design of the research process, reflecting on its general 
flexibility before turning to discuss the process of case and interviewee selection
3.4.1 Flexibility in Research Process
The way a piece of research is planned and carried out69 is typically presented in 
methodology chapters as a series of sequential steps taken in a research project namely selecting 
a topic, sampling, the employment of data collection methods and techniques, analysis, and 
theoretical elaboration.
In contrast, AT suggests the steps of the research process are best seen as flexibly 
positioned and dependent on a number of factors.70 This view is arguably closer to the dynamic
64 Yin, n 54, p 111-112.
65 Yin, n 54, p 112.
66 Yin, n 54, p 13-14.
67 Yin, n 54, p 13-14; Layder, n 31, p 3-4, 152-154, 166.
68 Layder, n 31, p 3-4, 152-154, 166.
69 McNeil, n 10, p 14.
70 Layder, n 31, p 3.
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nature of how research occurs in practice, where the specific research topic and problem often 
come into focus as existing literature is reviewed and emergent ideas arise from research data.71
Such flexibility certainly characterised this study, which commenced as a broad 
examination of new collaborative styles of governance and their capacity to fulfil environmental 
and other goals. However over the course of research this focus developed into a more precise 
analysis of the real world conditions under which key elements of NEG could be achieved in 
order to deliver “good” NEG.
While it is important that the dynamic nature of this study’s research process is 
acknowledged, for heuristic purposes the remainder of the chapter discusses the research 
process in a series of sequential steps, commencing with how and why the cases were selected, 
before turning to focus on considerations involved in interviewee selection.72
3.4.2 Selecting Cases
There were two key steps involved in selecting cases for the thesis, and as will be 
explained below, central to both these steps was a desire to capture diversity.
The first step related to selecting suitable comparative case studies, namely examples of 
NEG experiments in Australia. In Australia, many of the most interesting and novel NEG 
experiments are government based NEG programs. The term “program” is used here to refer to 
a particular government policy or instrument such as National Landcare Program in Australia or 
Project XL in United States.
To identify programs that could potentially be the subject of a case study for this research, 
a review of Australian NEG literature was initially conducted. A process of scoping particular 
programs was then carried out, including contacting key stakeholders involved in NEG 
experiments, as well as academics interested in studying them. Using this information, three 
programs were selected as the case studies for this thesis.
The basis on which these cases were selected was reminiscent of a common qualitative 
research approach to case and interview selection known as purposive sampling.73 As the name 
suggests, it is an approach to selecting cases with a particular purpose in mind.74 While there are
71 Layder, n 31, p 31-33, 166.
72 Layder, n 31, p 28-29.
73 There are many strategies that can be used for generating purposive samples, For a further discussion of purposive 
sampling see: Babbie E, The Practice o f Social Research (8th Ed, Wadsworth, 1998); Neuman, n 14; Layder, n 31, p 
46; Patton M, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd ed, Sage Publications, 1990) p 182-183.
74 Neuman, n 14, p 213.
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a range of strategies on which cases could be selected (eg. representativeness, homogeneity),75 
in this thesis’ comparative case study approach, three key strategies/considerations contributed 
to the selection of the programs.
First, program selection was based in part on practical considerations.76 For example, the 
location of the program was an important consideration (e.g. to reduce costs of travel only cases 
in eastern states of Australia were considered).
Second, and more importantly, these programs were selected on the basis that they all 
shared the characteristics of “good” NEG outlined in Chapter 2.77 To do this a number of cases 
were reviewed, drawing on parliamentary speeches, legislation and guidelines, which helped to 
identify that at least some of their components embraced certain types of procedures,78 namely 
collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and adaptation and “new” forms of 
accountability.79
This rationale for case selection is obviously central to this thesis80 because it ensures the 
empirical data and comparative insights generated from the cases will span the key research 
questions and provide insights into when and how “good” NEG can be achieved.81 Given this 
significance, it is obviously crucial that the thesis fully substantiate how and to what extent each 
case study embodies the characteristics of “good” NEG.82 This is the specific task of Chapter 4, 
which draws on parliamentary speeches, legislation, guidelines and interviews with key policy 
makers to investigate and describe the cases’ objectives with respect to the main characteristics 
of “good” NEG.83
The third and final consideration for the selection of cases was aimed at capturing 
diversity of conditions in NEG.84 The decision to use this selection criteria was motivated by the 
very real diversity in NEG experiments and scholarship, including the type of environmental 
problems addressed, the age of NEG experiments, the extent and nature of stakeholders 
involved and the unique institutional designs (see chapter 2).85 Accordingly, the three cases 
were selected to ensure they (i) involved pollution control and natural resources issues; (ii)
15 See for example: Lewis, n 21, p 52; Creswell, n 17, p 63; Stake, n 53, p 152; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
76 This is similar to the idea of convenience purposive sampling; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
77 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
78 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
79 This is roughly similar to the idea of criterion and Theory-Based/Operational Construction strategy of purposive 
sampling; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
80 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
81 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
82 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378
83 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
84 This is similar to maximum variation: Patton, n 73, p 213.
83 In this sense the process of case selection was similar to what is known as “replication logic”, which emphasises 
focusing on prior theorising of different types of conditions and selecting cases to address a desire to have subgroups 
of cases covering each type; Yin, n 54, p 47, 52.
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occurred at different scales of action; (iii) incorporated different types, ratios and roles for 
government and non government stakeholders, (iv) were different in maturity and development, 
(v) involved different policy contexts and (vi) different degrees of complexity.
By selecting for these types of diversity, the thesis aimed to ensure it examined an 
extensive range of the different NEG approaches to governing, and accordingly shed light and 
provided insights into whether and how different conditions, processes and contexts affect the 
achievement of “good” NEG.86 Further, where different NEG institutions employ the same 
institutional techniques or mechanisms, an examination of its impacts across a range of different 
contexts can begin to shed light on the wider applicability of institutional designs for achieving 
“good” NEG. Chapter 6, for instance, examines a number of institutional conditions common to 
most NEG approaches (including the case studies) that seek to ensure representative 
participation. However, the findings suggest that these processes appear likely to secure 
adequate representation in only very specific contexts.87 The diversity of NEG cases studies in 
this thesis also has the virtue of enabling the thesis to simultaneously test theoretical claims 
across a variety of different contexts. For example, chapter 5 examines competing claims about 
the role of trust in the emergence of successful collaboration, with the findings suggesting that 
the importance of trust may depend on certain traits of the environmental problem.
The above three criteria led to the selection of three cases: Environment Improvement 
Plans (EIPs); Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans (NEIP); and Regional Natural 
Resource Management (RNRM). As illustrated in Table 3.1 below, these cases ranged in 
environmental issues and scales of action, from local areas affected by point source pollution 
such as in the EIP, to large regional areas and natural resources such as RNRM. The programs 
cover different mixes of stakeholders. For example, some programs involve few governmental 
bodies (EIPs), while others comparatively involve much high numbers of government agencies 
and different levels of government (NEIPs and RNRM).
While all cases rely on an approach that involves plan development, implementation and 
monitoring and adaptation, the institutional structures and associated roles and responsibilities 
for stakeholders also vary across the experiments. For example, some programs are directly 
funded by government while others are not. Responsibilities such as implementing a plan also 
vary, involving only one industry actor in EIP, the resources of the entire collaborative group in 
NEIP, or the facilitation and use of government investment in RNRM. The programs also vary 
in maturity, some being older programs such as EIP while others are comparatively young, as 
with NEIP and RNRM.
86 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
87 This is of course an overgeneralisation and chapter 6 qualifies this finding further.
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Taken together, the foregoing differences also ensure the three cases broadly differ in 
degrees of complexity. That is, the EIP contains a relatively small number of stakeholders and is 
focused on one primary source of environmental pollution. The NEIP involves a much greater 
mix of public and private stakeholders and addresses multiple diffuse problems across a 
neighbourhood area. Finally, the RNRM case is even broader again, focusing on regional scale 
and involving stakeholders from national, state, regional and local levels.
Finally, the programs all vary in policy contexts, involving either the environmental 
regulator in Victoria (EIPs and NEIPs) or a Federal and Queensland government program 
(RNRM). Notably, both EIP and RNRM programs are operational in multiple jurisdictions, so it 
is worth briefly reflecting on why these particular policy contexts were selected for this thesis.
Regarding the EIP program, this NEG experiment and broadly similar initiatives,88 can be 
found across a range of Australian states.89 This thesis selected the Victoria EIP program 
because it was the pioneer, and remains the leading exponent of this approach in Australia. As 
elaborated in chapter 2, this EIP program has received previous academic attention,90 however, 
it was considered an apposite case for research in this thesis because most of the early research 
was policy based, lacked a comparative aspect, and had not located the EIP initiative within the 
then embryonic NEG literature.91
Regarding the RNRM program, as explained in more detail in chapter 4, RNRM is based 
on two federal government programs know as Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) and National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality92 (NAP) that ideally would have been delivered 
uniformly across the nation.93 However the practical need for the federal government to engage 
and reach agreement with unique state and territory governments to support these programs 
resulted in differences between state jurisdictions.94
As such, short of a comparative study of examples of RNRM from all state and territory 
jurisdictions (a task well beyond this thesis’ resources or time), the choice to study the RNRM 
program necessarily carries with it a choice of a particular state and its own unique features and
88 See Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), Ch 7, Pt 3 regarding Environmental M anagement Programs; 
Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 (Tas) Pt 3, Div 7 regarding Environmental Improvement 
Programmes.
89 Various forms of EIP can be found in South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria: See Environment Protection 
Act 1993 (SA), ss 44, 54 (In South Australia the EIP is exclusively limited to bipartite relationships between the 
regulator and enterprise); Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA), s 62A; Western Australia, Department of the 
Environment, Environmental Improvement Plans - Explanatory Document Western Australian Model (WA DOE,
2004); VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002).
90 Wills I and Fritschy S, “Industry-Community-Regulator Consultation in Improving Environmental Performance in 
Victoria” (2001) 8 Australian Journal of Environmental Management 158.
91 Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002) Ch 8.
92 See generally http://www.nrm.gov.au.
93 For a useful discussion on these programs see: Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional 
Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional 
Development (Ashgate, 2005).
94 Head, n 93, p 144.
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considerations. In this thesis, the choice to study RNRM in Queensland, as opposed to other 
manifestations in eastern states, was made on the basis that the RNRM program in Queensland 
offered a different policy context to the other two NEG experiments in Victoria, as well as a 
relatively unique approach to RNRM program. Indeed, compared to Victoria, which has a 
mature statutory NRM approach, or New South Wales, which recently created a statutory role 
for its RNRM bodies, the RNRM program in Queensland is “community” rather than statutory 
based.95 This arguably gives RNRM in Queensland a much stronger NEG flavour, with its 
emphasis on more participatory, collaborative endeavours without formal legal authority. 
Furthermore, although RNRM in Queensland has sparked scholars’ attention (see chapter 2), 
research so far has generally led to calls for further empirical evaluation of the many issues that 
arise from RNRM. These include questions such as whether RNRM amounts to devolution of 
power rather than responsibility? Whether there are opportunities for groups to learn from each 
other; and whether groups are adequately funded to fulfil responsibilities expected of them?96
Having selected three programs as comparative case studies the first step of case selection 
had been completed. However, across the three programs there were approximately 70 EIPs 
collaborations97 and 7 NEIPs collaborations98 in Victoria and 14 RNRM collaborations in 
Queensland99 that were all operational or being negotiated at the time of writing.100 A second 
step in case selection was accordingly needed which involved searching and selecting examples 
of these programs from these many “on ground” examples. For ease of reference, as the 
program is referred to as the “case study” in this thesis, the specific on-ground manifestation(s) 
are referred to as a “sub-case study”.
On-ground manifestations of NEG programs can and do vary101 on a number of variables, 
not least in who and how many actors come together. Accordingly, one must be clear why and 
for what reasons specific examples were selected.
The process of selecting this thesis’ sub cases followed AT’s iterative approach to 
research,102 and used a variety of considerations and steps to arrive at the selection of sub cases. 
As discussed below, these steps included scoping, selection, pilot studies, an assessment of
95 Head, n 93, p 144.
96 Head, n 93, p 145-148.
97 This number includes a range o f different “types” of EIPs. For further see chapter 4.
98 See http://www.epa.vic.gov.au.
99 Note there were originally fifteen regional boundaries required; See “My region” (The state o f Queensland, Qld) 
April 2007. http://www.regionalnrm.qld.gov.au/my_region/index.html viewed 10 May 2008; Head, n 93, p 144.
100 EIP and NEIP numbers are based on statistics obtained from the EPA (May 2005) and interviews.
101 See for example the discussion of variations in Habitat Conservation Planning in: Karkkainen B, “Toward 
Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso 2003).
102 Layder, n 31, p 3.
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suitability based on the research data that emerged103 and a decision to return to the case or 
pursue alternative or additional cases.
Case Overview of features
EIP • Issue: pollution from single industry.
• Scale: local areas affected by industry (eg. suburbs adjacent to industry discharge 
points).
• Structure: small collaborative groups (10-20 people); no direct government investment; 
the group periodically negotiate, draft, monitor and adapt a plan that is implemented by 
an industry to improve its environmental performance.
• Maturity: 1989-ongoing.
• Type of stakeholders: single industry, multiple local residents and non government 
groups, the environmental regulator which may include a few local government bodies 
and one or two businesses.
• Policy context: program of Victoria regulator.
NEIP • Issue: natural resource and/or diffuse industrial and urban pollution sources.
• Scale: catchment or small township.
• Structure: small to medium collaborative groups (20-30 people); no direct government 
funding; the group periodically negotiate, draft, fund, implement, monitor and adapt a 
plan to improve an environmental issue(s).
• Maturity: 2001- ongoing.
• Type of stakeholders: multiple industries and businesses, local residents, non 
government groups, and state government bodies, a few local governments and the 
environmental regulator.
• Policy context: program of Victoria regulator.
RNRM • Issue: natural resource issues (eg. salinity, water quality, biodiversity sustainable land, 
water and marine natural resource use).
• Scale: region, typically involving multiple catchments.
• Structure: regional collaborative group and staff (10 to 40 + people); program primarily 
funded by government investment; the group periodically negotiate, draft, monitor and 
adapt a plan and investment strategy, as well as facilitate the use o f  funds for 
implementation to improve resource condition/decrease rate o f degradation.
• Maturity: 2000/2001 -  ongoing.
• Type of stakeholders: multiple “farming” industries, regional residents, indigenous 
peoples, non-government groups, collaborative groups (eg. Landcare) and local, state and 
federal government bodies.
• Policy context: Federal government programs o f Natural Heritage Trust 2 and National 
Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, delivered in partnership with Queensland 
government.
Ta t)le 3.1: Overview of Programs Selected as Case Studies.
The initial step of scoping potential EIP, NEIP and RNRM sub cases relied on established 
contacts in each program and available public information (e.g. websites about particular EIP,
103 Layder.n 31, p 47-48.
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NEIP or RNRM groups). A process of purposive sampling was then used to select from the 
available sub cases. At this time three key criteria were important.
First, practical considerations were again relevant,104 particularly relating to the willingness 
of a sufficient number of key actors in sub cases to participate in the study and the agreeability 
of participants to accommodate the researcher in the earlier stage of the research.105 Aside from 
2 sub cases in EIP and NEIP programs,106 it was however rare for sub cases to be excluded from 
the study on the basis of such practical grounds.107
The second selection criteria sought to ensure sub cases were “information rich”,108 and 
captured sufficient data on the conditions of each program to allow the study of the case to be 
sufficiently detailed and intensive.109 For example, while RNRM consists of two programs 
(NHT and NAP), not all regions receive funding from both programs (see chapter 4). 
Accordingly, selecting a region that embraced both programs was considered more likely to 
provide richer data on the operation of the RNRM program overall.
Third, following an initial review of NEG theory, the researcher had identified some 
limited but potential “dimensions of interest” on which initial sub cases could be selected. For 
example, whether the sub case involved “nested” structures and/or appeared successful in 
involving environmental interests in collaboration.110 As we saw in chapter 2, both are 
hypothesised as conditions that can have important ramifications for features of “good” NEG.
Drawing on these considerations, one EIP, one NEIP and one RNRM sub case was 
selected as a pilot study for each case (see Table 3.2 below). These pilot studies were conducted 
at different times during111 mid 2005, after 9 months of reviewing NEG theory and 
methodological literature. Each pilot study involved the researcher visiting the selected sub case 
area for a period of 1 to 2 days and conducting pre-arranged interviews with a limited number of 
key participants from each case. The interviewing process is detailed below,112 but for present 
purposes Table 3.2 summarises the number and types of actors interviewed for each pilot.
These pilots provided the occasion to compare issues and conditions that arose from the 
sub cases with the existing themes and ideas identified in the NEG literature, and assisted in
104 This is similar to the idea of convenience or opportunistic purposive sampling; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
105 Yin, n 54, p 79.
106 As Robert Stake has argued, practical considerations are important in selecting cases because having an actual 
“opportunity to learn” is vital to any study; Stake, n 53, p 153.
107 Only two sub cases (1 NEIP and 1 EIP) were excluded on the basis that key stakeholders (typically industry in EIP 
case and local government/environmental regulator in NEIP case) were unwilling to participate in the study.
108 This criteria is consistent with the “case study” approach o f the thesis.
1(,<) This is close to the idea of purpose sampling for intensity; Lewis, n 21, p 52; Neuman, n 14, p 33; Stake, n 53, p 
139-140; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
110 This is similar to the theory based or operation construct of purposive sampling where a case is chosen based on a 
manifestation of a theoretical construct of interest; Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
111 Yin, n 54, p 79.
1,2 Yin, n 54, p 80.
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refining the research focus and questions. Furthermore, the researcher was able to develop a 
greater understanding of the individual programs, their features and operations. Such 
understanding also assisted in reflecting on the richness and adequacy of information likely to 
be gained from the individual sub cases in terms of answering this thesis’ research questions.113
Pilot Number and Type of Interviewees
EIP 5 interviewees, including industry, local residents and the Victorian Environment 
Protection Agency (VEPA).
NEIP 5 interviewees, including local government, environmental interest group, state 
government agency, VEPA.
RNRM 10 interviewees, including regional body staff, regional body members, 
subregional body members, sub regional body staff, state and federal government 
agencies, science/researchers.
Table 3.2: Pilot Sub Cases - Number and Type of Participants.
Taking stock of these issues, all pilots were deemed relevant and suitable for further study. 
However, there were two key but competing considerations that arose in subsequent decision 
about whether to pursue additional cases.
First it was clear from interviewing key participants in each sub case that there were 
variations between the pilot sub-case and other sub cases in each program. For example, 
interviewees pointed to differences in age of particular collaborations, and the actual 
organisation, types, behaviour and nature of individual stakeholders.114
Understanding and examining much of this variation in terms of the behavioural and 
contextual conditions is obviously in keeping with the epistemological and ontological approach 
of this thesis. Moreover, it is particularly vital to this study and its research questions, which 
seek to examine the impact of such conditions in practice, to identify possible important 
common patterns that cut across these variations and contribute to achieving “good” NEG.115
The second consideration arose from an identifiable distinction between the richness of 
data in EIP and NEIP sub cases on the one hand, and RNRM sub case on the other. The initial 
interviews in both the EIP and NEIP case suggested there was only so much qualitative data and 
information that could be gained about the program from any one in-depth sub case. Indeed, 
both sub cases appeared to contain only a limited number of key stakeholders, and different 
respondents had produced quite similar data.
1,3 Yin, n 54, p 80.
114 Stake, n 53, p 141.
115 Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
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In contrast, the RNRM program threw up extensive and diverse data from interviewees.116 
Pilot interviewees in RNRM were also quick to point out a plethora of additional key 
stakeholders, both in the region and in locations outside of the region (eg. key federal and state 
agency officials in capital cities that oversee the operation and approval of RNRM plans and 
funding), that they suggested were vital sources of information regarding the program.117
Balancing these two considerations, it was decided to improve this thesis’ depth of inquiry 
into the EIP and NEIP program through selecting additional sub cases.118 While in an ideal 
world, with unlimited time and funding it would have been beneficial to also contrast multiple 
RNRM sub cases, this was not possible given the extensive data needed to fully capture the 
conditions under which the RNRM program operated, both from within and outside of the 
region, and across a wide range of stakeholders. In an effort to compensate for this lack of 
comparison, key stakeholders from higher levels of the program (eg. government officials) were 
asked to reflect on differences between regions and impressions of the whole RNRM program 
in Queensland.
In terms of selecting additional EIP and NEIP sub cases, elements of replication logic119 
and purposive sampling were used to capture variation.120 These included variations identified 
from the pilot studies, such as environmental issues and maturity of the cases. For example, the 
selection of NEIP sub case 2 was based heavily on its maturity, and the fact that along with the 
pilot sub case, it was the only other NEIP to have commenced implementation of its plan.121 
Both NEIP 1 and 2 had been two of three “test” cases selected by the VEPA122 following a call 
for expressions of interest into experimenting with the new NEIP instrument. These “test” cases 
began shortly after the introduction of the NEIP in 2001, in an attempt by the VEPA to “learn” 
about their new policy tool.123
In EIP program, the pilot EIP revealed that the location of individual EIPs determined 
which of seven different jurisdictional offices of the environmental regulator managed their 
operation. Accordingly, in an effort to account for potential variation between offices’ practices, 
EIP sub cases were selected in part to ensure as close as practicably possible that at least one 
sub case from each of the seven different VEPA jurisdictional units were included.
116 This was attributable to its comparatively larger mix of government and non-government stakeholders and wider 
geographic and environmental scope.
117 In contrast, nearly all key stakeholders in both EIP and NEIP program were actively involved in and around the 
sub case, such as VEPA officers who hold oversight and accountability responsibilities relating to the EIP and NEIP.
118 Creswell, n 17, p 63.
119 Stake, n 53, p 148-149.
120 The researcher was assisted by VEPA officers in contacting sub cases.
121 The third pilot had yet to commence implementation at the time of research.
122 VEPA, Annual Report 2001-2002  (Publication 870, VEPA, 2002), p 38,41.
123 VEPA, n 122, p 41.
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Practical considerations were also a factor, such as limiting the number of replications to 
account for research time available. A “snowball” strategy to sampling was also used to select 
sub cases. The latter relied on key people (typically officers of the environmental regulator) who 
knew other actors that knew what cases may have been good examples for this study, such as 
particularly interesting variations in on-ground conditions and associated successes and 
disappointments.124 To illustrate, snowballing assisted the researcher to identify a NEIP sub 
case based on its comparatively unique conditions that involved a very small cohesive township 
of around 150 people (as opposed to a wider population base of the pilot NEIP which was 11 
000 people).
These processes resulted in the selection of seven additional sub cases in EIP and two 
additional sub cases in NEIP. As Table 3.3 summarises below, these sub cases varied in 
environmental issues, location and group size. The maturity and progress of cases also varied, 
such as in the EIP case where some sub cases had drafted and were currently implementing one 
plan, while others had drafted, implemented, reviewed and redrafted a number of subsequent 
plans in a continuous effort to try and improve their environmental performance. The scale of 
issues being addressed also varied among cases in NEIP where a neighbourhood boundary is 
defined by each sub case. Variation in issue size was not however relevant in the EIP case 
where no specific boundary is defined. All cases also involved a different mix of stakeholders, 
however details on these and other variations will obviously emerge over the course of this 
thesis’ analysis.
The above discussion has outlined the considerations, sampling criteria and processes used 
by the thesis to select three Australian NEG programs as case studies. Each case embraces the 
broad characteristics of “good” NEG, but together they capture a diversity of NEG experiments, 
conditions and contexts. As explained, the thesis analyses the three cases through the 
investigation of a number of on-ground manifestations of each program. These sub cases were 
selected to ensure they provided rich information on how each of these programs operate, 
dimensions of interest to NEG theory and, where possible and pertinent, variations in the 
different contexts and conditions involved. Given this, the thesis is accordingly well placed to 
shed light on and provide insights into whether and how different conditions, processes and 
contexts affect the achievement o f “ g o o d ” NEG.125
124 Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
125 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
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EIP Sub Cases
Pilot • Key Issues: environmental aspects of paper production industry (eg. noise, waste).
• Location: residential city suburbs.
• Maturity: commenced 2000, 2 plans completed, currently implementing 3rd.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: =12 people; area near industry/general environment.
2 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of sewage treatment plant (eg. odour, effluent).
• Location: residential city suburbs & beach town.
• Maturity: commenced 2003, plan finalised 2004/2005 & currently being 
implemented.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «23 people; area near plant & outfall/general environment.
3 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of power station (eg. dust, greenhouse).
• Location: rural townships.
• Maturity: commenced 1997, 2 plans completed, currently implementing 3rd.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «16 people; area near industry/general environment.
4 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of power station (eg. sulphur, visual).
• Location: coastal township.
• Maturity: commenced 2003, 2 plans completed, currently implementing 3rd plan.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «17 people; area near industry/general environment.
5 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of car production industry (eg. odour, water use).
• Location: residential/industrial city suburbs.
• Maturity: commenced 2003, 1 plan completed, currently implementing 2nd plan.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «9 people; area near industry/general environment.
6 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of plastics, rubber, resin industry (odour, flares).
• Location: residential/industrial city suburbs.
• Maturity: commenced 1993/94, 3 plans completed, currently implementing 4th plan.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «19 people; area near industry/general environment.
7 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of wood fibre panel industry ( noise, waste).
• Location: rural city.
• Maturity: commenced and plan completed 2004/2005, currently implementing.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «11 people; area near industry/general environment.
8 • Key Issues: environmental aspects of rendering plant (odour, greenhouse).
• Location: residential/industrial city suburbs.
• Maturity: commenced 2001, completed 1 plan, currently implementing 2nd.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «9 people; area near industry/general environment.
NEIP Sub Cases
Pilot • Key Issues: improving quality of polluted creek & its corridor.
• Location: residential/industrial city suburbs; pop. 11 000 people.
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• Maturity: commenced 2001/2002, 5 year plan finalised 2004, currently 
implementing.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «18 people; catchment of «20 square kilometres.
2 • Key Issues: developing a more sustainable community.
• Location: small coastal town; pop. 2,000 people.
• Maturity: commenced 2001/2002, 3 year plan finalised 2004, currently 
implementing.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «23 people; township of «5 square kilometres.
3 • Key Issues: improving quality of polluted creek that supplies town drinking water.
• Location: small rural town; pop. «150 people.
• Maturity: Commenced 2003; 5 year plan finalised in 2006; currently implementing.
• Group Size/Issue Scale: «35 people, catchment «22 square kilometres.
RNRM Sub Case
Pilot •Key Issues: improving condition/reducing rate of degradation of natural resource, 
assets (eg. land, biodiversity, water, coastal and marine, cultural resources).
•Location: North eastern Queensland, population « 190,000 people.
•Maturity: commenced 2002/2003, 5 year plan finalised 2005, currently 
implementing.
•Group Size/Issue Scale: « 11 people; region « 133,000 square kilometres (3 
bioregions).
Ta ble 3.3: Overview of Sub Cases.
3.4.3 Selecting participants
During the process of selecting cases, a simultaneous process of selecting interviewees was 
also being conducted. This selection process was based on purposive sampling and employed a 
snowball sampling'26 approach as well as a mix of the following:
•criterion sampling -  choosing interviewees that meet some predetermined criterion;
•stratified purposeful sampling- choosing interviewees on the basis that they illustrate 
characteristics of particular subgroups of interest; and
•opportunistic sampling -  following new leads during fieldwork to choose interviewees.727
Using this mix of criterion to select interviewees128 helped to compensate for the 
weaknesses of each technique with the strengths of others to ensure a sample of highly relevant
126 Yin acknowledges the benefits for case study research of respondents suggesting other people and sources of 
evidence during interviews; Yin, n 54, p 90; Neuman, n 14, p 211, 214; Miller W and Crabtree B, “Depth 
Interviewing” in Hesse-Biber S and Leavy P (eds), Approaches to Qualitative Research: A Reader in Theory and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, 2004) p 191.
127 Patton, n 73, p 182-183.
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and in-depth data from each of the EIP, NEIP and RNRM sub cases.129 Table 3.4 below 
provides illustrations of how each strategy was used and the benefits they provided.
Sampling
Approach
Illustration Benefit
Criterion
sampling
Selecting interviewees according to the criteria 
that they were directly engaged in the sub case or 
had a direct impact upon the program (eg. 
government agency who designed or oversaw the 
operation of the program).130
Ensured data relevance.
Stratified
purposeful
Select interviewees to illustrate key stakeholders 
groups involved in each sub case (eg. state 
government, local government, industry, resident, 
non government group, farmer etc.
Captured diversity of 
views and facilitated 
comparisons between 
them.
Snowball131
and
opportunistic
Identifying broader networks of vital interviewees 
that may have otherwise been overlooked (eg. in 
RNRM this process helped identify and arrange 
interviews with key farmers and government 
agencies; in the EIP and NEIP cases, EPA officers 
interviewed were often a key source of identifying 
key local resident and community group 
interviewees).
Enhanced depth and 
richness of data.
Table 3.4: Examples of Sampling Approach and Benefits to Study.
Using these selection strategies, interviewees were selected and subsequently took part in 
80 semi-structured interviews. Table 3.5 below summarises the type and number of interviews 
in each case.132 It is important to note that the stakeholder categories used in this table are broad 
generalisations. A number of interviewees could be classified within a multiple stakeholder 
group. For example, many government agency interviewees were also local residents in the sub 
case area. Some interviewees had also participated in two or more sub cases, cases and/or other
128 As Patton noted: “Because research and evaluations often serve multiple purposes, more than one qualitative 
sampling strategy may be necessary. In long-term fieldwork all of these strategies maybe used at some point”; Patton, 
n 73, p 181.
129 Snowball sampling is a method for identifying and sampling (or selecting) the cases in a network and usually 
involves getting cases using referrals from one or a few cases and then referrals from those cases and so forth; 
Neuman, n 14, p 211, 214; Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 191.
130 Over the course of the research, another criteria used was selecting participants based on their value to ideas 
emerging from the prior theory and the collection and analysis o f data. As discussed further below, this was 
facilitated through taking an iterative and staged process to data collection and analysis; Layder, n 31, p 3, 47-48.
131 Consistent with snowball sampling, respondents were asked at the completion of the interview if he or she would 
recommended any other individuals as relevant to the research project. This individual’s details were then usually 
obtained through key government contacts or from a public source. Time and funding considerations meant that not 
all recommended interviewees were contacted.
132 All interviewees in EIP and NEIP cases were from the collaborative group itself, while in keeping with the more 
complex structure of RNRM, the interviews included interviewees active both in RNRM group and region as well as 
stakeholders in the wider RNRM program. Further details on interview methods and period of data collection is 
discussed in the sections below on data collection and analysis. There was some overlap between interviews. This 
was primarily in the case of EIP and NEIPs where some interviewees were involved in both EIP and NEIP sub cases 
(typically EPA officers). However the numbers below generalise the interview numbers into each case.
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on ground manifestations of the program. This was common among government officers and 
some local residents in EIP and NEIP cases, as well as some key RNRM interviewees who had 
experience in other RNRM regions in Victoria and Queensland.
EIP Sub Cases
Residents/non government groups ^133
EPA/local government 8
Industry 9
Total 24134
NEIP Sub Cases
Residents/non government groups 9
EP A/state and local government 14
Industry /business 3
Total 26
RNRM
Stakeholders directly connected with regional/subregional bodies 
(eg. advisor, member, staff, regional farmers)
11
Government bodies involved in the program (eg. federal, state, 
local, science)
12
Non government bodies (eg. peak industry and conservation 
bodies)
7
Total 30
Table 3.5: Number and Types of Interviews for Each Case.
Having explicated this study’s adaptive theory and collective case study approach to 
research, the design and rationale of selecting cases, and the process of selecting interviewees, 
the next section turns to focus on the methods of data collection and analysis.
3.5 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
3.5.1 Methods of Data Collection
This section outlines the methods used to collect data from the cases and the subsequent 
process of data analysis. The collective case study and adaptive theory methodology that guide 
this research project both encourage the use of multiple data collection methods, which can
133 One resident was involved in two EIP sub case and was accordingly interviewed about both.
134 Note that EIPs were also discussed in 3 NEIP interviews (2 government and 1 industry).
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include both qualitative and quantitative approaches. 135 Consistent with the qualitative 
orientation of this thesis, the primary method used for data collection was interviewing. 
Documentary analysis methods were also used, as well as limited observation made in the field 
and some secondary quantitative data.
The discussion that follows focuses on the two main data collection methods used, namely 
interviewing and documentary analysis, and examines both the reasons behind their selection 
and how they were conducted. First the interviewing method is examined by sequentially 
outlining the following five key issues: (i) the reasons for selecting interviewing as the primary 
method of data collection; (ii) the type of interviewing method used; (iii) how the interview 
questions were developed; and (iv) the process of interviewing, including how the researcher 
dealt with problems of bias and misunderstanding in the interviews. The method and extent of 
documentary analysis is then discussed. As this section proceeds, pertinent ethical, and validity 
issues addressed by the thesis are also examined.
3.5.2 Interviewing
3.5.2.1 Rationale for choosing interviewing method
Interviewing was chosen as the primary method of data collection for this research project, 
not least because interviews are one of the most important sources of data for case studies.136 
Unlike other qualitative methods such as documentary techniques,137 interviewing suited more 
closely the scope and nature of the project. In particular, interviews allowed a great deal of 
detailed information138 to be obtained about NEG and importantly provided the opportunity to 
draw on and explore actual participants’ experience with NEG in practice, eliciting in-depth 
views and insights into what had or hadn’t worked in the NEG programs, and the respective 
conditions that had brought about these outcomes. In contrast, utilising documentary analysis as 
the primary research tool would mostly have been too limiting because documents themselves 
are unlikely to capture detailed data on the specific conditions, context and relationships that 
impacted on the operation of NEG.139
135 Adaptive theory advocate methodological pluralism such that a wide range o f accommodating methodological 
positions and approaches are employed, whilst not abandoning systematic method altogether (Layder, n 31, p 68-77, 
178). For case studies see Yin, n 54, p 13-14; Stake, n 53, p 148, fn 1.
136 Yin, n 54, p 89.
137 For a discussion on documentary and other qualitative methods such as observation see: Creswell, n 17, p 58; 
Angrosino M and Mays de Perez K, “Rethinking Observation: From Method to Context” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y 
(eds), Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (2nd Ed, Sage Publications, 2003); Neuman, n 14, chapter 13.
138 Silverman, n 20, p 36.
139 Atkinson P and Coffey A, “Analysing Documentary Realities” in Silverman D (ed), Qualitative Research Theory 
Method and Practice (Sage, 2004) p 57-58.
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Of course, interview methods are not without their limitations. Not least, interviews have 
been criticised for being too subjective, contingent on respondent’s memories140 and because 
they may suffer from problems of cognitive dissonance,141 or the “halo effect” (i.e. collaborators 
who experience positive interpersonal relationships in a collaboration are likely to have a 
positive bias toward their views of environmental and social outcomes of the group).142
To mitigate these weaknesses, triangulation143 of multiple sources of data (interview, 
documentary, and limited observation and quantitative data) were employed to corroborate 
findings and contribute to improved validity,144 as well as broaden and deepen the investigation 
by taking a multi perspective look at NEG and its conditions in practice.145
3.5.2.2 Type of interviews
The majority of the 80 interviews146 conducted in this thesis were in-depth conversations147 
and followed a semi structured148 interviewing technique.149
Unlike its unstructured equivalent,150 the semi- structured interviewing approach was able 
to use NEG theoretical themes and issues to orient and sharpen the issues discussed in the 
interview. This use of prior theory to add some structure to the interview was particularly 
important to this thesis given its focus on empirically examining and testing NEG theory on the 
conditions relevant to achieving “good” NEG. Further, the semi structured approach was well
140 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 381; Koontz and Thomas, n 2 at 115-116; Lubell et al, n 2, p 278-280.
141 Coglianese, n 2; Leach et al, n 2 at 654.
142 Leach W and Sabatier P, “Are Trust and Social Capital the Keys to Success? Watershed Partnerships in California 
and Washington” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming 
Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005), chapter 8; Lubell et al, n 
2, p 280; Conley and Moote, n 2 at 381; Koontz and Thomas, n 2 at 115-116; Lubell et al, n 2, p 278-280.
143 Neuman, n 14, p 138 (Neuman identifies the following four types o f triangulation - measure triangulation, 
observer triangulation, theory triangulation and method triangulation); Layder, n 31, p 68.
144 Stake, n 53, p 148; Silverman, n 20, p 177.
145 Stake, n 53, p 148; Silverman, n 20, p 177; Yin, n 54, p 98.
146 Some interviews were more informal and shorter in nature due to practical constraints such as an interviewee 
having to leave earlier than expected due to personal issues.
147 Layder, n 31, p 52.
148 Semi structured interviewing involves the researcher asking the same predetermined questions in each interview, 
however he/she can do some probing for further information; Arthur S and Nazroo J, “Designing Fieldwork 
Strategies and Materials” in Ritchie J and Lewis H (eds) Qualitative Research Practice A Guide fo r  Social Science 
Students and Researchers (Sage, 2003) p i l l .
149 This approach can be compared to other types of interviews (eg. highly structured, standardised quantitatively 
orientated survey interviews, face to face interchange, focus groups, brainstorming, in-depth interviews, free flowing 
exchanges and so on). For further see: Fontana A and Frey J, “ The Interview from Structured Questions to 
Negotiated Texts” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds) Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials (2nd ed, Sage, 
2003) p 62; Holstein J and Gubrium J, ‘T he Active Interview” in Silverman D (ed) Qualitative Research Theory 
Method and Practice (Sage, 2004) p 141; Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 188.
150 Unstructured interviews include in-depth interviewing, which typically involve a broad agenda but the order and 
way in which the agenda is followed varies considerably between the interviews; Arthur and Nazroo, n 148, p i l l .
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suited to supporting and assisting the comparative focus of the thesis as it ensured that each 
interview across the distinct cases and subgroups covered broadly the same issues.151
Of course, structured152 interviewing could equally deliver such benefits.153 However the 
semi structured interviewing technique importantly maintained the ability of the research project 
to be open to issues and information raised by participants regarding conditions in practice that 
may have been overlooked or unexplored by NEG theory.154
In short, the semi-structured interview approach ensured the same issues of interest to the 
thesis could be covered in each interview, while allowing individual experiences, meanings and 
perceptions to emerge.155
Having given the reader an understanding of the reasons behind choosing semi structured 
interviewing as the primary method of data collection, the following discussion turns to outline 
relevant details of the interview process, commencing with how the questions were formulated, 
before discussing how the interviews were conducted.
3.5.2.3 The questions
The structured questions used in the interview were developed through a review of NEG 
literature and legislative and policy documentation relating to each program.156 An interview 
protocol was developed that listed a number of largely open-ended questions about germane 
elements of the program. These questions were supported by potential probes relating to 
relevant conditions about that element. For example, an open-ended question such as “tell me 
about the process of decision making” may have been followed up with probes regarding 
particular conditions (eg. mediators) if sufficient detail was not forthcoming.157
The open ended questions were structured to build rapport and ease respondents into the 
interview by using opening biographical questions158 followed by questions that were
151 Arthur and Nazroo, n 148, p i l l .
152 Structured interviewing involves the researcher asking all respondents the same series o f pre-established questions, 
each with a limited set of response categories; Fontana and Frey, n 149, p 649.
153 Fontana and Frey, n 149, p 650-651; Arthur and Nazroo, n 148, p 110-111.
154 Yin, n 54, p 90.
155 Bonnell J, and Koontz T, “Stumbling Forward: The Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining 
Collaborative Watershed Management” (2007) 20(2) Society & Natural Resources 153 at 156.
156 Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 190.
157 Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 190.
158 The predetermined questions for the interviews were ordered and structured in relation to the following matters: (i) 
the opening questions were biographical in nature and were designed to build rapport and ease the participant into the 
interview context eg. asking the participant to describe his or her position and experience in the program; (ii) the 
questions that followed were general contextual questions about successes and failures, followed by more specific 
questions on relevant research topics and specific conditions o f the sub case; and (iii) to wind down the interview, 
participants were given the opportunity to raise any additional issues they thought may have been overlooked in the 
discussion (eg. possible issues or conditions they thought vital to improving the NEG program). Arthur and Nazroo, n 
148, p 112-113; Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 185.
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formulated to use “how” inquiries rather than “why” , the former being advocated by case study 
authors such as Yin as being more friendly and thus avoiding defensiveness from the 
informants.159
The questions were also refined throughout the data collection. For example, the original 
questions developed were honed after the initial pilot study. This provided an opportunity to 
learn about the “everyday commonsense understanding” and terminology of the interviewees 
regarding the programs. This learning was used to ensure that the language and specific terms 
used in subsequent interviews was better suited and comprehensible to those being 
interviewed.160
Furthermore, because the semi structured interviewing technique gave respondents the 
flexibility to express their own perceptions and understandings of NEG program  and its 
operation, the researcher iteratively developed additional questions or probes over the 
course of the research to pursue fruitful lines of questioning.161 For instance, insights or 
issues raised in one interview were often used to develop additional interview questions to 
inform the direction of inquiry of following interviews.162 This approach effectively treated the 
interviews as an ongoing conversation between the researcher and those involved in the case, 
testing, refining and balancing opinions and views of respondents through the views of others163 
in an effort to build a more complete picture of the NEG program as the interviews proceeded.
While the order of topics and questions sometimes varied between interviews, a sample of 
an interview guide used is contained in the Appendix of this thesis.
3.5.2.4 Interviewing Process
Turning to examine the interview process, most interview data was collected in mid to late 
2005. The interviewing process was purposefully conducted in a staged manner for each case. 
For each case this involved at least 2 primary “rounds” of interviewing.164 The first round was 
the pilot. The second round spanned between 3 to 7 days. This interviewing occurred during the 
following periods:
•EIP: May (pilot), June and August 2005;
159 Yin, n 54, p 90.
160 Fontana and Frey, n 149, p 86; Miller and Crabtree, n 126, p 190.
161 Bonnell and Koontz, n 155 at 156.
162 Layder, n 31, p 48.
163 In keeping with the ethics of this thesis, this testing and refining was done in an anonymous fashion. A common 
technique across the interviews was to say “There is an opinion that “X”.
164 I note due to practicalities such as time and availability there were some interviews conducted at different periods 
throughout the research.
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•NEIP: July (pilot) and August 2005, December 2006, February 2007;165 and 
•RNRM: July (pilot), October and November 2005
Following one round of interviews such as the pilot study, the data would be transcribed 
and an initial analysis conducted (as discussed below). Consistent with AT, the purpose of this 
initial analysis was to help support an iterative approach to the next round of interviewing. 
Among other things,166 this contributed to the research and assisted with the testing and refining 
of ideas that had emerged from the initial round of data collection and analysis.167
When arranging and conducting the interviews a primary concern was the researcher’s 
ethical responsibilities.168 Indeed, this thesis’ interviews and research were conducted in 
accordance with guidelines and clearance of the Australian National University Human 
Research Ethics Committee.169 Pursuant to these guidelines,170 arranging and conducting 
interviews required interviewees to give their informed and voluntary consent,171 and for the 
researcher to respect the privacy and confidentiality of participants.172 A number of procedures 
were used to meet these requirements. This included ensuring the details of potential 
interviewees were always obtained from either a public source (eg. website) or from an 
intermediary actor (eg. government officers) who had obtained the interviewees consent.173
When the researcher was initially contacting participants by telephone or email the 
research project was always described in full,174 including acknowledging the role of the
1651 note that interviewing in NEIP case was required to be put on hold in 2005 and subsequently conducted at 
comparatively much later stages in the research process (2006 and 2007) due to staff turnover and internal decisions 
made by the industry partner to the study, the Victorian Environment Protection Agency.
166 As discussed above, the ideas emerging from the analysis of data and theory also helped to contribute to the 
selection of the next round of interviewee participants.
167 Layder, n 31, p 48.
168 Neuman, n 14, p 116.
169 The discussion of ethical considerations is based on the research project’s approved ethics application form made 
to the Australian National University Human Research Ethics Committee.
170 There are of course wide arrays of other ethical issues that pertain to the research. For example, ethical issues can 
relate to the role of the researcher and “using” those who you study for your own “personal gain” . In my role as a 
researcher I did not identify any ethical dilemmas regarding the exclusive use of participants for my own personal 
gain. That is to say, whilst I may gain benefit from publishing data obtained from government, industry, farming or 
community groups involved in the ongoing programs, the participants in these initiatives will hopefully gain benefit 
from my research findings as well, which seek to make recommendations that may prove to provide more efficient 
and effective outcomes for the participants own program arrangements and others like it; Glesne C and Peshkin A, 
Becoming Qualitative Researchers An Introduction (Longman, 1992) p 112-117; Creswell, n 11, p 63.
171 Neuman, n 14, p 124; Christians C, “Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds) 
The Handbook of Qualitative Research (2nd ed, Sage Publications, 2000) p 138.
172 Neuman, n 14, p 126; Christians, n 171, p 139.
173 The officers would contact a potential interviewee on behalf o f the researcher (following the same ethics protocol 
discussed below) and seek their consent to pass on their details to the researcher.
174 This involved outlining the aims of the project, the intended use o f interview and possible documentary data, the 
safeguards taken with respect to confidentiality, privacy an anonymity (including that they may freely choose to stop 
participation at any point in the study), and the nature of the questions they were likely to be asked; Glesne and 
Peshkin, n 170, p 112.
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Victorian EPA as an industry partner,175 and asking whether they would consent to the interview 
being recorded.176
If the prospective interviewee agreed to participate in the research project, a formal 
interview was scheduled for a time that was suitable to them, usually at least 1 to 2 weeks later. 
At the time of scheduling the interview, the participant was provided with a choice of venue, 
including their home, their work, or a suitable alternative venue.
At the scheduled interview, the participants were given an information sheet for their 
records and a written consent form, both of which provided details of the research, the intended 
use of interview data, the safeguards taken with respect to confidentiality, privacy and 
anonymity considerations,177 and contact details of the researcher and the Human Ethics officer 
of ANU. In addition, interviewees were informed that they did not have to answer questions, 
could discuss issues “off the record” 178 and end the interview at any point they wished. If the 
prospective interviewee agreed with this arrangement, they were asked to sign the consent form 
(see Appendix for a copy of the form).
Nearly all interviews were recorded. To avoid any deception,179 the researcher always re­
checked with the interviewee at the beginning of the interview whether a tape recorder could be 
used. It was only used when permission was granted from participants.180 The tape recorder was 
also always located in clear view of the interviewee and researcher. In 6 of the 80 interviews, 
participants chose not to be recorded but consented to notes being made.
Most interviews were conducted one on one181 and in person. However, in 11 of the 80 
interviews telephone interviews were used due to availability and schedule conflicts between the 
researcher and interviewees. These interviewees were arranged and conducted following a
175 Although this project is conducted in partnership with the Victorian EPA, it is also important to note that they 
made no attempt to restrict the findings that are published in this thesis. Furthermore, at no time did the EPA breach 
any ethical boundaries that impacted upon the conduct of this research according to accepted standards; Neuman, n 
14, p 130-132.
176 The details of the description of the research project and the nature of the questions they were likely to be asked 
are contained in Appendix to this chapter.
177 These included: (i) protecting the identity of each participant and/or organisation by using a system of identifier 
codes on transcripts and documents (as discussed above); (ii) taking all reasonable steps to ensure that any 
information in this thesis will not enable the reader to identify who was spoken to; (iii) storing all data in password 
protected computer system and/or a locked cabinet in the locked office. Furthermore, this interview data was stored 
separately from the list of identifier codes.
178 In a few instances respondents asked that the tape recorder be tum off while they discussed “off the record” issues. 
Such requests were always complied with.
179 Neuman, n 14, p 123; Christians, n 171, p 139.
180 As discussed above some respondents chose not to have the interview recorded but consented to notes being taken 
about the interview.
181 While I sought to arrange only one-on-one interviews, some interviewees had a preference for their associates to 
attend the interview with them, and I accordingly accommodated. In the later stages of interviewing some interviews 
in the respondent validation process discussed below were, for practicality reasons, arranged to have a number of 
interviewees. Early in the project a few interviews involved and were conducted jointly with 2 other researchers.
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broadly equivalent process to that described above.182 Telephone interviews obviously have 
restrictions as an interviewing tool, not least reducing capacity to build rapport and make visual 
observations. Even so, given time and location constraints it acted as a workable substitute.183 
For the interviews that were face to face, the researcher always sought to ensure that the 
interview was conducted in the most private and quiet area of the chosen venue to ensure it was 
conducive to the participant being open and comfortable.184 Interview time tended to range form 
between 10 minutes to 2 hours with most typically lasting for about 60 minutes. The interviews 
were conducted over a period of approximately 6 weeks in total.
Discussing the process of interviewing also raises the important issue of how interviewees’ 
responses were treated by the researcher.185 Interview statements can have multiple meanings.186 
According to constructionist schools of thought, the perspectives and meaning elicited in the 
interview process is actively constructed from the actions undertaken to obtain it.187 Thus 
“respondents are not so much repositories of knowledge...as they are constructors of knowledge 
in association with interviewers”.188
This was the experience that played out in most of this thesis’ interviews, with many 
respondents seeking to comprehend and reflect on the interview questions and why they had 
been asked. A simple illustration of this process in action is evident from one interview where 
discussion had led the researcher to ask “So what is your general impression of the NEIP as a 
tool for environmental improvement?”, with the interviewee responding “So are you asking me 
whether I think a neighbourhood environment improvement plan as a model is a good 
model?”.189
This is essentially an active style of interaction between interviewer and interviewee that is 
less a neutral tool of data gathering and more an approach that produces negotiated contextually 
based results.190 The obvious weakness of this style of interviewing is that it can augment 
opportunities for bias and misunderstanding.191
182 In these 11 interviews, initial contact with the participant followed the above procedures and arranged for a phone 
interview at later date. At the phone interview I again sought consent to use the tape recorder and made it made it 
clear to the interviewee if and when the tape recorder was being used. I also ensured consent and information forms 
were forwarded to the participants via email or post.
183 Weiss R, Learning from Strangers, The Art and Method o f Quantitative Interview Studies (Free Press, 1994) p 59; 
Hendriks, n 11, p 58.
184 Where interviewing was in a more public area, or another person interrupted the interview, I ensured that the 
interview was stoped whilst others were within hearing range; Miller J and Glassner B, “The ‘inside’ and the 
‘outside’ Finding Realities in Interviews” in Silverman D (ed) Qualitative Research Theory Method and Practice 
(Sage, 2004)p 133.
185 Silverman, n 20, p 32.
186 Silverman, n 20, p 36.
187 Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 125-126; Holstein and Gubrium, n 149, p 141.
188 Holstein and Gubrium, n 149, p 141.
189 Interview 216, Business Association.
I9<l Fontana and Frey, n 149, p 62.
191 Holstein and Gubrium, n 149, p 141.
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In order to lessen the potential for bias, error, misunderstanding or misdirection in the 
interviews, a number of strategies were employed by the researcher. First, after an interviewee 
had finished answering a question the researcher would seek to rephrase what the interviewee 
had said and then give the interviewee an opportunity to further confirm or further explain their 
response.192 This process helped to ensure that the researcher understood their responses and that 
they understood the questions that were asked.
In a similar vein, a second strategy for reducing misunderstanding and bias was to use 
multiple interviewees to corroborate contested interviewee opinions, as well as test the 
researchers’ tentative ideas and findings. This process was facilitated by the staged approach to 
interviewing and analysis, which allowed the researcher to reflect on what had been said in one 
round of interviewing and “test” these ideas in subsequent rounds. In addition, a more formal 
process of checking for clarity and validity was used in the later stages of the research through a 
process of respondent validation (discussed below).193
A third strategy to lessen the potential for bias, error or misunderstanding was to actively 
foster the trust of interviewees, which in turn was aimed to contribute to gaining better mutual 
understanding between the interviewee and researcher. This trust was achieved through various 
methods of rapport building, including taking all interviewees seriously, respecting what was 
said, letting interviewees know that what they had to say matters,194 and assuring confidentiality 
(eg. stopping the interview if requested).195
Like most interviews, the particularities of the interviewee and interviewer may also have 
had some influence on the interviewing process. The interviewees ranged in age,196 gender, 
race197 and profession. As such, the researcher aimed at all times to be conscious of how they 
presented themselves to the interviewees, in order to limit the influence this presentation may 
have had on interviewees’ ability and willingness to tell various sorts of stories.198 In general, 
the personal information shared with interviewees was limited to knowledge about the 
researcher’s role. In keeping with ethical requirements this typically involved making sure that 
interviewees were aware of contact details, the goals of the research project, and what they
192 For example, in one NEIP interview the researcher asked a respondent whether they thought the NEIP 
collaborative group was sustainable over the longer term. Answered by the respondent the researcher proceeded: 
“Sure. So if I was to paraphrase what you're saying, and correct me if I'm wrong. The group or the NEIP in some 
form or another is going to continue but... the effectiveness of the group at particular periods o f time will be 
dependent on available funding”; Interview 215, Local Government; Hendriks, n 11, p 58-59.
193 Silverman, n 20, p 176; Yin, n 54, p 35.
194 Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 131.
195 Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 133.
196 From their early 20s to their 70s.
197 Most, but not all, interviewees appeared to be Australians of European descent.
198 Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 130.
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could do after the interview in terms of further contact or questions with the researcher. Overall, 
most respondents’"  were eager to disclose information and openly talk about the programs in 
which they had invested a large part of their work and/or private time.
Finally, to try and avoid the problems of bias the researcher sought to corroborate 
interview data with general observations,200 and associated memos201 taken during the rounds of 
interviewing and fieldwork, and more particularly, information from documentary sources.202
3.5.2.5 Documentary Analysis
The documentary analysis method used in this thesis involved, first, selecting relevant 
documents based on whether they related to or impacted on the operation of the sub cases and 
cases.203 The documents selected included:
•agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings;
•plans, legislation, parliamentary speeches and guidelines;
•public administrative reports (proposals, progress or annual reports, budgets);
•other studies or evaluations of the case;
•newspaper articles or community newsletters; and204
•reports containing relevant quantitative data.205
199 Even so, the researcher’s personal characteristics appeared to have had some influence, with a few interviewees 
using “familiar” narrative constructs rather than provide meaning into their subjective views. As a younger researcher 
with a legal professional background I found this to be true mainly with a few older, rural respondents who were 
sometimes not forthcoming. I found in these times that revealing a little more about my own background, such as 
emphasising my own childhood and adolescence on a farm was a useful way to break through this barrier and 
facilitate a context where they were more willing to disclose information; Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 127;
Hendriks, n 11, p 57-60.
200 These observations involved recording observations of the conditions of the general site and environmental 
problems. These observations were designed to add important dimensions to developing an understanding both to the 
context and phenomena of the environmental problem and the NEG approach designed to address it; Yin, n 54, p 92-
93.
201 For instance, making field notes about observations or documenting connections between issues raised in 
particular interviews and identify possible categories and concepts that were being revealed from the data that 
potentially fit into my own ideas developed from extant theory; Layder, n 31, p 58-61.
202 Yin, n 54, p 92.
203 The collection of documents occurred via two systematic searches. Firstly, as a part of identifying the three 
programs and pilot sub cases, an initial search and review of documents was conducted. This included searches of 
websites, newspapers, Victorian legislation databases, case databases, Hansard, Legislative Councils agendas, 
minutes and reports. The second search focused on obtaining more specific documents about the pilot and/or 
additional sub cases themselves. For example, the available minutes of meetings, agendas, annual reports and 
newspaper clippings. Many of these documents were accessible from websites, and others were made available by 
interviewees during the fieldwork.
204 Yin, n 54, p 85-86.
205 The quantitative data used in this project was sourced from the relevant government agencies or industry and 
related to a limited number of issues such as number of environmental incidents and prosecutions of firms or 
available quantitative baseline and trend measurements of pollutant discharges or environmental and natural resource 
conditions; Maxwell, n 18, p 5.
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While not amounting to a complete collection of all relevant documents, the documentary 
information206 collected added substantial depth to the thesis’ inquiry into the operation of the 
EIP, NEIP and RNRM programs.207 For example, while most non-government and government 
interviewees focused on the ongoing operation of the programs, the legislation and 
parliamentary documents provided important background data and insights into the political 
context and original intention of each program. As we will see in the chapter 4, this background 
is vital to identifying the general intent and goals of each case regarding the common elements 
of NEG (eg. nature and extent of collaboration) and subsequently investigating and analysing 
how successful each program was in practice.
3.5.3 Data Analysis
Having outlined exactly how and what data was collected for this research project above, 
this section examines the procedures and systems used to manage and analyse data.
In accordance with the stipulations of AT, the analysis and management of data for this 
research project was conducted simultaneously with data collection. As discussed above, this 
involved at least 2 stages of data collection, interspaced with preliminary data analysis. This 
preliminary analysis applied extant NEG theory to develop and apply possible concepts and 
categories to the interview and documentary data collected, while simultaneously thinking about 
possible emerging ideas and categories from the data itself. This analysis informed the 
subsequent collection of data, which was then itself transcribed, analysed and compared with 
the provisional categories. Following the completion of this analysis and data collection, a re­
analysis of all the data was conducted within each case and between cases.
Notwithstanding this ongoing process of data collection and analysis, there were two broad 
interrelated steps employed in the data analysis process that took their general cue from AT’s 
approach to coding and Robert Yin’s theory-based analytical strategy for analysing case study 
evidence.208
The following discussion sequentially outlines these steps. The first step discussed relates 
to matters of transcribing interviews, and the use of a computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
system in data management and analysis. Particular attention is paid to the rationale for 
choosing a qualitative data analysis system and the benefits it provided the research project. The 
second step discussed relates to processes of “coding” data to analyse patterns and peculiarities
206 Yin distinguishes between documentary materials and archival materials (computer files and records, census data 
etc), however any relevant archival material has been incorporated into this section on document collection Yin, n 54.
207 Yin, n 54, p 85; Atkinson and Coffey, n 139, p 59.
208 Yin, n 54, p 112.
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that emerged within and between the cases and how these came to inform the analysis chapters 
of this thesis.209
3.5.3.1 Transcribing and NVivo
In accordance with the ethical and confidentiality responsibilities of the thesis, the process 
of transcribing interviews required that the identity of each interviewee be protected by using a 
system of identifiers. This identifier system is used throughout the thesis and categorises each 
interview using a number between 3 to 4 digits in length, followed by a statement of the general 
category of stakeholder type.
The first digit in the identifier relates to case type -  EIP (1), NEIP (2) and RNRM (3). The 
second digit indicatively210 signifies either the relevant sub case in the EIP and NEIP case (EIP 1 
to 8, NEIP 1 to 3) or a general grouping of stakeholder type in RNRM case (1 represents non 
government bodies such as peak industry bodies, 2 or 3 represents government or science 
bodies, 4 represents stakeholders connected to the region such as regional body staff or 
members). The third and/or fourth digits in the identifier signify the order in which the interview 
was conducted in each sub case or grouping of stakeholders. To briefly illustrate, the identifier 
for the first interview conducted in the EIP pilot case with an industry representative would be 
“Interview 111, Industry”.211
Nearly all interview recordings and written records were transcribed verbatim into an 
electronic format to ensure a rich and complete record of data. However, given the large number 
of interviews (n80), limits on time and resources, and the tendency of some interviews 
(particularly in the later stages) to produce opinions and information that was largely consistent 
with early interview data, 11 of the 80 interviews were not transcribed in full (3 EIP, 3 NEIP 
and 5 from RNRM).
Not transcribing interviews in full can of course lead to fractured analysis, promote 
deductive over inductive reasoning and/or result in the researcher overlooking valuable data (eg. 
data may not appear relevant or vital initially but may prove to be significant as analysis 
progresses).212 To mitigate this problem, the computer assisted qualitative data analysis 
system213 that was applied in this thesis (discussed below) was used to link the original
209 Marshall H, “What Do We Do When We Code Data?” (2002) 2(1) Qualitative Research Journal 56 at 56.
210 That is, these “second digit signifies” are only indicative because interviewees sometimes were involved in 
multiple sub cases or stakeholder types. For example one EIP interviewee was involved in both EIP sub case 5 and 6, 
while some RNRM interviewees were both non-govemment and regional interests.
211 Another example would be an interview with a regional body representative in the RNRM program: “Interview 
341, Regional Body”.
212 Miller and Glassner, n 184, p 127.
213 Weitzman E, “Software and Qualitative Research” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds) Collecting and Interpreting 
Qualitative Materials (2nd ed, Sage, 2003) p 310-311.
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recording or written record of the interview to a “proxy” electronic file, typically containing 
electronic notes of key quotes or a summary of the interview. By including and connecting the 
original recording or written record in this way, the researcher sought to facilitate easy access to 
key insights and the full data record (eg. clicking on the link to listen to parts or the whole 
interview record) to ensure the 11 interviews were fully accounted for in the data analysis.
A similar process of creating proxy files that linked to key electronic or hard copy 
documents and field notes on observations was also conducted. Along with these proxy files, 
the 69 fully transcribed interviews were also entered in full as separate files into the computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis system known as NVivo.
While computer assisted qualitative data analysis systems have sometimes been subject to 
criticism,214 the NVivo software program was deemed suitable to assist the researcher in storing, 
organising and analysing data in this project.215 Box 3.1 below outlines the NVivo program and 
its suitability to the research project.
NVIVO
NVivo provides the capacity to electronically store, distinguish and track case study data, as 
well as sort and connect different portions of the data as they relate to a particular case or 
issue. This was useful and important for the case study approach employed in this project 
because it allowed all relevant data to be sorted into three rough case study databases.216 It 
also ensured that interrelated documents and interviews could be electronically linked and 
cross referenced to ensure all relevant data was considered in analysis.217 
NVivo was also well suited to this thesis because,218 consistent with AT, it is designed to 
employ an efficient219 coding based data analysis technique.220
Coding is a comon tool of organising and analysing data and basically involves creating
214 See: Marshall, n 209 at 56 at 59, 61, 63-67; Seale C, “Using Computers to Analyse Qualitative Data” in Silverman 
D (ed) Doing Qualitative Research A Practical Handbook (Sage Publications, 2000) p 164; Creswell, n 17, p 156; 
Weitzman, n 213, p 318, 332.
215 For example, the database capacity o f NVivo was adequate in terms of the number of cases, and expected size of 
the interview transcripts and documents. See for instance: Bazely P and Richards L, The NVivo Qualitative Project 
Book (Sage, 2000); Weitzman, n 213, p 327.
216 NVivo was used to classify every interview or document from a round of Fieldwork according to case type (EIP, 
NEIP, or RNRM), type o f record (i.e. Document or interview) and where relevant, the type of interviewee (eg. 
industry, state government). This provided the useful ability to act as an organised storage system that assisted in 
quickly and easily locating material; Creswell, n 17, p 155; Weitzman, n 213, p 325; Yin, n 54, p 102.
217 Yin, n 54, p 103.
218 Weitzman, n 224, p 320, 324-325; Creswell, n 17, p 155; NVivo Online Help, Appendix A, “What Is Qualitative 
Research?” QSR International Pty Ltd NVivo 2.0.
219 Marshall, n 209 at 56, 58.
220 Weitzman, n 213, p 320, 324-325; Creswell, n 17, p 155.
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specific categories/codes that relate to the relevant question, concept and themes of the 
research and assigning them to passages of text relevant to that issue or them e.221 Rather than 
carry out data analysis by hand (typing, photocopying, marking text with highlighters, pasting 
text on file cards), NVivo allows the researcher to electronically create a “node” as a code 
and then select and assign that node to specific text or passage. This coding is possible only 
where text data is compatible with NVivo, such as properly formatted interview text. Most of 
the documents obtained by this thesis such as reports on quantitative data,222 parliamentary 
speeches and plans were not in an appropriate format. Thus, while all were reviewed in detail, 
they were not subject to the specific coding process in NVivo.
Even so, using NVivo helped to improve the rigour and consistency of interview coding and 
improve validity and reliability. In particular, the searching tools in NVivo increased the 
power of engaging with the whole corpus of data to assist in coding223 and ensure thorough 
data treatment.224 Such tools ensured that the thesis was careful about finding deviant “cases” 
and not missing important data.225
Box 3.1: Overview of the NVivo Program and its Suitability to the Study.
Having outlined the initial step of transcribing interviews and the choice and general 
benefits of the NVivo qualitative data analysis system, the next section discusses the second 
step of coding processes and analysing the patterns and peculiarities that emerged in and 
between the case studies.
3.5.3.2 Data Analysis and Coding Using Adaptive Theory
A dynamic process of analysis and coding was employed that involved preliminary 
analysis of data, a discrete case study analysis and more comparative analysis between the
cases.
After importing the data from the first round of field work into NVivo, the first process 
conducted was a system of provisional coding pursuant to the approach set out in AT.
221 Huberman A and Miles M, “Data Management and Analysis Methods” in Denzin N and Lincoln Y (eds), The 
Hand book o f Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 1994) p 428; Layder, n 31, p 52.
222 1 note in relation to quantitative data that as they were sourced from secondary sources such as condition and trend 
measurements required little analysis. Some quantitative data was however entered into Excel and “analysed” using 
descriptive statistics to arrive at the number and patterns of participation. This analysis did not pose any concerns 
relating to ethical issues such as identifying specific industry bodies.
223 In addition, the program helped me in locating particular words, ideas, statement or phrases more quickly and 
easily when organising codes or statements; Creswell, n 17, p 155-156.
224 That is all cases must be incorporated into the analysis such that any generalisation is able to apply to every single 
piece o f relevant data collected; Silverman, n 20, p 179-185: Lewis J and Ritchie J, “Generalising from Qualitative 
Research ” in Ritchie J and Lewis H (eds), Qualitative Research Practice A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers (Sage, 2003) p 275-276; Yin recognises approaches that adopt a somewhat similar logic to ensuring 
internal validity. He terms these technics rival explanations, logic models, explanation building and pattern matching. 
For a discussion of these technics see: Yin, n 54, Chapter 5; Seale, n 214, p 155.
225 Weitzman, n 213, p 316.
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Provisional coding, as the name suggests, is the use of provisional code names/labels to indicate 
text that may relate to a particular concept or category.226
Drawing on extant NEG theory, as well as the researcher’s own thoughts and notes about 
themes in the data that emerged during its collection, a number of prior theoretical ideas were 
used as orienting concepts.221 These concepts stimulated some provisional codes228 relevant to 
the thesis’ broad research focus on NEG. For example, the collective action literature and 
discussions in NEG theory provided inspiration to develop concepts and codes to refer to the 
challenges of collaborating. These and other codes were entered into NVivo as “free nodes” and 
were used in the process of provisional coding of lines, words and larger sections of text. These 
and other provisional codes were employed throughout subsequent periods of data analysis and 
were concurrently and dialogically engaged with emergent core codes and concepts (discussed 
below) to encourage serendipitous discovery of emerging theory and to ensure a conduit to 
existing NEG theoretical ideas.229 Table 3.6 below provides an illustration of some codes that 
were used by the researcher.
Code Explanation Illustration
Representativeness Responses about 
the
representativeness 
of the collaborative 
group and 
conditions that 
impacted upon it.
“we have tried to have people represented and we 
have gone out...to get people involved and in 
reality we were only able to elect back the members 
we had in the first place really with one additional 
one, so that hasn’t been as successful as it should 
have been, because we had people sitting on the 
sidelines snipping a bit at some of the things we 
weren’t doing but they weren’t prepared to put their 
hand up”.230
Countervailing
power
Responses 
regarding the 
presence, absence 
and associated 
impact of 
environmental 
groups.
“we’ve got conservation people that have got very 
deeply entrenched attitudes and belief systems...so 
some of the [environmental groups] have made the 
strategic decision not to engage in the process”.231
Government
tensions
Responses about 
relationships 
between agencies,
“the commonwealth bureaucracy attempt to use 
[money investments] as a lever [with the states] and 
it really gives me the stirks so when you have
226 Layder,n 31, p 53-54.
227 Layder, n 31, p 101.
228 Layder, n 31, p 54.
229 Layder, n 31, p 54-55.
230 Interview 131, Industry.
231 Interview 318, Environmental Group.
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different levels of 
government.
programs like that and you have 20 or 30 million a 
year well I spend that downstairs on salaries”.232
Table 3.6: Examples of Coding Used in Research.
After a significant amount of data had been collected about each of the three cases, and a 
large number of interview transcripts had been provisionally coded, the researcher commenced 
a relatively discrete analysis of each case. This involved analysing and bringing together the 
specific details of sub case(s) to build up a collective and more holistic picture of the operation 
of the NEG program.233
Broadly employing Stake’s and Creswell’s suggested approach to data analysis, the 
researcher focused not only on coding and recoding data to capture patterns, but also to capture 
discrepancies across the interviews and sub cases. 234 An example of identifying such a 
discrepancy arose in the analysis of the NEIP sub cases, where coding around the concept of 
“representativeness” revealed that while all three sub cases shared a range of common features, 
the peculiarity of an extremely small population in one sub case produced quite distinct results 
from the other 2 sub cases.
Having developed a more in-depth understanding of some general themes emerging from 
the experience in the cases, the researcher revisited the provisional codes to see if they 
accounted for the experience in the cases and/or if they needed to be confirmed as core 
concepts, or modified, refined, abandoned or supplemented with additional codes.235 Additional 
codes consequently emerged (both from the data such as tensions between government and 
collaborative groups, and from the NEG literature 236 ) as the researcher developed an 
understanding of each cases’ institutional arrangements, its aspirations, and general strengths 
and weaknesses as an environmental governance program. For example, the analysis of the 
RNRM case brought to the attention of the researcher its complex accountability structure. 
Accordingly, additional concepts were drawn from the NEG literature to refer to these particular 
challenges.
It is important to note that during this analysis and coding, not every line or word of text 
was coded. For example, some interview data was focused on clarifying questions, providing 
background data on roles and positions within the program and building trust. However the 
researcher sought at all times to ensure comprehensive data treatment that coded all pieces of
232 Interview 323, Government Agency.
233 This also involved an analysis of the more general interviews from government respondents in RNRM.
234 Stake R, The Art of Case Study Research (Sage, 1995); Creswell, n 17, p 153-154.
235 Layder, n 31, p 54.
236 Creswell, n 17, p 153-154.
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relevant data collected.237 Further, the researcher was careful to ensure that there was a good fit 
between specific concepts and empirical indicators, as well as being clear about what ‘slice of 
reality’ was referred to by the concept.238 Following AT,239 this process involved an ongoing 
rigorous and recursive process of reviewing and scrutinising NEG theory and data, as well as 
exploring the connection of the coding concepts to the thesis’ primary research goal.
The validity of case analysis and its conclusions were also checked through a process of 
respondents’ evaluation240 conducted near the end of the fieldwork for each case. Here, a limited 
number of key informants were engaged to discuss some preliminary findings from my initial 
analysis of the case data.241 This involved holding a dialogue/reinterviewing 5 key government 
and/or non-government participants (1 in EIP, 2 NEIP and 2 RNRM) that had significant 
carriage and/or involvement in each of the three programs.242
Rather than attributing a “privileged status” to the responses given by these key 
participants on the findings,243 the researcher used this validation process to help identify and 
address various relevant perspectives,244 which lessened the likelihood of further analysis 
overlooking any key issues and/or falsely reporting an event.245
This preliminary validation and ongoing case analysis merged into the final stage of data 
analysis that focused on broader comparative patterns and themes between the cases. While 
such patterns and themes emerged at various stages of the project, this process became more 
organized after the initial cases analysis had been completed. This second stage of analysis 
involved a process of comparing and contrasting the three cases’ individual institutional 
arrangements, conditions and concepts that had emerged from the data on each case.
Important to this analysis was a process of grouping concepts within and across the cases 
into wider configurations. That is, the researcher identified concepts developed from the above 
coding which appeared to be ‘core’ and those concepts that appeared to be related to or further 
dimensions of this core concept.246 In this sense, related concepts were used to develop
237 Silverman, n 20, p 179-185; Lewis and Ritchie, n 224, p 275-276; Yin recognises approaches that adopt a 
somewhat similar logic to ensuring internal validity. He terms these technics rival explanations, logic models, 
explanation building and pattern matching. For a discussion of these techniques see Yin, n 54, p Chapter 5.
238 Layder, n 31, p 97-98.
239 Layder, n 31, p 56.
24(1 Respondent validation refers to the practice of going back to participants with tentative results and refining them in 
light of subject’s reactions and accounts o f the context of their actions; Silverman, n 20, p 99, 176; Yin, n 54, p 35.
241 That is prior to the completion of coding and analysing all available interview data.
242 1 note that this technique of improving the study’s validity could have been more robust if it had been employed 
after the analysis had been completed and/or the researcher had given a greater number of respondents an opportunity 
to respond to the findings, however practicalities o f time, access and resources prevented this from occurring.
243 Fielding N and Fielding J, Linking Data (Sage, 1986) p 43; Silverman, n 20, p 177.
244 Yin, n 54, p 34159-160.
245 Yin, n 54, p 34, 159-160.
246 Layder, n 31, p 117.
Cameron Holley Ne w En vironmental Go vernance
124
conceptual clusters or networks in order to represent a wider range of phenomena than that 
represented by a single concept.247
For example, relations were drawn across the cases between various coding concepts 
relating to the representation processes, countervailing powers, and the decision-making 
process. These were subsequently grouped under the overarching theme of meaningful 
participation and deliberation in NEG. This and other conceptual clusters were ultimately 
grouped into 5 overarching themes on the emergence of successful collaboration, sustaining 
collaboration, meaningful participation and deliberation, effective learning and adaptation and 
new forms of accountability. This reflected the character of the concepts that had emerged from 
the interplay between data and theory, but also connected the empirical research with broader 
NEG theory and the research focus of this thesis.248
While the majority of this analysis was conducted in NVivo, as the main themes and core 
coding began to take shape, the researcher began to collect and analyse coded text through 
writing “reports” on each of the main research themes.249 These reports broadly followed the 
standard approach for composing journal or research articles.250 The report purposefully sought 
to check and link themes with the literature to explicitly produce insights for NEG theory and 
practice. It did this by outlining relevant theory on conditions to each theme; drawing on the 
coding and analysis, it identified the relevant goals and institutional arrangements of the three 
programs for each theme and the different issues and conditions that had impacted on the 
achievement of the goal in practice. These reports formed the first drafts of the analysis chapters 
5-8.
Throughout the above analysis, and the chapters produced, the researcher endeavored to 
define and make clear the standards of “success” or “effectiveness” when drawing conclusions 
regarding each of the defining features of “good” NEG (e.g. “successful” collaboration).251 Even 
with these criteria, it is important to remember that as with every research project value 
judgments will often be the basis for determining what makes a process successful or 
unsuccessful, and different evaluators may well judge the same process differently.252 Indeed, 
given the complexity of conditions in NEG, the impact of context on qualitative research253 and 
the large data set like that used in this thesis, others examining the same case studies may arrive 
at different conclusions.254 Certainly the findings are not claims of “truth” offering some
247 Layder, n 31, p 159.
248 Layder, n 31, p 159.
249 Yin, n 54, p 133 to 158; Creswell, n 17, p 186.
250 Yin, n 54, p 133 to 158; Creswell, n 17, p 186.
251 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 377-378.
252 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 376.
253 Lewis and Ritchie, n 224, p 270.
254 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 376.
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independent and utterly reliable access to reality.255 Like most qualitative research, the findings 
may have been influenced to some extent by the researchers own background.256 Further as the 
cases are all ongoing,257 the data and findings in this thesis are obviously limited to the period of 
the study. As the cases studied capture only a certain set of institutional conditions and contexts, 
the findings’ generalisabilility may also be limited to cases in similarly settings.258
Even so, the conclusions, linkages and findings made by this thesis are intended to offer a 
logical set of statements and insights into how “good” NEG can be achieved.259 Indeed, the 
insights this thesis offers have emerged from an iterative and continuous comparative analysis 
that accounts for a wide diversity of NEG institutions and conditions exposed through three 
examples of NEG that have been supported by multiple sub case analysis and/or extensive 
interviewing, validity assurances and the use of several data sources.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the methodological orientation, data collection methods and data 
analysis approach applied by this thesis. From this discussion, the reader should be aware of 
both the purpose of the study and the basis for choosing its methods, which hopefully will 
facilitate (rather than confound) attempts to compare and learn from its insights into NEG.260
As should be apparent, the orientation, methodology and data collection methods laid out 
in the above discussion are not those of a research project that is seeking to develop an all- 
embracing descriptive, explanatory or normative theory about NEG. Rather, the adaptive theory 
and collective case study approach that guides and underpins this thesis is well matched to its 
more modest, empirically focused goal. That is, to draw on NEG theory and qualitative case 
study data to provide a range of empirically based insights for NEG theory and accordingly 
begin to fill in some of the gaps, resolve some of the debates and advance our understanding of 
the conditions of possibility for achieving NEG’s vision of “good” environmental governance.
The qualitative focus and ontological and epistemological beliefs of this thesis seek to 
ensure that these insights into NEG’s operation in practice are firmly rooted in and make the 
most of the unique thoughts, views, attitudes and practices of participants in NEG programs.
255 Hammersley, n 13, p 69.
256 McNeil, n 10, p 129.
257 That is, this study does not involve a “retrospective study” approach; Yin, 54.
258 Sabatier et al, n 5, p i 2.
259 Perakyla A, “Reliability and Validity in Research Based on Naturally Occurring Social Interaction” in Silverman 
D (ed), Qualitative Research Theory Method and Practice (2nd Ed, Sage Publication, 2004) p 283; Yin, n 54, p 33.
260 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 382.
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However, critical focus is also placed on the influences of structural factors26' and their 
interaction with social activity to ensure that vital issues such as power and domination are not 
overlooked in seeking to understand when and how key elements of “good” NEG can be 
achieved.
The above discussion has also emphasised the comparative nature of this thesis’ research. 
While the thesis examines three cases that all aspire to and can be defined by the broad 
characteristics of “good” NEG,262 these cases also account for a wide range of different NEG 
approaches. Indeed, the EIP, NEIP, and RNRM cases collectively address different 
environmental and natural resource issues, occur at different scales of action, incorporate 
different types, ratios and roles for government and non government stakeholders, and cross 
different policy contexts. The thesis compares and contrasts these different examples and 
conditions of NEG through examining a number of information rich sub cases that included 
potential “dimensions of interest” for NEG theory. Moreover, by studying multiple sub cases in 
both EIP and NEIP, and interviewing higher order officials in RNRM, the study seeks to bolster 
the diversity of context and conditions captured by the cases.
As indicated, this diversity across the cases heightens the possibility for this thesis to 
explore, test and clarify theoretical claims across different contexts and NEG approaches, as 
well as shed light and provide insights into whether and how different conditions, processes and 
contexts affect the achievement of “good” NEG.263
As explained above, arriving at these insights involved the collection of data from each 
case study, ensuring validity was checked through respondent validation and triangulating 
processes. Analysis of this data involved methodically coding and using both extant theory and 
ideas that emerged from empirical data. This coding and analysis process first involved a 
relatively discrete analysis of each case before comparing, contrasting and synthesising the data 
from the three cases to produce the 4 key foci of the research project, namely the issues of 
collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and adaptation, and new forms of 
accountability.
The chapters that follow take up these themes and investigate whether and under what 
conditions these four features of “good” NEG were achieved in practice. The investigation and 
findings lead each chapter to confirm and reformulate, as well as adding to a number of 
suggested conditions and mechanisms raised in NEG theory for achieving “good” NEG. Where 
theoretical claims do not hold, each chapter draws on both insights from the findings and wider 
new governance theory to suggest alterative conditions, reformed approaches and in some cases
261 Neuman, n 14, p 81.
262 Patton, n 73, p 182-183; Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
263 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 378.
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the need for better clarification and greater discipline in NEG theorising.264 Before commencing 
this investigation however, it is useful to provide some background to the cases, both to set the 
context and to demonstrate how and to what extent each of the three case studies embraces 
collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and adaptation and new forms of 
accountability.
264 Conley and Moote, n 2 at 379.
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Chapter 4: The Case Studies - Aspiring to 
New Environmental Governance
4.1 Introduction
The approach of this thesis is to empirically examine three case studies to provide insights 
into the conditions under which “good” new environmental governance (NEG) can be achieved. 
However, to assess, evaluate and learn from the cases in practice, it is necessary first to identify 
precisely whether and how each case study embodies the broad defining features of “good” 
NEG, namely collaboration, participatory and deliberative aspirations, learning and adaptation, 
and new forms of accountability. Indeed, it is characteristic of the still emerging and evolving 
nature of NEG that these broad approaches can take different forms (e.g. “once o f f ’ 
collaborative decision making versus long term, collaborative problem solving and 
implementation) or embrace slightly different principles (e.g. a reflexive law approach to 
learning and adaptation versus a pragmatist one) (see chapter 2). Accordingly, it is important to 
be clear about the unique form each feature takes in the case studies.
This chapter satisfies this purpose by drawing on parliamentary speeches, legislation, 
guidelines and interviews with key policy makers to investigate and describe the cases’ 
objectives with respect to the characteristics of “good” NEG. This analysis serves three vital 
functions for this research project. First, it provides the reader with an understanding of the 
context of each case, and its location among the variety of NEG experiments. Second, it 
provides the necessary background for the subsequent chapters to evaluate and compare each 
case relevant to the characteristics of “good” NEG. Third and finally, by explicating the specific 
goals of the cases with respect to each of the defining features of “good” NEG, this chapter 
begins to flesh out the evaluative standards against which the cases’ experience in practice will 
be later evaluated.
The chapter proceeds in three sections, each dedicated to an examination of one of the 
three cases - Environment Improvement Plan (EIP), 1 Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plan (NEIP)2 and Regional Natural Resource Management (RNRM). To provide 
some background to these programs, each section commences by describing the historical origin
1 The discussion on EIP draws on: Holley C and Gunningham N, “Environmental Improvement Plans: Facilitative 
Regulation in Practice” (2006) 23(6) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 448.
2 The discussion on NEIPs draws on: Gunningham N, Holley C and Shearing C, “Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plans: Community Empowerment, Voluntary Collaboration and Legislative Design” (2007) 24(2) 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 125.
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of the program and the reasons behind its development.3 The discussion then provides a brief 
overview of the program and places it within the context of wider NEG developments by 
connecting it with similar NEG experiments around the world. Finally, the investigation turns to 
discuss how the case study embodies the four characteristics of “good” NEG.
4.2 Environment Improvement Plan -  NEG and Point 
Source Pollution
4.2.1 Background and History of EIP
During the early 1990s, the Victorian Environmental Protection Agency (VEPA) pioneered 
the EIP. It was heralded as a mechanism to engage a broader range of stakeholders in the 
regulatory process and to generate co-operative and innovative approaches to addressing the 
environmental challenges confronting (usually large) industrial enterprises.4
Like many NEG initiatives, the concept of EIP evolved not from elegant theorising but as a 
practical response to a concrete and pressing environmental problem: the stand off between a 
local community and the collection of industries that made up the Altona Chemical Complex in 
Melbourne (the Complex).5 In a familiar failure of planning, the Complex, although initially 
located at some distance from residential areas, found itself in increasingly close proximity to 
the expanding and sprawling suburbs of Melbourne. Over the years, the local community and 
the Complex became increasingly polarised over the Complex’s severe pollution impacts, such 
as odour, noise and the health impacts of chemical discharges.6
Finding the Complex’s management unresponsive to their concerns, residents turned to the 
VEPA, demanding that it take action to address their concerns. However, when the VEPA 
investigated, it found no easy solution to the conflict (tough action to reduce pollution might 
threaten the economic viability of chemical complex facilities, and there was little room for 
compromise). For a period, there was a stand off. The community, unhappy with the VEPA’s 
slow response,7 began to take “radical” action, opposing all development proposals by the 
offending facilities (including a proposal for a bike shed!).8 In 1989, the local Member for 
Parliament, facing heated demands from both sides, orchestrated a number of public meetings 
between concerned community members, the industries, the VEPA and local government
3 Gunningham N, “The New Collaborative Environmental Governance” International Meeting on Law and Society in 
the 21 Century, Humboldt University, Berlin, 25-28 July 2007 at 2-3.
4 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) p 1.
5 This included an oil refinery, carbon black manufacturer and a number of chemical industries); Meek T, 
“Environment Improvement Plans -  Going Beyond Compliance to Achieve Sustainability” 13th World Clean Air and 
Environmental Protection Congress and Exhibition London, UK, August 22 - 27, 2004 at 2.
6 Meek, n 5 at 2.
7 Wills I and Fritschy S, “Industry-Community-Regulator Consultation in Improving Environmental Performance in 
Victoria” (2001) 8 Australian Journal o f Environmental Management 158 at 159; Meek, n 5 at 3.
8 Wills and Fritschy, n 7 at 158 - 159; Meek, n 5 at 2.
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members. One outcome was an agreement to form the Altona Complex Neighbourhood 
Consultative Group (“ACNCG”) comprising all the main stakeholders.9
At this point the VEPA took on a new role.10 Using the ACNCG forum, the VEPA 
facilitated the group’s development and ultimately steered it towards a negotiated solution. That 
solution committed the Complex to improve emissions to air, reduce liquid and sold waste 
generation and manage noise emissions.11 In return, the local community stopped blocking the 
Complex’s various expansion plans. Over time, through continuing dialogue and the 
consultation process, the industries in the Complex came to enjoy an increasingly productive 
and less adversarial relationship with the local community and VEPA.12
So successful did the VEPA regard this Altona model, that it decided to “roll it out” across 
the state.13 They did so under the banner of EIP.
4.2.2 Overview of EIP and international comparisons
As described by the VEPA an EIP is:
a public commitment by a company to enhance its environmental 
performance. The plan outlines areas of a company’s operations to be 
improved and is usually negotiated in conjunction with the local community, 
local government, EPA and other relevant government authorities. Where 
possible, an EIP contains clear timelines for completion of improvements 
and details about on-going monitoring of the plan. Improvements may 
include new works or equipment, or changes in operating practices. 
Monitoring, assessments and audits are undertaken to plan and support these 
improvements.14
While these features are common to most EIPs,15 over the decade and half since the EIP 
was introduced a number of distinct forms of EIP have emerged.16 These are outlined in Box 4.1 
below.
9 W ills and Fritschy, n 7 at 158 - 159; Meek, n 5 at 1-2.
10 Meek, n 5 at 2.
11 Robinson B (Chairman of EPA) “Cleaner Production -  Pathways for the Future” 2nd Asia Pacific Cleaner 
Production Roundtable held in Brisbane, Australia 21-23 April 1999 p 7.
12 Meek, n 5 at 3; Robinson, n 11 at 7.
13 Meek, n 5 at 4; Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf, 2002) p 159.
14 VEPA, Information Bulletin: Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 394, VEPA, 1993).
15 In principle the EIP process may abandon direct local stakeholder involvement in favour of a bipartite approach 
involving just the industry and VEPA, however this was very uncommon. Such a bipartite form would obviously 
struggle to satisfy participation and arguably many forms o f collaboration characteristic of NEG. Accordingly, the 
empirical component of the research focused principally on voluntary and multi-stakeholder EIPs.
16 See generally Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13.
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By far the most common form of EIP is the “voluntary EIP”. Comprising the large majority of 
approximately 70 EIPs that were operational or being negotiated at the time of writing,17 the 
voluntary EIP is developed by industry, local stakeholders and VEPA pursuant to VEPA 
guidelines.18 These guidelines are designed to encourage both poor and better performing 
industries to genuinely volunteer to participate in the EIP process.
A similar type of voluntary EIP emerged in 1994 as a part of VEPA’s “accredited licence 
scheme” (AL).19 AL is targeted at leading environmental performers and provides them with a 
less prescriptive alternative to the standard works approval and licence.20 To obtain an 
accredited licence a firm must develop or have in place, inter alia, an EIP.21 Nonetheless, as 
previous research on AL in Victoria has shown, very few enterprises have gone down this 
path.22 Indeed based on the author’s research, only 21 accredited licences had been granted, 
out of the approximately 1000 licensed premises in Victoria.23
Beyond these two types of voluntary EIPs, there are two compulsory forms. The first is an 
EIP under s 31C of the Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) (the Act). This section 
empowers VEPA to effectively compel industries to develop and implement an EIP. This is 
achieved through a convoluted mechanism, which involves “declaring” a particular highly 
polluting industry sector to be subject to s 31C of the Act and then offering individual 
industry enterprises within it the “option” of entering an EIP as a more palatable alternative to 
a mandatory environmental audit.24 The second compulsory EIP arises from VEPA’s 
legislative powers, which conceivably allow it to impose an EIP on any scheduled premises as 
a licence condition, or as a term of a work approval,25 notice or other statutory mechanism.26 
These powers, as well as s 31C of the Act, are rarely executed in practice.27 However, as we’ll 
see in subsequent chapters, these powers are far from redundant and can have an important 
role in acting as an incentive altering mechanism to tip industry’s cost benefit equation and 
encourage them to collaborate.
Box 4.1: Types of EIPs.
17 Total EIP numbers based on statistics obtained from VEPA.
18 VEPA, n 4, p 2, 13; VEPA, Environment Improvement Plans -  An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 
2; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, p 171-174.
19 See Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26A-26E; VEPA, Accredited Licensee System Guidelines for  
Applicants (Publication 424.1, VEPA, 2006).
20 See Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26B(2)(c).
21 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26B(2)(c).
22 The main reason for this is that very few industries have seen the purported benefits o f an accredited licence as 
worthwhile (i.e. a reduced licence fee, greater flexibility and autonomy in determining how to handle environmental 
management issues and enhanced credibility with the community). Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, pp 171-174.
23 The number of accredited licencees was based on statistics obtained from the EPA. Estimate of total licences based 
on most recent published figures of VEPA licence numbers; VEPA, Annual Report 2002-2003 Compliance Report 
(Publication 919, VEPA, 2003) p 2.
24 See Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 31C(6).
25 In these cases the contents of an EIP will be tailored to the issues o f the particular development and will include an 
emphasis on site operating conditions; VEPA, n 4, p 1.
26 In addition, pursuant to VEPA authority under a number o f State Environment Protection Policies (SEPPs), VEPA 
can also require an enterprise to develop an EIP: VEPA State Environment Protection Policy (Air Quality 
Management) 2001 (Vic), cl 20; State Environment Protection Policy (Control O f Noise From Commerce, Industry 
And Trade) No N -l 1989 (Vic), els 17A-17G; State Environment Protection Policy (Prevention And Management Of 
Contamination O f Land) 2002 (Vic), cl 17.See for instance Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 20(6)(b); 
VEPA, n 4, p 1.
27 The VEPA has only sought to use its powers under s 31C of the Act and VEPA confirmed that imposing licence 
condition EIPs was rare in practice: See Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, p 163.
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Regardless of the particular form an EIP takes, they all share the same overarching goal. 
That is, to accomplish continuous corporate environmental improvement, including extending 
“beyond compliance” with legal requirements.28
Similar goals for improving the environmental performance of industry have been pursued 
by international NEG experiments,29 including Project XL in the United States of America 
(USA), and environmental agreements and covenants in Europe.30 Like EIP, these NEG 
experiments have focused on encouraging leading or “good” performers to voluntarily aspire to 
go beyond compliance. However the EIP embodies two characteristics that set it apart from 
these NEG experiments. First, the EIP is one of few NEG approaches to focus on improving the 
environmental performance of both the best and the worst industries.31 The second unique 
characteristics of the EIP initiative is that it was introduced a number of years before 
“regulatory flexibility initiatives” such as Project XL, making EIP a considerably more mature 
example of N EG .32
Such differences aside, like all NEG experiments focused on pollution control, the EIP 
represents a move away from conventional command and control regulation (notwithstanding 
that VEPA’s traditional regulatory powers still underpin the EIP’s operation).
Similar to its counterparts in Europe and the USA, the EIP was (and remains) symbolic of 
the “new” way of governing industry pollution in the face of world wide trends of shrinking 
government resources, mounting criticism of command and control regulation, industry 
demands for more self regulation and citizens’ expectations of inclusion in decision-making.33 
This “new” way of governing is evident in the design of the EIP that involves the quintessential 
features of NEG: (i) collaboration  between industry, VEPA and non government stakeholders;
(ii) participation  of local residents and non government actors and deliberative decision 
making; (iii) “reflexive” and “adaptive management” processes of learning and adaptation ; and
28 VEPA, n 4, p 1.
29 See also example Wisconsin Green Tier Initiative online at http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environmental/ viewed
30 May 2008; The process based approach of EIP (discussed further below) also mirrors a range of environmental 
management systems championed by O rt’s ideas on reflexive environmental law; Orts E, “Reflexive Environmental 
Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227.
30 Karkkainen classifies the EIP as an example of environmental contracting; Karkkainen B, “Information-Forcing 
Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU 
and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 293-294; In Europe similar approaches have been discussed in the following: 
Heritier A, “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy Making without Legislating?” (2002) 81 Political Science 
Series Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, p 13-14; Orts E and Deketelaere K, “Introduction: Environmental 
Contracts and Regulatory Innovation: in Orts E and Deketelaere K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative 
Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe (Kluwer Law, 2001) p 5.
31 As such, the EIP provides a rare example of NEG that may provide insights into the extent to which such forms of 
NEG can be extended beyond just leading firms, to also address good and poor performers: Gunningham and Sinclair, 
n 13, p 158.
32 The EIP accordingly stands as an important example of an earlier, but long standing form of NEG from which 
much can be learned empirically about the conditions under which “good” NEG can be achieved. Gunningham and 
Sinclair, n 13, p 158.
33 For discussions of the changing nature of environmental regulation see: National Symposium on Second 
Generation Environmental Policy and the Law (2001) 29(1) Capital University Law Review 1-318.
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(iv) many “n ew ” form s o f accountability, including third party monitoring, process and the 
performance based accountability regime. The following discussion focuses on each of these 
features to demonstrate and provide greater insight into how the EIP gives expression to these 
defining characteristics of NEG.
4.2.3 EIP and the defining characteristics of NEG
4.2.3.1 Collaboration
At the heart of the EIP is “effective collaboration”34 between industry, VEPA and non 
government stakeholders.35 This design feature is reflective of VEPA’s overall approach to 
governance, which assumes there is more to be gained through “strategic alliances and forming 
or facilitating partnerships for environment protection with industry, local government and the 
community”36 than by adversarial, government centred regulation.37 Indeed, for the VEPA, face 
to face negotiation among partners and cooperative action is thought more likely to dissipate 
conflict, mobilise new resources and provide innovative solutions than the other more 
conventional tools in their kit.38 Achieving such benefits through a collaborative EIP process are 
particularly germane to VEPA’s efforts to deal with situations like Altona.39 That is, situations 
where industries often have severe environmental impacts on local residents, traditional tools 
are inadequate to resolve the problem and the situation is rife with conflict and community 
dissatisfaction.40
The collaborative approach that will ideally emerge under the EIP involves the relevant 
stakeholders forming a “Community Liaison Committee”, 41 modelled on the tripartite 
consultation process that proved so successful at Altona.
The committee is flexible in size, but ideally will be made up of about twelve members 
comprising two to three enterprise representatives; government representatives (local and 
VEPA); two to three representatives of interested groups such as NGOs; and five to six local
34 VEPA, n 18, p 1; VEPA, n 4, p 2, 10.
35 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  Running Community Liaison Committees (Publication 740,VEPA, 2001) p 2-3.
36 VEPA, Corporate Plan 2002-2003 (Publication 848, EPA Victoria, 2002) p 6 ,4 1 .1 note that its 2002-2003 
corporate plan is designed to help give effect to the Victorian government’s “vision for the future” set out in the 
document: Victorian Government, Growing Victoria Together (Vic, 2000) p 22.
37 Shapiro S, “Administrative Law After the Counter-reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government” (2000)
48 U Kan L Rev 689 at 729-730.
38 VEPA, n 18, p 1; Holley and Gunningham, n 1.
39 “In many cases...industries or housing have been allowed to develop too close together, causing amenity problems 
for nearby residents. Conflicts have then sometimes emerged...there are generally no winners in these situations, and 
a traditional regulatory approach has not always worked...In an attempt to more effectively deal with these more 
challenging situations, some years ago, EPA Victoria recognised the value of getting industry and its community 
neighbours together to attempt to resolve these problems”; VEPA, n 18, p 1.
40 VEPA, n 18, p 1; VEPA, Ten steps to successful community/industry consultation (Publication 520, VEPA, 1996); 
VEPA, n 4, p 1 ,2,7; VEPA, n 35, p i ,  4, 5.
41 As the guidelines point out: Proponents, facility operators and affected communities have been able to develop 
collaborative approaches to solve problems and potential issues of concern”; See: VEPA, n 35, p 1.
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community representatives.42 These members collectively participate43 in and are given 
responsibility for defining and assessing aspects of the industry’s environmental performance,44 
and effectively “tailor” the EIP to the specific environmental and industrial conditions in each
45case.
The group accordingly develops, agrees to, monitors, evaluates and adjusts a single plan 
that governs improvements to industry’s environmental performance for an agreed period 
(usually between 1-3 years). The EIP is not, however, intended to be a “once o f f ’ collaborative 
problem-solving endeavour.46 While the guidelines do not offer any specific time line as to the 
length of time collaborative groups are expected to survive, the EIP is designed specifically to 
be a long term collaborative endeavour.47 Indeed, when an industry has completed implementing 
a given plan, the group is required to redraft and agree to a new one in a manner that is 
consistent with the EIP’s goals for continuous environmental improvement and adaptive 
management (discussed in more detail below).48
4.2.3.2 Participatory and Deliberative Aspirations
In addition to collaboration, the EIP has identifiable participatory and deliberative 
aspirations. Indeed, the EIP is one of the key environmental governance instruments in the State 
of Victoria intended to deepen the ways in which non governmental actors participate in and 
influence decisions about environmental problems and policies that affect their lives.49
In Victoria, as elsewhere, political appeals to “third w ay"50 and non-government 
participation in governance have grown over the last three decades,51 culminating in the recent 
“Growing Victoria Together” plan .52 Like other “third way” reforms in Australia,53 this plan
42 VEPA, n 35, p 1-3.
43 VEPA, n 35, p 3.
44 For example local resident and non governmental actors may “ask questions about the project, identifying areas of 
concern, suggesting strategies for improvements and providing constructive feedback on the proponent’s suggestions 
for improvements ... [and] provide valuable information and feedback about the facility’s impacts in the surrounding 
community” ; VEPA, n 35, p 3.
45 The EIP should be a useful working document, so its layout and scope should be tailored to suit the needs and 
circumstances of the company. Factors that may influence the type of EIP produced include the size of the 
organisation, the nature o f its operations and the characteristics of its operating environment; VEPA, n 4, p 5; 
Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, p 157.
46 As the guidelines note: “Having produced an EIP it should be borne in mind that this is only the first step”, VEPA, 
n 4 p 9.
47 The EIP is designed specifically to sustain the collaboration, noting that overtime “If participation is dropping off, 
it may be necessary to restart or reinitiate some o f the contact strategies”; VEPA, n 35, p 3.
48 VEPA, n 4, p 11; VEPA, Enforcement Policy (Publication 384.2, VEPA, 2005) p 9; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, 
p 57.
49 Fung A and W right E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), 
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 5;
50 Giddens A, The Third Way and Its Critics (Polity Press, 2000).
51 Wiseman J, “Local Heroes? Learning from Recent Community Strengthening Initiatives in Victoria” (2006) 65(2) 
Australian Journal o f Public Administration 95 at 96.
52 Victorian Government, n 36, p 22.
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embraces “building cohesive communities”54 “partnerships” and “community participation and 
engagement”.55 Unsurprisingly, this message has trickled down to the VEPA whose EIP 
program (and the more recent NEIP initiative discussed below)56 are intended to support the 
VEPA corporate objective57 to “engage with and enable communities in ways that are 
meaningful to people”.58 The EIP has a particularly significant role to play here because its 
intention to address “amenity problems” for residents near industries59 can give voice to the 
typically disenfranchised interests of those who bear the brunt of society’s industrial lifestyle 
(such as the environmental justice movement60 did on a broader scale in the USA).61 Notably, 
the EIP focus is also broad, and can give others such as environmental interest groups voice in 
seeking to reduce wider environmental impacts of industry.
However, the reader should be aware that the participatory aspirations of EIP are distinct to 
what we shall see below is a more “community building” focus taken by the other two cases.62 
That is, while the EIP is concerned with empowering citizens to have a greater say over 
environmental problems that affect them, its narrow focus on “what comes out of a single 
industry” mean there is little attempt to connect residents or other interests to the broader local 
environment per se or establish a sense of “community” with others in the local area.63
The collaborative EIP group has been designed as the vehicle through which these 
aspirations are to be achieved. This involves requirements for collaborative groups to meet 
procedural criteria common in NEG regarding inclusiveness, representativeness, and decision 
making processes (see chapter 2). These criteria are discussed in more detail in chapter 6, but 
they include requirements for the EIP to involve the “affected community”, including “as much
53 Giddens A, n 50, p 31 ; see Reddel T, “Third way Social Governance: Where is the State?” (2004) 39(2) Australian 
Journal of Social Issues 129; Moore S, “ Regional Delivery of Natural Resource Management in Australia: Is it 
democratic and Does it M atter?” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds) Participation and Governance in Regional 
Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 125-127.
54 Victorian Government, n 36, p 22.
55 Victorian Government, n 36, p 22.
56 The VEPA’s more recent corporate plan goes further, making “community involvement” one of only five key 
results area for the organisation, with a primary aim “to improve Victoria’s environment through community 
involvement”, specifically through EIPs and NEIPs; VEPA, Corporate Plan 2004-2005 (Publication 913, EPA 
Victoria, 2003) p 7.
57 The VEPA’s more recent corporate plan goes further making “community involvement” one of only five key 
results area for the organisation. According to the plan, “community involvement is central to EPA’s work” and 
achieving this specifically involves developing, delivering and facilitating “Environment Improvement Plans (EIPs)”. 
VEPA, n 56, p 7.
58 VEPA, n 36, p 1 ,6 ,4 1 .
59 VEPA, n 18, p 1.
60 For a recent overview see Ringquist E, “Environmental Justice” in Durant R, Fiorino D, and O ’Leary R (eds), 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, Cambridge).
61 VEPA, n 4, p 2; Conley A and Moote M, “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management” (2003) 16 
Society and Natural Resources 371 at 377.
62 Cannon J, “Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management “ (2000) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 
379 at 421-422.
63 Cannon, n 62 at 421-422.
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resident participation as possible” as well as “different community interests and perspectives”. 4 
Decision making is also to occur through “negotiation”,65 where industry is to “communicate 
clearly and without the use of jargon and industry specific language”, treating non government 
actors fairly and as equals,66 to arrive at joint decisions about objectives, targets and actions 
designed to improve industries’ environmental performance.67
The intent is that over time, using this participatory and broadly deliberative approach, 
residents’ comments and suggestions will lead to effective solutions to their long-standing 
problems.68
4.2.3.3 Learning and adaptation
The third NEG feature embraced by EIP is processes of learning and adaptation. Here, the 
EIP is unique among the case studies as it is the only one designed to combine a “process- 
based” approach to learning and adaptation, with an overlapping implementation method akin to 
“adaptive management” .
It may seem somewhat odd to associate the EIP with “adaptive management”. Certainly, 
the point source pollution problems addressed by EIP are a far cry from the ecosystem situations 
where Holling’s original “adaptive management” methods of scientific hypothesis testing were 
applied.69 However, consistent with the trend to extend the basics of this adaptive approach to 
different institutions and scales,70 the designers of the EIP appeared to believe that point source 
pollution governance should also be adaptive. Indeed, the EIP has been designed to involve an 
implementation method that roughly mirrors a “passive” adaptive management approach.71 As 
Karkkainen describes it, “passive” adaptive management is characterised by heightened 
monitoring of key indicators and subsequent adjustments in policies in light of what may be 
learned.72
This process is evident in EIP requirements for the collaborative group to set measurable 
objectives; identify critical aspects of each objective and the standard that is to be maintained;
64 VEPA, n 35, p 1 -3 ,4 , 6; VEPA, n 18, p 3-4; VEPA, n 4, p 10.
65 VEPA, n 35, p 4-5; VEPA, n 18, p 3-4; VEPA, n 40, p 1-2.
66 As the guidelines note a characteristic of this include that Industry is encouraged to do “a lot of listening” “attempt 
to see the situation from the community’s point of view”, hearing people out and responding openly and honestly to 
questions are important behaviours to adopt”; VEPA, n 18, p 4.
67 VEPA, n 18, p 1.
68 VEPA, n 18, p 4.
69 Dovers S, “Processes and Institutions for Resource and Environmental Management: Why and How to Analyse?” 
in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 4.
70 Ruhl J, “Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?” (2005) 7 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 21.
71 Karkkainen B, “Panarchy And Adaptive Change: Around The Loop And Back Again” (2005) 7 Minnesota Journal 
of Law, Science & Technology 59 at 70-72.
72 Karkkainen, n 71 at 70-72.
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monitor these aspects and performance against the objective; and adapt actions in the plan as 
necessary.73 Much of this is carried out by industry, which must report monitoring data to the 
collaborative group in order to facilitate the cooperative identification of any shortfalls in 
meeting targets and standards, and develop actions to remedy them.74 The local knowledge of 
residents on the collaborative group is also central to monitoring the impacts of actions taken 
under the EIP. As the guidelines note, residents may alert the group to any problems or new 
issues that need to be remedied over the course of the EIP:
[Residents] live in the area, experience the problems and may be able to help 
in tracking down sources of the problem if they are not immediately 
obvious.75
These features will ideally ensure that EIP is more effective and responsive to the 
uncertainties and dynamic nature of industries’ operations and their environmental impacts on 
local communities.76
Overlapping with the adaptive method of EIP is a second approach to promoting learning 
and adaptation that arises from a “process-based approach” to regulation. Much like reflexive 
law ideas outlined in chapter 2, process approaches assume that far more will be achieved by 
influencing attitudes and creating a framework for better environmental organisation than by the 
imposition of detailed prescriptive standards.77 The focus is similarly on developing systems for 
managing environmental performance across an organisation as a whole through requiring 
industry to set objectives and targets, establish a management program, set procedures for 
achieving the targets, and measurement techniques to ensure that they are reached.78 By 
systematically examining its environmental impact and means of reducing it, these processes 
will ideally stimulate a continuous search within the organisation for environmental impacts that 
fall outside of current regulation, followed by system self-correction and thus a process of 
continuous adjustment and improvement.79
73 VEPA, n 4, p 9-10 (noting that “The EIP should provide for periodic (usually annual) review of assessment and 
monitoring data, and overall environmental performance...[including] updating the EIP itself following the review”.
74 VEPA, n 4, p 9-10.
75 VEPA, n 4, p 18.
76 As Ruhl has generally pointed out “it is almost universally the case that advocates of regulatory innovations also 
advance the method of implementation known generally as adaptive management: Ruhl, n 70, p 28; Fung and Wright, 
n 4 9 ,p 21-22.
77 See: Gunningham N and Johnstone R, Regulating Workplace Safety (Oxford University Press, 1998) Ch 2-3;
Parker C, The Open Corporation (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
78 Holley and Gunningham, n 1.
79 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13, p 180; Fiorino D, “Flexibility” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 415.
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80As other authors have pointed out, the EIP has been designed to operate along these lines. 
Specifically, the negotiated plan must include a range of processes as minimum requirements, 
including: undertakings to comply or go beyond compliance with licences and regulations; 
emission and waste production standards; monitoring of compliance; audits and assessments; 
improvement project details including what needs to be done, how it will be done and by when; 
provision for upgrading of plant; assessment of new and emerging technology; emergency and 
contingency plans; assessment and monitoring; review, reporting and updating, enhanced
response to community complaints; community relations, health and safety issues; and
81community reporting requirements on progress.
As the last three requirements given above make clear, the processes inherent to this 
approach intermesh heavily with the adaptive approach carried out by the collaborative group.82 
Even so, the more discrete intention of the EIP process based approach is to provide “an 
effective tool to guide a company’s environmental management”. Doing so, the EIP is aimed at 
enabling and encouraging industry to change its behaviour in response to new information and 
opportunities about its operations and environmental impacts, and thus achieve “continuous 
improvement”.83
4.2.3.4 “New” Forms of Accountability
Finally, to ensure industry and collaborators contribute to (rather than pervert) 
environmental improvement, the EIP has been designed to employ a range of “new” forms of 
accountability.84 As with other accountability discussions in NEIP and RNRM, this section 
focuses on accountability design features of the case study, but acknowledges that wider 
mechanisms such as judicial review may operate to support elements of the process (eg. agency 
accountability).
As is characteristic of NEG’s “new” forms of accountability, the EIP supplements 
traditional hierarchical accountability relationships (eg. industry to VEPA) with horizontal ones 
(eg. industry to local residents). It also capitalises on the involvement of private actors such as 
industry, auditors and local residents in EIP, and the roles they can play in ensuring 
accountability for performance.85 By doing so, it is designed to ensure performance and make
80 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13.
81 VEPA, n 18, p 2; VEPA, n 4, p 9.
82 VEPA, n 4, p 2,10.
83 VEPA, n 4, p 1 ; Fiorino, n 79 p 402.
84 Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” (1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 1 at 96.
85 Freeman, n 84 at 96; May P, “Regulatory Regimes and Accountability” (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 8 at 11.
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the program responsive not only upward to agencies (and thus ideally parliament)86 but also to 
more immediate publics such as local residents.87
The “new” forms of accountability in EIP are applied within two interrelated 
accountability regimes. That is, accountability for its process based approach, and 
accountability based on performance. While they overlap, for heuristic purposes the two are 
treated separately below.88
In terms of the EIP’s process based approach,89 accountability is centred on whether 
industry has an acceptable plan, rather than on the basis of its environmental outcomes.90 
Industry’s “professional accountability” is vital here, employing their professional expertise in 
designing the system.91 Further, accountability is to be delivered through VEPA oversight of 
the plan, supplemented by independent experts auditing of the system.92 These public and 
private actors are to determine “whether the EIP has been adequately implemented and is 
operating properly to manage environmental performance, rather than assessing the actual 
environmental performance of an organisation (through environmental monitoring)”.93
Overlapping with accountability for processes are a suit of mechanisms designed to ensure 
industry is also accountable for its performance. The core of this approach includes 
requirements for the industry (in negotiation with the others in the collaborative group) to set 
and be held accountable for measurable objectives.94 These objectives must meet a number of 
broad requirements, namely “improve environmental performance”95 by meeting or going 
“beyond-compliance”96 with licences and regulations.97
Central to ensuring accountability for performance is a reliance on industry self monitoring 
and reporting to VEPA and a collaborative group, as well as horizontal mechanisms of 
accountability fostered through industry’s and VEPA’s collaboration with non government 
stakeholders. Indeed, non-government actors are expected to play “a valuable role in monitoring
86 This section overlooks precisely how links between agencies and parliament are designed, as these considerations 
are beyond the scope of the specific design of the EIP.
87 Freeman, n 84, p 96.
88 VEPA, n 4, p 10.
89 May, n 85 at 13.
90 May, n 85 a tp  10.
91 Manring N, “The Politics of Accountability in National Forest Planning” (2005) 37(1) Administration and Society
57 at 61 ; May, n 2 at 10, 13.
92 VEPA, n 4, p 10.
93 VEPA, n 4, p 9-10.
94 For example “Ensure no offensive odours are discharged beyond the boundaries of the premises” or “Reduce the 
volume of sludge wastes by 20 per cent within the next two years” ; VEPA, n 4, p 7.
95 The EIP also aims to achieve social outcomes such as resolving conflict between industry and local community; 
VEPA, n 4, p 1,4-11; VEPA, n 18, p 1-3.
96 This will involve either “eliminating”, “reducing” or “controlling” its “environmental impacts and risks” VEPA, n 
4, p 7.
97 Further, the ongoing participation of agency officials in collaboratives may provide ongoing checks on industry to 
ensure they adhere to performance goals, and assist them to leam and adapt.
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and reviewing the performance of existing facilities”.98 Such an approach not only checks 
industry behaviour but also adds to transparency.99 The aim is for stakeholders to “blow the 
whistle” or otherwise bring pressure to bear (eg. using local media to threaten industries’ 
reputation and social licence) if decisions and actions are failing to achieve the set targets and 
reduce its impacts on the local area.100
The mutual accountability and third party auditing mechanisms are also supplemented by 
the traditional command and control powers of VEPA. The VEPA retains a right to amend and 
approve plans to ensure the targets set are appropriate. The primary boundary on this decision 
being that the target must meet and/or go beyond minimum legal requirements.101 If slippage in 
a target is evident, the VEPA has recourse to its regulatory powers (eg. impose more stringent 
licence conditions or prosecution) that may be used as a threat if industry performance slips 
significantly below established thresholds.102
4.2.4 Summary
To sum up, although the EIP is underpinned by command and control style powers of the 
VEPA, its approach to governing industry represents a significant departure from conventional 
rule based regulation. Its systematic approach to pollution prevention by encouraging greater 
industry self-management sets it apart from prescriptive regulatory approaches that demand 
adherence to fixed rules. It also evidences a shift away from a traditional bipartite relationship 
between the regulators and the regulated, to a “tripartite” approach involving disclosure of 
information to, consultation with, and empowerment of local communities. As demonstrated 
above, one can clearly discern within this distinctive program the intention to pursue, and 
successfully implement, a collaborative, participatory and deliberative process that fosters 
learning and adaptation to changing environmental issues and impacts, while ensuring 
performance and public interests are secured through a mix of traditional and new forms of 
accountability. Each of these key features take a unique shape relevant to the EIP approach, but 
all offer an expression of the defining features of NEG.
98 VEPA, n 35, p 1.
99 Fung and Wright, n 49, p 16-17.
100 Local residents may also play a democratic accountability role in scrutinising VEPA actions and relationships with 
industry in pursuing environmental performance; W eber E, ‘T he Question of Accountability in Historical Perspective: 
from Jackson to Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem Management” (1999) 31(4) Administration and Society 451 at 
453.
101 VEPA, n 4, p 11.
102 In the event of a breach of law, this may involve a prosecution. However, even for targets that go beyond 
regulatory baselines, if there is continual underperformance the VEPA may make the targets binding conditions of a 
licence, effectively compelling industry to meet them or face legal action. Even in cases where leading performers are 
involved, underperformance could lead to rescinding accredited licencee status. Meek, n 5, p 4; Gunningham and 
Sinclair, n 13, p 163.
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The next section turns to consider a second NEG program and case study of this thesis: the 
NEIP. Despite a similarity in nomenclature with the EIP, the NEIP’s translation of NEG’s 
approach to governing is noticeably distinct.
4.3 Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan -  
NEG and Complex Environmental Problems
4.3.1 Background and History of NEIP
In 2001, the VEPA introduced the NEIP as a new tool to address complex local 
environmental problems.103 In distinct contrast to the EIP’s focus on single industry sites, the 
NEIP is designed to operate as a “place based” approach at a “neighbourhood” scale that 
involves multiple industrial, residential, commercial and/or agricultural causes of environmental 
problems. The NEIP also discards command and control for broad based “community” decision 
making that engages not only large point source polluters, but the entire gamut of public and 
private actors who contribute to or are responsible for environmental problems at a 
neighbourhood level.104
The introduction of the NEIP instrument105 formed a part of a wider shift in the direction of 
environmental governance and policy106 toward developing new tools for addressing complex 
environmental problems.107 These so called “second generation” environmental problems108 
include issues such as the cumulative impact of multiple sources of pollution at a local level.109
103 Garbutt The Hon S, Environment Protection (Liveable Neighbourhoods) Bill 2000 (Vic) 2nd Reading (Hansard 
Extract, Legislative Assembly, 2 November 2000) at 2, available online at 
http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/proiects/NEIPS/docs/protec.pdf (viewed 30 May 2008).
104 Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans -  Developing a Voluntary Proposal (Publication 846, 
VEPA, 2002) p 1.
105 As the second reading speech spells out quite clearly: ‘T he Environment Protection Act provides EPA with a 
range of tools to protect and improve the Victorian environment. In particular, there are many effective tools which 
EPA has used over the years to reduce emissions from industry, especially from larger industrial sites. These well 
developed statutory tools include licences, works approval and notices. However, as we are well aware, local 
environmental problems are increasingly the result o f the cumulative impacts of multiple sources. For example, 
sources of air pollution in a local urban neighbourhood might include one or two large industrial sites, several small 
commercial premises, motor vehicles and emissions from lawn mowers and wood heaters. Furthermore, the 
responsibility for managing these sources is often split between EPA, local government and other state government 
agencies. Local communities and state and local government agencies need a new tool to help them address local 
environmental issues in a more useful and cost-effective way. In response to this need, the Bracks government is 
delivering on its commitment to improve the quality o f the local environment and hence, the liveability of 
neighbourhoods through the establishment of neighbourhood environment improvement plans” ; Garbutt, n 103, p 2.
106 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13.
107 For discussions of the changing nature of environmental regulation see “National Symposium on Second 
Generation Environmental Policy and the Law” (2001) 29(1) Capital University Law Review 1-318.
108 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 13.
109 Often, these diverse and diffuse sources o f pollution have an overall environmental impact far exceeding that of 
the “traditional villain”, namely large industrial enterprises. It has been estimated that in the UK over 70% o f total
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As we saw in chapter 1, traditional regulatory approaches to these problems have often been 
adhoc, lacking in integration and were largely ineffective in resolving these issues.110
For these reasons, the Victorian Minister for Environment and Conservation made the case 
in 2001 for a more holistic locally based governance approach known as NEIP that would be 
used to address complex environmental problems.111 NEIP was duly introduced into the Act112 
and was described as:113
a statutory mechanism to enable those contributing to and those affected by 
local environmental problems to come together in a constructive forum. In 
this forum, the members of the local community, including residents, 
industry and local government, can agree on the environmental priority 
issues for the neighbourhood. They can then devise a plan to address their 
agreed environmental issues in a practical manner."4
4.3.2 Overview of NEIP and International Comparisons
Two types of NEIP were introduced: a directed,115 and a voluntary NEIP.116 At the time of 
writing, there have been no directed proposals and none were anticipated, at least in the short or 
medium term. Rather, the focus in practice has been, and will continue to be, on the voluntary 
NEIP processes. For this reason, it is the latter that is the focus of the remainder of this thesis. 
Box 4.2 below provides an overview of the structure of voluntary NEIPs.
A voluntary NEIP process117 can be initiated by any interested member of a local community. 
This NEIP process is developed in stages that involve developing a “proposal” for a NEIP, 
then a NEIP plan. The proposal is designed for VEPA’s purposes of judging “suitable” NEIP 
projects. The proposal is used to guide the development of the NEIP plan, which identifies 
finalised objectives and actions for improving the local environment. The plan is to apply to a 
“neighbourhood boundary” defined by participants. The intention is to give the NEIP the 
flexibility to develop institutional structures and frame solutions at the local scale.118 This
environmental pollution is caused by the activities of small and medium sized enterprises; Groundwork, Small Firms 
and the Environment: A Groundwork Status Report (Groundwork Foundation, 1998).
110 VEPA, n 104, p 2.
111 In particular she argued that: “local communities and state and local government agencies need a new tool to help 
them address local environmental issues in a more useful and cost-effective way”; Garbutt, n 103 p 2.
112 See Environment Protection (Liveable Neighbourhoods) Act 2000, No.7/2001 (Vic).
113 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AD defines "neighbourhood environment improvement plan" to mean 
a neighbourhood environment improvement plan that is developed as a result of either a directed proposal or a 
voluntary proposal”.
114 Garbutt, n 103 p 2; VEPA, n 104, p 1.
115 In general terms, a directed proposal refers to a process whereby the VEPA directs a local government or some 
other “protection agency” to submit a NEIP proposal document to the VEPA for endorsement. For the specific 
requirements, notification obligations and timelines relating to this process see Environment Protection Act 1970 
(Vic), ss 19AF, 19AG and 19AH.
116 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AD, 19AE and 19AH.
117 See generally VEPA, n 104.
118 Karkkainen, n 71 at 72 at 76; Karkkainen B, “Transboundary Ecosystem Governance: Beyond Sovereignty?”
(2005) 35 ELR 10094.
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may involve tackling issues on a geographical basis, for example, as part of a water catchment 
or air shed, or the neighbourhood may be better defined by a social or administrative 
boundary like a township.11
Pursuant to the Act, a NEIP cannot be developed without identifying a “NEIP 
sponsor”.120 A “sponsor” can be an actor from a particular group of State, region or a local 
governmental agency known as a “protection agency” that have powers or duties under 
legislation other than the Act but with respect to the Victorian environment.121 The most 
appropriate sponsoring agency will depend on the context and issue being addressed122 and 
the particular role of the chosen protection agency will also vary. For example, it can include 
taking a leadership role, providing funding or support, or merely acting as one of the many 
participants.123 However, the sponsor is required to act “on behalf of the neighbourhood 
community to take the proposal through the formal stage of gaining EPA endorsement”, 
ultimately submitting the proposal and plan to VEPA.124
Once a sponsor is acquired and the plan is approved, the NEIP is intended to “improve the 
quality of the local environment” 125 through multiple public and private stakeholders 
collaborating together to address a shared and complex local environmental problem.126 
Notably, the NEIP program has no central source of government funding (such as RNRM 
program discussed below). Further, it is only members of the collaborative group who 
voluntarily agree and commit to take actions as a group. That is, the NEIP does not impart 
any direct regulatory authority to the collaborative group nor any significant resources to 
assist in, coerce or offer incentives to compel others to take action.127
Box 4.2: Overview of Voluntary NEIP.
The NEIP’s approach shares some similarities with international NEG experiments. For 
example, the NEIP echoes elements of “civic environmentalism” identified by Dewitt John128 
and others in the USA. However it is more closely related to the now defunct NEG experiment 
of Community Based Environmental Protection (CBEP) that was developed by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA).129 Like CBEP, the NEIP program aims to
1,9 VEPA, n 104, p 2-3.
120 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AE; VEPA, n 22, p 2.
121 Protection agencies are persons or bodies such as local governments, water authorities, catchment management 
associations or State government departments (eg the Department of Natural Resources and Environment or the 
Department of Infrastructure); Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 4(1); VEPA, n 104, p 7.
122 For instance, members of a local community who want to focus on natural resource and water quality issues may 
approach a catchment management authority, while a local government may be a more appropriate sponsor if 
members of a local community wish to develop a proposal to improve the health of local urban streams.
123 VEPA, n 104, pp 7-8.
124 VEPA, n 104, pp 7-8.
125 Garbutt, n 103.
126 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) 19A(1); Garbutt, n 103 at 2.
127 Steinzor R, “The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10909 at 14 
"pdf'.
128 For example, both NEIP and John emphasise ideas of “sponsors”, and both civic environmentalism and NEIP 
emphasise more bottom up efforts that embraced community capacity to govern local second generation 
environmental problems; John D and Mlay M, “Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic 
Environmentalism” in Sexton K, Marcus A, Easter K and Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental Decisions (Island 
Press, 1999) p 361.
129 US EPA, Community Based Approaches (US EPA) at http://www.epa.gov/ecocommunitv/ (viewed 5 March 2007). 
This has since been replaced by Community Action for a Renewed Environment (CARE) http://www.epa.gov/care/.
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achieve a form of “top down support for bottom up community initiatives”.130 Similarly, both 
are “place-based” approaches that encourage collaboration between local stakeholders in a 
community to addresses complex and cross-media environmental problems. However, in 
contrast to the NEIP program, CBEP was not a statutory mechanism that was formally 
enshrined in legislation, nor was it a specific US EPA program. Rather, CBEP was a more 
general initiative, which aimed to build on the US’ EPA existing media-specific statutory 
program by incorporating CBEP into all US EPA programs to “change...how the Agency does 
business”. 131
The unique design of the NEIP involves the tell tale features of NEG, including: (i) 
collaboration  between multiple public, private and non government actors within a local 
neighbourhood; (ii) participation  of local residents and non government actors and deliberative 
decision making; (iii) “adaptive management” and “systemic” processes of learning and 
adaptation ; and (iv) many “new" forms o f  accountability, including mutual accountability, 
contractual agreements, and a performance based accountability regime. The following 
discussion elaborates on each of these features to illuminate the way in which NEG is manifest 
in NEIPs.
4.3.3 NEIP and the Defining Characteristics of NEG
4.3.3.1 Collaboration
Broadly consistent with VEPA’s abovementioned collaborative approach to regulation, the 
NEIP has been designed to make voluntary collaboration and “partnerships” 132 a central feature 
of its approach.133 As the guidelines point out,134 the NEIP has been designed to address sever 
and complex environmental problems135 “which require concerted shared action”. 136 These
130 John and Mlay, n 128, p 361.
131 Office for Reinvention EPA, EPA’s Framework fo r Community Based Environmental Protection (NSCEP, 1999) 
p 5-11; Weiland P and Vos R, “Reforming EPA's Organizational Structure: Establishing an Adaptable Agency 
Through Eco-regions” (2002) 42 Natural Resources Journal 91 at 123-124; Nickelsburg S, “Mere Volunteers? The 
Promise and Limits of Community-based Environmental Protection” (1998) 84 Virginia Law Review 1371 at 1372- 
1373; John and Mlay, n 128, p 361-362.
132 Partners can include a broad range of people including individuals and households, social groups and services, 
local businesses, industry and business organisations, local green groups, state and local government agencies, green 
peak bodies, professional associations, and financial institutions/VEPA, n 104, p 8; VEPA, Annual Report 2003- 
2004 Community and Environment Report (Publication 962, VEPA, 2004) p 10.
133 Indeed references to partnership abound in the NEIP guidelines. For example: (i) “Each Neighbourhood EIP will 
be comprised of different partners... Partners should include those groups, businesses or people contributing to the 
environmental problems in your neighbourhood as well as those concerned about it and with the responsibility to act 
on it...” (VEPA, n 104, pp 8-9); (ii) “EPA must be satisfied that the people or organisations...likely to be required to 
undertake works have been identified and have agreed to participate. These become ‘partners’ in the Neighbourhood 
EIP” (VEPA, A Guideline fo r  Submitting a Voluntary Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan Proposal 
(Publication 847, VEPA, 2002) p 2); and (iii) one possible outcome of a NEIP is said to include “building 
relationships and partnerships across all community members, friendships and social networks” (VEPA, n 104, p 6).
134 VEPA, n 104, p 2; VEPA, n 133, p 1.
135 Karkkainen, n 118 at 76; Karkkainen, n 118.
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include situations such as “when there are multiple sources of pollution and where a joint effort 
is required to develop and implement solutions”137 and/or existing “plans or programs are not 
being effectively implemented.” 138 They will also generally be characterised by community 
dissatisfaction with the result of the status quo (eg. “community concern”).139 The assumption 
inherent in these statements is that collaboration will be better suited to addressing such 
complex second generation issues than traditional regulation. This is a common assumption of 
NEG which accepts that the active involvement of public, private and other local stakeholders in 
cooperative decision-making and implementation is more likely to mobilise knowledge 
sensitive to the local context and complexities of an environmental problem than an approach 
which relies on centralised regulatory decision-making and action.140
Benefits such as these are to be delivered through a NEIP collaborative group that can be 
any size but must include the sponsor, “those groups, businesses or people contributing to the 
environmental problems” in the neighbourhood as well as “those concerned about it and with 
the responsibility to act on it” (such as the VEPA).141
This NEIP collaborative group is to be responsible for developing both the proposal and 
subsequently the planning document (both in consultation with the neighbourhood community). 
Upon the plan being approved by the VEPA142 it becomes a living document. Like EIP, the 
NEIP collaboration is intended to be an ongoing and long term collaborative process that is 
subject to a process of regular review and monitoring of progress, which can lead to plan 
amendments,143 and over the longer term a total review and redraft of plans.144
4.3.3.2 Participatory and Deliberative Aspirations
Like the EIP, the NEIP forms a central plank in community empowerment and “Third 
Way” aspirations inherent in the “Growing Victoria Together” 145 strategy and VEPA’s aims “to 
improve Victoria’s environment through community involvement”.146 Indeed, according to the 
relevant second reading speech, the NEIP was expressly designed to “operate on the basis of
136 VEPA, n 56, p 7.
137 VEPA, n 104, p 3.
138 VEPA, n 104, p 4.
139 VEPA, n 48, p 9; Minister for Environment and Conservation, Garbutt, n 103.
140 Cohen J and Sabel C, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3(4) European Law Journal 313 at 326; 
Karkkainen, n 30 p 294.
141 VEPA, n 104, p 7-8.
142 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(4).
143 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AI(3)(f) and 19AJ, 19AI(e)(f).
144 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), 19AI(e)(f)
145 Victorian Government, n 36, p 22.
146 According to the plan, “community involvement is central to EPA’s work” and achieving this specifically involves 
developing, delivering and facilitating “Environment Improvement Plans (EIPs)” and “Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plans (NEIPs)”; VEPA, n 36, p 7.
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community agreement and participation” 147 (the community being defined as “the people who
148live, work and play” in the neighbourhood).
The fact that NEIP is intended to provide opportunities for local resident, non government
149  • •groups and others in a neighbourhood to play a greater role in environmental decision­
making is also evident in a range of other statements about the NEIP. For example, the NEIP 
has been described as “a means of grass roots empowerment” 150 and as tool for giving control to 
local communities and “encouraging participation and commitment”.151 These statements reveal 
not only the extent of participatory focus but also the community building approach designed to 
transform citizen preferences through “building a shared vision, and an understanding o f 
problems and options to address them ” 152 ideally leading to:
community empowerment, ownership and understanding, building 
relationships and partnerships across all community members, friendships 
and social networks.153
These aspirational statements are to be achieved primarily through the collaborative group 
and its consultation and interaction with the neighbourhood community.154 As in the EIP case, 
NEIP is designed to ensure that the members of the collaborative group contribute to its 
participatory and deliberative goals by requiring that the group meet procedural criteria 
regarding inclusiveness, representativeness, and deliberative decision making processes. As will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, these criteria include requirements for NEIP to be 
“open to all parts of the community”, include representation from a cross section of the 
community155 and use “negotiation” and “mediation” processes to make decisions (including in 
proposal and plan consultation processes).156
147 Garbutt, n 103, p 4.
148 VEPA, n 104, p 1.
149 Of course government actors are also included in the NEIPs definition of community, however the general intent 
of “empowerment” noted in the statements above appear unlikely to apply to the already powerful and empowered 
government actors within the neighbourhood.
150 Robinson B, “A New Policy Paradigm for Environment Protection” (2004) 38(1) Clean Air and Environmental 
Quality 33 at 35.
151 VEPA, n 104, p 3.
152 VEPA, n 104, p 8-9; Cannon, p 62 at 421-422.
153 VEPA, n 104, p 6; Cannon, p 62 at 421-422.
154 In addition, the NEIPs consultation also has an important role to play in ensuring community input into decision­
making.
155 VEPA, n 104, p 8. Although the quote from the second reading speech above suggests “community” includes 
“residents, industry and local government”, at other times “community” is juxtaposed with “industry and local 
government”; VEPA, n 25, p 10.
156 VEPA, n 104, p 4-6, 9; VEPA, n 133, p 6; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) sl9AI(3)(d).
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The intention is that these processes will allow the local residents and non governmental 
members of the neighbourhood to effectively “address environmental issues of importance to 
the community at the local scale”.157
4.3.3.3 Learning and Adaptation
The third NEG approach embodied in the NEIP is an intention to foster learning and 
adaptation. It does this in two overlapping ways. First, the NEIP is designed to require a method 
of implementation broadly akin to an “adaptive management” approach. The fact that it does so 
is hardly surprising, given that NEIP deals with these types of complex and dynamic 
ecosystems, catchments and/or other neighbourhood scale environmental issues to which 
adaptive management approaches are commonly suited.158
Like the EIP, the NEIPs adaptive approach appears to be closest to a “passive” style of 
adaptive management.159 This involves the NEIP group setting measurable targets and 
objectives, developing processes to measure progress including “milestones” such as “short and 
longer term indicators of progress towards goals”,160 monitoring these milestones and indicators, 
and conducting a “regular review and updating”161 of the plan to rectify any ineffective actions, 
update targets or address any new issues or problems that monitoring identifies.162 By following 
this process, the aim is to ensure the NEIP will perform better and be equipped to cope with the 
likely uncertainties and dynamic nature of the complex second generation environmental 
problems they are addressing.163
In addition to its style of “adaptive management”, the NEIP is intended to establish a 
process of information sharing and learning that is broadly consistent with elements of 
pragmatic and democratic experimentalist ideas of “systematic learning”.164 Systemic learning is 
used for shorthand to describe two key processes of learning: (i) the sharing of information and 
innovations between local collaborations that follow “experimental’Vadaptive management
157 VEPA, n 104, p 2.
158 Bellamy J, “Adaptive Governance: The Challenge for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Brown A and 
Bellamy J (eds), “Federalism and Regionalism in Australia New Approaches, New Institutions? (ANU EPress, 2007) 
p 95,108-109.
159 Ruhl, n 70, p 28.
160 VEPA, n 104, p 10.
161 VEPA, n 104, p 1.
162 The legislation also notes that the NEIP must provide for “the monitoring of compliance with the neighbourhood 
environment improvement plan and the reporting of the implementation of agreed outcomes...the evaluation of the 
plan's effectiveness in achieving the agreed outcomes... mechanism for review of the plan by the relevant protection 
agency...If following a review of a neighbourhood environment improvement plan in accordance with the review 
mechanism...a protection agency is of the opinion that an amendment to the plan is required, the protection agency 
may submit a proposal to amend the plan to the Authority for approval” Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 
19AI(3)(c)-19AI(3)(f), 19AJ(1), 19AJ(2).
163 Ruhl, n 70, p 28; Fung and Wright, n 49, p 21-22; Fiorino, n 79, p 401-402.
164 Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale complexity and dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 243.
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methods;165 and (ii) the continual adaptation of explicitly provisional government policy 
determinations.166
This systemic approach to learning was entirely absent from the aspirations in EIP.167 
However, the NEIP case expresses a clear intention for the VEPA to collate and diffuse the 
different experiences of the NEIP collaborations. As the guidelines note:
EPA is seeking to document and share ways different communities develop 
Neighbourhood EIP proposals and plans.168
Individual collaborations are also expected to embrace “learning objectives” that involve 
“developing and sharing Neighbourhood EIP models with other neighbourhoods”.169
This approach appears to fall short of the full blown democratic experimentalist system, 
not least because there appears to be no express intention for the VEPA to use the information 
gained from collaborations as means to revise the rules that frame NEIP.170 However, the design 
of the NEIP clearly shares with experimentalists an appreciation for processes that diffuse 
information and innovative ideas between collaborative groups.171 Indeed, doing so may well 
lead to improved performance and problem solving capacities of individual collaborations.
4.3.3.4 “New” Forms of Accountability
Finally, the NEIP is designed to deploy a range of “new” forms of accountability to try and 
ensure the accountability of collaborators’ governing local environmental issues.172
Like EIP, the NEIP employs not only traditional hierarchical accountability mechanisms, 
but also horizontal ones that seek to capitalise on the roles that its collaborators can play in 
holding each other to account.173 As discussed further below, central to this approach is the use 
of contractual controls to contribute to accountability of the program. These accountability
165 Such systemic learning has also been recognised outside of the pragmatist paradigm: See for example Paton S, 
Curtis A, McDonald G and Woods M, “Regional Natural Resource Management: is it Sustainable” (2004) 11 
Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 259 at 262; (noting the failure of RNRM approach to identify 
lessons learned between regional NRM  groups); Sirianni C and Friedland L, “Civic Environmentalism” in Sirianni C 
and Friedland L (eds), Civic Innovation in America (University of California Press, 2001) p 86.
166 Sabel C, Fung A and Karkkainen B, “Beyond Backyard Environmentalism” (1999) October/November Boston 
Review 1 at 4; Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great Lakes” 19 
(2006) Pacific McGeorge Global Business &  Development Law Journal 209 at 238.
167 There was no evidence that the agency responsible for overseeing EIP (the VEPA) intended second order learning 
for this program.
168 VEPA, n 104, p 4, 6.
169 VEPA, n 104, p 4, 6.
170 Sabel et al, n 166 at 693.
171 Fung and Wright, n 49, p 21-22; Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem Management And Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward A Bounded Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 943 at 959-960; Freeman, n 84 at 28-29.
172 VEPA, n 104, p 3.
173 Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795 at 904.
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features ideally check environmental performance and make the program responsive to VEPA 
(and thus ideally parliament) as well as the more immediate neighbourhood community.174
Consistent with many NEG initiatives, these “new” forms of accountability are deployed 
within a performance accountability regime. This involves collaborations setting and being held 
accountable for the achievement of broad environmental targets175 to “improve the quality of the 
local environment”.176 Within this regime the collaborative group is expected to conduct self­
monitoring and report to the VEPA.177
Akin to some NEG experiments,178 the NEIP use a form of contractual arrangement as a 
means to foster accountability. This arrangement is designed so that once the plan is approved 
by VEPA, it is subsequently “gazetted” as a statutory document,179 making the actions in the 
plan binding at law.180 Consistent with the voluntary approach to collaboration, a partner’s 
decision to commit to actions in the plan is voluntary in nature and they must formally sign-on 
to the plan to demonstrate their willingness to do so.181 However, those who choose to 
participate accordingly bind themselves to a form of agreement, which is essentially contractual 
in nature.182 The consequences of subsequent withdrawal or failure to fulfill the contractual 
terms are intended to involve a breach of law .183
This contractual mechanism is intended to provide a number of accountability and 
transparency benefits,184 including improving the capacity of collaborators to hold each other to 
account by enhancing capacity to shame or bring other formal pressure to bear on 
underperforming partners.185 As the guidelines sum up the intended benefits of this contractual 
approach:
A Neighbourhood EIP can... encourage greater commitment and 
accountability through a public and statutory document.186
The NEIP has also been designed to impart to the VEPA a number of powers to ensure the 
accountability of the collaborative group. The VEPA has powers to amend, impose conditions
174 Freeman, n 84, p 96.
175 For example: “Improvements in environmental quality and amenity” of a creek or “improving neighbourhood 
sustainability, VEPA, n 104, p 6.
176 Garbutt, n 103.
177 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AI, 19AJ.
178 See for example Freeman J, “The Contracting State” (2000) 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 at 198-201; Dana D, “The 
New 'Contractarian' Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” 2000 U. 111. L. Rev. 35 (2000) at 36.
179 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(4).
180 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(4).
181 VEPA, n 133, p 6; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AH.
182 Gunningham et al, n 2.
183 Gunningham et al, n 2.
184 Freeman, n 178 at 207.
185 VEPA, n 104, pat 3.
186 VEPA, n 104, pat 3.
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and/or approve the NIEP proposal and plan to ensure targets set are credible.187 The NEIP is 
designed to impose only very broad boundaries on the targets that groups’ set or on VEPA 
approval of them. While the NEIP at minimum must be “consistent” with any applicable 
existing planning and environment protection policies,188 the objectives and targets must
189“improve the quality of the local environment”.
The VEPA power to approve the plan also acts as an important check on whether the 
processes of monitoring, evaluation and reporting established by the collaborative group accord 
with guidelines.190
4.3.4 Summary
In summary, the NEIP is a unique manifestation of NEG approach to governing which has 
the potential to provide a much needed addition to a regulatory toolkit that currently contains 
fragmented, ad hoc and largely ineffective means of addressing complex “second generation” 
environmental problems. Like the EIP approach, the NEIP pursues the features of NEG 
approach to governance. However, the NEIP embodiment of these NEG characteristics is also 
different to the EIP on number of dimensions. Not least, it addresses more complex 
environmental problems; involves a broader mix of public and private actors in collaboration; 
seeks learning gains through a process of systemic learning; and is focused exclusively on a 
performance accountability regime.
Having analysed and discussed both the NEIP and EIP case studies of this thesis, the next 
section turns to focus on the final case study, namely RNRM.
4.4 Regional Natural Resource Management- NEG and 
Natural Resources
4.4.1 Background and History of RNRM
The final NEG case study of this thesis is regional natural resource management (RNRM). 
This program involves the federal and state governments committing billions of dollars of 
public funding to what is perhaps the most ambitious and substantial NEG initiative in 
Australia.191
187 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH(2), 19AI(2).
188 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI (3).
189 VEPA, n 104, p 1 ; Garbutt, n 103, p 2.
190 Further, the ongoing participation of agency officials in groups may provide ongoing checks on groups to ensure 
they adhere to performance goals and assist them to learn and adapt.
191 Moore, n 53, p 121.
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There are many factors behind the introduction of RNRM, including the rise of
“sustainable development” discourse in Australia and wider shifts in the roles of government
192and civil society in governance. However, perhaps the most influential factor was a need for 
government to find an alternative to the limitations of more traditional regulatory approaches (as 
discussed in chapter 1), as well as the shortcomings of three more innovative reforms in the 
governance of natural resources, namely Integrated Catchment Management (ICM), Landcare 
and the Natural Heritage Trust.
Both ICM and Landcare emerged during the 1980s and 1990s and both were integral to 
laying the groundwork for the emergence of RNRM. As we saw in chapter 2, ICM emerged 
primarily at the state level in response to growing concerns about the failure of traditional 
approaches to provide an integrated and holistic approach to managing natural resources. While 
these state ICM arrangements made a positive step toward a more holistic approach for 
managing natural resources,193 many of the ICM arrangements suffered from weaknesses that 
constrained their success, including: lack of funding,194 problems of representation,195 the limits 
of the supply of volunteer efforts,196 and particularly in Queensland, a general lack of legislative 
backing and mandate197 that reduced the influence of catchment groups over broader public 
policy.198
Around the same time as ICM was being rolled out at the state level, the National Landcare 
Program emerged at the Federal level. This was a broad collaboration between government and 
“rural communities”199 involving limited government funding for demonstration and trials of 
new farming practices and education to assist farmers to become more skilled, informed and
192 Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R 
and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 140; Moore, n 53, p 
121.
193 Bellamy J, Ross H, Ewing S and Meppem T, Integrated Catchment Management: Learning from the Australian 
Experience fo r  the Murray-Darling Basin (CSIRO, 2002); Carr A, Grass Roots and Green Tape (Federation Press,
2002) p 403.
194 See for example: House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage, Coordinating 
Catchment Management: Report o f  the Inquiry into Catchment Management (Cth, 2000); Bellamy et al, n 193.
195 Margerum R, “Integrated Environmental Management: The Foundation for Successful Practice” (1999) 24(2) 
Environmental Management 151 at 157; Similar exclusion has also been noted with respect to Landcare where cases 
of Landcare groups forming to block entry of environmental and other stakeholders in decision making have been 
recorded; Lawrence G, “Promoting Sustainable Development: the Question of Governance” Plenary Address XI 
World Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim Norway, 25-30 July 2004 at 8; Curtis A and Lockwood M 
“Landcare and Catchment Management in Australia: Lessons for State-Sponsored Community Participation” (2000) 
13 Society and Natural Resources 61 at 66.
196 Bellamy et al, n 193; Curtis and Lockwood, n 195.
197 See generally: Ewing S, “Catchment Management Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing 
Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 393; Bellamy et al, n 193.
198 Buchy M  and Race D, ‘The Twists and Turns of Community Participation in Natural Resource Management in 
Australia: What is Missing” (2001) 44(3) Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 293 at 303.
199 Lockie S “Collective Agency, Non-human Causality and Environmental Social Movements: A Case Study of the 
Australian ‘Landcare Movement’ ” (2004) 40(1) Journal of Sociology 41 at 43-44.
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adaptive land managers (see further chapter 2).200 This program had its share of successes, 
including mobilising extensive numbers of the rural community.201 However, it soon became 
apparent that local Landcare groups, working with limited resources, were unlikely to effect 
landscape change necessary to protect critical natural resources assets.202 As discussed in
chapter 2, the Federal government sought to address this problem in part by committing more
203funds to Landcare for on ground works.
These funds came through a new Federal program known as the Natural Heritage Trust,204 
which was supported by a $1.25 billion reserve.205 This five year program was introduced in 
1996/97 and is commonly called the ‘first phase’ of the NHT (NHT 1). NHT 1 was 
implemented through partnership agreements with the states to ensure effective planning and 
service delivery.206 The focus of the program was primarily on funding on-ground conservation 
works 207 in addressing water, seas, coasts, sustainable agriculture, and natural resources
management.208 The National Landcare Program was one of the programs funded under NHT,
209and landcare groups (as well as ICM groups) also became involved in other NHT programs.
NHT 1 grants extended to more than 12 000 projects around Australia and involved an 
estimated 400 000 Australians.210 The monies invested in the NHT Reserve also provided 
funding for a National Land and Water Resources Audit that collected and collated primary data 
and information related to Australia's natural resources and their management.211
Despite NHT 1 ’s postive impacts, reviews of the program at the end of the 1990s pointed
212  213to substantial shortcomings. Some of the biggest weaknesses were that government
200 Lockie, n 199 at 43-44; Moore, n 53, p 122; See: Curtis A, “The Landcare Experience” in Dovers S and Wild 
River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 446.
201 Lawrence, n 195 at 7.
202 Moore, n 53, p 123; Paton et al, n 165 at 259; Curtis, n 200, p 454.
203 Curtis, n 200, p 446.
204 The Natural Heritage Trust Act 1997 (Cth).
205 This was later expanded to $1.5 billion over six years; Curtis, n 200, p 454.
206 Head, n 192, p 142-143.
207 Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 (Cth), Part 3.
208 Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 (Cth), s 3; Moore, n 53, p 123.
209 Curtis, n 200, p 446-447.
210 Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 (Cth), s 3. As a result of such projects it is estimated that some 36,00 
kilometres of fencing were erected to proect vegetation and sensitive areas, 27 million seedlings were planted and 
7,000 square kilometres of native vegetation protected; See generally nht.gov.au.
211 National Land &  Water Resources Audit 2002 - 2007 available at http://www.nlwra.gov.au/ accessed on 30 May 
2008.
212 Environment Australia and Dept. Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Mid-term review o f the Natural Heritage 
Trust-The Response (Cth, 2000) p 2, 14; See AN AO  Performance Information fo r  Commonwealth Financial 
Assistance under the Natural Heritage Trust (ANAO, 2001).
213 As one Commonwealth Government report noted: “Good progress...has been made with Landcare and the Natural 
Heritage Trust. However, the lack of agreed, specific on-the-ground outcomes and targets for water quality, salinity 
and other natural resource management attributes has been a major barrier to guaranteeing a return on the 
Commonwealth’s investment”; Council of Australian Governments (COAG), Our Vital Resources: A National 
Action Plan for Salinity & Water Quality (COAG, 2000) p 6.
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investment tended to be piecemeal, lacked good performance information to measure outcomes, 
and had failed to be effectively strategic in targeting priority national and state natural resource 
problems.214
In response, the Federal government began to think about ways for developing a more 
“strategic” approach to resource management215 and began moving towards a system of 
“regionally” focused governance.216
4.4.2 Overview of RNRM and International Comparisons
The first step in this shift to a regional focused system was the announcement in 2000 of a 
new program known as “the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality” (NAP).217 
The program involves a federal and state commitment of $1.4 billion for seven years.218 Its 
focus was primarily on achieving “place based", regional natural resouce management solutions 
that delivered on nationally agreed goals, namely preventing, stabilising and reversing salinity; 
and improving water quality for human use and the environment.219 The program is managed 
via both the Commonwealth and States under signed Bilateral Agreements, and focused on 21 
“priority regions” across Australia (with 4 of these being in Queensland).
Investment is delivered into each priority region via a community/stakeholder based 
regional body (including local land-managers, local communities, NGOs and other ground level 
stakeholders) to manage and protect the region’s natural resources.220 Regional bodies are 
expected to develop a regional plan in consultation with the regional community that identifies 
regional priorities and regional targets that accord with nationally determined “matters” (eg. soil
214 Head, 192, p 143; Paton, n 165 at 259; Natural Resource Management Standing Committee (NRMSC), M&E Key 
Documents, Draft Users’ Guide (preamble) Monitoring and Reporting on Natural Resource Management, (NRMSC, 
2003) at 3.
215 NNRMTF (National Natural Resource Management Taskforce), Managing Natural Resources in Australia for a 
Sustainable Future (Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia, 1999).
216 As one government discussion paper pointed out “Policy approaches need to be applied in an integrated way 
across regions and catchments and at the local and farm levels...[involving] devolved authority and empowered 
regional communities”; NNRMTF, n 215, p 1, 29, 39, 43.
217 Council of Australian Governments, n 213.
218 $700 million from the states and $700 million from the Commonwealth.
219 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, 2001, cl 5 available at 
www.napswq.gov.au/publications/books/iga.html (hereafter “Intergovernmental Agreement”).
220 Intergovernmental Agreement, n 219, Cl 13,14; Head B and Ryan N, “Can Co-Governance Work? Regional 
Natural Resource Management In Queensland, Australia" International Symposium On Public Sector Management 
VIII, 31 March - 2 April 2004, Budapest; See Intergovernmental Agreement, n 219, cl 16.
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condition)221 and contribute to national identified outcomes (eg. The impact of salinity on land 
and water resources is minimised, avoided or reduced).222
The regional plan and a supporting “investment strategy” also identify projects and actions 
(eg. rehabilitation, best practice management) to deliver on these targets.223 The State and 
Federal government subsequently invest in these actions and projects which are carried out by 
the regional body itself or other subregional catchment management groups, farmers, science 
bodies or other stakehodlers.
As the roll out of NAP commenced, the Commonwealth government announced in its May 
2001 budget that it would invest a further $1.5 billion in a revised version of the NHT program 
for a further 5 years. This was the so called “second phase” of NHT (NHT 2) and provided a 
strategic shift in its delivery.224 The new focus and approach of NHT 2 was threefold: (i) 
investment relating to national priorities; (ii) investment at the regional level that, like NAP, 
was to rely on regional bodies and regional plans; and (iii) investments at the local level through 
the Australian Government Envirofund.225 For the purposes of this thesis, it is only the regional 
component of NHT 2 that is relevant.
The regional component of NHT 2 followed the format of NAP and created multi 
stakeholder regional bodies across the entirety of Australia. State and Territory governments 
also agreed to match, either dirctly or in kind, the Commonwealth’s investment.226 Regional 
bodies accordingly were to develop a plan to guide this investment and deliver regional 
outcomes that contributed to national goals of biodiversity conservation,227 sustainable use of
228 229natural resources and community capacity building and institutional change.
NHT 2 and NAP were subsequently aligned and are now jointly delivering, as far as 
possible, their different regional boundaries and dispersing their separate funding streams 
through the same regional bodies.230 Additional funding commitments have since been made by
221 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC), National Framework for Natural Resource 
Management (NRM) Standards and Targets (NRMMC, 2002) lank" http://www.nrm.gov.au viewed 10 March 2008 
ss 4- 11, p 10 (hereafter “Standards and Targets Framework”).
222 Standards and Targets Framework, n 221, ss 4- 11, Table 1 p 10.
223 Head and Ryan, n 220 at 13-14.
224 Framework for the Extension of the Natural Heritage Trust (2002) available at http://www.nht.gov.au/ (hereafter 
“NHT Framework”).
225 See http://www.nht.gov.au.
226 NHT Framework, n 224.
227 The full goal is as follows: ‘The conservation of Australia's biodiversity through the protection and restoration of 
terrestrial, freshwater, estuarine and marine ecosystems and habitat for native plants and animals” NHT Framework, 
n 224, cl 3.
228 The full goal is as follows: ‘The sustainable use and management of Australia's land, water and marine resources 
to maintain and improve the productivity and profitability of resource based industries”; NHT Framework, n 224, cl 3.
229 The full goal is as follows: “Support for individuals, landholders, industry and communities with skills, knowledge, 
information and institutional frameworks to promote biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource use and 
management”; NHT Framework, n 224, cl 3.
230 NHT Framework, n 224, cl 3.
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governments in both programs extending them into 2008.231 At the time of writing the federal 
government had signalled its intent to commitment to a “NHT 3” program until at least 2013.232
For the present time, both NHT 2 and NAP are delivered through 56 regions across 
Australia and together they form what this thesis refers to as RNRM.
As we saw in chapter 2, these new RNRM arrangements have already sparked the attention 
of Australian scholars.233 As some of them have pointed out, despite its relative novelty in 
Australia, RNRM has a number of close NEG relatives internationally.234 Box 4.3 below 
provides an overview of some of these links between RNRM and other international examples 
of NEG. 235
RNRM’S IMMEDIATE “NEG FAMILY”236
RNRM ’s immediate NEG family include collaborative regional ecosystem efforts in Chesapeake 
Bay, San Francisco Bay Delta and the multiparty, regional landscape scale Habitat Conservation Plans 
(what Karkkainen classifies as “Type II HCPs”)237 under the Endangered Species Act in the USA. While 
all share a broadly similar collaborative and regional ecosystem focused approach, there are also some 
differences. As we saw above RNRM primarily relies on dedicated government investment to provide 
incentives and support to underpin the formation o f collaborative groups, planning and implementation. 
In contrast, HCP’s overall approach to regional collaborative ecosystem governance depends less directly 
on government investment and more on legal incentives and mechanisms,238 particularly the operation of 
a “penalty default” style rule239 that encourages and compels landowners, local governments, and others 
to collaborate and engage in landscape-scale ecosystem planning.240
RNRM is also distinct from the Bay Delta and Chesapeake Bay experiments. Both these 
experiments emerged in response to limitations of traditional approaches, citizen movements that 
demanded improvements in the Bays, and longstanding conflicts between key stakeholders. They have 
since developed their own unique and lengthy history, which has involved a greater deal o f institutional 
innovation and evolution to address the problems plaguing their regional ecosystem s.241 In contrast, 
RNRM stands as a far more structured and ambitious attempt to roll out a government designed regional 
ecosystem program across an entire country.
231 See Moore, n 53; Farrelly M, “Régionalisation of Environmental Management: a Case Study of the Natural 
Heritage Trust, South Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393.
232 Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Framework fo r  Future NRM Programmes 
http://nrm.gov.au/publications/frameworks/pubs/future-programmes.pdf. viewed 30 May 2008; See generally: 
http://nrm.gov.au/.
233 For further see chapter 2.
234 Head, n 192, p 139; Lawrence, n 195 at 10.
235See also developments in nested watershed structures in: Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration 
Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources 135; See developments in New Zealand in: Frieder J, 
Approaching Sustainability (Ian Axford NZ Fellowship in Public Policy, 1997).
236 Margerum, n 235; Frieder, n 235.
237 Karkkainen B, “Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 211-212.
238 Thomas C, “Habitat Conservation Planning” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003).
239 See generally: Karkkainen, n 171.
240 This rule arises under a set of provisions of the Endangered Species Act that lists endangered species and imposes 
strong sanctions on those who harm/harass them or their habitat, unless a HCP is developed and approved; Thomas, n 
237, p 145-150; Karkkainen, n 236, p 213-214.
241 Freeman and Farber, n 173 at 837-839, 854-857; Karkkainen B, “Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance” 
(2004) 4(1) Global Environmental Politics 72 at 81-82.
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A final comparison can also be made between the approach o f RNRM and NEG experiments such 
as Open Method o f Coordination in Europe (OMC) with both seeking to “combine the advantages o f  
decentralised local experimentation with those o f centralised coordination”.242 In the case o f RNRM, its 
decentralised regional approach seeks to grapple with the fact that regional ecosystems are diverse, 
dynamic, contextual, and interconnected with human systems and stakeholders (whose capacity and 
resources to manage them are likely to vary between areas/ecosystems). By giving regional bodies the 
freedom to identify issues and develop management responses that reflect their aspirations, the RNRM  
program intends to ensure the different social, economic and environmental dimensions o f regions are 
fully considered and the program is accordingly adapted to respond to their specific circumstances.243 At 
the same time, RNRM seeks to take advantage o f centralised government coordination and its ability to 
ensure that common national goals are achieved. It does this through the government framework of 
guiding national outcomes, matters for targets (and employing a range o f perfomrance monitoring and 
other controls discussd below). As the guidelines note, regional planning is “an effective way to engage 
all stakeholders and to build on activity at the property and local levels, while also complementing state 
and national activity”.244
The OMC approach conducts a broadly similar process to RNRM but does so in the context o f the 
European Union, where the pursuit o f the U nion’s common objectives are achieved through a system that 
respects the diversity o f member countries in implementation and standard setting. Notably, the OMC 
appears to employ slightly different forms o f formal coordination than RNRM, including requiring 
countries to carry out benchmarking and multilateral surveillance.245
Box 4.3: RNRM and International NEG Experiments.
Ultimately, while RNRM shares many similarities with other NEG experiments, it also 
stands as a unique experiment in NEG. While a number of authors have begun to define some of 
its key features, from the perspective of this study RNRM can also be characterised as involving 
the four key approaches of NEG.246 As discussed in more detail below, NEG is manifest in 
RNRM’s emphasis of (i) nested collaboration between multiple public, private and non 
government actors; (ii) participation of regional communities/non government stakeholders and 
deliberative style decision making; (iii) “adaptive management” and “systemic” processes of 
learning and adaptation ; and (iv) “n ew ” forms o f accountability such as a nascent 
destabilisation right within a performance based accountability regime.
242 Sabel C and Zeitlin J, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Union” (2007) European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No C -07-02 at http://www.connex- 
network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-02.pdf viewed 10 May 2008, p 8.
243 Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth o f Australia and the State o f Queensland To Deliver the Natural 
Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), Attachment E, p 57 (hereafter “Bilateral Agreement NHT”).
244 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment E, p 57.
245 See for example: Porte C, “Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European 
Level in Sensitive Policy Areas” (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal 38 at 38; Trubek D and Trubek L, “Hard and 
Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination” (2005) 11(3) 
European Law Journal 343 at 344; Eberlein B and Kerwer D, “New Governance in the European Union: a 
Theoretical Perspective” (2004) 42(1) JCMS 121; Scott J and Holder J, “Law and New Environmental Governance in 
the European Union” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006) 
p 212.
246 See chapter 2.
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Before turning to discuss the first of these features, it is important to point out that the 
dimensions of RNRM vary slightly between States and Territories (as discussed in chapter 3).247 
The discussion that follows focuses primarily on RNRM arrangements relevant to the 
Queensland case study.
4.4.3 RNRM and the Defining Characteristics of NEG
4.4.3.1 Collaboration
Collaborative processes have been common to earlier NRM programs such as ICM, 
Landcare and NHT.248 Stemming from these experiments, RNRM logically continues this 
emphasis and seeks to govern natural resource’s problems through collaboration and 
partnerships. 249 This is evident throughout RNRM discussion papers and guidelines that 
repeatedly refer to “cooperative partnerships” 250 and “partnerships—between landholders, 
Landcare and catchment groups, rural industries, environment groups, Indigenous Australians, 
and the Commonwealth, State and Territory, and local governments”.251 As one framework 
document aptly sums up: “Partnerships are essential to the success of this important 
initiative”.252
Like many NEG experiments, including NEIP and EIP, the RNRM program appears 
premised on the assumption that a collaborative approach is better suited to governing complex, 
severe and increasingly urgent environmental problems than more traditional approaches.253 
Building on initiatives such as Landcare and Natural Heritage Trust, collaboration is seen to 
offer an effective process for “negotiating trade-offs, resolving conflict” at the regional level,254 
as well as enhancing capacity to address natural resource problems by “bringing together the 
efforts of individuals, communities and governments” .255
This intention to involve partnerships between individuals, community and governments 
engenders a more palpably distinctive collaborative arrangement than those of EIP or NEIP 
cases. While EIP and NEIP involve a single collaborative group of public and private
247 Head, n 192, p 144-145.
248 “Initiatives such as The Decade of Landcare and the Commonwealth Government’s Natural Heritage Trust show 
how people can all work together to improve the management of our natural resources”; Council of Australian 
Governments, n 213, p 3.
249 For other discussions of partnership and partnership discourse in RNRM, see: Head, n 192, p 138; Whelan J and 
Oliver P, “Regional Community-Based Planning: The Challenge of Participatory Environmental Governance” (2005)
12 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 126.
250 NNRMTF, n 215, p 27.
251 NNRMTF, n 215, p 27.
252 Council of Australian Governments, n 213 p 3.
253 Council of Australian Governments, n 213, p 3, 5.
254 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment E, p 57.
2,5 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 73.
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stakeholders, RNRM is designed as a “nested” arrangement, involving collaboration at several 
“levels”.
First, the RNRM case is designed to involve collaboration between ministers and 
governments at a national level, who define and oversee program frameworks. Below this are 
various federal/state collaborative groups comprised of agencies that influence government 
spending and regional level policy issues.256 Nested within this framework is the lower level 
regional and local scales, involving collaboration between regional community and stakeholder 
bodies. These collaborations are given devolved responsibility to manage natural resources 
within particular regions.257 To provide some context to this nested collaborative approach, 
some of the key institutional bodies at different national, state and regional levels are described 
in Table 4. 1 below.258
Level Structure
National •A t the national level the overarching body o f the program is the Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council. This body is comprised o f Commonwealth and State 
Ministers and oversees the development and implementation of national natural resource 
management programs, including NAP and NHT 2.259 Also at the national level is the 
Natural Heritage Ministerial Board comprising the Commonwealth Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage and the Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry who are responsible for administering the NHT funding account.260
State •A t the Queensland State level, the key oranisation is the Joint Steering Committee (JSC), 
which is predominantly comprised of multiple representatives from different Queensland 
and Federal government agencies. This body has primary responsibility for overseeing 
implementation o f regional and state arrangements in Queensland and is the main vehicle 
for supporting regional bodies, authorising payments, bilateral decision making and making 
recommendations to the Ministerial Board and State Ministers regarding investment and 
planning approval.261 Below the JSC are four Regional Coordination Groups (RCGs) 
composed o f senior management level representatives from governmental agencies. These 
groups operate at the meso regional level, having responsibility for one o f 4 areas that divide 
the state and include mutliple regions. These bodies are designed to support regional body 
operations, foster strong community-govemment partnerships, coordinate the whole of 
government processes, and resolve policy inconsistencies at the regional lev e l.262
256 Margerum, n 235 at 143.
257 Karkkainen, n 236, p 221.
258 1 note that there are other government networks and stakeholder advisory groups not discussed here. For further 
see: An Agreement between the Commonwealth o f Australia and the State o f Queensland for the Implementation o f  
the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, March 2001 (Cth and 
Qld), s 22 (hereafter “Bilateral Agreement NAP”); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 44, 45; Margerum, n 235 at 
142.
259 Subject to Protocols and General Principles for the Operation of Ministerial Councils agreed by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in June 2001. See generally: http://www.mincos.gov.au/about_nrmmc.
260 Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 (Cth), s 40.
261 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 37-43; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 22.
262 See: http://www.regionalnrm.qld.gov.au.
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Regional •Nested below the RCG are regional bodies and more localised stakeholders such as local 
level farmers, Landcare groups or other sub regional collaborative bodies. There is no one 
specific prescribed form that the regional body must take, however they are required to meet 
a number o f broad criteria to be “designated” as a formal regional body by higher level 
government bodies and thus receive funding.263 These requirements include that the body 
must be incorporated, involve a majority community membership, as well as relevant 
stakeholders including indigenous interests, and local government (coastal and marine 
stakeholders where relevant). 64
•The regional body, in consultation with the regional community, are responsible for 
developing a plan and an investment strategy.265 While the former sets targets and actions to 
improve natural resources, the latter acts as a kind of prospectus, listing NRM actions for 
which the Regional Body is seeking funding from the government, and providing 
information to inform investment decisions (e.g. costing o f actions and risk factors).2660n ce  
the plan and investment strategy receive approval, the regional body will receive 
government funding and begin to deliver actions, in “collaboration” with other local and 
regional stakeholders.
Tab e 4.1: Illustrations of Nested Structures in RNRM.
Like the other two cases, the expectation appears to be that this nested collaborative model 
will be sustained over the longer term and involve the regional body conducting continuous 
development, monitoring, review and improvement of the plan. While it is unclear whether 
government investment will continue to support the program beyond their stated commitment 
periods, the intention for sustained regional collaboration appears inherent in requirements that 
regional groups set long term aspirational goals for at least 50+ years.267
4.4.3.2 Participatory and Deliberative Aspirations
Akin to the other two cases, RNRM is emblematic of “Third Way” and other community 
governance approaches to politics and democracy.268 This way of thinking is evident in the 
rhetoric of prominent Australian political figures that broadly describe RNRM as a way to elicit 
the energies and influence of regional communities to solve NRM problems.269 As the former 
Prime Minister John Howard stated in 2000, RNRM’s intention was focused squarely around 
community involvement in decision making:
263 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 68; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 7.1.
264 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 68(b), (c). Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 7.1(b).
265 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 93, 87; NAP Bilateral s 13.1.
266 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 93; NAP Bilateral s 13.1.
267 The national frameworks for RNRM suggest 50 year targets, and resource condition targets of between 10-20 
years Bilateral Agreement NHT, p 72, Attachment H, s 11.
268 See Moore, n 53.
269 Fung and Wright, n 49, p 4-5.
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the states and communities will develop plans to restore the natural 
environment in each area and then communities will be funded to do the
270work... importantly it seeks to marshal everybody in the community.
271This political lexicon was similarly replicated in national guidelines and the Bilateral
Agreements between the Commonwealth and the state of Queensland. For example the NAP
272bilateral notes:
The active involvement and participation of rural and regional communities 
is the cornerstone of this Plan...we seek to enable communities to take 
responsibility for planning and implementing natural resource management 
strategies, in partnership with all levels of government, that meet their 
priorities for sustainable development and ongoing viability.273
Such participatory aspirations are akin to broader trends towards democratic 
decentralisation of NRM such as identified by Ribot.274 However in contrast to Ribot’s emphasis 
on building on elected local representative systems, RNRM fulfils these aspirations via the 
regional collaborative group, most often formed through the process of stakeholder self 
nomination, and government appointment in consultation with the regional community.275 Like 
the other two case studies, RNRM is designed to ensure that the members of the regional group 
meet inclusiveness and representativeness criteria, and that regional decision making follow 
deliberative processes. These criteria are elaborated further in chapter 6, but include 
requirements that participants in the regional body involve a majority of regional community 
members and balance production and conservation interests. 276 While the legislation and 
guidelines make no specific reference to how decision making among regional body members 
should be conducted, decision making in plan development is to involve “negotiation”, 
“facilitation”, and ensuer “general public and stakeholders [are] provided with adequate 
opportunities to participate in defining the problems, setting the region’s vision and targets... 
developing solutions and designing monitoring and evaluation systems”.277
270 Howard J The Hon “Transcript Of The Prime Minister The Hon John Howard MP Press Conference On Natural 
Resource Management Parliament House, Canberra”, 10 October 2000.
271 National guidelines point to an intention for RNRM program to assist regions to “become self sufficient in 
managing their natural resources in the longer term”; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 57.
272 See also: Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 1, 13, Attachment E p 62.
273 Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, p 2.
274 Ribot J, “Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain in Democratic Decentralization” (2007), 50(1), 
Development 43 at 45; Ribot J, Democratic Decentralization o f Natural Resources: Institutionalising Popular 
Participation (World Resources Institute, 2002) p 4.
275 Head, n 192.
276 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 68.
277 EA and DAFF, n 212, at 6; NNRMTF, n 215, p 27; Cth and Qld Government, Guidelines fo r  Community 
Engagement by RNRM Bodies (Qld/Cth, 2004) at 2,4-5; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, cl 83, Attachment E, p 59- 
60, 62, p 121 ; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 12.5, Attachment 3, si2.
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By fulfilling these participatory and deliberative aspirations, RNRM aspirations, like the 
NEIP program, are intended to connect residents, farms and other stakeholders with regional 
resources to ultimately assist regional communities to “become self sufficient in managing their
278natural resources in the longer term”.
4.4.3.3 Adaptation and Learning
The third feature of NEG embraced by RNRM is learning and adaptation. Like most NEG 
experiments focused on managing ecosystems, RNRM has been specifically designed to follow
279 • 280an adaptive management approach to implementation. This is plainly evident, in key
28i 282 283RNRM discussion papers, national frameworks and Queensland Bilateral Agreements, 
which refer to the technique of “adaptive management”284 and define it as a process that 
enables:
lessons learned to be realised...and to make necessary adjustments in 
response...utilising] monitoring and evaluation activities to form a feedback 
loop in order to make necessary adjustments.285
Adaptive management will ideally form a central focus of the efforts of regional bodies 
and government.286 As the guidelines note: “there will need to be regular reviews of targets to 
implement an adaptive management approach. Reviews will also enable targets to take account 
of improving information and scientific understanding about trends in resource condition and 
about ecosystem function”.287
The exact form of adaptive management to be implemented by regional bodies appears 
close to a “passive” approach to “adaptive management”, which involves them using best 
available information to set measurable regional targets for matters such as the condition of soil. 
Indicators are then to be set in accordance with those that are nationally recommended (e.g. 
Indicators for soil condition include soil properties such as measuring soil acidity and organic
278 Bilateral Attachment NHT, n 244, p 57; Cannon, n 62 at 421-422.
279 Karkkainen, n 71 at 70-72.
280 Of course RNRM builds on a history of governments and communities pursuing governance experiments 
grounded on underlying assumptions of change, adaptation and learning; See for example: Bellamy, n 158, p 106; 
Bellamy et al, n 193.
281 NNRMTF, n 215, p33; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment E p 57.
282 NRM M C, n 221; NRMMC, National Natural Resource Management Monitoring and Evaluation Framework 
(NRMMC, 2002) http://www.nrm.gov.au viewed 10 March 2008.
283 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 106, 137 (e).
284 NNRMTF, n 215, p 13.
285 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, at Attachment C, Attachment K, cl 11, p 118.
286 Utilising monitoring to enable “the region to evaluate the impact of its investment strategy on natural resource 
management outcomes and progressively adapt its strategy accordingly”; NRMSC, n 214, p 7; Bilateral Agreement 
NHT, n 242, s 1, 13, Attachment E, p 68.
287 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment H, p 82.
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carbon).288 Regional bodies are then expected to follow ongoing monitoring and evaluation 
processes established in their plan to ensure the plan and targets reflect new information and 
achieve continuous development and improvement over time.289 The state government may also 
assist the regional body by providing monitoring data on changes in resource conditions.
This adaptive management approach is designed to ensure regional bodies will better 
address uncertainties associated with natural resource issues and ecological processes and 
enable targets and actions “to take account of improving information and scientific 
understanding about trends in resource condition and about ecosystem function”.290
While adaptive management is to be carried out at the regional body level, RNRM also
291aims to pursue an overlapping form of “adaptive” process across the program as a whole. 
Regional monitoring data (which is required to follow abovementioned indicators and follow 
common data protocols)292 is to be aggregated “to broader scales to describe the progress being 
made on NRM issues throughout the country”.293 This data will contribute, in part, to periodic 
reviews and evaluations that occur at “key decision points” throughout the life of the program. 
These evaluations are intended to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the 
program in the achievement of its objectives and intended outcomes at all levels.294 The results 
inform “adaptive management by improving program design or delivery [and] may reorient 
activities and investments” and “fulfill accountability requirements”.295 Regional bodies are 
subsequently required to respond to and implement the findings of the evaluation.296
This process appears broadly similar to elements of democratic experimentalist “systemic” 
learning (and other approaches that suggest adaptation at the policy level).297 However, in 
contrast to NEIP’s approach to experimentalist systemic learning, RNRM’s aspiration does not 
appear to specifically focus on processes that assist regional bodies to share experiences, 
information and learning.
Of course, in practice RNRM’s periodic evaluations may be used to identify “best 
practice” across regional bodies that could be used to assist regional bodies to learn from the 
experiences of others. Further, regional body monitoring and reporting (discussed below)
288 For resource condition indicators see: http://www.nrm.gov.au/publications/factsheets/me-indicators/index.html 
viewed June 2007.
289 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment E, p 62 and 68.
290 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 82.
291 Commonwealth and Qld Government (Cth/Qld), Monitoring and Evaluation Implementation Plan for the National 
(Australian and State) Programs (Cth/Qld, 2004), s 7.3; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment K, p 108.
292 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, sl45-146.
293 NRMSC, n 214, p 7; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment K, p 108.
294 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment K, p 108.
295 Cth/Qld, n 290, s 7.1; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment K, p 108.
296 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 68-69; Cth/Qld, n 290, s 8.2.6.
297 Dovers, n 69, p 4; Freeman, n 84 at 28-29, 31-32 fn 72, 77.
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298provides the higher governmental levels with extensive data on regional body performance. 
This information may be used to assist regional bodies to determine which bodies are similarly 
situated, what projects those bodies are pursuing and what modifications of the project might be 
needed under local conditions.299 However such sharing of information and experiences does not 
appear to be clearly stated in the guidelines.
Instead, RNRM focuses more on periodic adaptation of provisional government policy 
determinations.300 While evaluations are also used for accountability purposes to assess how 
well the program is performing per se, its approach appears to be only a pale reflection of the 
democratic experimentalist ideal, which suggests using locally reported data to periodically 
reformulate and progressively refine minimum performance standards or desirable targets that 
regional bodies would then be required to pursue.301 Nevertheless, RNRM’s aspiration for a 
more adaptive program is likely to produce a number of benefits, not least periodically 
addressing emerging problems in process and delivery to create a continually more effective 
system of governance.
4.4.3.4 “New” forms of Accountability
Given that RNRM involves the application of billions of dollars of public funding, 
pursuing proper accountability was of particular concern to the architects of the program. As the 
guidelines point out, “the Parliament and the public need to be confident that program funds are 
being spent on actions that will make positive changes to Australia’s environment".302
RNRM is designed to achieve this using various “new” mechanisms and forms of 
accountability, including an embryonic form of “destabilisation right” (discussed below) and a 
performance based regime that expressly seeks to replace traditional accountability notions with 
an understanding of accountability that accords more with adaptive management. RNRM is also 
designed to utilise collaborators’ capacity to deliver democratic accountability as well as fulfill 
self monitoring and reporting tasks. However compared to the other two cases, RNRM places 
far heavier reliance on delivering accountability through hierarchical, bureaucratic monitoring
298 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 145-151.
299 Cohen and Sabel, n 140 at 335.
300 Karkkainen, n 164 at 189 at 243; Karkkainen B, ‘“New Governance’ In Legal Thought And In The World: Some 
Splitting As Antidote To Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471 at 484 -485.
301 Sabel et al, n 166; Karkkainen, n 299 at 484-485.
302 NRM M C, n 281, p 20.
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requirements and fixed parameters of the program via government frameworks 303 and 
monitoring and reporting strategies.304
Commencing at the regional level and working our way up the nested structure, RNRM is 
designed to utilise the skills and capacities of regional bodies to contribute to program 
accountability. This includes requiring regional bodies to conduct extensive monitoring, 
evaluation and reporting to government on progress against management action targets 
(discussed below),305 outputs, finances306 and changes in resource conditions (the latter in 
conjunction with the state government who contributes to monitoring).307 Regional bodies are
308required to have a communications strategy that may, inter alia, contribute to transparency. 
Mutual accountability between different regional body stakeholders (who must balance 
production and conservation interests) may also be an important ongoing check against 
performance and the application of government investment, although the guidelines do not 
explicitly raise this role.309
At the level of government, there are multiple accountability responsibilities and 
relationships between the various institutional scales of nested arrangements. There are various 
accountability controls on how government investment and accounts are to be managed,310 as 
well as multiple reporting requirements between the different state and national bodies, leading 
back to Ministers and Ministerial Council.311 Formal political and democratic accountability 
ideally exists at the top levels, with ministers being held accountable through the electoral 
system.
In terms of ensuring accountability for performance of the program, RNRM follows 
similar designs to other performance based NEG approaches but establishes more detailed 
controls over the type of targets that can be set and the outcomes they are to deliver on. Targets 
must be consistent with other planning processes and legislative requirements and meet 
overarching objectives and boundaries for targets.312
303 NRMMC, n 221; NRMMC, 281.
304 Cth/Qld, n 290 (Queensland’s is still largely in draft form); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242; Bilateral Agreement 
NAP, n 257.
305 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 94; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 14, 30.3.
306 Cth/Qld, n 290 6.2.1 -6.2.3.
307 Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257 s 24; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242.
308 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, p 62-63.
309 Cth/Qld, n 290, s 5.2.1-5.2.3, 7.1.
310 Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 (Cth), s 19: Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 6, Attachment J.
311 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, si 53, 154, Attachment J, s 8.1 ; Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia Act 1997 
(Cth), s 41,43.
312 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment E, p 64.
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This involves requiring regional bodies to set relevant regional objectives against a 
minimum set of matters (see Box 4.4) that contribute to established national outcomes (see Box 
4.5).
Resource Condition Matters 
•Land salinity;
•Soil condition;
•Native vegetation communities’ integrity;
•Inland aquatic ecosystems integrity (rivers and other wetlands); 
•Estuarine, coastal and marine habitats integrity;
•Nutrients in aquatic environments;
•Turbidity/suspended particulate matter in aquatic environments; 
•Surface water salinity in freshwater aquatic environments; 
•Significant native species and ecological communities; and 
•Ecologically significant invasive species.
Management Action
•Critical assets identified and protected;
•W ater allocation plans developed and implemented; and 
•Improved land and water management practices adopted.
Box 4.4: Matters for which Regional Targets Must be Set.313
(i) The impact of salinity on land and water resources is minimized, avoided or reduced.
(ii) Biodiversity and the extent, diversity and condition of native ecosystems are maintained 
or rehabilitated.
(iii) Populations of significant species and ecological communities are maintained or 
rehabilitated.
(iv) Ecosystem services and functions are maintained or rehabilitated.
(v) Surface and groundwater quality is maintained or enhanced.
(vi) The impact of threatening processes on locations and systems which are critical for 
conservation of biodiversity, agricultural production, towns, infrastructure and cultural 
and social values, is avoided or minimized.
(vii) Surface water and groundwater is securely allocated for sustainable production purposes 
and to support human uses and the environment, within the sustainable capacity of the 
water resource.
(viii) Sustainable production systems are developed and management practices are in place,
_______ which maintain or rehabilitate biodiversity and ecosystem services, maintain or enhance
313 NRMMC, n 221, ss 4- 11, p 10.
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resource quality, maintain productive capacity and prevent and manage degradation.
Box 4.5: Desired National Natural Resource Outcomes.314
When setting objectives against the matters, regional bodies are required to formulate three 
different types of targets: aspirational, resource condition and management action. These are 
outlined in Table 4.2.
Type of 
Target
Definition Illustration
Aspirational Desired condition of natural 
resources over long term (eg 
50+ years).
• Regional extent o f native vegetation to be 
increased to X% cover.
• X% Decrease in average salinity in 
regional streams.
Resource
Condition
Setting a target for an 
“absolute improvement in 
resource condition or 
decreases in the rate of 
degradation” consistent with 
resource condition matters for 
medium term (10-20 year).
• Average salinity of X ECs at specific 
end-of-valley site by year Y.
• X hectares of specific native vegetation 
type within region at year Y maintained 
or regenerated.
• X stream sites within region in specific 
river condition category by year Y.
Management
Action
Seting a short term “output” 
target (1-5 years) set against 
management action matters to 
progress towards the 
medium-term resource 
condition targets.315
• X hectares o f recharge zones within 
region to be revegetated by year Y.
• X km of riparian zone to be fenced and 
managed for conservation and landscape 
function.
• X% of farms covering Y% of region with 
whole farm plans.
Table 4.2: Overview of RNRM Targets.
These broad requirements are intended to ensure the targets and subsequent actions taken 
by regional bodies will contribute to outcomes relevant to the nation. To ensure targets accord 
with frameworks parameters, Ministers (via the JSC) have approval rights over the plan 
ensuring that the targets set and the processes of monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
established, accord with these guidelines.316 The Joint Steering Committee317 also has primary
3,4 NRMMC, n 221, ss 4- 11, p 10.
315 NRMMC, n 221, s 11.
316 Further, the ongoing participation of agency officials on regional bodies may provide ongoing checks on the 
bodies to ensure they meet performance expectations, and assist them to learn and adapt.
317 This accountability relationship between JSC and regional body exists pursuant to a “partnership agreement” 
which sets out inter alia: agreed outcomes to be achieved; financial, legal and administrative arrangements, as 
necessary (eg. independent auditors); performance measures and milestones; obligations and accountability 
arrangements for reporting, monitoring, evaluation and review; compliance measures relating to specific performance 
under contractual arrangements; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 69, 94; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 14.1.
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responsibility for holding regional bodies accountable for “agreed expenditure and achievement 
of targets”.318
Regional bodies are subsequently to be held accountable for achieving their management 
action targets and the associated implementation and delivery of “management programs, 
strategies and policies for which funding has been provided.319 In terms of resource condition 
targets, the program recognises that holding groups accountable for their achievement can be 
difficult given the complexity, dynamism and interrelated nature of ecosystems.320
Indeed, it is seen to be inapposite to hold participants directly accountable for changes in 
resource condition where there is a lack of major scientific certainty or there are significant 
external factors over which the participants have little or no control.321 Performance against 
resource condition targets are accordingly to be assessed as part of the overall evaluation plans 
for the implementation of the National Action Plan and the Natural Heritage Trust, and 
government is to take the inherent uncertainties of NRM into account when assessing the 
regions’ progress towards resource condition targets.322
The RNRM has also been designed to use various forms of “non traditional” mechanisms 
to ensure accountability. These include contractual based “partnership agreements” between the 
State Government and regional collaborative bodies, that spell out outcome and performance 
milestones expected and other accountability responsibilities and expectations of regional
bodies.323
The RNRM program has also been designed to impart to the JSC a role that borders on the 
democratic experimentalist concept of an administrative “destabilisation right”324- a right to 
intervene, destabilise and disentrench collaborative efforts that evidenced chronic 
underperformance relevant to expectation, or other procedural defects.325 This is intended to 
create an opening for a fresh start under new arrangements that are prescribed in detail from 
above but are fashioned by stakeholders in response to a critique by an oversight agency.326
This nascent “destabilisation right”,327 gives the JSC the power to intervene on evidence of 
underperformance or financial impropriety (gained through regional body monitoring and
318 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 71; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 8.1.
319 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment H, p82.
320 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, si38.
321 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment K, s 8.
322 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, Attachment H, p 82.
323 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 71, 94, Attachment J, s 8.5; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 8.1, 14.1.
324 Note one of two forms of destabilisation right is discussed here. For further see: Karkkainen, n 30, p 318-320.
325 Karkkainen, n 30, p 317.
326 Karkkainen, n 30, p 317.
327 Albeit within what would likely be considered a more prescriptive and government dominated regime than 
envisioned by democratic experimentalist; Karkkainen, n 30, p 317.
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reporting) to stop funding the regional body, conduct an evaluation,328 critique accountability 
procedures, skills capacities of representatives 329 or the arrangements of regional body 
membership and leave the details of the response to the regional body stakeholders, under 
ongoing monitoring from JSC.330
To sum up then, RNRM’s design establish a number of novel but quite strict accountability 
arrangements that include setting broad outcomes and matters for target, government approval 
of regional plans, partnership agreements, destabilisation right, and self monitoring and 
reporting of collaborative groups within a performance accountability regime.
4.4.4 Summary
In summary, RNRM offers a unique example of NEG that departs significantly from often 
ineffective traditional regulatory approaches. It also seeks to rectify weaknesses in some not so 
traditional resource management approaches (such as NHT 1) to offer a more strategic, 
innovative and wide scale program that balances a decentralised and centralised approach to 
address some of the most intractable environmental and natural resource problems.
This approach is underpinned by the four key characteristics of NEG. However, there are 
distinct differences in the form these approaches take compared to both EIP and NEIP cases 
discussed above. In particular RNRM is focused on a much larger scale, deals with more 
complex environmental problems than either NEIP or EIP, involves direct investment of public 
funds; and follows a nested model o f collaboration. It also relies much more than the other cases 
on strict, extensive and complex government frameworks and oversight to ensure 
accountability.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined how the case studies of this thesis embody the four approaches 
characteristic of “good” NEG. In doing so it has sought to lay the groundwork and necessary 
background for analysis in the subsequent chapters.
Acknowledging that the specific form of NEG’s broad approaches often vary between 
NEG experiments, the chapter drew on legislation, guidelines and policy documents to 
demonstrate that all three cases represent a significant departure from traditional approaches,
328 Cth/Qld, n 290, s 7; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, s 137; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 257, s 30.
329 The state government and JSC have a positive duty to ensure a regional body “maintains and provides proper 
financial accounts and detailed records for funds received in order to provide reports” and “has the necessary skills 
and capacity to manage the implementation of agreed components” and “fulfil the accountability responsibilities” of 
RNRM in its region; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 67, 68, 71, Attachment D p 56; Bilateral Agreement NAP, 
n 257, s 7.1(b).
330 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 242, ss 67, 68, 71, Attachment D p 56; Karkkainen, n 30, p 317.
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share similarities with comparative experiments internationally and most critically, embrace the 
central features of NEG, but do so in slightly different ways.
In terms of collaboration, all three emphasise long term cooperation, partnerships and 
collaboration, albeit ranging in form from a small group of localised non government actors, 
regulator and industry, to a medium size multi-agency and multi-stakeholder neighbourhood 
group, all the way to the much more complex nested model of RNRM.
All three cases also strongly emphasise participatory and deliberative aspirations that 
mirror broad themes of community empowerment, and participation of ordinary citizens in 
decision making over environmental issues.
The learning and adaptation aspirations of the cases vary widely. These include the 
reflexive process based approaches of EIP; the “passive” style of adaptive management 
embraced in the implementation methods of EIP, NEIP and RNRM collaborative groups; and 
the broader experimentalist style of systemic learning processes of both NEIP and RNRM. 
However as we saw, neither NEIP or RNRM come close to capturing the democratic 
experimentalist model in full - the NEIP emphasising shared learning and experiences between 
collaborations while RNRM emphasises adaptation of government policy determinations.
Finally, all three cases seek to ensure program accountability through a range of “new” 
accountability mechanisms and forms. Like many NEG approaches all adopt a performance 
based approach to accountability, while EIP also supplements this with a focus on process. 
Rather than a simple hierarchical principal/agent relationship, all three cases evidence multiple 
avenues and mechanisms for holding groups to account. Capitalising on the roles of private and 
non government actors, the cases emphasise professional and/or mutual accountability. 
Government oversight also plays a key role, and appears far stricter in RNRM than the other 
cases.
Having explicated the specific goals of the cases with respect to each of the defining 
features of “good” NEG, the next four chapters turn to consider whether and to what extent the 
cases achieve these goals of collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and 
adaptation, and new forms of accountability. Consistent with the focus of the thesis on these 
conditions, and acknowledging there is often a difference between aspirations and mechanisms 
designed to achieve them, these chapters all investigate the institutional design of each case to 
identify the conditions and mechanisms that may impact on the achievement of these goals in 
practice.
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Chapter 5: Collaboration -  Exploring the 
Conditions for its Successful Formation
5.1 Introduction
Under what conditions can “good” NEG be achieved? This chapter begins to answer this 
question empirically with a focus on the first of its defining features, namely collaboration.
The primary task of many collaborative NEG processes is to form a multi-stakeholder 
collaborative body that develops a plan to guide subsequent implementation. This task is no 
small undertaking given purported “cooperation dilemmas” 1 that suggest transaction costs and 
self-interested individuals will effectively stymie efforts to voluntarily cooperate to capture joint 
gains.2 Yet, despite these purported barriers, cooperation to address environmental problems is 
increasingly common3 -  at least under certain conditions that both the NEG and other literatures 
have sought to identify.4 However there remains considerable debate as to what these conditions 
might be and very limited empirical research5 to support the various assertions as to how the 
emergence of successful collaboration can best be fostered.6 Some of the important issues yet to 
be resolved in the NEG literature include: What institutional design conditions best overcome 
transaction costs? What is the role and importance of trust in achieving successful 
g
collaboration? What is the nature and impact of consensus decision-rules common to
g
collaboration?
' Olson M, The logic o f Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory o f  Groups (Harvard UP, 1965 and 1971); 
Hardin G, “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243 at 1244.
2 Raymond L “Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming Collective Action Barriers to Endangered Species Protection”
(2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37 at 37.
3 Raymond, n 2 at 37.
4 See for example: Ostrom E, Governing the Commons (Cambridge UP, 1990); See generally discussion of relevant 
collaborative literature in chapter 2 and below in this chapter; Raymond, n 2 at 37.
5 Heikkila T and Gerlak A, “The Formation of Large-scale Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: 
Clarifying the Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions” (2005) 33(4) Policy Studies Journal 583 at 583-584; 
Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale complexity and dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 225-233; 240-241.
6 See generally discussions in: Karkkainen, n 5, at 225 -238; Karkkainen B, “Post-Sovereign Environmental 
Governance” (2004) 4(1) Global Environmental Politics 72 at 91.
7 Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources 135 
at 137, 140; Coglianese G, “Is consensus an appropriate basis for regulatory policy” in Orts E and Deketelaere K 
(eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches to Regulatory Innovation in the United States and Europe 
(Kluwer, 2001) p 106, 110; Wilson M  and Weltman E, “Government’s job” (1999) October/November Boston 
Review 13 at 14; Gaines S, “Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development” (2002/2003) 10 
Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 1 at 17; Karkkainen, n 6 at 91.
8 Gaines, n 7 at 17.
9 Karkkainen, n 5 at 240, fn 116; See also Karkkainen, n 6 at 91; Coglianese, n 7.
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This chapter provides insights into these and other issues by examining three case studies 
and their efforts to bring public and private stakeholders together to draft a plan.10
Following this introduction, the chapter’s analysis proceeds in three sections. Mindful that 
there is often a difference between a program’s aspiration for “collaboration” and the 
mechanisms designed to achieve it, section 5.2 examines the different legal and policy design 
conditions likely to impact on the emergence of collaboration.
Section 5.3 then examines whether and to what extent these or other contextual conditions 
contributed to the emergence of successful collaboration in practice. This involves exploring a 
range of different collaborative arrangements and settings.
The findings ultimately reveal that all three cases were able to foster collaboration, but 
with varying degrees of success. Drawing lessons from their comparative achievements, the 
chapter argues that a number of conditions which fall under five broad and interrelated “themes” 
appear to increase the likelihood of successful collaboration emerging.11 These themes include: 
the severity of environmental problems, cooperation inducing incentives (both negative and 
positive), structures for supporting and funding collaborations, consensus decision making, and 
in most, but not all cases, building trust. Section 5.4 takes stock of the findings and lays outs 
specific implications for the NEG literature.
Before embarking on this detailed analysis it is important to make clear the precise scope
of the investigation. First, space precludes addressing all physical, community and institutional
12attributes that might impact on likelihood of collaboration. Instead this chapter focuses its 
attention on the institutional design specific to each of the case studies, and a limited number of 
contextual matters (eg. attributes of environmental problem).
Second, while there is some overlap between collaboration and the participatory and
deliberative aspirations of NEG, for heuristic reasons, the present chapter is confined to an
investigation of the effectiveness of the collaborative process, defined as where two or more
stakeholders pool knowledge, understanding, and/or tangible resources, (e.g., information,
13money, labour etc), to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually. For the 
purposes of this chapter, this definition is taken to exclude consideration of issues such as
10 Accordingly the chapter does not focus on subsequent stages of the collaboration process such as (i) 
implementation; (ii) monitoring and enforcement; and (iii) adapting, reviewing and recommencing collaboration after 
the completion of the original agreement. These issues are more appropriately dealt with later in the thesis, especially 
in chapters 7 and 8.
" Margerum R, “Integrated Environmental Management: the Foundations for Successful Practice” (1999) 24(2) 
Environmental Management 151 at 152.
12 For a list of some of the potential variables see: Varughese G and Ostrom E, “The Contested Role of Heterogeneity 
in Collective Action: Some Evidence From Community Forestry in Nepal” (2001) 29(5) World Development 747 at 
752-753; Lubell M, Schneider M, Scholz J and Mihriye M, “Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of Collective 
Action Institutions” (2002) 46(1) American Journal of Political Science 148 at 151.
13 Gray B, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems (Jossey-Bass, 1989) p 10; Gray B, 
“Conditions Facilitating Interorganizational Collaboration” (1985) 38 Human Relations 912 at 912.
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representativeness of stakeholders and power sharing in decision-making (for further on these 
issues see chapter 6).14
5.2 Fostering the emergence of collaboration: the legal 
design of the cases
To investigate when and how stakeholders were able to come together to form a 
collaborative group and develop a plan, it is important that we first understand the institutional 
design conditions that are likely to impact on the emergence of successful collaboration. This 
section fulfils this purpose and commences by providing a general overview of design features 
before focusing in depth on some of the more important strategies and activities carried out by 
each case.
5.2.1 Overview of design features that support the formation of 
collaboration
Experience and theory suggest that there are few guarantees that collaboration will emerge, 
let alone be successful.15 Familiar problems of free riding, fear of future defection, and high 
transaction costs (i.e. the personal time, resources, and travel expenses associated with 
participating in the interactive process) may all stymie voluntary cooperation from providing 
collective goods.16 All three case studies confronted such difficulties, albeit in somewhat 
different guises.
In each case there were attractions to collaboration, not least that developing a 
collaborative may be cheaper than traditional regulation, and provide benefits for all 
concerned.17 For environmental groups and citizens, collaborations may contribute to solving 
environmental problems that are typically outside the scope of conventional regulation.18 For 
industry, cooperation may reduce the economic impact of addressing environmental problems, 
while for farmers or other economic interests it holds out the promise of greater flexibility and 
of reducing the threat of more stringent policies in the future.19
14 While the issue of shared decision making power is often cited as an important feature of genuine collaborative 
partnerships (see for example Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource 
Management” in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 
2005) p 138; this issue is considered in the context of chapter 6’s discussion of deliberative decision making.
15 Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 583-544.
16 Raymond, n 2 at 39; Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 583-544; Margerum, n 7 at 137.
17 Raymond, n 2 at 39.
18 Raymond, n 2 at 39.
19 Raymond, n 2 at 39.
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However, actors across the cases may not see such benefits as outweighing their short term 
economic interests. Furthermore, the transaction costs of organising and negotiating a plan are 
likely to be high. Actors with divergent interests are expected to voluntarily form a group and 
engage in years of time-consuming negotiation and information exchange to agree on objectives 
and actions to improve environmental and natural resources issues.20 Such costs might be 
expected to block many if not all EIPs, NEIPs and RNRM from even getting off the ground.21
However as a host of theories reveal, such cooperation dilemmas are neither inevitable nor 
necessarily fatal.22 For example, common pool resource and co-management scholarship23 has 
shown that under apposite conditions, typically small, user based groups can voluntary provide 
collective goods.24 This is more likely to occur when environmental problems are sufficiently 
severe (or perceived to be severe) when parties see benefits in collaborating;25 when institutions 
grant autonomy to allow local collaboration; and/or when institutions provide funding to 
subsidise transaction costs.26
Other theories, such as the social capital literature, suggest trust, reciprocity and networks 
can foster and make collective action easier.27 Similar ideas are also suggested in the “Advocacy 
Coalition Framework” (ACF),28 and alternative dispute resolution literatures,29 which claim that
20 For example, the guidelines across the cases note: “Most EIPs generally take about 12 months to complete”, VEPA, 
Environment Improvement Plans - An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 2; NEIPs note “that plan 
development has typically taken two years”, VEPA, Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans -  Developing a 
Voluntary Proposal (Publication 846, VEPA, 2002) p 9; In RNRM  most plans are expected to be substantially 
completed within 1 to 3 years of signing bilateral agreements, Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth of 
Australia and the State o f Queensland To Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld), Attachment E 
National Guidelines For The Accreditation Of Integrated Catchment/Regional Natural Resource Management Plans, 
p 65 (hereafter “Bilateral Agreement NHT”); Margerum, n 7 at 137.
21 Raymond, n 2 at 39.
22 See for example, Libecap, G, Contracting for Property Rights (Cambridge UP, 1989), (on natural resource 
extraction); Robert Axelrod’s famous use of game theory to demonstrate that an iterative (rather than static) approach 
to games can lead to cooperation (rather than free riding) overtime - Axelrod R, The Evolution o f Cooperation (Basic 
Books, 1984).
23 Ostrom, n 4.
24 Schlager E, “Common Pool Resource Theory” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental 
Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 162-164.
25 Severe problems tend to arise where existing institutions are not actively addressing the problem; Schlager, n 24 at 
151; Thomson A and Perry J, “Collaboration Processes: Inside the Black Box” (2006) December, Public 
Administration Review 20 at 21; Lubell et al, n 12 at 150; Lubell M , “Collaborative Institutions, Belief-systems, and 
Perceived Policy Effectiveness” (2003) 56(3) Political Research Quarterly 309 at 311.
26 Schlager, n 24, p 152; Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 585; Sabatier P, Leach W , Lubell M  and Pelkey N, “Theoretical 
Frameworks Explaining Partnership Success” in Sabatier P, Focht W , Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and 
Matlock M  (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 
2005) p 182; Ostrom E, Burger J, Field B, Norgaard B and Policansky D “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, 
Global Challenges” (1999) 284 Science 278 at 281; Olsson P, Folke C and Berkes F, “Adaptive Comanagement for 
Building Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems” (2004) 34 (1) Environmental Management 75 at 84.
27 The primary inspiration to this literature includes de Tocqueville A, Democracy in America (1835, 1840) Maier J 
(ed), translated by Lawrence G (Anchor, 1969) and its more recent contributors such as Putnam R, Bowling Alone : 
the Collapse and Revival o f American Community (Simon and Schuster, 2000) at 19; Putnam R, Leonardi R and 
Nanetti R, Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton UP, 1993) at 15; Coleman J,
“Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” (1988) 94 American Journal of Sociology S.95 at 101; Sabatier et 
al, n 26, p 188.
28 The advocacy coalition framework focuses on policymaking among specialists and argues that actors from agencies, 
interest groups and so on may be grouped into “advocacy coalitions” whose members share a set of normative beliefs
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successful collaborative agreements are more likely to occur and be implemented where, inter 
alia, trust is built,30 and a consensus decision rule is followed.31 And wider contract and 
regulation theory has repeatedly shown that cooperation has a greater chance of success when 
“incentives” (eg. threat of direct regulatory action or monetary incentives) are fittingly applied.32
Like many scholars in the NEG literature, the astute policy designers of the three programs 
appear to have been mindful of these insights, at least in broad terms. For example, at a general 
level the collaborative orientation of the programs provides a form of “autonomy” for local 
stakeholders by creating a space for local people and associated organisations to initiate and 
participate in collaboration.33 As discussed in chapter 4, the cases were also designed with an 
intention to address severe environmental issues that traditional regulatory approaches have 
been unable to resolve and for which many stakeholders have an established concern.
In addition to these broad matters, the cases have also been designed mindful of other 
conditions likely to increase the chances of successful collaboration. These include providing 
grant money and/or designing support structures to subsidise and reduce transaction costs, 
imposing positive and negative incentives to encourage collaboration, building trust and using 
consensus decision rules.34 The cases give different weight to these conditions and each 
program applies them in different ways. Accordingly a brief discussion is necessary to outline 
the contours of each of these design features, commencing with institutional conditions
and perceptions of the world, acting largely in concert to pursue their common objective. These pre-existing shared 
beliefs are seen as difficult to alter, meaning actors from different coalitions are likely to perceive the same 
information in very different ways. However, broadly akin to alternative dispute resolution literature, the framework 
suggests mutually agreeable solutions can be reached under, inter alia, the guidance of a third party, by parties 
reasoning through their differences. For further see: Sabatier P and Jenkins-Smith H, Policy Change and Learning: 
An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Westview Press, 1993); Sabatier et al, n 26, p 189, 192, 198; Heikkila and Gerlak, 
n 5 at 587-588.
29 See for instance: O ’Leary R, Nabatchi T and Bingham L, “Environmental Conflict Resolution” in R Durant, D  
Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 338; Fisher R, Ury W  and 
Patton B, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd ed, Penguin Books, 1991); Susskind L,
Levy P and Thomas-Larmer J, Negotiating Environmental Agreements: How to Avoid Escalating Confrontation, 
Needless Costs, and Unnecessary Litigation (Island Press, Washington DC, 2000).
30 Both advocacy coalition framework and many in the ADR literature suggest that the development of trust is more 
difficult than social capital than literature would claim, because both start with a situation in which individuals are in 
a dispute, and use models of individuals that stress the role of perceptual filters and distrust; see Sabatier et al, n 26, p 
192-198.
31 This consensus rule may vary; it may be a hard veto rule. Or alternatively, it may be based on BATNA (best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement) where dissatisfied stakeholders are free to pursue other alternatives. In general, 
stakeholders are more likely to reach consensus and negotiate seriously where alternatives to negotiation are 
relatively unattractive; Sabatier et al, n 26, p 196; Susskind et al, n 29; Susskind L, “Building Consensus” (1999) 
October/November Boston Review 22 at 22-23.
32 Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002) p 149; Selin S and Chavez D, 
“Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning and Management” (1995) 19(2) Environmental 
Management 189 at 191.
33 Olsson et al, n 26 at 84.
34 There are of course a number of other factors that may play an important role here, however for present purposes 
these strategies are the most pertinent and significant in each case as they relate to points of interest in the NEG 
literature discussed in chapter 2. Further, respondents confirmed that these factors were some of the most relevant 
matters for fostering the emergence of successful collaboration across the cases.
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designed to subsidise transaction costs. The discussion also raises a number of questions about 
when and whether these conditions are likely to foster the emergence of successful 
collaboration.
5.2.2 Subsidising and reducing transaction costs
As noted above, transaction costs are seen to be a major constraint on collaboration in 
NEG.35 However, consistent with a number of suggestions in the NEG and wider literatures, the 
cases have been designed to employ mechanisms and conditions that absorb or decrease such 
costs.36 The specific design features vary between the cases but include incentives to encourage 
collaboration, and the provision of government resources to reduce transaction costs. These two 
features are discussed in turn below.
Central to the institutional design of both EIP and RNRM is the provision of incentives to 
reduce transaction costs.37 The design of RNRM, for example, can offer some “positive” 
incentives to induce stakeholder engagement. For example, dedicated funding given to regional 
bodies to support their organization, pay rent, hire staff and take action on natural resource 
issues may act as an important incentive for interested actors to volunteer to collaborate on 
regional boards and accordingly further their work in natural resource endeavours. Positive 
incentives are also applied in the EIP case to motivate environmental leaders to collaborate in an 
EIP under an Accredited Licencee Program.38 These incentives include reputation benefits and 
less prescriptive regulatory requirements (eg. reduced licence fees).39
However, for the majority, the EIP program has been designed to harness “negative” 
incentives to encourage collaboration. For example, the EIP can draw on local community 
pressure as a spur to bring industry to the table to engage in affirmative collaboration.40 This 
pressure could include community legal challenges to industry development applications or 
local residents using the media to threaten industries “social licence”. 41 The Victorian 
Environment Protection Authority (YEPA) using its regulatory powers to “compel” industry to
35 Dana D, ‘The new "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) U. 111. L. Rev. 35 at 54; 
Margerum, n 7 at 135, 137; Coglianese, n 7, p 106, 110; Wilson and Weltman, n 7 at 14, Gaines, n 7 at 17; 
Karkkainen, n 6 at 91.
36 Margerum, n 7 at 137.
37 Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded 
Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 943 at 966; Karkkainen, n 5 at 229.
38 See chapter 4 for an overview of EIPs in Accredited Licences; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26B(2)(c).
39 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) p 1.
40 Karkkainen B, “Information -Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burca G and Scott J 
(eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 2006) p 296; Karkkainen, n 37 at 989-990; Gunningham 
and Sinclair, n 32, p 163.
41 See generally: Gunningham N, Kagan R and Thornton D, Shades o f Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment 
(Stanford UP, 2003).
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collaborate may achieve similar incentives. Broadly akin to a penalty “default rule”,42 VEPA 
can invoke a threat of more stringent and costly licence conditions, audits (and potentially a 
subsequent prosecution), or a compulsory “section 31C EIP”.43 While these powers effectively 
allow VEPA to force industry to undertake a collaborative EIP, the “arm twisting” approach is 
seen to be a more desirable outcome because VEPA has learnt from its experience at Altona and 
elsewhere that where practicable, persuasion (albeit in “the shadow of the law”) is less costly 
and can achieve much better results than direct coercion.44
In contrast to the EIP and RNRM cases, the NEIP has not been designed to expressly 
invoke any incentives. The NEIP is not directly underpinned by any regulatory rules that could 
be used as a credible threat to induce cooperation from reluctant parties.45 And collaborators are 
expected to use their own resources or identify external funding sources to perform works under 
the plan without any government investment to provide incentives to make meaningful 
commitments.46
In lieu of such incentives, the NEIP appears to assume that: (i) potential partners who are 
interested, concerned or who have responsibility for environmental issues will voluntarily 
participate in the proposal and sign on to participate and perform works under the plan; and/or
(ii) local stakeholders who initiate the NEIP or join the collaboration will have sufficient skills, 
resources or leverage themselves to encourage participation from potential partners.47 Whether 
this purely voluntary approach to collaboration is sufficiently sound to achieve successful 
collaboration is explored in the findings below.48
Regardless of whether the cases utilise incentives or not, all three programs have been 
designed to reduce transaction costs by providing different forms of government support and/or 
funding.
The EIP program provides only minimal government support to collaborators, such as 
VEPA officers giving collaborators information about regulatory standards or acting as a broker
42 Karkkainen, n 40 at 296, 298, 321; Karkkainen, n 5 at 241; Karkkainen, n 37 at 944.
43 See chapter 4; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 31C; Gunningham and Sinclair n 32, p 162.
44 Holley C and Gunningham N, “Environment Improvement Plans: Facilitative Regulation in Practice” (2006) 23 
EPLJ 448.
45 As one VEPA respondent plainly put it: “Actually there’s no penalties in the Act for not participating in it.” 
Interview 237, EPA.
46 VEPA, Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans - Developing a Voluntary Proposal (Publication 846, 
VEPA, 2002) p 8-9.
47 In broad terms, the NEIP appears to be designed around the idea of parties taking a “leadership” role to convince 
others to collaborate. For a discussion on the role of leadership in fostering collaboration see for example John D, 
“Civic Environmentalism” in Durant R, Fiorino D  and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered 
(MIT, 2004) p 230-234; Rose C, “Property as Storytelling: perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory” (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 37 at 48-53, 54-56; Freeman J, “Collaborative 
Governance In The Administrative State” 45 (1997) UCLA Law Review 1 at 31-32; Raymond, n 2 at 53; VEPA, n 
46, p 5.
48 This is an important question for NEG theory as it provides a case to compare and respond to queries regarding just 
how much harsh default rules are responsible for driving collaborative processes toward successful resolutions; See 
Karkkainen, n 5 at 241.
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between industry and community.49 However the EIP design also ensures in-kind support is 
provided to the collaborative group by the better resourced industry partner. Indeed, most 
financial costs associated with meeting rooms, negotiators, minute taking and drafting the EIP 
plan50 are to be covered by industry, either voluntarily or as result of “incentives” such as VEPA 
“arm twisting”.51
Akin to suggestions in the NEG literature, both the NEIP and RNRM programs have been
52designed to provide comparatively greater government funding and support for collaborators. 
This is understandable given the greater number of parties involved in both cases, as well as the 
greater costs associated with meeting the additional requirements of both programs that partners 
consult with neighborhood and regional communities on not only a plan, but also a “proposal” 
in NEIP,53 and Regional Investment Strategy (RIS) in RNRM .54
49 VEPA, Environment Improvement Plans - An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 1, 3, 5; VEPA, n 39, p 
10.
50 The EIP plan is to include: undertakings to comply or go beyond compliance with licences and regulations; 
emission and waste production standards; monitoring of compliance; audits and assessments; improvement project 
details including what needs to be done, how it will be done and by when; provision for upgrading of plant; 
assessment of new and emerging technology; emergency and contingency plans; enhanced response to community 
complaints; community relations, health and safety issues; and community reporting requirements on progress; 
VEPA, n 49, p 2.
51 VEPA, Guidelines for Running a Community Liaison Committee (Publication 740, VEPA, 2001) p 5.
52 For example: John D and Mlay M, “Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic 
Environmentalism” in Sexton K, Marcus A, William Easter K and Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental 
Decisions Strategies for Governments, Businesses and Communities (Island Press, 1999) p 362-363; John, n 47, p 
230-242; Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795 at 890.
53 In NEIP this proposal and planning process will generally involve meeting a number of broad steps , including the 
community and sponsor drawing a “neighbourhood boundary” around an issue; identifying where the problems are, 
and what the possible solutions may be; engaging and obtaining formal sign-on of so called NEIP “partners”; 
establishing a steering committee made up of key partners; conducting a process of community consultation; 
determining a “vision” for the neighbourhood; determining how the vision may be achieved through the efforts of the 
whole community; identifying the financial or other resources needed to fund the development of the NEIP plan; 
identifying the likely nature of involvement and resource commitments to be made by the partners; detailing the 
proposed process for developing the plan; developing the plan in consultation with the neighbourhood; developing 
processes to measure progress, milestones and review, including short and longer term indicators of progress toward 
goals; and ensuring that the process is open to all parts of the community; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 
19AH(1); VEPA, n 46, p 2-10; VEPA, A Guideline for Submitting a Voluntary Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plan Proposal (Publication 847, VEPA, 2002) p 2-3.
54 Regional NRM  plans are to meet set “accreditation criteria”, namely (i) cover the full range of natural resource 
management (NRM) issues; (ii) underpinned by scientific analysis of natural resource conditions, problems and 
priorities; (iii) have effective involvement of all key stakeholders in plan development and implementation; (iv) focus 
on addressing the underlying causes rather than symptoms of problems; (v) include strategies to implement agreed 
NRM policies to protect the natural resource base; (vi) demonstrate consistency with other planning processes and 
legislative requirements applicable to the region; (vii) set targets at the regional scale, consistent with the National 
Framework for NRM  Standards and Targets (viii) identify strategic, prioritised and achievable actions to address the 
range of NRM  issues and achieve the regional targets; and (ix) provide for continuous development, monitoring, 
review and improvement of the plan. The Regional Investment Strategy must contain information to inform 
investment decisions and be developed in consultation with key stakeholders; See Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, s 
80-93, Attachment E; An Agreement between the Commonwealth o f Australia and the State o f  Queensland fo r  the 
Implementation o f the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality,
March 2001 (Cth and Qld), s 12.7 (hereafter “Bilateral Agreement NAP”).
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In the NEIP case, financial and in kind support includes the VEPA providing short-term 
“seed” funding for administration and organisation tasks.55 The NEIP has also been designed to 
harness local government (or some other appropriate government agency) as a “sponsor” who 
may reduce costs by providing or obtaining resources to support group operation.56 This role is 
similar to “sponsors” in “civic environmentalism” in the USA.57
The support provided in the RNRM program includes: (i) a small rebate for regional body 
collaborators (eg. covering the costs of time and travel);58 (ii) “foundational” and “priority” 
project funding for the regional body to support the process of establishing regional bodies, 
consultation and drafting the plan;59 and (iii) in-kind support from government officers, such as 
information provision and guidance for the establishment and tasks of the multi stakeholder 
collaborative regional body.60
Such support under RNRM’s nested model of collaboration can reduce transaction costs by 
creating opportunities for interaction that might otherwise require considerable time and 
resources.61 For example, a structured collaborative forum at the state level may reduce the time 
spent by agencies consulting each other about issues and actions.62 In addition, a nested regional 
structure where a regional body divides its region into smaller areas and links with lower level 
groups may reduce the regional body’s costs and time associated with collaborating across the 
region.63 Simultaneously, local level groups gain from this nested arrangement because they can 
interact at the regional scale with each other and with agencies in more a structured single forum 
rather than each seeking agency advice in an adhoc manner.64
On the other hand, a nested model, with many levels, necessarily involves greater costs in 
cooperating than collaboration at a single local level.65 Indeed, some authors suggest a major 
challenge for nested models is trying to achieve collaboration between different agencies (such
55 The precise amount of funding is unspecified, but in practice it appears to fall somewhere between $10 000 and $30 
000.
56 VEPA, n 46, p 1-5,7-10.
57 John, n 47, p 239, 241-242.
58 In practice this appears generally to range from $1000 to $5000 dollars per annum.
59 Regional bodies can apply for Foundational Funding to support the process of establishing a collaborative 
organisation and drafting an NRM plan. Priority Action Funding can also be accessed by regions to address pressing 
NRM issues prior to the accreditation and implementation of a regional NRM  plan; Interim Financial Agreement to 
Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust Extension in Qld 27 June 2003 (Cth/Qld), s 51 ; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, s 
95; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 54 ss 9, 24; Farrelly M, “Régionalisation of Environmental Management: a Case 
Study of the Natural Heritage Trust, South Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393 at 396.
60 See for example Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, ss 40-42, 83, 101.
61 Margerum, n 7 at 144.
62 Margerum, n 7 at 144.
63 Bonnell J and Koontz T, “Stumbling forward: the organizational challenges of building and sustaining 
collaborative watershed management” (2007) 20(2) Society and Natural Resources 153 at 161, 163.
64 Margerum, n 7 at 144-146.
65 Margerum, n 7 at 144-146.
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as state government agencies working together to assist with the delivery of RNRM) and 
different levels of government (such as federal and state governments negotiating bilateral 
agreements in RNRM). Different governments and agencies are notoriously unwilling to share 
authority and funds and if their cooperation is not forthcoming the consequences may be 
devastating for lower levels who depend on government for guidance and support.66 The extent 
and impact of conflict or cooperation between different agencies and levels of government is 
further explored later in the chapter.67
5.2.3 Building Trust
The benefits of building trust to solve collective action problems are asserted not only in 
the social capital and ADR literatures, but also in many NEG theories.68 “Trust” has been 
variously defined across these literatures, however for the purposes of this thesis it can be 
understood to mean confidence that people will keep their promises, treat others fairly and show 
some concern for the others’ welfare.69 Such forms of trust are claimed to result in greater
70cooperation, and a greater likelihood of agreement and implementation by partners.
The architects of the three programs clearly agreed with this claim. Each case implicitly or 
explicitly accepts that mistrust between stakeholders will be rife. Accordingly, all have been 
designed to involve a range of “negotiation”, “mediation”, and “facilitation” processes in 
collaborative meetings and consultations.71 The broad intention is that these processes and the 
opportunities they afford for assisting parties to show respect, contribute their fair share and 
iteratively demonstrate reciprocity,72 will ultimately “build trust”73 and “resolve conflict” 74 
among stakeholders in the development of their plans, or other outputs.75
66 Margerum, n 7 at 144-146, 149; Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 900-901; Ewing S, “Catchment Management 
Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 
406; Farrelly, n 59 at 400; Paton S, Curtis A, McDonald G and Woods M, “Regional Natural Resource Management: 
Is It Sustainable” (2004) 11 Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 259 at 263.
67 Head, n 14, p 145.
68 See for example Fung A and Wright E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and 
Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso,
2003) p 15; John, n 47, p 232, 235; Freeman, n 47 at 24; Sabatier et al, n 26, p 186, 189; Head B, “Governance” in 
Saunders P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and Influence Social Science and Public Policy in Australia (UNSW Press,
2005)p 57.
69 Sabatier et al, n 26, p 187; Thomson and Perry, n 25 at 28.
70 Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 801.
71 VEPA, n 51, p 4; VEPA, n 46, p 3, 4; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, s 121, Attachment E p 62-63; Cth and Qld, 
Guidelines fo r  community engagement by RNRM bodies (Cth/Qld, 2004) p 4-5; Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG), A National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, (COAG, 3 November 2000) p 10.
72 See for example Kahan D, “The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law” (2003) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 
71 at 71-88-89.
73 As the EIP guidelines point out, the intent is for the first meeting(s) to be used to “build up trust” involving 
“skilfully chaired” negotiations assisted by VEPA officers as brokers between the sides; VEPA, n 49, p 1, 2, 3-6; 
VEPA, n 39 p 1, 2, 7; VEPA, n 51, p 1, 2, 4, 5. Similarly, the NEIP process is also intended to involve building 
“better relationships...friendships and social networks”; VEPA, n 46, at 5- 6.
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Of course, as we saw in chapter 2, not everyone sees building trust as necessary, relevant 
or even beneficial to achieving successful collective action.76 Whether the programs are 
successful in building trust and the subsequent impact that has on the emergence of successful 
collaboration is accordingly an important issue that is examined in the findings below.
As the next section discusses, the cases’ negotiation and mediation process also have 
another interrelated purpose besides building trust. That is, they also provide processes for 
decision-making that typically follow a “consensus” decision rule.
5.2.4 Consensus Decision Rules
Consensus decision rules are seen by many in the NEG literature as likely to lead to more 
successful collaboration. This is because consensus can improve understanding and agreement 
about causes and consequences of environmental issues and increase the likelihood of
implementation and compliance (because the solutions developed respect people’s rights and
77interests and have the support of parties).
Two out of the three cases appear to be explicitly designed with such benefits in mind.
Indeed, both EIP and NEIP cases’ guidelines require that decision-making should “be by
78consensus” . In contrast, the RNRM case does not directly refer to “consensus”. However, the
79program’s overarching intention of “close partnerships and cooperation” and abovementioned
focus on negotiation processes during consultation appears to emphasise decision making that
80pursues a very similar goal. For that reason, this chapter loosely groups RNRM’s decision 
making processes under the broad notion of “consensus” decision making.
74 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, p 57.
75 Raymond, n 2 at 42; Olson, n 1, p 44,49-50.
76 Raymond, n 2 at 37; Leach W  and Sabatier P, “Are trust and social capital the keys to success? Watershed 
partnerships in California and Washington” in Sabatier P, Focht W , Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and 
Matlock M  (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) chapter 
8; Cook K, Hardin R and Levi M, Cooperation Without Trust? (Russell Sage Foundation, 2005).
77 Coglianese, n 7, p 96 102, 106, 110; Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From 
The Great Lakes” (2006) 19 Pacific McGeorge Global Business &  Development Law Journal 209 at 228-229; 
Karkkainen, n 6 at 91; Sabatier P, Focht W , Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, “Collaborative 
Approaches to Watershed Management” in Sabatier P, Focht W , Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock 
M  (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 275; Lubell M, 
“Collaborative Environmental Institutions: All Talk and No Action?” (2004) 23(3) Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 549 at 551.
78 VEPA, n 49, p 1, 2, 3-6; VEPA, n 46, p 5.
79 NNRMT (National Natural Resource Management Taskforce) Managing Natural Resources in Australia fo r  a 
Sustainable Future (DAFF/NNRMT, 1999) p 13, 27.
80 Similar observations have been made by other authors for example by Head, n 14 p 138; Whelan J and Oliver P, 
“Regional Community-Based Planning: The Challenge of Participatory Environmental Governance” (2005) 12 
Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 126 at 129; Pero L, “From governance rhetoric to practical 
reality: Making community-based natural resource management decision-making work” (2005) 1 Griffith Journal of 
the Environment 1 at 5-6; Jennings S and Moore S, “The Rhetoric behind Regionalization in Australian Natural 
Resource Management: Myth, Reality and Moving Forward” (2000) 2 J. Environ. Policy Plann. 177 at 182.
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Having said that, there are many different decision rules that can fall under the concept of
81“consensus”, including total unanimity, majority voting or otherwise. Unfortunately, the 
cases’ guidelines do not explicitly define the precise decision rule that informs their 
understanding of consensus or cooperative decision making. As with other consensus-based 
processes, much may be left to parties and their negotiator, mediator or otherwise to define the 
precise decision rules for their separate situations.82
However, at the very least, the specific requirements regarding who must formally endorse 
their plans suggest that in terms of this ultimate agreement, all three cases have been designed to 
employ a “consensus” decision rule that is not based on every party being given a “veto”.
Rather the form of “consensus” appears to be close to what Karkkainen defines a “mixed”
83consensus process.
Here government bodies - the VEPA in EIP and NEIP cases and the Joint Steering 
Committee (JSC) in RNRM - have an ultimate veto over each of the plans, proposals and
investment strategies in their respective cases, and must formally approve them when they meet
84requisite requirements. Subject to this veto is the agreement by the other stakeholders on these 
documents. Even so, all cases require that other stakeholders “sign o f f ’ on their plans to confirm 
that they “support” targets and actions proposed in the plan and/or agree to fulfil their 
commitments.85
In addition to this mixed process, some form of voting is likely to be evident in the
decision making of regional bodies in RNRM, not least because they are required to be an
86incorporated body with directors who operate under a constitution.
These various consensus and cooperative decision rules raise some important issues. 
Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, there are many ongoing disagreements about the nature and
87impacts of different “consensus” decision rules. One primary concern is whether they lead to
groups focusing on the most tractable issues over the most important (“tractability”) or produce
88lowest common denominator outcomes. The findings below accordingly return to consider 
these issues.
81 For example, while some consensus techniques may require everyone to agree with the outcome, consensus can 
also be redefined as a majority decision if all the parties agree to that redefinition; O ’Leary et al, n 29, p 330-335.
82 Innés J, “Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics” (2004) 3(1) Planning Theory 5 at 7, fn 4.
83 Karkkainen, n 5 at 240.
84 For EIP see: VEPA, n 39, p 2, 7, ll;ForNEIP see: Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH, 19AI( 1 ), 
(3)(b); VEPA, n 52; VEPA, n 46; For RNRM see for example: Bilateral Agreement, NHT, n 20, s 80-84.
85 See VEPA, n 39, p 11; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH(1), 19AI(3)(j); Bilateral Agreement NHT, 
n 20, Attachment E p 62-63.
86 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, s 68(a); Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 54, s 7.1(a).
87 See for example O ’Malley R and Janetos A, “Consensus on Consensus?” (2004) 46(6) Environment 11 at 11-12; 
Karkkainen, n 5 at fn 116.
88 Coglianese, n 7, p 96, 106, 110; Karkkainen, n 6 at 91.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
182
5.2.5 Summary
This section has provided an overview of the conditions and strategies designed to try and 
achieve the emergence of successful collaboration. Overall, the cases appear to anticipate and 
deal with, in different ways, a number of recognised barriers to collaboration. The EIP and 
RNRM for example harness positive and negative incentives to compel reluctant actors to 
collaborate, while NEIP does not. Further, the NEIP and EIP expressly emphasise consensus 
decision rules to try and enhance likelihood of implementation, while RNRM seems less 
committed to such an approach. All the cases also seek to build trust among parties to make 
cooperation easier, but each provides different forms of information and funding support to 
parties to reduce transaction cost.
As we saw, some specific questions remain about these approaches, including the role and 
impact of trust, the likelihood of cooperation at higher levels in the nested collaborative model 
of RNRM, the likely success of NEIP’s purely voluntary collaboration and the impact of 
consensus decision rules on the success of collaboration. How these issues played out in 
practice is examined in the next section, followed by a discussion of the implications for the 
literature.
5.3 Fostering the Emergence of Successful 
Collaboration in Practice
This section examines in detail whether and to what extent the cases were able to foster the 
emergence of successful collaboration in practice. The findings presented below illustrate that
diverse stakeholders in each case were able to overcome cooperation barriers to collaboratively
89develop a plan to address environmental and/or natural resource problems. However, as we 
will see, the path to cooperation was different in each case, and some routes were far more 
successful than others.90
Success here is gauged using respondents’ opinions and analysis of data regarding whether 
the collaboration included relevant stakeholders (see Table 5.1 below), and whether these 
stakeholders were able to combine their capacity, resources and knowledge to develop a plan 
which contained significant objectives and commitments toward improving the environmental 
problem(s).91
89 Raymond, n 2 at 46-47.
90 Raymond, n 2 at 46-47.
91 Following adaptive theory, these criteria were identified from the literature; Karkkainen, n 5 at 240; Varughese and 
Ostrom, n 12 at 752; Gray B, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems (Jossey-Bass, 1989) 
p 10; Head, n 14, p 148.
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This analysis proceeds in three parts, each dedicated to analysing the emergence of 
collaboration in one of the case studies. It commences with the EIP program, before turning to 
NEIP and RNRM.
EIP NEIP RNRM
• Local residents.
• Industry.
• Government bodies 
(local/state).
• Other interested groups 
(eg. environmental 
groups).92
• Those groups, businesses 
or people contributing to 
the environmental 
problems in your 
neighbourhood as well as 
those concerned about it 
and with the 
responsibility to act on 
it.93
• Community membership, 
including production and 
conservation interests and 
relevant stakeholders 
including at minimum 
Indigenous interests, and
i i 94local government.
Table 5.1: Stakeholders Across the Three Case Studies.
5.3.1 Environment Improvement Plans -  Collaboration without 
Trust and Collaboration with Little Cause
The VEPA is responsible for over 1000 licences in the state of Victoria, relatively few of 
which have embraced the collaborative approach embodied in the EIP approach.95 Although 
over the 15 odd years the EIP program has been in operation, the total numbers of EIPs has 
grown there are today only about 70 that were operational or being negotiated at the time of 
writing - some 7% of total licences.96 Nevertheless, even though these are a relatively small 
proportion of the total licenced population, these collaborations demonstrate that some 
stakeholders and industries have been able to overcome barriers to cooperation and to address 
environmental challenges in a collaborative manner.97
Based on the analysis of the sub cases, the path to such collaboration tended to follow two 
distinct routes.98 The first was blazed by sub cases that involved “good” and “poor” industry 
performers. These sub cases were the most successful in overcoming collective action barriers, 
yet contrary to conventional wisdom (and much of the literature) this was achieved without 
building trust. The second route was followed by a minority of sub cases that involved 
“leading” industries and was far less successful in engaging stakeholders. This latter route
92 VEPA, n 51, p 1-3,4, 6; VEPA, n 49, p 3-4; VEPA, n 39, p 10.
93 VEPA, n 46, p 5, 8, 9.
94 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 20, ss 67, 68(b), Attachment D  p 56; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 54, cl 7.1(b) and (f); 
Cth and Qld, n 71, p 3.
95 Estimate of total licences based on most recent published figures of VEPA licence numbers; VEPA, Annual Report 
2002-2003 Compliance Report (Publication 919, VEPA, 2003) p 2; Raymond, n 2 at 45.
96 The only available statistics on the growth of EIPs was between period of 1997-1998 to 2001/2002 which annually 
grew as follows - 31 (97/98), 35 (98/99), 36 (99/00), 50 (00/01), 54 (01/02). Since this time they have risen to 
approximately 70 (based on statistics obtained from the EPA (May 2005) and interviews); VEPA, n 95, p 2.
97 Raymond, n 2 at 45.
98 Raymond, n 2 at 46, 47.
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somewhat incongruously pursued collaboration in situations where environmental problems 
lacked any real severity: truly an example of “collaboration with little cause”. These two 
different routes are discussed and compared below.
The initial catalyst to the first set of collaborations was the occurrence of severe 
environmental problems (or at least problems perceived to be severe by residents whose 
amenity and/or health was affected). Broadly similar to the Altona experience discussed in 
chapter 4, the story for both “good” and “poor” performers was a familiar one: most industries 
had quite severe noise, odour, amenity or other pollution impacts on local residents. Residents’ 
attempts to approach industry were often stonewalled, while their complaints to VEPA and/or
• 99local government typically engendered only cumbersome, slow and/or ineffective responses. 
Table 5.2 below provides an overview and illustration of this experience using two of the sub 
cases, and defines the terms “good” and “poor” performers.
The primary challenge here was getting industry to come to the table to collaborate, and as 
we will see, negative incentives were used with considerable success to induce both good and 
poor industries to collaborate, although the precise nature of those incentives varied between the 
two groups.
“Good” industries tended to be particularly sensitive to their public image and brand name.
Unsurprisingly, when frustrated local stakeholders began opposing industry expansion100 and
drumming up bad publicity in the local media,101 they saw this assault on their social, economic
102and/or regulatory viability as an unacceptable cost and accordingly came to the table. As one 
VEPA respondent succinctly put it:
bad publicity is the best thing. Not a prosecution. Bad publicity is the turning 
point for a lot of these industry changes.103
While similar community pressure emerged in sub cases involving poor performers, this 
was typically not enough to tip the cost-benefit equation of these less reputation conscious 
industries. Amid the community furore, and after repeated VEPA investigations and notices, 
VEPA ratcheted up “regulatory threats”, warning industry that harsher licence conditions,
99 In one EIP for instance, local residents sent letters to local media and made over 50 complaints to the VEPA in one 
year alone.
100 “We opposed absolutely every application they made...we basically said, “look you’re wasting your money, you 
know, you’re moving, we don’t want you here”, Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
101 As one respondent explained, it was not until an environmental group “turned up the heat” through a negative 
publicity campaign that the industry deemed the costs (and thus associated benefits) as sufficiently high to begin to 
collaborate; Interview 121, EPA.
102 In some sub cases, industries - alerted to the unrest in the local area - initially undertook to consult with the local 
community before ultimately turning to an EIP.
103 Interview 121, EPA.
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compulsory EIPs, and audits and prosecutions, could be imposed. 104 The costs and 
consequences of these threats were sufficient to motivate most poor performers to engage in the 
collaborative process.105 As one VEPA officer generalised:
there is still that arm-twisting in the background. The classic one would be:
“Right, if you don’t agree with this we’ll just put it in your licence”. So 
there’s the easy way or the hard way.106
However it is worthy of note that such arm-twisting was insufficient in a few sub cases 
where industry management and owners were largely antagonistic to good environmental 
practice.107 Instead the VEPA had to break out the handcuffs and force industry to collaborate 
via a court order108 or inserting EIP conditions into the licence (see Box 5.1 below for an 
example of one such sub case).109
“LICENCED” COLLABORATION
EIP sub case 7 involved a wood fibre manufacturing industry that had been performing 
poorly economically, which had made it “difficult to fund any environmental 
initiatives”. Furthermore, “the nature of the cultural background of the owner meant 
environmental performance was not an important aspect of the business” (Interview 
174, Industry). The result was repeated noise and fibre emissions, much to the chagrin 
of neighbouring residents. After receiving numerous complaints from the community, 
the VEPA used threats of prosecution and suggested to industry that it try to organise a 
collaborative EIP process. Industry half heartedly agreed and for over 6 years met with 
an angry local community. However little came of such efforts. Various undertakings 
were made by industry to solve its noise impacts, but agreements frequently stalled and 
were ultimately never signed off on or actioned. According to industry, they generally 
lacked the resources or management commitment to earnestly engage in the process 
and keep their promises. It was ultimately only the VEPA’s inclusion of a condition in 
the enterprise’s licence that made the completion of a collaborative process and the 
negotiated targets legally binding, that resulted in the company taking the collaboration 
seriously and responding in a more effective manner to local community requests. As 
the VEPA officer involved noted: “when it was just voluntary nothing happened. 
Binding the company with a license amendment brings them to the table...since the 
inclusion of the [license] condition the industry is now getting somewhere. Before it 
was just 'coming, going, crying, fighting’ - nothing was getting done! Now it’s getting
104 As one VEPA respondent put it “Of course in other times we have to really, by force or threaten to add licence 
conditions to ask them to improve their performance”, Interview 181, EPA; Another industry pointed out: “EPA 
really on your case...saying we’re not sure that you should have a licence to operate”, Interview 161, Industry.
105 Similar findings were made in Gunningham and Sinclair, n 32, chapter 8.
106 Interview 121, EPA.
107 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 32, p 162.
108 In sub case 8, after continuing odour pollution by the industry, the VEPA reportedly “saw red”. They prosecuted 
industry for a breach of licence and pollution offences. The court ordered that the company be placed on a good 
behaviour bond, a condition of which was to develop an Environment Improvement Plan in consultation with the 
local community; Interview 184, Industry.
109 See Box 5.1 above. I note also that a section 31C EIP was also reportedly used once to impose a compulsory EIP 
on an industry. As one respondent put it: “I remember vividly sending the fax off to [industry]. It was faxes in those 
days. “We are gazetting you [under section 31C]”. We just imagined the guy turning pink and purple and every other 
colour, because he wasn’t... they were just in denial and quite awful denial... in the end we got to a point where you 
know, they were “you give me the shits but I can see what you’re saying”...we then all wrote the EIP [local resident, 
VEP and industry] and that was the nature of that particular situation”. Interview 121, EPA.
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documented, the company attitude is better now”. (Interview 171, EPA)
Box 5.1: An Illustration of the Direct Application of Law to Generate Collaboration.
Having successfully brought industry to the table using negative incentives or direct 
force,110 there was unsurprisingly little trouble generating interest from already incensed local 
stakeholders: “people would turn up and were very irate, you know like you’d get 70 people at a 
meeting”.111 These stakeholders coalesced into groups of around 20 people or less that included 
different mixes:112 6 to 12 residents (and local environmental groups where they were present in 
the local area),113 industry representatives, 1 to 3 local governments and 1 to 4 government 
agencies.
While these stakeholders were not “representative” and inclusive of all interests in a 
democratic sense (for further see chapter 6), these sub cases nevertheless achieved considerable 
success in engaging a diverse mix of the main interests, a degree of success that contrasts 
markedly with the experience of “leading” environmental performers.
Indeed, collaboration in sub cases involving “leading” environmental performers (see 
Table 5.2 below for an illustration) was almost the mirror opposite of collaborations involving 
“good” and “poor” performers.114 In contrast to the theatrics of community pressure and VEPA 
brandishing its “stick”, leading industries were motivated to voluntarily initiate an EIP in order 
to secure an Accredited Licence and its reputation benefits.115 Logically, the exceptional 
environmental performance of these “leading” industries meant there were only very minor or 
highly infrequent environmental impacts on the local area.116 Without any “severe” problem,
. 117
local stakeholders unsurprisingly identified few benefits in bearing the costs of collaborating.
110 These conditions were generally replicated across around 50 EIPs.
111 Interview 184, Industry.
112 Other interests that participated in a minority of cases included political parties, community groups, and other 
collaborative government bodies, such as catchment management authorities.
113 For further see chapter 6.
114 At the time of writing 21 leading companies had received an accredited licence.
115 Consistent with earlier research uptake of accredited licence was low, not least because positive inducements such 
as lower scrutiny and lower licence fees were insufficient incentives given time and cost involved in preparing an EIP 
and other documents. “We didn’t want to go down that community path... [and] 25% reduction in fees to us is not a 
big deal....the EIP process adds money that costs us...so the 25% is not why we did it... we did for reputation”, 
Interview 151, Industry.
116 As one respondent explained: “a small problem...they have got a slight odour problem and they’re conscious of 
noise, they’ve had to build mounds and that sort of thing”, Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
117 “Its a bit of a struggle here as well even with residential members because we are sitting in very dirty area, there is 
a lot of high risk activity occurring in [near by industries], when in comparison we are a much lower risk for them so 
we are down on their list of priorities, you know, they are more interested in the chemical complexes” Interview 151, 
Industry.
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The result was obvious: “industry have major problems getting attendance at their committee 
meetings because they don’t annoy anyone”. 1,8
Leading industries and VEPA accordingly had to invest considerable time and effort in 
identifying non-government actors to bring to the table.119 This often involved VEPA drawing 
on its contacts with non-government actors in other EIP collaborations. While not directly 
affected, these actors were interested in the general environmental performance of industry 
and/or wanted to make a broader “public contribution”.120 Even so, the resulting collaborative 
group was a marginal collection of stakeholders at best, involving 3 non-government 
stakeholders, 1 local government body, and 4 state government agencies.121 As two respondents 
put it: “It would be good to have more involvement from our neighbours”;122 “I’ve got to admit, 
there’s three of us and that’s not too many” .123
Good Performer Poor Performer Leading Performer
Overview • “Good” performing 
industries generally 
maintained better 
performance records 
under their VEPA 
licence (eg. infrequent 
licence violations).
• However they often had 
pollution impacts that 
were problematic for 
local resident and/non 
governmental groups 
but were often within 
licence requirements or 
were so infrequent that 
VEPA did not see it as 
worthwhile use of 
resources to take 
serious action to 
address the problem.
• Poor performing 
industries often had 
persistent regulatory 
breaches, had been 
fined (or even 
prosecuted), and were 
under close scrutiny by 
VEPA for their 
environmental 
performance.
• The impacts on local 
residents were often 
serious or outright 
breaches of licence.
• However in these cases 
VEPA actions to 
address the problem 
were extremely slow, 
cumbersome and often 
resoundingly 
unsuccessful.124
• Leading industries had 
a really strong focus on 
the environment and 
from the VEPA’s 
perspective, these 
industries “more or 
less looked after
I O C
themselves’ .
• They rarely had major 
impacts on the local 
area and there were no 
specific complaints 
lodged.
• Their EIPs was 
commenced as a 
component of the 
“accredited licensing 
scheme”.
Context • 1 100 hectare site of 
sewage treatment plant 
near residential suburbs
• 4.9 hectare site of 
organic
recycling/rendering
• 88 hectare site of car 
manufacturing industry 
in industrial,
118 Interview 113, VEPA.
119 As one VEPA respondent explained: “the setting up of their EIP wasn’t from the community. It was more... we’d 
like you to help us, rather than, we want you to tell us what we’re doing wrong”, Interview 153, EPA.
120 Interview 161, Industry.
121 Interview 151, Industry.
122 Interview 151, Industry.
123 Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
124 As one respondent put it: “the EPA are tied down with the bureaucracy and the time it takes to take odour samples 
and get them tested and come back months had gone past” Interview 182, Local Resident.
125 Interview 153, EPA.
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Good Performer Poor Performer Leading Performer
and a 56 kilometre 
pipeline to ocean.
• Affected population 
included beach users 
and those closest to 
industry boundary.
plant.
• Affected population 
contained in three local 
government areas, 
within a 10 sq 
kilometre radius.
residential suburb 
• Small affected area at 
immediate industry 
boundary.
Key
Cause
and
Problem
• Sewage treatment 
process, waste gas 
burning, effluent 
discharged into ocean.
• Odour impacts on 
residents, declining 
water quality and 
beach conditions, 
health risks to beach 
users, declining marine 
ecology.
• Rendering of meat 
products release 
extensive odour.
• Odour impact on 
residents, greenhouse 
gas, waste water, 
water, resource 
utilisation.
• Air emissions and 
noise from foundry and 
vehicle assembly, 
vehicle painting.
• Minor noise and odour 
impacts near 
immediate industry 
boundary, stormwater 
contamination, 
wastewater generation 
and water 
consumption.
History • Established some 
distance from 
residences (1975) but 
urbanisation increases 
residential proximity 
near site and outfall.
• Study finds significant 
decline in marine 
ecology (1997).
• Industry consults 
community near outfall 
and forms group which 
is informed of industry 
activities (1998-2002).
• Local environmental 
group formed 
regarding impact on 
oceans (2000).
• Stakeholders make 
some complaints to 
VEPA about outfall 
and odour, and despite 
minor breach company 
found by VEPA to be 
generally in 
compliance (2002).
• VEPA grants Works 
Approval for upgrade 
to outfall (2002).
• Environmental Group 
unsuccessfully 
challenges approval, 
and ramps up pressure 
through media 
campaigns and 
lobbying politicians
• Established plant in 
isolated suburb 
(1960s).
• Plant begins operating 
(1964).
• Urbanisation and 
business growth near 
the factory (1960s - 
2000).
• Increase in odour 
reports, many smelt up 
to 10 kilometres from 
the site (1960s -2000).
• Numerous complaints 
to EPA and media 
(1998).
• Licence change 
requires enclose part of 
the plant (1998)
• Industry fails to 
enclose plant (1998).
• Licence amendments 
and court proceedings 
commenced by VEPA 
(1998-2000).
• 56 complaints to EPA 
(1999-2000).
• Local residents sent 
letters to local media 
(1999-2000).
• Local members of 
parliament bring issue 
to parliament’s 
attention (2000).
• EIP commences.
• Industry established 
1970s.
• Urban and industry 
growth in the area 
encroaches on industry 
(1970-2000).
• Noise and odour events 
brought to industry’s 
attention by people on 
their boundary (1990s 
onwards).
• Noise bund built 
(1990s).
• Industry 
Environmental 
Management System 
(EMS) certified to ISO 
14001 and puts 
Environmental Audit 
system in place (1998- 
2000).
• EIP commenced by 
industry to obtain an 
accredited licence.
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Good Performer Poor Performer Leading Performer
(2002).
• EIP commences.
Table 5.2: Three Examples of Typical EIP cases -  “Good”, “Poor” and “Leading” 
Performers.126
With both sets of sub cases having overcome the initial challenges of bringing stakeholders 
together (albeit with less success in “leading industry” sub cases) the next stage of the journey 
was rising to the challenge of developing a plan. As we will see, this process involved a number 
of steps including arranging support processes, building trust and consensus decision-making.
With few exceptions, it was reported across all sub cases that the EIP design provided
adequate support to reduce the costs of those involved in collaboration. It was indeed rare for
127people to disengage during plan development due to excessive transactions costs. The small
128size of the affected area (on average a few square kilometres) certainly kept travel costs down
for residents. VEPA officer support also provided useful assistance with communication
129between stakeholders. Perhaps most importantly, the incentives that had brought industry to
the table were also effectively harnessed to compel them to cover the principal collaborative
.  130costs:
the EPA would say to [Industry], “you need to get an independent person 
and you need to pay for it, you need to have an independent location for the 
meetings and you need to pay for it, and by the way if the meetings is on at 6 
o ’clock at night and people are coming straight form work maybe you 
should put a bit of supper on...and they did.131
The abovementioned support was vital during lengthy negotiations which took anywhere 
between 6 months and 2 years to agree to a plan. The experience of negotiating and agreeing to 
the plan was different for good and poor performers on the one hand and leading performers on 
the other.
126 Although there are 8 sub cases, for reasons of scope and practicability, only 3 illustrations have been provided 
here. However, each is broadly typical of, and corresponds to, the different contextual factors found across the 8 sub­
cases.
127 Only two sub cases reported someone leaving the group. In one case this was due to their own personal 
circumstances rather than due to the EIP process itself. In another, it involved an environmental group who dropped 
out to pursue a more adversarial approach to the environmental problem (see chapter 6 for further).
128 While there was no firm demographics on who or how many people were affected, respondents’ estimates on the 
affected group size ranged from no more than 10 households in sub case 7, to much higher numbers (in the hundreds) 
from sub cases in populated suburbs of between 2000 and 10000 people.
129 “EPA helped in the earlier period regarding the [formation of the EIP group]”, Interview 111, Industry; “So we 
certainly work with the company but it’s generally as a first point of contact”, Interview 181, VEPA.
130 The exception being leading industries who generally took on this role themselves.
131 Interview 182, Community.
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In EIP sub cases involving poor and good performers, the historically adversarial 
behaviour of parties meant there was typically a high degree of mistrust and animosity between 
most parties. Despite repeated meetings and negotiations,132 such high degrees of mistrust were 
rarely broken down. “Shouting and screaming”,133 “a lot of anger” and accusations of “lying”134 
remained common. Local residents evidenced minimal trust in VEPA or local government, who 
they believed had not “represented them to the degree that they expected,”135 while industries 
naturally remained wary of the regulator.136 Industries tended to reveal only the bare minimum 
of information, ensuring they were “tight lipped”137 in response to a mistrusting community. As 
one respondent explained:
the residents argued over every step of the way...because the relationship
was so poor that nobody trusted each other. They argued over every single
138word. They spent hundreds and hundreds of hours drafting this document.
As this quote suggests, the failure to significantly improve trust and reciprocity augmented 
the transaction costs of negotiating, and lengthened the time it took to draft a plan.139 However, 
this was not fatal to the process, as the high benefits to be gained by local stakeholders and the 
background pressure on industry were sufficient incentives to keep these key parties at the 
table.140
After some time, the parties agreed to a plan. The “mixed” decision rule designed by EIP 
sometimes involved VEPA exercising its veto to ensure minimum standards and processes were 
m et,141 but generally the sub cases achieved “substantial” agreement among most of its 
stakeholders, including VEPA.142 Such “substantial” (as opposed to 100 %) agreement among
132 These decision making processes are considered in more detail in chapter 6. Generally speaking, these processes 
sometimes involved strategic bargaining. However, as a result of assistance from mediators and others, more genuine 
negotiation processes emerged and each party came to understand the positions of the others.
133 Interview 112, Community.
134 “I didn’t believe them for years and years and years, every night, they were telling lies and some of them have 
admitted that they have told lies... they were long and tiring, difficult meetings that we all absolutely hated going to, 
for years really”, Interview 162, Community.
135 Interview 174, Industry.
136 Even in case of government owned industry the relationship between VEPA prosecutions and agency was still 
reported to be characterised as “enemies”, “rivalries”, Interview 121, EPA.
137 Interview 111,SCA.
138 Interview 184, Industry.
139 As respondents from a number of EIPs described it: it was “a long drawn out process”, (Interview 173, Local 
Resident); “it took a long time...these meetings were very acrimonious, very acrimonious”, (Interview 121, Industry); 
“the meetings went past midnight and there was lots of screaming matches because it was borne out of 
dissatisfaction... it’s been a long process”, (Interview 161, Industry).
140 As one industry respondent explained, they felt compelled to continue to try and resolve the problem because: “the 
EPA were just about to put our lights out ...we really hadn’t take a lot of action until then... [but] that just jacked the 
whole thing up and obviously the community anger”, Interview 184, Industry.
141 The VEPA reportedly did not formally exercise its veto power to override or stymie an entire plan per se, but used 
it to “make sure that what goes in the EIP actually reflected EPA’s position”, Interview 123, EPA.
142 “I think it’s one of the things with any EIP’s is really, coming to consensus around the priorities and in this one in 
particular it was painstakingly done to the point where I think we’ve got good acceptance and congruence” Interview 
211, EPA.
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stakeholders is common to many consensus processes in practice that accept that some outliers 
will exist.143 These parties may oppose a proposal but are nevertheless willing to “step aside” 
because while a specific issue or agreement does not serve their interests, it does not entirely 
harm them .144 Or stakeholders may be willing to forego some of their immediate goals on the 
understanding that these would be addressed more fully over the long term.145 This certainly 
appeared to be the case in EIP as one industry respondent explained:
I think one of the most important things we had to do is make them realise 
you couldn’t just do that overnight, it had to be a 5-6 year program to do it 
[over a number of EIP plans].146
Even though total agreement had not been obtained, the “consensus” orientation had 
reportedly provided a number of benefits to the collaborative endeavour. Respondents 
acknowledged they had achieved greater understanding and agreement on some environmental 
problems, particularly “the on ground issues in the local community”.147 The consensus rule also 
appeared to reduce the chances of parties defecting or undermining the plan’s implementation. 
For example, after reaching agreement local stakeholders generally stopped complaining to 
VEPA148 and gave industry “a moratorium on complaints” so they could get on with plan 
implementation.149 One respondent summed up these benefits:
It’s helped them see the relative merits of all these things and prioritised it. I 
think it’s one of the things with any EIP that is really good, coming to 
consensus around the priorities... we’ve got good acceptance and 
congruence, and I think that’s important because if you’ve got that 
agreement you can move forward.150
143 Innes, n 82 at fn 4.
144 As one respondent illustrated “in some instances it really wasn’t about working towards outcomes that were 
agreeable... some of the members who sign off don’t agree with all the targets and actions in there” Interview 141, 
Industry; Innes, n 82 at fn 4.
145 As another industry member explained regarding decision making on targets and actions to reduce it: “You know, 
they want to know what we’re going to do to reduce our impact...the plan is to significantly reduce it over the two- 
year EIP into the future, and it takes a little bit of debate and discussion for them to understand that - but typically 
they do. They say, “Okay, well, as long as you’re setting yourself up that at some stage you’re going to, you know, 
create a step change down”, Interview 142, Industry.
146 Interview 131, Industry.
147 Interview 121, Industry.
148 Certainly, in some EIPs there were community complaints that had occurred after occasional “once off’ pollution 
events. This typically led the VEPA to use their regulatory powers to enforce the EIP. However in no cases had the 
EIP agreement been undermined.
149 Interview 173, Local Resident.
150 Interview 121, EPA.
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Ultimately, collaborators suggested the collaboration had “really added value”151 and the 
plan for action had allowed them to “take some steps”152 likely to contribute to improving the 
environmental performance of industry. As one industry respondent summed up:
I think it’s a pretty good - it’s not efficient and it’s not conflict free, but it’s a 
good working group that has actually achieved a lot.153
Turning to sub cases involving leading industries, the negotiation process here was much 
smoother because the absence of any severe or pressing environmental problem meant the 
stakeholders had less pre-existing animosity to each other and were able to quickly establish 
greater trust among collaborators. As one respondent explained, during these negotiations, acts 
of good faith such as VEPA and industry openly sharing information with community groups 
broke down barriers and built trust:
they came with the mind set that perhaps we weren’t as open but that broke 
down very quickly.... It was putting everything on the table ...Just [by]
i 154proving we were honest.
This honesty improved relationships, and enabled the group to work together in a more 
coordinated, timely and effective way. As one respondent explained: “Every member on the 
[EIP group] is very supportive”.155 Indeed, because of this fact these sub cases were able to 
reach agreement on a plan many months earlier than the majority of EIPs.
The improved relationships also led the group to achieve almost unanimous agreement on 
the plan by following decision rules of “substantial consensus”, checked by VEPA veto.156 
While this rule appeared to have achieved greater agreement among parties regarding some 
minor local problems, 157 its overall utility both in terms of enhancing chances of 
implementation and in contributing to the production of an effective plan appeared to be
151 “It was a collaborative effort between [Industry] and the community...we are engaging with some of our harshest 
critics, and we are meeting with them and they come in with a big bag of rocks and they will throw them at us and 
sometime its fair and sometimes its not fair, but you know it really adds value”, Interview 141, Industry.
152 Interview 173, Community.
153 Interview 161, Industry.
154 Interview 151, Industry.
155 Interview 151, Industry.
156 While one respondent noted one or two minor issues which they believed were not fully addressed under the EIP 
plan (eg. cigarette and general litter in the industry’s driveway), for the most part the stakeholders appeared to have 
all been in agreement on the EIP. This is hardly surprising given industry’s high environmental performance and 
minimal impact on the local area meant that: (i) there were few reasons for VEPA vetos; and (ii) most of the 
stakeholders interests and concerns were minimal and for the most part easily satisfied. As one respondent 
explained:” “We told the group what we were doing and they were happy to run along with it”, Interview 151, 
Industry.
157 As one respondent put it: “they might have strengthen up the project like foundry odour the main community 
issue”, Interview 151, Industry.
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minimal.158 Indeed, the plan that was produced largely reiterated existing industry targets, 
projects and priorities for both local and broader issues which industry were already committed 
to under their pre-existing environmental management systems:
we already had a lot of our projects documented and set up in a way that 
worked with our ISO system...[so] we already had the projects anyway.159
Notably, this “business as usual” plan appeared more attributable to the fact there was no 
severe environmental problem to be addressed, rather than a flaw in the consensus decision rule 
per se. Indeed respondents noted the decision rule had allowed local stakeholders to effectively 
“push” industry to respond to their interests and agree to improve its impacts -  it’s just that 
there weren’t that many gains that could be made:
whenever we suggest anything they’ve either tried it and failed, but they’ll 
try again, or they’ve taken on board and they get it done straight away.160
Indeed, what is interesting about the agreements reached by the “consensus” decision rule 
across all the EIP sub cases is the lack of evidence that these rules were responsible for 
producing pathologies such as tractability or lowest common denominator solutions.161 Across 
all sub cases, minimally acceptable outcomes or issues most amenable to agreement rarely 
appeared to taken preference over the most “important” issues.162 Pressure from community, 
VEPA and/or industry’s own internal management programs ensured stakeholders had agreed to
1 C.'l
address a full gamut of relevant and challenging issues. These included often large scale 
commitments to address highly controversial impacts of industry on local neighbourhoods (such 
as $80 million plant upgrades to reduce dust or noise), to more complex issues that were 
sometimes less important to local stakeholders but important to industry and VEPA, such as 
targets and actions to reduce water consumption by 29%, solid waste to landfill by 30%, 
prescribed waste by 15% and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 35 % .164
158 “They could do without me. I’ve got to admit”, Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
159 Interview 151, Industry.
160 Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
161 Leach W , Pelkey N and Sabatier P, “Stakeholder Partnerships as Collaborative Policymaking: Evaluation Criteria 
Applied to Watershed Management in California and Washington” (2002) 21(4) Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 645 at 665.
162 Some respondents did report that there were “degrees or elements of compromise” that reduced the likely 
effectiveness of some agreed actions. For example Interview 141, Industry pointed out that some targets set through 
the process had at times “pandered” too much to stakeholders who were interested in lower priority, local issues. 
However such “pandering” appeared rare over the longer term, with all plans containing a mix of local and “higher 
priority” targets on issues such as greenhouse gas.
163 Coglianese, n 7, p 107-109; Leach et al, n 161 at 165.
164 I note however that chapter 7 raises questions about whether the targets set by poor performers regarding some of 
these issues were sufficiently ambitious.
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To conclude this discussion of the EIP case, the above analysis suggests the EIP program 
followed two paths that overcame cooperation barriers and achieved collaboration, with varying 
degrees of success.165 Subtly these two distinct routes reveal that collaboration is contextual in 
nature, with success depending on the conditions of the situation in which the EIP institution is 
applied.
The first path evidenced “cooperation without trust” and was, somewhat counter
intuitively, the more successful in overcoming collective action barriers. 166 Certainly
transaction costs were augmented by this lack of trust, but the findings suggested that the
historically adversarial stakeholders were able to find ways to cooperate and reach what was
167considered a sound agreement. Key to supporting this process was the presence of a severe 
problem to engender stakeholders to cooperate; “negative” incentives (and even direct force of 
law) to compel industry to collaborate and make meaningful commitments; adequate in-kind 
support from VEPA officers and industry to reduce transaction costs; and consensus decision 
rules that improved agreement on issues, contributed to increased likelihood of implementation, 
and appeared to address the most important issues.168
Trust was more evident, and made cooperation easier in the second route to collaboration, 
which was followed by a minority of sub cases involving leading industries. Even so, this 
collaboration was far less successful in engaging a diversity of stakeholders and producing an 
effective plan that went beyond “business as usual”. Ultimately these weaknesses came back to 
the fact that this had been a process of collaboration with little cause: there was not a 
sufficiently “severe” problem to make collaboration worthwhile.
5.3.2 Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans: flawed 
design and limited success
In contrast to the EIP program, the NEIP addresses much more complex second generation 
problems across a larger area, and involving a greater number of stakeholders. Broadly 
consistent with collective action theory, there have been comparatively fewer attempts at NEIPs 
than EIPs: only 7 operational NEIP collaborations have arisen over its 7 year life, compared to 
35 EIPs that were commenced over its first 7 years of operation.169 Nevertheless, the very 
existence of these 7 collaborative endeavours show that at least some stakeholders have begun
165 Raymond, n 2 at 46, 47.
166 Raymond, n 2 at 40-41, 54.
167 Raymond, n 2 at 40-41, 54.
168 Leach et al, n 161 at 665; Coglianese, n 7, p 107,110.
169 For the number of NEIPs see www.epa.vic.gov.au; Raymond, n 2 at 45.
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to overcome the barriers to collective action to address neighborhood environmental challenges 
in a collaborative manner.170
Based on the analysis of three of the most advanced NEIP collaborations, the path to 
collaboration in this program again followed two distinct routes. The first and most common 
route was the least successful. Here a diverse group of stakeholders were able to come together 
and agree on a plan. However its overall success was limited by a lack of incentives in the NEIP 
design, which prevented the group from engaging key stakeholders, or ensuring parties made 
meaningful commitments. The first part of this section details these mixed results through 
examining NEIP 1 and 2.
While these findings suggest the lack of incentives represented a significant flaw in the 
NEIP design, the final part of this section turns to consider NEIP 3, where the analysis shows 
that it was surprisingly able to achieve successful collaboration because of three conditions 
external to NEIP institution: small population size, high and direct stakes for local actors, and 
external funding.
With the introduction of the NEIP instrument in 2001, VEPA sought to “learn” about its 
new and untested instrument by selecting NEIP 1 and 2 as “pilot” cases171 from more than 70 
expressions of interest.172 Not coincidentally, both these initial “test” cases were selected 
because they involved conditions favourable to collaboration, namely environmental problems 
perceived to be severe by a concerned local community.
NEIP 1 focuses on a highly degraded urban creek that had long been used as a drain and 
was polluted by diffuse sources, not least pollution from multiple industries and small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs). NEIP 2 focused on the even more complex problem of 
developing a “sustainable township” in a diverse coastal environment threatened by a range of 
diffuse problems, including air pollution and habitat impacts from a local coal mine and power 
station, development pressure, and household and business resource use. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 at 
the end of this section provide further details on the context and history of both NEIPs.
Commencing the collaborative process, the local governments that had nominated their 
neighbourhoods as “pilot” cases took on the formal role of a “sponsor”, and committed a small 
amount of resources to the NEIP endeavour.173 The sponsor also received short term “seed”
170 Raymond, n 2 at 45.
171 The third pilot is not the subject of this study because at the time of research it had yet to reach agreement on its 
plan.
172 VEPA, n 16, p 42.
l73As one respondent described their decision: “We thought yes it’s going to be difficult, it’s going to mean that we’re 
going to have to put in more resources... [but] we see NEIP is a way forward with the potential for partnerships and 
working together”, Interview 213, Local Government.
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funding from the VEPA, and small funding contributions from other partners.174 This collective 
funding was used by the sponsor to employ a coordinator for the 2 to 3 years that it took to 
develop a proposal and plan.175 These coordinators were resoundingly seen to be an effective 
and vital means of overcoming the transaction costs associated with bringing parties together, 
bargaining and keeping stakeholders connected in the relatively small local neighbourhoods (20 
square kilometres or less):176
I think initially to get a project up and going and build momentum, you 
definitely need someone in a paid position...to build that initial enthusiasm, 
involvement, and commitment, get runs on the board.177
With this coordinator support, local government and VEPA officers began engaging 
partners and consulting with the neighbourhood by holding initial meetings, multiple public 
workshops and conducting surveys. 178 The pre-existing community concern about the 
environmental problems ensured relatively high participation at these meetings: between 100 
and 200 people in each sub case.179 These meetings in turn led to some, but as discussed below 
not all,180 significant stakeholders engaging, including 1 to 4 industry collaborators, 5 to 7 
government collaborators, 5 to 6 non government groups and 2 to 11 residents.
Having engaged a number of diverse stakeholders, the next stage was building trust among 
them. This was led by the local government, coordinator and VEPA. After many months of 
consultation and negotiation, respondents reported there was a marked improvement in trust, 
with “none of this us and them thing” anymore.181 This trust in turn enabled them to work
174 Approximately $30 000 and $20 000 was received from contributions in NEIP 1 and 2 respectively. NEIP 1 
received funding from the VEPA as a result of an alternate penalty provision, while NEIP 2 received a once off grant 
from the VEPA. Additional funding was also received from 2 industry partners in the NEIP 1 and a Catchment 
Management Authority Partner in NEIP 2; Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Anglesea 
Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Surf Coast Shire Council, 2004) p 28; Maribymong City Council 
and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, Stony Creek Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Maribymong City 
Council, 2004) p 17.
175 This was obviously a protracted process that created some frustration among stakeholders. As one respondent put 
it: “you look at it - 12 months or so to develop a proposal ... then 12 months before you’ve got a plan. It’s two years 
and a lot of people are - “oh God, you’re still banging on about this, what have you actually done?”; Interview 211, 
EPA.
176 This small area likely kept travel costs to a minimum.
177 Interview 221-1, Coordinator.
178 To illustrate, in NEIP 1, the coordinator, VEPA officer and local government officer conducted processes such as 
public forums and workshops (over 60 people attending these in total, including 15 industries), as well as sending out 
questionnaires to develop a shared community vision and objectives regarding the creek. NEIP 2 also ran a 
significant number of meetings and workshops, some 60 people turned up to one workshop alone. Maribymong City 
Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 174, p 16; Interview 222, Local Government.
179 In NEIP 1 approximately 100 people/businesses in total from a population of 11 000 attended consultation 
meetings. In NEIP 2, between 150 and 200 people attended similar events from a smaller population of 2 000.
180 See also chapter 6 discussing representation deficits.
181 As one respondent illustrated: [community and government] all get together and there’s none of this us and 
them thing...it’s just that we have managed to build those relationships ... I think without that, you're always 
going to have that bit of cynicism and a bit of lack of trust” Interview 221-1, Community. Similar improvements 
in trust occurred between businesses and local stakeholders: “So those conversations are open rather than the
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together strategically in a more coordinated and effective way to move beyond their previously 
fragmented responsibility and interests:
it’s making it a bit more effective and that’s been a really good outcome, 
even identifying, well, hey, we’re doing this. Let’s join up together182
While these are all positive achievements, the findings suggested that there were 
significant limits to the success of the collaborations in terms of achieving improved 
environmental outcomes. Indeed, respondents pointed to a lack of “buy in” from key industry 
stakeholders who were some of the primary contributors to the local environmental problems.
This weakness was most dramatically illustrated in NEIP 1, where over 200 industries and 
SMEs lined the polluted creek and were a major source of its degradation. The sponsor and 
VEPA tried to engage industry through workshops and sending out 400 letters to industry 
managers. However only 15 industry members attended the workshops and not one response 
was received from the letters.183 The VEPA accordingly tried to use tacit regulatory pressure. 
However a lack of officer resources and limited leverage over SMEs restricted such pressure to 
only a few large, licensed industries.184 The result was a dismal number of industry interests 
signing on to the plan: 1 business representative group and 3 industries. Respondents were clear 
on the reason for this minimal engagement:
I don’t think the NEIP has the capacity to engage with industry. I think with 
industry, if they’re abusing the creek, then they will choose not to be 
engaged...the only way they will become engaged is through regulation.185
The absence of sufficient incentives to engage industry not only stifled engagement, but 
also meant that those who had engaged had no motivation to share information or make 
anything other than tokenistic commitment.186 Indeed, none of the 4 industry interests made any 
commitment to improve environmental performance, and were essentially “free riders”:187
they did attend some meetings but nothing’s actually happened with them.
They haven't formally committed to anything.188
[local business] for example just being totally hostile to the [community group] and seeing them as just a bunch 
of greenies. That conversation is more open so they are, I think, successes,”; Interview, 213 Local Government.
182 Interview 211, EPA.
183 Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 174, p 17.
184 This involved encouraging industry to provide $3000 to the NEIP.
185 Interview 216, Industry/Business Association.
186 “I think that one of the issues with the NEIPs system is that... there's nothing to force them to participate in that 
area”; Interview 212, Local community. Karkkainen, n 40, p 296.
187 In broad terms, industry displayed a form of free rider behaviour. That is, potentially gaining reputation benefits 
from collaborating to improve the creek, without making any significant contribution themselves. Indeed, industry 
made only the minimalist of commitments to help other partners develop a best practice stormwater management plan 
for goods and transport handling. Gunningham and Sinclair, n 32, p 150.
188 Interview 212, Local community.
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Overall, many felt that without increased industry participation and commitment there 
were substantial limits on what NEIP 1 could achieve in the future in terms of improving the 
creek’s water quality.
The lack of incentives in the NEIP design also produced similar difficulties in NEIP 2. 
Although the sustainability agenda of this NEIP was wide in scope, the threats to the local air 
shed and habitat from the only major industry in town was still one of the primary identifiable 
impediments to the town’s “sustainability”.189 With only the one industry to contend with, the 
local government sponsor was able to successfully focus its efforts on persuading this industry 
to come to the table.190 However again, respondents reported the NEIP had not provided them 
with the necessary tools to encourage industry to take positive action, and only tokenistic 
commitments ensued.191 The collaboration and its likely success in improving sustainability of 
the town were accordingly seen to be weaker as a result:
I smile, I suppose, when you look at [Town] and you sort of say, okay, yeah, 
we want to be a sustainable, ecologically friendly town, and then you look 
out the back and you see this dirty rotten big m ine...I don't think we'll have 
as much of a chance getting them to change their output. I think that's a bit 
beyond the NEIP.192
These limitations of NEIP 1 and 2 extended beyond the issue of industry partners. Some 
respondents raised concerns that even in the case of other government partners, the NEIP had 
insufficient incentives, particularly dedicated funding to encourage and enable government 
parties to make commitments that went significantly beyond “business as usual”:193
there's no central source of funding ... that meant that they committed to a 
lot less than they would’ve committed to...that money wasn’t there so they 
couldn’t agree to anything where they didn’t have it.194
A failure to go beyond “business as usual” is a common criticism of many “consensus 
building” processes.195 However it is important to be clear that in NEIP it appeared to be more
189 As the plan and proposal point out, the reason for commencing a NEIP in the town included “Concern about air 
quality: especially coal mine and its emissions” Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Proposal to 
Develop a Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Surf Coast Shire Council, 2002) p 1; Surf Coast Shire 
Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, n 174, p 12.
190 The sponsor was helped by the fact that the industry was a reputation conscious “good” performer. As the industry 
reported, it was in their self interest to maintain their public image and social licence by participating in the NEIP: 
“we try to participate very actively in the community that we operate in to give back to the community”, Interview 
223, Industry.
191 The extent of industry’s contribution was to help with a workshop and participate in a town clean up day. 
Interview 223, Industry.
192 Interview 221, Local Resident.
193 “In some sense aspects of the NEIP, the approved plan, were written in a way that people just said what they were 
already doing or slightly improved, so they weren’t over committing”, Interview 213, Local Government.
194 Interview 212, Environmental Group.
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the lack of incentives (a condition that is external to the consensus decision rule) and less the 
decision rule per se that caused this problem.
Indeed, while commitments from government parties may not have gone far enough in the 
immediate term, the decision rule used to agree on the plans typically emphasised “substantial” 
consensus among stakeholders,196 which appeared to ensure that government agencies had at 
least accounted for and sought to meet other parties’ interests over the longer term (i.e. over a 
number of plans). As one respondent illustrated, while budget limitations had prevented one 
agency from undertaking infrastructure works to restore the flow of the creek under the 5 year 
NEIP plan, the agency and stakeholders were able to reach an agreement on long term 
commitments to complete these works over a 30 to 40 year time frame. As one respondent put it 
“we’re prepared to be patient”.197
Broadly akin to the EIP case, the consensus agreement in NEIP generally avoided the 
VEPA exercising its “veto” over the plan directly,198 but as the rule suggests, there was not total 
unanimity on the plan.199 Even so, the use of a consensus rule had reportedly led the parties to 
set objectives, targets and actions that focused on a full gamut of complex200 and important 
environmental issues,201 albeit severely hampered by lack of industry involvement. The decision 
rule had also reportedly increased the likelihood of implementation202 and assisted parties to 
improve their understanding and agreement on the nature of environmental problems, allowing 
them to create a new shared agenda. As one respondent put it:
we’re clearer on our own areas of direct responsibility and shared 
responsibility and we have an improved understanding of the broader issues
203and the greater challenges.
In short, the consensus decision rule in NEIP 1 and 2 appeared to actually have a number 
of benefits for the success of the collaboration. However, as suggested above, the external 
design conditions within which this consensus rule was exercised appeared to have seriously 
undermined the chances of the plan delivering successful environmental improvements.
195 Coglianese, n 7, p 107-110.
196 Some decisions were also made by an agreement among a sub set of parties such as between a coordinator and 
officer who conducted a consultation process.
197 Interview 215, Local government.
198 However as we will see in chapter 6, VEPA indirectly used their position to dominate decisions.
199 “Sometimes there’s no consensus on things”, Interview 227, Local Resident.
200 “It was a complex problem and I guess in summary that’s why the NEIP for us was so good....we’ve got a plan 
which has both some short term, medium and long term goals...we’ve brought partners together and we’ve all moved 
forward”, Interview 213, Local Government.
201 Indeed in NEIP 2 some respondents believed the NEIP aimed extremely high: “my honest observation of the NEIP 
is it aims too high. The projects that they want to achieve are so big”, Interview 223, Industry.
202 “What’s relevant is that there’s consensus around what’s in it. That’s all that matters...to make it happen”. 
Interview 224, EPA.
203 Interview 213, Local Government.
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However, this was not an inevitable outcome for all collaborations as the findings in NEIP 3 
reveal below.
NEIP 3 commenced shortly after NEIPs 1 and 2 and was not a “pilot” case. Like NEIP 1 it 
also focused on a degraded creek under threat from diffuse sources of pollution, but NEIP 3 was 
located in a rural rather than urban community (see Table 5.5 below). The findings on the 
emergence of collaboration in this context corresponded closely with those in NEIP 1 and 2 on 
many issues, including the positive support role of the local government sponsor, effective seed 
funding,204 cooperation enhancing trust building205 and beneficial consensus decision rules.206 
However in contrast to NEIP 1 and 2, NEIP 3 was far more successful in engaging and 
obtaining meaningful commitment from its “problem” stakeholders as well as other parties in 
collaboration. The findings indicated this was primarily due to three conditions.
First, stakeholders had a much greater stake in the environmental problem in NEIP 3 than 
in the other two sub cases. The polluted creek not only provided irrigation for local dairy and 
other farming industries, it was also the sole water supply for the population of 100 people in 
the catchment, including a rural township that had no waste water system. This water supply 
was not however treated and was below Australian standards for drinking water. While some 
residents suggested, they had “built up a bit of an immunity”, personal health concerns were 
evident, particularly for visitors to the town, with noted cases of tourists becoming sick from 
drinking the water.207 These events raised not only health concerns, but also economic issues by
204 Short term “seed” funding (a $20 000 grant from the Victorian Catchment Management Council) was used by the 
local government sponsor to employ a coordinator. Combined with VEPA officer support, the coordinator had 
engaged a large number of parities and conducted extensive consultation within the neighbourhood. This involved 
public meetings, information days, giving out flyers, and surveys; Towong Shire Council and Partners of Little 
Snowy Creek NEIP, Little Snowy Creek Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Towong Shire Council,
2006) p 37-38.
205 As discussed below, NEIP 3 involved a smaller community that provided a much greater “base level” of trust and 
networks on which to build cooperation. As one respondent put it: “every single person knows every single person” 
and in “these small towns., they have so many bloody committees” (Interview 234, Local Government). Even so, 
developing trust and overcoming transaction costs was as vital to NEIP 3 as the other sub cases. Indeed, mistrust 
between the township and surrounding farmers in NEIP 3 was high: “It’s a sort of a ‘them and us’ because blame was 
laid on both as to the causes of declining water quality” (Interview 234 Local Government). However after 
negotiating, trust had noticeable improved, and so had cooperation. As one respondent commented: “It’s not as bad as 
it was, it is getting better, the communication and the cooperation [between farmers and town] I suppose you could 
say is getting better” Interview 232, Water Trust.
206 Consensus decision making in NEIP 3 followed similar decision rules to NEIP 1 and 2, although it occasionally 
used majority voting when participant numbers at meetings were quite large. As one respondent explained: “It’s more 
discussion than voting...everyone says “yeah”... [but] when I say consensus, you still might get the odd dissenting 
voice” (Interview 324, Local Government). Reportedly these approaches to consensus had improved stakeholders 
understanding of the creek’s pollution, and increased ownership and chances of implementation. As one respondent 
summed up: “Well the fact that you can get to a point where most of these players that were often fighting with each 
other through the process...actually agree on something, signed on to it, I mean that’s brilliant. That’s brilliant” 
(Interview 235, EPA).
207 As one respondent explained: “Sometimes people have come here and stayed at camping grounds, they’ve been a 
bit sick from the water... but I just think oh well, that’s their constitution... we’ve been drinking the water the whole 
time” Interview 236, Community Group.
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threatening tourism, stymieing future development208 and raising public liability issues both for 
the town and agencies with responsibility for public health.209
Such direct health and economic stakes for local actors meant there was a much greater 
range of stakeholders that saw high benefits in engaging and committing to the collaboration 
than for either NEIP 2’s more diffuse threats to “sustainability” or the polluted creek in NEIP 1 
which provided largely only amenity uses.210
The second reason why NEIP 3 was able to achieve a more successful collaboration than 
NEIP 1 and 2 was the difference in population size. Within only around 100 people within the 
small catchment area, transaction costs were much lower than in the other sub cases, and 
engagement rates proportionally higher.211 This enabled sponsors to focus their resources to 
engage a larger proportion and mix of significant stakeholders (18 local residents/farmer 
representatives, 13 government and 3 non government groups, and 1 collaborative Landcare 
body).212 Notably these stakeholders included two thirds of the key “problem” stakeholders,
213namely the dairy farming industry.
The ability of this NEIP to engage these “problem” stakeholders arose largely from the 
third and final reasons for why NEIP 3 was the most successful NEIP collaboration: resources. 
Specifically, the town water supplies and the management of rural resources were both issues 
that fortuitously were the subject of significant external government funding.214 Unlike NEIP 1 
and 2 where stakeholders had to rely on their own limited resources or small grant programs to 
fund their commitments,213 these external funding sources brought with them more than $700
208 One respondent put it like this: “The town were really driven by the fact that tourist potential would suffer as a 
result of grey water and stinky water in their drains and boil water notices... their ability to not sub divide and the 
value of their properties because waste water hadn’t been managed was really important to them”, Interview 135, 
EPA.
2(19 Because the town provided their own water supply by pumping water from the creek, the town was effectively 
liable for those who drank the water: “the issue that needed to be solved was in fact that they were carrying a legal 
liability for it”, Interview 237, EPA.
210 As one respondent stated: “This NEIP is very different to the others...because the core issue is the water supply 
which affects everybody” (Interview 237, EPA). Indeed, these conditions made the benefits of collaboration so high 
that a nascent form of collaboration between local and state government officers had commenced a year before the 
NEIP formally began.
2" One or two public meetings reportedly included almost the entire neighbourhood population: “I might add that 
most of the town was represented at that meeting” (Interview 231, CMA). As one VEPA respondent reflected on the 
difference between NEIP 1 and NEIP 3: “the last couple of meetings we were having 15 to 20 people...So it’s actually 
bloody high numbers if you talked about it, if you looked at it terms of what does that mean for [NEIP 1] you’d have 
over 1 000 people at a meeting” (Interview 237, EPA).
212 Although lacking an environmental interest group, this was beyond the control of the group itself as there was no 
environmental group in the local area. For further see chapter 6.
213 Much like NEIP 2, there were only a small number of these “problem” stakeholders (6 dairy farmers), which made 
it easier for sponsors and partner agencies to persuade them to engage. As one respondent put it, the NEIP had 
achieved “pretty bloody good involvement...two thirds of the dairy farmers so what more can you ask sort of thing”, 
Interview 237, EPA.
214 That is, the Rural Water Supplies grants and Regional Natural Resource Management programs in Victoria that 
were accessible through one of the key NEIP partners - a regional catchment management body; Interview 241, EPA.
215 Both NEIP 1 and NEIP 2 had obtained some small, short term grants to resource their projects. For example, the 
NEIP 1 sponsor secured funding from a Victorian State Government initiative for addressing storm water issues.
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000 in investment over four years. This funding enabled partners to make significant 
commitments and to progress the plan towards development of wastewater and water supply 
systems, as well as to undertake waterway restoration projects. Perhaps most importantly this 
funding was used to provide incentives that encouraged local farmers to engage and contribute 
to on farm improvements. As one respondent pointed out, landholders were apparently 
motivated to collaborate because of these incentives:
they wanted all of their waterways fenced out, they wanted all the willows 
removed, they wanted it all reveged, and they saw that as being a real bonus, 
a real benefit, and they were very committed to that.216
While some commitments in NEIP 3 plan still depended on future cooperative decisions 
and resourcing,217 the above three conditions appeared to have ensured that this sub case 
achieved far greater success than NIEP 1 or 2.218
To conclude this discussion on NEIPs, at a general level the NEIP appears to have been far 
less successful than EIP in fostering the emergence of successful collaboration. Certainly the 
above analysis suggests that all NEIP sub cases were able to facilitate some diverse public and 
private stakeholders to come together for the first time to agree to a plan and make collective 
commitments to address significant environmental issues at neighbourhood level. Akin to the 
EIP sub cases involving poor and good performers, these achievements appeared attributable to 
the presence of a severe problem, sufficient subsidies for transaction costs (in this case through 
a “sponsor” and seed funding) and a consensus decision rule. However, the above analysis 
suggests trust building was seen to be more important in contributing to the success of NEIPs.
The overall success of most NEIPs was nevertheless qualified to the extent that the design 
of the NEIP lacked the capacity to engage and/or obtain commitment from key stakeholders, 
which severely constrained their potential to achieve significant environmental improvements.
Yet, despite these weaknesses the NEIP design clearly can “work" under the right 
conditions. Indeed, like the findings in EIP it was clear in NEIPs that collaboration was
Similarly, NEIP 2 gained external funding from the Australian Greenhouse Office Cool Communities Program, as 
well as government monies for a “plastic bag free campaign”; Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP 
Partners, n 174, p 25; Anglesea. Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, n 174, p 23.
216 Interview 231, CMA.
217 While funding had been obtained for feasibility studies on waste water and water supply systems, the group 
still had to find resources for actually building these systems. However, stakeholders were generally confident 
that resources were available. As one respondent explained: “we have commitment from [Water authority] that 
they actually will do the water supplies within a year or so, and the waste water will probably get done within 
three or four years. So we have certainly gone toward achieving both of those initial aims”, Interview 231,
CMA.
218 As one respondent summed up: “I think [NEIP 3] has worked quite well... we can say where potential 
environmental outcomes are going to come from...it’s had resources coming to it ... we had a really good roll up of 
people... we know who is going to doing what. That was all developed well”, Interview 241, EPA.
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contextual. Here, the findings in NEIP 3 suggested that NEIP collaborations are more likely to 
succeed in a small population with high stakes in an environmental issue, particularly where 
funding is (fortuitously) available to effectively fill the “incentive gap” left in the NEIP design.
NEIP Sub Case 1
Context • Lower stormwater drainage catchment of urban creek approximately 20 sq 
km.
• Creek runs through residential and industrial areas, acts £s industrial and 
stormwater drain, runs through 3 local government jurisdictions, and 3 state 
agency jurisdictions.
• Over 11000 residents live in the neighbourhood.
Key Cause and 
Problem
• Pollution incidents from industry, stormwater run off, littering and illegal 
dumping of waste, inappropriate vegetation management, transport and truck 
spills on roads, sewage leaks and illegal connections of waste discharges, 
run-off from washing cars and dog faeces in parks, urbanisation and 
development.
• Poor stream form, poor water quality, loss of habitat, loss of open space, 
species decline, erosion and sedimentation, decreased infiltration and 
filtering to the flow regime, pests.
• Complaints from the neighbourhood population, particularly from local 
environmental groups had long demonstrated community concern about the 
failure of ad hoc and typically uncoordinated regulation219 that had been at 
best ameliorative.220
Key
stakeholders
involved
• Local residents, industries, VEPA, state government agencies, local 
government, environmental groups, industry associations, water authorities, 
museum, businesses.
History and 
attempts to 
address the 
problem
• Death of mangroves (1987).
• Local environmental group formed (1993).
• 18 prosecutions from industries and road spills (1993-2004).
• Responsible state agency rates creek as highly degraded, and does not invest 
resources to address problems (ongoing).
• Sponsor’s Open Space Plan identifies linear park along creek corridor as 
priority (1997).
• State Agency and local council develop Foreshore Strategic Plan (1998).
• Local environment group holds planting days (late 1990s).
• Sponsor develops Project Directions Plan to guide the implementation of 
works along the Creek open space corridor (1999).
• Local government storm water management plans emphasise creek problems 
and key water quality risks (1999-2000).
• Residents’ complaints about park litter and condition of creek (1990s/2000s)
• Government rates Creek as one of the poorest quality urban waterways 
within Victoria (2000).
• Red coloured water flows, death of eels, fish and birds (2001/2002).
• Council lose three appeals against developments abutting Stony Creek 
(2001-02).
219 As one respondent explained the buck passing that occurred between multiple agencies responsible for the creek, 
“Our community walks by this creek every day and they see the banks not maintained and weeds. Council maintains 
the parks around the area to a much higher standard and comes back to council and says why aren’t you maintaining 
it, so that’s not our responsibility and the State agency say well it’s not our park, we normally wouldn’t maintain a 
drain to the standard so it’s that kind of tension, trying to encourage them”; Interview 213, Local Government.
220 Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 174, p 3.
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• Sponsor receives funds to address stormwater issues of Creek (2001/2002).
• Industry convicted of polluting Creek ordered to conduct one year baseline 
monitoring o f creek (2002).
• Almost 200 reports o f pollution being received by VEPA (2001 -2003).
• NEIP commences.____________________________________________________
Table 5.3: Background to the Emergence of Collaboration in NEIP 1.
NEIP Sub Case 2
Context • Coastal township aprox. 5 sq km including urban centre, beach front, 
estuary, creek and environmental reserves.
• Tourist area but also home to a population approximately 2000 extending to 
10000 during tourist season.
Key Cause and 
Problem
• Tourism, development, industry air pollution and mining, woodfires, waste 
landfills , litter, sewage outfall, energy usage.
• Poor water quality, acidification of river, declining air quality, pressure on 
the coastal and marine environment, impact on the watertable, Loss of 
habitat and biodiversity values, increasing resource consumption.
• While these threats to “sustainability” could be reduced through ad hoc 
regulations, engineering or technological solutions, more gains could 
arguably be made through collaborative approaches that engage people, 
groups and businesses where they live and work to change their habits and 
behaviours.221
Key
stakeholders
involved
• Local residents, environmental and community groups, VEPA, industry, 
local government, state government agencies, water authorities, waste 
management authorities, catchment management authority, tourism 
associations, school.
History and 
attempts to 
address the 
problem
• Local environmental group formed (1960s).
• Local Coast Action group formed (1995).
• Local government Conservation Plan engages local groups in identifying 
actions (1996).
• Formation of power state and coal mine Community Consultation Network 
(2001).
• Ongoing increase in town population, loss of vegetation, and decline in 
kangaroo populations.
• Tourism increases periodically augmenting population 5 fold (ongoing).
• Complaints to VEPA about local creek pollution (2001/02).
• Sponsor pilots eco-footprint program.
• Sponsor conducts community capacity building initiative (2001).
• Swinburne University research indicates high level of concern about 
environmental issues and over half of respondents acknowledge there is an “ 
active community” (2001).
• NEIP commences.
Table 5.4: Background to the Emergence of Collaboration in NEIP 2.
221 Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, n 174, p 13-14.
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NEIP Sub Case 3
Context • Catchment of rural creek approx. 22 sq km.
• Flows through rural town and agricultural land, provides sole water supply 
to population and is used for agricultural irrigation.
• Population 105 people (2001).
Key Cause and 
Problem
• Township wastewater and agricultural activity (effluent discharge, run-off), 
competing water usage, bank erosion, lack of native riparian vegetation, no 
water treatment facility septic tank and grey water leakage from the town, 
campers and anglers.
• Poor stream health, elevated nutrient and pathogen loads within the 
waterway, poor water quality (unsuitable for human consumption), water 
shortages.
• This problem had long been overlooked by traditional regulatory institutions
222and was subject of significant concern from the community.
Key
stakeholders
involved
• Local residents, farmers, catchment management authorities, local 
government, water authorise, state government agencies, businesses, 
(tourism farmers )VEPA, community associations, water trust, landcare 
groups.
History and 
attempts to 
address the 
problem
• No public water treatment or waste water treatment facility (ongoing)
• Committee of local residents sets up Water Trust to supply town with water 
(1970s).
• More than a dozen cases and complaints of visitors or new arrivals to town 
becoming sick (gastroenteritis) from creek (historically - 2003).
• Resident, state government agencies, local government and water authority 
discuss public health issues (1999).
• Ongoing willow and woody weed infestations, declining fish populations, 
low or restricted flows, black sludge and mud covering the bottom of the 
creek, deteriorating water quality.
• Complaints registered with agencies, but no government follow-up to issue 
(1999-2002).
• Department of Human Services issue Boil Water Advice (1999 - ongoing).
• Water Trust committee ceases because public liability risk and inability to 
obtain insurance but a few individuals continue the water supply services 
(2002 onwards).
• Meetings between catchment management association (CMA), VEPA, local 
government to discuss options to address problems (2002).
• CMA commission Waterway Action Plan (2003/2004).
• Planning scheme restricts development due to inability to retain wastewater 
on site (2003/4).
• VEPA, CMA and local government and other state agencies survey and 
meet with community (2002-2003).
• NEIP commences.
Table 5.5: Background to the Emergence of Collaboration in NEIP 3 .223
222 A study conducted in 2002 interviewing residents in the area found that “there was a large majority agreement 
among farmers and township residents alike that the creek has been deteriorating since the 1980s” Towong Shire 
Council and Partners of Little Snowy Creek NEIP, Eskdale-Little Snowy Creek Neighbourhood E1P Proposal 
(Towong Shire Council, 2005).
223 Towong Shire Council and Partners of Little Snowy Creek NEIP, n 204; Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea 
NEIP Partners, n 174; Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 174.
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5.3.3 RNRM -  the challenges of nested arrangements
Collaboration in RNRM is slightly different to EIP and NEIP, as its nested model requires 
cooperation at more than one institutional level. That is, collaboration must occur between (i) 
federal and state governments to negotiate bilateral agreements; (ii) state government agencies 
to support RNRM delivery; and (iii) local and regional stakeholders across 15 different regions 
to negotiate and cooperatively agree to a plan and investment strategy.224
Based on the findings in the RNRM case study, stakeholders achieved substantial 
cooperation at all of these levels. However at each level, problems were reported. These 
included drawn out conflicts between federal and state governments; agency “turf wars” at the 
state level; vague guidance and insufficient support for regional bodies; and difficulties 
achieving consensus and trust between regional community and government.
Some of these problems were interrelated, and none were immediately fatal to the 
collaborative arrangements. However they all diminished the overall success of the 
collaborative arrangements that emerged. The discussion below outlines in broad terms the 
steps taken to achieve these collaborative RNRM arrangements and highlights at each stage the 
achievements and shortcomings of the collaborative endeavour.
The primary issue for RNRM ’s nested approach was state and federal government 
agreeing to bilaterals to provide the strategic framework for the state’s RNRM. Consistent with 
suspicions of some RNRM commentators and NEG authors,225 conflict rather than cooperation 
was evident in some of the very first steps in the RNRM nested model. Here, transactions costs 
of negotiating bilateral agreements were extremely high, with problematic, lengthy, and 
repeatedly stalled negotiations.226 This was particularly the case regarding the more expansive 
NHT 2 bilateral (NAP being limited to only 4 “priority” regions in Queensland). Indeed, 
following announcements that NHT and NAP would be implemented together227 the NAP 
agreement was reached relatively quickly in 2002 but negotiations continued on the NHT 
agreement until 2004.228 A number of factors appeared to contribute to these difficulties. First, 
respondents pointed to state/federal conflicts and lack of trust historically entrenched in a 
federal system:
124 Head, n 14, p 144.
25 See Margerum, n 7 at 149; Paton et al, n 66.
26 As one respondent noted “they couldn’t even get NHT contract signed between the fed and state gov” (Interview 
3210, Science).
27 For a discussion of the events around this period see Head B and Ryan N, “Can Co-Governance Work? Regional 
Natural Resource Management In Queensland, Australia” International Symposium On Public Sector Management 
VIII, 31 March - 2 April 2004, Budapest p 16-17.
28 This was in part because NAP was developed through the Council of Australia Governments, which involves both 
itate and federal governments. In contrast, NHT was predominantly a federal program.
Cameron Holley New Environmenta/ Governance
207
you know what the states are like they are always paranoid about the 
feds...“If its federal driven it must be crap, those bastards, they are just 
pushing us around”.229
Second, some respondents suggested the federal government had wrongly assumed that the 
state would see resource benefits arising from the collaboration with the federal government. 
However the magnitude of federal resources was reportedly too small to motivate meaningful 
state cooperation. As one respondent put it:
[the federal government] think they’ve so much money to run this [RNRM] 
that the state will click and dance. Well it started to click and dance and then 
it decided well no, get nicked ...there’s not enough money...so you had a 
failed system to start off with.230
This conflict not only weakened the very foundation of RNRM’s collaborative process, but 
as discussed below also reduced the overall success of the RNRM collaboration by creating 
delays in funding support and fostering uncertain guidance for lower regional levels.
Simultaneously contributing to these problems was an ongoing conflict at the Queensland 
government level. Akin to “turf warfare” among administrative departments that has been a 
noted problem in earlier NEG experiments,231 state agencies reportedly struggled to find 
agreement regarding their collective approach to RNRM. While some agencies with direct 
responsibility for RNRM reportedly wished to pursue a collaborative 232 and “whole of
233government” approach, others were resistant to sharing their power, leading to a 
“disintegrated government system”234 and a number of independent reviews of the system.235 As 
one respondent put it, this uncertainty and conflict: “was a tragedy because...the whole of 
government solidarity sort of fell apart” .236
While these conflicts were going on, the governments pressed ahead and rolled out RNRM 
at the regional level, operating under the NAP bilateral and interim NHT arrangements.237 In 
some respects, government officers appeared quite successful at assisting regional stakeholders 
to cooperate. Building on pre-existing groups238 and following numerous meetings with regional 
community, government officers facilitated a number of the main interested stakeholders to
229 Interview 334, Regional Body.
230 Interview 3210, Science.
231 Ewing, n 66, p 406.
232 “They need partnerships to actually operate”, Interview 334, Regional Body.
233 Interview 334, Regional Body.
234 Interview 334, Regional Body.
235 See for example Zammit C, Head B, Miles R and McDonald G, A Review o f the NRM arrangements in 
Queensland (DNRM, 2004).
236 Interview 334, Regional Body.
237 Interview 342-1, Subregional Body.
238 For further see Head and Ryan, n 227, p 16-17.
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form a collaborative regional body. These included 5 sub regional collaborative group members 
(catchment management/landcare groups), 2 science interests, 2 indigenous interests, 2 local 
government members and 4 non-voting government advisors.
Why did these stakeholders want to collaborate? At the broadest level, stakeholders were 
interested in participating in the collaborative group because they were concerned about the 
region’s severe natural resource problems.239 Indeed, as Table 5.6 illustrates, since the 1990s, 
community concern and involvement in catchment or Landcare groups had sought to manage 
the diverse natural resources that were reportedly threatened and degraded by a range of 
competing and interconnected intensive resource uses such as grazing, cane farming and urban 
development.240 Unsurprisingly, the 5 existing sub regional groups were thus some of the most 
motivated stakeholders to seek membership on the regional body. Furthermore, for some of 
these groups, obtaining and/or controlling government funding also acted as an important 
incentive for seeking membership on collaborative regional body. As one respondent put it: 
“they nominated these people to make sure that they got some money for their organisations”.241
Although valid questions exist about the inclusiveness and balance of interests on the 
regional body (discussed further in chapter 6), the membership of the sub regional bodies had 
gone some way toward bringing a diverse mix of key stakeholders into the regional 
collaboration, including Landcare, local government, environmental and agricultural interests. 
Furthermore, one particularly beneficial feature of the sub regional groups’ involvement was 
that the regional body had essentially developed a “nested” approach that took account of the 
geographical spread of catchments in the large region.242
That is, the region was divided into 5 sub regions that corresponded to each subregional 
group on the regional body. This structure ensured that at least some existing sub regional 
groups were not forgotten or overlooked in the shift to regional arrangements (which some 
emerging RNRM research has shown was a noted problem in other regions).243
This nested arrangement also appeared to help reduced transaction costs in ways broadly 
consistent with hypothesis in the literature.244 For example, because the regional body contained
239 Indeed, natural resources were the primary source of livelihood in the region - 96% o f the regional land use was 
cattle grazing, and tourism was the major employer. BDTNRM, Burdekin Dry Tropics Natural Resource 
Management Plan 2005-2010 (BDTNRM, 2005) p 29-33.
240 BDTNRM, n 239, p 1, 8, 29, 30.
241 Interview 341, Regional Body Officer.
242 Gilbey P, “Rights and Duty of Care A Queensland Perspective” (2002) ANCID, Townsville, 
http://www.clw.csiro.au/lbi/publications/ANCID2002paper-Gilbev.pdf viewed 30 May 2008.
243 Other regions in Queensland adopted different approaches and structures, and as some researchers have noted (eg. 
Whelan and Oliver, n 80) many faced significant degrees of conflict between existing sub regional and other 
community groups in the regional establishment process. However, it appeared in this sub case that as the regional 
body had embraced a number of existing sub regional groups, such conflict had been reduced. Indeed, subregional 
bodies generally suggested it was a successful “bottom up” process; Interview 342, Subregional Body; BDTNRM, n 
239, p 8; Gilbey, n 242.
244 Margerum, n 7.
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government advisors and interacted with agency staff, it was able to provide a structured forum 
that reduced costs of feeding government guidance down to individual subregional groups to 
assist with their consultation process.245 Simultaneously, dividing the workload among these 
groups reduced the time and resources spent by the regional body in consulting with the wider 
region.
Indeed, the “foundational funding” obtained by the regional body was partly devolved to 
the sub regional bodies to hire coordinators.246 As in NEIPs, these coordinators were seen to be 
vital in assisting sub regional groups to overcome some of the transaction costs of consulting 
and bargaining regarding critical NRM assets, targets, actions and prioritising in each 
subregion.247 While the specific form of sub regional consultation and negotiation varied, the 
coordinator typically assisted the group to complete targeted consultation, workshops and public 
notice and comments procedures with the catchment’s community, industry groups and local 
governments.248
This consultation fed up to the coordinating regional body, where the remaining 
foundational funding was reportedly vital to enabling the body to rent an office and employ 
support planning staff, including a consultant to complete the RIS.249 The body also conducted 
its own regionally focused consultation process, conducting a 2 day regional forum attended by 
60 people that integrated the issues and targets identified across the five sub-regions into a 
regionally-based structure.250
245 For example, the regional body’s staff and government advisors were able to develop a standardised template to 
assist sub regional groups with their processes of consulting to set measurable and time bound targets. This template 
ensured that the correct information was supplied and that targets could be compared across sub regions; BDTNRM, 
n 239, p 187.
246 8 coordinators were hired in total, three of which had technical skills in biodiversity, water quality and coastal and 
marine issues and were outsourced to provide broad technical support across the regional area; BDTNRM, Annual 
Report 2004-2005 (BDTNRM, 2005) p 15; Gilbey, n 242.
247 “Our coordinator makes sure information is disseminated properly... coordinators are needed because farmers or 
landholders, they don’t know how to connect” Interview 342, Subregional Body.
248 For example one subregional body followed this process: “the coordinator and the technical support 
officer...complete[d] targeted consultation with community, industry groups and local government throughout the 
[sub region]. Community consultation was held over three days in [8 towns]. Interviews were held at the [Shire 
Council], Correspondence was sent to key stakeholders... River Trust, 2 Water Boards, Shire Council, Landcare 
Association, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Department of Primary 
Industries, Queensland Parks and Wildlife Service, CANEGROWERS, Pest and Productivity Boards, Mango 
Growers Association, Pacific Reef Fisheries, Irrigators Committee, Catchment Committee, CSIRO, Tourism 
Association and 2 Chambers of Commerce...Prioritisation workshops were held by the sub-committees in [2 
towns],..The steering committee, the coordinator and the technical support officer then grouped the similar issues and 
reworked issues to reduce the total number of issues....Initially over 200 issues were submitted through these 
community, stakeholder and natural resource management plan steering committee consultations...steering sub­
committees, along with the Co-ordinator and relevant Board staff involved in the community consultations reviewed 
the entire list of issues...The issues list was placed on the [Region’s] InfoBase and disseminated to general 
[subregional body] members and then prioritised by the natural resource management plan steering sub-committees”. 
BDTNRM, n 239, p 185-187.
249 BDTNRM, n 239, p 197.
250 BDTNRM, n 239, p 65, 185-196.
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These were all positive achievements in the development of plan and strategy. However 
the overall success of collaboration at the regional level was limited by a number of issues. 
First, because of the ongoing bickering over the overarching bilateral agreements, government
251guidance intended to support the regional body was often vague and constantly changing. As 
one government advisor to the regional body explained:
the regional bodies have been evolving at the same time as the infrastructure 
has been... The administrative arrangements the guidelines... we haven’t 
necessarily provided them with the framework or the support to be able to 
achieve what we want them to achieve.252
This did little to reduce transaction costs, and may have even augmented them as regional 
bodies continually had to adapt and readapt to changing requirements. 253 Furthermore, the 
findings indicated this lack of firm guidance may have been detrimental to the overall success of 
the process, with regional bodies often failing to connect effectively with key stakeholders.254 
As one respondent reflected:
we have got some major coal and gold mines in the area. Not one of the 
mining industries has even been talked to.255
The second issue that undermined the success of regional collaboration were reported 
delays and insufficiencies in government funding to mitigate transaction costs. These delays 
were created by the ongoing disagreement between federal and state governments, which 
subsequently increased, rather than decreased, the time it took to complete the plan and made it 
more difficult to engage local stakeholders. As one respondent explained:
I see the [Queensland] - [Federal] crunch as incredibly negative. It’s stopped 
us getting funding when we needed our funding....and then that flows 
through to the community, through the committee to the community, so there 
is all this negative stuff that comes out at friction at the top end.256
251 See also Farrelly, n 59 at 399.
252 Interview 327, Government Agency.
253 For example, requirements for regional body organisational structures reportedly changed from a focus of 
establishing public good organisations to forming companies; Interview 327, Government Agency.
254 Interview 327, Government Agency.
255 Interview 341, Regional Body.
256 Interview 342, Subregional Group.
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Augmenting these difficulties were reported insufficiencies in the foundational funding. As
one respondent frankly stated: “the biggest deficiency is that it is hopelessly under
”  257 resourced .
258Even with volunteers putting in “thousands o f hours”, the funding had not sufficiently 
equipped the sub regional groups to overcome transaction costs and cooperative barriers that 
arose in the extremely large geographic region (almost 130 000 square kilometres). Indeed, 
respondents reported they lacked the time and resources to engage with a range of peak industry
bodies who were reportedly wary of new regional bodies and saw them as “a threat” to their
259influence over rural issues. More problematic were reports that the body had failed to “tap
260into all o f the farming structures” in the region, particularly average farmers as opposed to
261those who were already involved in existing sub regional Landcare or catchment bodies. As 
one respondent put it:
we have had a group of most probably 30 land holders, commercial beef 
property people have been involved fairly heavily in doing all this 
consultation process for the planning, but the majority haven’t engaged.262
These vital stakeholders had not engaged in the regional collaborative process for a 
number o f reasons. These included “cynicism” about government programs;263 anger that on­
ground funding had largely ceased while RNRM plans were being developed;264 and most 
prominently, the fact that some farmers had to drive some “many hours” to attend meetings.265
257 Interview 337, Local Government.
258 Interview 342, Subregional Group.
259 As one respondent explained: “they did see them as a threat, w e’re talking in code here, but the idea was that when 
these regional bodies emerged they’d be, kind of have some persuasive influence over the assignment of resources at 
the regional level. That’s not the case, so there was a fear in the mind of these industry groups that may be perceived 
to be stacked in a particular way, whether a green persuasion or not, and they’d be calling the shots at a regional 
level” Interview 323, State Agency.
260 Interview 314, Industry Body.
261 For example coordinators and subregional groups were working with farmers on projects -  however the general 
view was that these farmers were “leaders” as opposed to “average punters”.
262 Interview 344, Subregional Body.
263 As one respondent put it: “Part of the problem with these arrangements...is they’re so...governments both state 
and federal, [Program A] in Qld was one example: it becomes something that they do and deliver in a budget cycle 
and then the funding dries up and then they don’t do it again. Then it goes away and it comes back re-badged with the 
same people, who three months ago were delivering [Program A] to you, are all now standing on your farm saying “I 
have got [Program B], it’s the new best thing”, so growers get a little bit tired of 2 year, three year funding cycles.
The money dries up and goes away, its rebadged as something else, so its actually been quite difficult to get some o f  
the growers past the cynicism, and us as well, in some respects and say the regional arrangements are around, how 
long are they actually around for? And how much effort in some respects do you actually put in to try and work and 
get these long term?”, Interview 311, Industry Body.
264 For example, on respondent pointed out: “I don’t think the task the regional bodies have had to do particularly in 
Queensland, for the last 2 years hasn’t really given them much o f a leg up in the communities view. For two years 
they have just been planning, planning, planning and there is no money being channelled down except through 
different...we have had one regionally competitive bid, a Landcare program, but the NHT they (the farmers) had just
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This lack o f engagement from key stakeholders appears likely to have reduced the overall 
success o f the collaborative process and the effectiveness o f the plan that was produced.
However those that did engage were at least able to agree to a plan and a RIS.266 According 
to respondents, the repeat interactions and negotiations to develop these documents (while far 
from conflict free)267 had helped build stronger relationships and reduce mistrust, which made 
reaching agreement much easier. As one science respondent reflected on the experience after a 
number o f negotiated meetings with farmers, local government and peak industry bodies:
you know when you have some sort of break in the log jam .. .there was just a 
level of honesty about presentations by all sides that got it away from the 
hostility.268
Having built trust over time, how did the parties reach agreement on the plan and RIS? 
Although the RNRM legislative design did not definitely emphasise consensus decision making, 
it was reported that in practice the planning process had sought to use the ongoing consultation 
and negotiation processes as a way “to work towards consensus”.269 What is different about this 
consensus focus in RNRM compared to the other two cases was that RNRM was not so much 
about a relatively defined group of stakeholders following a consensus decision rule to agree to 
a plan, but more a multiplicity of sub regional, regional, and other decision making forums that 
were designed to contribute to some form of overall regional consensus.270
For example, in one sub region alone a facilitated workshop of sub regional stakeholders 
reached agreement on issues for the sub region, while a select group of these stakeholders then 
agreed on the priority of these issues and decided which would have targets set for them. This 
was followed by smaller technical teams agreeing to targets for each of the priority issues.271 
Finally, a regional forum involving regional and sub regional stakeholders reached agreement
got used to had ceased, but they were asking them to come along to all these volunteer meetings to give their opinion 
on what was going on on the land, but they didn’t really”; Interview 345, Subregional Group.
265 Interview 345, Subregional Group.
266 Following the regional planning process, the RIS was developed. This process was conducted by a consultant 
hired by the Regional Body. This consultant conducted workshops with subregional groups to refine and develop 
costings for each management action. This was followed up by meetings with specific sectors to identify costing and 
potential in-kind support for the implementation of the plan; BDTNRM, n 239, p 66 197.
267 As one respondent pointed out: “One of the biggest conflicts we have got is the targets, sediment targets, and there 
is some really crazy stuff they are talking about”, Interview 341, Regional Body.
268 Interview 331, Science.
269 BDTNRM, n 239, p 49.
270 Of course, NEIP also involved multiple consultation forums, however this was typically carried out by members o f  
a single collaborative group and their coordinator (as opposed to different subregional groups, technical teams, and a 
regional body all reaching agreement on multiple issues).
271 Followed by notice and comment processes that stimulated new agreements on targets.
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on which of the targets had regional value, which was then followed by planning staff and 
regional body negotiating with government agencies and other key industry stakeholders to 
draft and agree to a plan.272
As one may expect, these different processes threw up a host of different decision rules,
273 • • •ranging from “substantial” agreement among subregional group stakeholders, majority voting 
(both in sub regions and the regional body)274 and agreement by a small representative group of 
stakeholders275 or by a technical advisory team.276 As with NEIP and EIP, unanimous agreement 
in any forum appeared to be rare, with particular disagreements regarding scientific information 
and targets.277
Given the multiple and interconnected decision forums, untangling the precise impacts of 
each of these different decision rules was beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what was 
clear from a regional body perspective was that these processes had involved “decision making 
that promoted mutual education” and “increased knowledge of resource issues”.278 Respondents 
also reported that reaching “consensus” agreement had reportedly helped increase the chances 
of implementation from regional and local stakeholders who had signed onto the plan:279
getting sign off on the plan is the big thing. As I say I think we have done 
that ...they have at least signed off to a set of targets and aspirations that 
hopefully we are all going to achieve.280
However for some respondents, whatever consensus had been achieved at the regional 
level had been significantly undermined by the “mixed” decision process and the JSC’s 
subsequent exercise of its veto over the plan to ensure that the plan accorded with existing law 
and program requirements. As one respondent put it:
from our point of view, we said “No. From a government point of view, as
2g i
the funder of the groups, you’ve got to address these issues”.
272 BDTNRM, n 239, p 68-69, 187-190.
273 BDTNRM, n 239, p 193.
274 BDTNRM, n 239, p 193.
275 As one respondent explained it was “difficult in this type of compromise situation” for all stakeholders to get all of 
their views and the outcomes they were looking for”, Interview 323, State government; BDTNRM, n 239, p 188.
276 BDTNRM, n 239, p 190.
277 A number of respondents recounted the lack of “scientific consensus” on acceptable levels of river load reductions 
into the ocean; Interview 341,Regional Body; Interview 334, Regional Body.
278 As one respondent explained, a key part of this mutual education and increased knowledge had been decision 
making processes that sought to find agreement between “science” and local knowledge of key stakeholders: “science 
is not going to solve our problems, what we need is on ground people to have an input’ you know...[so we] set up a 
subcommittee of rural people who if the science had a bright idea they’d run it past us to see what we thought about 
it”, Interview 342, Subregional Body; BDTNRM, n 239, p 49.
279 “its their plans, their targets ...w e sat there and we workshopped the growers with the work...it creates ownership 
if the plan sits there and these targets if they know they helped write them they understand why we are achieving or 
why we driving for targets, and they can achieve them, then they are more likely to actually engage in it”
Intevreiw311, Industry Body.
28() Interview 237, Local Government.
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The findings suggested this veto had the potential to undermine the agreement and 
ownership achieved at the regional level, and the increased chances of implementation that 
come with it. As one respondent described how they felt about government’s actions: “Your 
opinion is irrelevant basically or that’s the way it seems”.282 However a redeeming feature of 
government veto and oversight of the program, at least according to some stakeholders, was that 
it ensured regional groups had set targets and actions for issues that were important, rather than 
simply creating tradeoffs between agricultural and environmental interests:
if we were to hold a meeting here of local community people in the region 
and you go in with a blank sheet of paper, I don’t think that is all together 
helpful. You end up with such compromise... it is lowest common 
denominator outcome...that means no outcome quite often. So you need to
283have some broader policy guidance as to how that might be applied.
Indeed it was clear that the plan contained some ambitious targets.284 These ranged from 
soil issues (eg. by 2024, achieve a 10% improvement in soil health in extensive and intensive 
agricultural areas) to biodiversity issues (eg. by 2015, ensure 90% of all threatened flora and 
fauna species in the region will be represented in conservation reserves or under voluntary 
conservation agreements) to coastal and marine issues (by 2025 connectivity between and 
within fresh water and marine ecosystems will be restored).285
To sum up the above discussion, RNRM has been successful in facilitating federal, state 
and a range of regional non government stakeholders to come together to produce a new nested 
set of collaborative arrangements. Broadly similar to elements of some EIP and NEIPs, the 
findings suggested that vital to these achievements were severe natural resource problems and 
monetary incentives to engender interest from key regional stakeholders, government support 
(albeit insufficient) to reduce transaction costs, trust building and a broad consensus orientation 
to regional decision making, albeit one perhaps undermined by government veto.286
However like the NEIP case the success of RNRM is qualified to the extent that it faced a 
host of difficulties in engaging key stakeholders to input into the plan. These difficulties arose
281 Interview 323, Government Agency.
282 Interview 242, Subregional Body.
283 Interview 328, Government Agency.
284 As discussed in chapter 7, some respondents questioned the general validity of RNRM targets, however this 
weakness was not seen to arise from the decision rule itself.
285 BDTNRM, n 239.
286 As one respondent summed up: “I think this regional approach is as I say the best thing we got at the moment, as I 
see it everybody supports it, then it comes to how do you deliver a good NRM outcome through this type of structure.
I think the idea o f having a regional plan is a good one with time bound targets measurable time bound and 
measurable with an investment strategy, all that is very rationale”, Interview 337, Local Government.
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because of problems at different institutional levels. While nested arrangements appeared to 
have some benefits in reducing transaction costs across such a large region, consistent with fears 
of some authors, conflict and uncertainty at higher levels not only created unstable foundation to 
the RNRM program but also delayed financial support and reduced effective guidance from 
government to regional bodies. These problems, along with insufficiencies in funding, hindered 
regional stakeholders’ attempts to engage key stakeholders. Notably, many of these problems 
are consistent with those documented within regional arrangements in other states.287
R N R M
Context • Region approximately 133,432 sq km, population approximately 190,000 (2004).
• Area contains one main river, 5 sub-catchments and three main bioregions, 
continental islands, densely populated coastal areas, but sparsely populated inland.
• Region contains mining, grazing, forestry, manufacturing, tourism, industry, 
Traditional Owner land uses, fishing, urban, irrigation, sugar cane, horticulture.
Key Cause 
and Problem
• Causes o f  problems include: excessive grazing, tree clearing and irrigation, 
fragmentation and degradation o f  native vegetation, unsustainable development, 
declining rural population, and increasing urbanisation.
• Problems include: land degradation, water quality degradation, degradation and 
eutrophication o f  coastal and inner reef environments, salinity, native vegetation 
degradation, loss o f  biodiversity, soil degradation, pest plants and animals, 
unsustainable development, loss o f  soil productivity, local and regional extinct 
species, endangered, increase in rare and vulnerable species and vegetation.
• While respondents confirmed that not all members o f  the region shared a concern 
with improving or contributing to NRM solutions, “community based NRM. 
planning” was “a significant feature” o f  the region since 1990s.288
• Further, these problems had not been adequately addressed by early institutional 
arrangements, including some o f  the more immediate predecessors to RNRM such 
as NHT 1 and integrated catchment management. As one respondent reflected: the 
NHT 1 experiment... it was a very very inefficient use o f  money in the sense o f  
strategic application o f  dollars to fix big problems... [Queensland] had been 
supporting this ICM type concept for years.. .Very very very under resourced so no 
real impact, and basically treated within government as a bit o f  a joke”.289
Key
stakeholders
• Local residents, farmers, environmental groups, industry associations, local 
government, state government agencies, federal government agencies, land care 
groups, science bodies, traditional owners, catchment management groups.
History and 
attempts to 
address the 
problem
• National Landcare Program (1989) a community-based alliance between 
landholders, environmentalists and state and federal governments.
• Qld Integrated Catchment Management creates voluntary catchment groups that 
develop catchment management strategies (1990/91).
• Various state government based NRM programs, e.g. Water Act 2000.
• Also, government (under EPA) in cooperation with industry groups, developed 6
287 Paton et al, n 66; Farrelly, n 59.
288 BDTBNRM, n 239, p 8.
289 Interview 334, Regional Body.
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codes o f  practice, and best management practice including COMPASS (ongoing).
• The Natural Heritage Trust Act 1997 set up the Natural Heritage Trust o f Australia 
Reserve from a $1.35 billion partial sale o f Telstra using partnership agreement 
between federal and state governments (1997-2001).
• Catchment management groups, land care groups etc received funding under NHT 
for on ground works and produced a range o f  strategies.
• NAP proposed and NHT Mid Term Review points to need for more strategic 
regional approach.
Table 5.6: Background to the Emergence of Collaboration in RNRM.
5.4 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter has examined the conditions that fostered the emergence of successful 
collaboration. Focusing on the experience of “tripartite”, “neighbourhood” and “nested” 
collaborative models, it has provided a range of insights into under-researched questions and 
debates in the literature.291
Although collective action barriers ostensibly remain a “theoretical thorn in the side” of 
NEG,292 the above analysis suggests that under the right conditions a more sanguine view of 
collaboration is justified. Consistent with growing empirical evidence,293 the very existence of 
collaboration across the cases suggest that all three cases effectively removed much of the 
metaphorical thorn by designing institutions to target favourable conditions and utilise 
mechanisms to reduce these barriers.294
This basic finding suggests that it is oversimplification to rely on tragedy of the commons 
and cooperation dilemmas to write off all or even most NEG cooperative solutions as 
theoretically impossible.295 Having said that, most of the collaboration processes examined here 
were far from easy. All were time and resource intensive and extended for many years, some 
expended extensive resources to try and engage reluctant participants (such as NEIPs), while 
others involved taxing conflict (such as EIPs and government levels of RNRM). Consistent with 
suggestions in the broader NEG literature, collaborative experiments like the three case studies 
appear unlikely to speed up the policy process and may expend considerable government and 
non government resources.296
290 BDTNRM, n 239.
291 Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 584; Karkkainen, n 5 at 242.
292 Homstein D, “Complexity Theory, Adaptation and Administrative Law” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 913 at 952.
293 See for example: Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5; Raymond, n 2, Lubell, n 12.
294 Karkkainen, n 5 at 229.
295 Gaines, n 7; Steinzor R, ‘The corruption of civic environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 
10909 at page 1 of “p df’; See discussion at Karkkainen, n 5 at 231, 233.
296 Lane M, “Critical issues in regional natural resource management”, Paper prepared for the Australian State of the 
Environment Committee 2006 (DEH, 2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/nrm- 
issues/pubs/nrm-issues.pdf viewed 20 May 2008; Coglianese, n 7, p 113; Coglianese C, “The limits of consensus” 
(1999) 41 Environment 28; See discussion in Karkkainen, n 6 at 91; Karkkainen, n 5 at 225.
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The findings also revealed varying degrees of success between collaborative processes. At 
a broad level, the EIP program appeared more successful than the other two cases, with most 
EIP collaboratives engaging a majority of key stakeholders that subsequently developed a plan, 
which took substantial steps toward resolving local environmental issues. Of course, such 
success appears partly attributable to the fact that EIP faces comparatively “simple” point 
source pollution problems,297 and involves few key parties making direct commitments. In the 
NEIP and RNRM cases, where problems are more complex and involve many more 
stakeholders, the most successful collaboration appeared to be NEIP 3, which emerged in 
relatively unusual circumstances involving an extremely small population, high stakes for local 
actors in a severe environmental problem and fortuitous external funding.298
These general conclusions may appear to support sceptics’ arguments, based largely on 
theory, that successful collaboration in NEG is at best limited to narrowly constrained or unique 
circumstances,299 like a small community closely tied to environmental conditions evident in 
NEIP 3,300 or less complex settings involving fewer parties such as EIPs.301
However such a conclusion would arguably place too little weight on the quite significant 
achievements made by RNRM and the other NEIP sub cases that at the very least suggest the 
very real potential for success, albeit under more appositely designed institutions (discussed 
further below).302 Moreover it would incorrectly overlook the relative failure in the EIP sub case 
involving leading industries.
An arguably better conclusion to draw from the relative success of the cases is that 
collaboration is highly contingent and contextual: success or failure is dependent on the specific 
circumstances to which institutions are applied.303 What then can we learn from the cases about 
the conditions that foster the emergence of successful collaboration? Certainly, one must accept 
that contextuality means any conclusion on a specific condition cannot be said to be predictive 
of success per se.304 Even so, insights drawn from the findings across the diversity of contexts
297 Along with the EIP’s capacity to harness negative incentives to engage industry.
298 Obviously the other features of NEIP design also had an important role to play.
299 Gaines, n 7 at 17; Cannon J, “Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management”, (2000) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. 
L. & Pol'y Rev 379 at 428.
300 Gaines, n 7at 17; See also comments in Karkkainen B, “ ‘New Governance’ In Legal Thought And In The World: 
Some Splitting As Antidote To Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471 at 476-477.
301 Of course this is not to suggest that situations like EIP will easily achieve successful collaboration either. As we 
saw some EIPs were more successful than others.
302 Indeed, we should be mindful here o f research in more extensive common pool resource settings which suggest 
that although collaboration is often more viable in relatively small, simple and isolated settings, research suggests 
successful collaboration can be achieved in larger resource systems and the numbers of appropriators does not affect 
the likelihood of collective action; see Schlager, n 24, p 162-163; John, n 47, p 236-237.
303 Schlager, n 24, p 164, 169.
304 Margerum, n 11 at 154.
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and institutional arrangements of the three programs do point to some key conditions that would 
appear to increase the likelihood of successful collaboration emerging.305
These conditions fall under five main themes: the severity of environmental problems, 
incentives (both negative and positive), structures for subsidising transaction costs, consensus 
decision-making, and trust. As will be apparent, all of these themes broadly resonate with 
existing hypotheses and claims in the NEG or wider literature about matters that can increase 
the likelihood and success of collaboration. However for each, the findings provide some 
important empirical based lessons for NEG theory and for policy makers.
Commencing with the issue of problem severity, most cases dealt with problems perceived 
to be severe by key stakeholders, be it odours from an industry, degraded urban creek, or 
degraded natural resources. In all cases such severity had created concern among such 
stakeholders, which appeared central to their willingness to collaborate. In harmony with these 
findings, a lack of problem severity in some EIP sub cases resulted in only marginal groups that 
produced few gains.306
Consistent with suggestions in the literature,307 the relatively common sense lesson here is 
that successful collaboration is more likely to emerge where problems are relatively severe (or 
perceived to be severe), not least because it is in these circumstances that parties are most likely 
to see a tangible benefit in collaborating.308 From a policy perspective, the findings in the EIP 
sub case involving leading industries also strongly suggest that if environmental problems are of
very modest dimensions or negligible there may in fact be few returns from collaborative
. . . ™t) initiatives.
The findings also provided insights as to whether, to what extent and in what 
circumstances the use of incentives (both negative and positive) increase the likelihood of 
successful collaboration.310 It is widely acknowledged in regulatory literature that the strategic 
use of government funding and/or authority (or even harnessing pressure from third parties)311 
can be an effective spur to cooperation and affirmative self regulatory behaviour.312 However 
the application of these conditions in recent NEG developments has received much less 
empirical scrutiny.313
305 Margerum, n 11 at 154.
306 Sabatier et al, n 26, p 181.
307 Cannon, n 299 at 408. Sabatier et al, n 26, p 181.
308 Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 586; Lubell et al, n 12 at 148.
309 Cannon, n 299 at 408.
310 Karkkainen, n 5 at 241.
311 See: Gunningham N and Grabosky P, Smart Regulation (Clarendon Press, 1998).
312 Karkkainen, n 40, p 296; Karkkainen, n 5 at 229.
313 The main focus on such conditions has come in the form o f regulatory penalty defaults in the USA context; 
Karkkainen n 40; Karkkainen, n 3; Wondolleck J and Yaffee S, Making Collaboration Work Lessons from Innovation 
in Natural Resource Management (Island Press, 2000) p 240-241 ; Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 903.
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As we saw from the NEIP program, at least some NEG policy designers appear to expect 
successful collaboration to emerge without the use of government authority or funding 
incentives. However, based on the analysis above this appeared to be an over-optimistic and 
deeply flawed assumption with most NEIP initiatives struggling to engage and/or obtain 
meaningful commitment from a host of stakeholders. This conclusion was strongly reinforced 
by the findings in NEIP 3 whose surprising success depended in part on the fortuitous 
availability of funding incentives.314 The obvious implication from these findings is that 
appositely designed incentives are vital to the chances of achieving successful collaboration.315 
However, this begs the question, what should these incentives look like and when will they be 
most effective at fostering successful collaboration?
First, the findings in EIP confirmed the common claim that social and economic pressure 
from non government stakeholders can act as an effective cooperation inducing incentive, at 
least where large reputation conscious corporations or stakeholders are involved.316 However as 
we also saw, in both EIP and in NEIP cases, there appeared to be very real limits to third 
parties’ capacities to pressure industry or other stakeholders who place little credence on high 
profile or public image.
Much may accordingly depend on NEG institutions effectively utilising government 
authority or funding to induce cooperation. Consistent with some suggestions in the literature, 
the findings in RNRM and NEIP 3 revealed government funding can act as an incentive for 
some groups to collaborate and make meaningful commitments.317 Such funding incentives 
would appear to be particularly vital in NEG experiments like NEIP 1 where SMEs were a 
significant cause of the problem but did not require a licence (which makes regulatory threats 
difficult).318
Of course, as the findings in EIP confirmed, where there is sufficient leverage over 
regulated parties, background regulatory pressure is likely to be central to shift the cost benefit 
calculations of reluctant stakeholders to bring them to the table to collaborate seriously.319 As a 
range of NEG authors have aptly argued in the USA context, such arm twisting need not be
314 Certainly, the high severity of the problem and the small population were also important to NEIP 3 success and 
should not be overlooked as important conditions. However without the buckets o f funding it appears unlikely that as 
many farmers would have come to the table or that partners would have made as many commitments.
315 Lubell, n 77 at 565.
316 Gunningham N, Kagan R and Thornton D, Shades o f Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment (Stanford UP, 
2003).
317 Karkkainen, n 5 at 229; Margerum, n 11 at 156.
318 SMEs may also possess unique characteristics that create considerable internal and external barriers to 
environmental improvement. Funding may be used to substantially raise or lower the benefits or costs incurred by 
SMEs in their current management practices. For further discussion on optimal regulatory approaches for SMEs see 
Gunningham and Sinclair, n 32, Ch 2; Watson K, “The New Regulatory Challenge: Designing Optimal 
Environmental Regulation for Small to Medium Sized Enterprises” (2005) 22 EPLJ 350 at 352, 356-364.
319 Karkkainen, n 5 at 229.
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limited to private regulated parties, but can also seek to harness agencies, state or local 
governments through an appropriately designed penalty default rule.320
Interestingly, the findings in the EIP case suggest that the “shadow of the law” may not, 
however, always be sufficiently menacing to compel the most recalcitrant actors to collaborate. 
Instead direct legal compulsion may need to be used. This finding reveals a somewhat unique 
and rarely discussed point: law can be brought into the foreground as a credible and direct tool 
to enhance the likelihood of successful collaboration. Of course the use of such direct 
compulsion on a wide scale may likely be subject to resistance and may produce less efficient 
results.321 However in some instances it appears to play an important role in achieving 
successful collaboration.
In addition to incentives, the above analysis also shed some light on arrangements to 
subsidise the transaction costs of collaboration. Many authors in the literature have suggested 
that designing institutions to provide sufficient support to collaborators is vital to reducing 
transaction costs and to increasing the chances of successful collaboration.322 The findings in 
this chapter add strong empirical support to these claims.323 However simply suggesting that 
support is needed to contribute to the emergence of successful collaboration is a little imprecise. 
Were there more specific lessons from the findings?
One lesson from the NEIP and RNRM cases that adds support to other empirical research 
in the literature is that funding, often coupled with government officer support, is vital to 
reducing transaction costs and increasing the chances of successful collaboration emerging.324 
Based on NEIP experience, such monetary support could often be quite modest, such as small 
grants to employ a coordinator. However comparison between NEIP and RNRM, where 
insufficiencies in funding were reported, suggests that when dealing with more stakeholders and 
larger areas, funding and grants may need to be significantly more substantial.325
A second insight into support arrangements arose from the NEIP case and the role of their 
“sponsors”. John’s theory of civic environmentalism in the USA suggests outside “sponsors” 
such as agency managers or elected officials can facilitate funding and information to support 
the collaborative process and ensure its success.326 As the findings in NEIP revealed, this 
general strategy of “sponsorship” appears replicable to a wider range of bodies such as local
320 Karkkainen, n 40 p 310-311, 314; Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 903.
321 Ayres I, “Ya-Huh: There Are And Should Be Penalty Defaults” (2006) 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 589 at 589.
322 See for example, John D and Mlay M, n 52, p 362-363; John, n 47, p 230-242; Sabatier et al, n 26 p 181.
323 Sabatier et al, n 26 p 181.
324 Margerum, n 11 at 155; Curtis A, “The Landcare Experience” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing 
Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 406 at 453; Lubell et al, n 12 at 159.
325 Of course obtaining sufficient funding is a well-recognised constraint in many environmental and natural resource 
programs, however the findings in RNRM confirm that without it, the success of collaboration is likely to be limited; 
Farrelly, n 59 at 402; Head, n 14 at 145.
326 John, n 47, p 239, 241-242.
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government, who themselves appeared quite successful in providing funding or in kind support 
to significantly reduce transaction costs of collaborative processes.327
The findings in EIP sub cases suggest a third way of reducing transaction costs. Here, the 
incentives that had induced industry to collaborate were typically sufficient to make them 
shoulder most of the organisational costs of collaboration.328 The implication is that NEG 
experiments may be able to design institutions that target a single well resourced actor or actors 
with harsh default sanctions or significant economic incentives to successfully induce them to 
bear the majority of the costs associated with collaboration.329
The findings also shed some light on the capacity of nested structures to reduce transaction 
costs. Consistent with some authors’claims, the regional nested structure appeared capable of 
mitigating transaction costs by tapping into pre-existing sub regional bodies to divide and 
conquer collaborative tasks at lower levels, while their representatives on the regional body 
were able to interact and receive guidance in a structured way from government advisors.330 
However as the findings revealed, such guidance was often ineffective and uncertain, and 
funding support was often delayed. These problems arose because of government’s desire to 
“get on” with the program, despite failing to fully overcome the resistance of agencies and 
governments to willingly share power.331
These findings provide empirical support for the hypothesis that cooperation at these 
higher levels poses one of the greatest challenges to the effectiveness of nested collaborative 
models and their potential to reduce transaction costs.332 At a more practical level, the 
implication for policy makers is that rather than trying to develop collaboration at multiple 
institutional levels all at once, the success of nested models may depend on proceeding in a 
more staged approach.
The findings also provided insights into the issue of consensus decision rules. According to 
many authors, consensus decision rules are vital to finding new areas of agreement and 
enhancing chances of implementation. In general, the findings in this chapter largely confirmed 
these facts. The findings from EIP and NEIP suggested that their “mixed” form of consensus 
rule had often assisted in improving understanding of and reaching agreement on the nature of
327 John, n 47, p 239.
328 Karkkainen, n 5 at 241.
329 Raymond, n 2 at 48, 53-54; Karkkainen, n 5 at 228; Selin and Chavez, n 32 at 191.
330 Of course, if such sub regional bodies did not already exist, this structure would likely have been less successful 
and instead encountered additional transaction costs; Bonnell and Koontz, n 63 at 161, 163;Margerum, n 7 at 144- 
146.
331 Head, n 14, p 145; Bonnell and Koontz, n 63 at 161, 163; Margerum, n 7 at 144-146; Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 
900-901.
332 As the findings suggested, it was inadequate funding that was one of the major impediments to state’s willingness 
to collaborate with federal governments, and consistent with Freeman and Farber suggestions, significantly more 
funding may be required to generate greater cooperation at these higher levels; Freeman and Farber, n 52 at 901-903; 
Margerum, n 7 at 149-150.
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environmental and resource problem, and had increased the likelihood of implementation.333 
Broadly similar findings appeared to arise from RNRM’s various decision making rules 
orientated toward producing a regional consensus - with the exception that government veto 
may have the potential to undermine ownership and commitment to implementation.
Across all three cases the term consensus admittedly meant many things to many people 
and different forms of “mixed” consensus rules were involved.334 While empirical research has 
shown that some NEG experiments have followed decision rules based on unanimity and 
vetos,335 the findings here resonate more with research in the watershed context336 that point to 
consensus being achieved through substantial agreement, voting or agreement being reached 
among a sub set of stakeholders.337
The findings did reveal that the agreements reached through these different rules were 
often ineffective or went little beyond “business as usual”. However this appeared to arise from 
factors external to the rule itself, and none of the decision rules appeared to directly lead to 
claimed pathologies of lowest common denominator outcomes or “tractability”.338 It may be 
true that some forms of consensus rules (e.g. veto based decision rules in NEG) may give rise to 
such problems, but the findings in this chapter suggest that generalized claims that all consensus 
approaches will lead to these problems, are not empirically defensible.339 Arguably more 
precision may be needed in how the term consensus is used, if NEG scholars are to have 
meaningful debates about the merits of consensus rules.340
The final insight provided by the chapter relate to the role of trust. Many in the NEG341 and 
wider social capital literatures claim or assume that building trust will make it easier for 
stakeholders to cooperate and achieve successful collaboration. The findings in NEIP, RNRM 
and the few EIP sub cases that involved leading industries appeared consistent with these 
claims. However, the findings in the majority of EIP sub cases revealed a more nuanced take on 
the issue of trust. Resonating with a handful of empirical studies in other NEG experiments that 
suggest complex agreements can be reached and successful collaboration achieved in the
333 Margerum, n 11 at 158.
334 Leach W, “Theories About Consensus” (2005) 20(2) Conservation Biology 573 at 574.
335 Wondolleck and Yaffee, n 313, p 105-106; Coglianese, n 7.
336 Leach et al, n 161 at 661.
337 “Substantial” consensus (most prominent in NEIP and EIP) appeared closely aligned to Innes work on consensus 
building processes; Innes, n 82 at 7; Karkkainen, n 5 at 240; O ’Malley and Janetos, n 87 at 574.
338 Coglianese, n 7, p 96, 106, 110; Karkkainen, n 6 at 91.
339 See discussions of this issue in O ’Malley and Janetos, n 87 at 11-12 Leach, n 334 at 574; Karkkainen, n 6 at 91; 
Karkkainen, n 5 at fnl 16; Innes, n 82 at 7.
34<> Leach, n 334 at 574; Karkkainen B, “Panarchy And Adaptive Change: Around The Loop And Back Again“ (2005)
7 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 59 at 73.
341 See for example Stewart J and Jones G Renegotiating the Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 128-129; Fung 
and Wright, n 68, p 15; John, n 47, p 232, 235.
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absence of trust,342 the findings in EIP suggest trust can be largely irrelevant to successful 
collective action.343
Why was trust seen to be important to success of some collaborations but not others? One 
possible explanation is that most EIP sub cases started from a very low base of trust created by 
adversarial relationships involving legal action, complaints to the media, and stubborn industry 
behaviour. Starting from such a low base, stakeholders’ motivation to solve the pressing 
problem may have simply taken precedence over the huge challenges of building trust -  
stakeholders essentially were willing to take a form of “calculated risk” and forge an agreement, 
despite distrust, to try and resolve the problem.344 While mistrust and conflict was readily 
evident in the other cases (including community complaints to government agencies in NEIPs) 
they did not evidence the kind of entrenched anger and adversarial behaviour focused on a 
single industry “culprit” by the “victim” residents and VEPA “police”.
The implication here for the literature is that trust operates differently in different contexts, 
and at least in some, may be largely irrelevant to successful collaboration.345 At present, 
empirical research, including the findings in this study, have presented different explanations 
for this finding, including issues such as the age of collaboration, which did not appear to 
explain the findings here.346 While these findings suggest a more nuanced theory of trust and 
collaboration warrants attention, further research is clearly needed to determine when trust is a 
relevant factor. 347 Depending on the conclusions drawn, the implication for policy makers may 
be that in many situations NEG experiments may be able to spend less time and energy seeking 
to build trust between parties and instead focus more on designing incentives and institutional 
mechanisms that make cooperation and reaching agreement the rational choice for otherwise 
adversarial and disorganized stakeholders.348
To conclude, the findings in this chapter highlight the realities of collaboration in NEG 
institutions.349 This chapter has suggested a host of conditions under which successful 
collaboration in NEG appears more likely to emerge and accordingly contribute to “good”
342 Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and Matlock M, “Conclusions and Recommendations” 
in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: 
Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 275; Raymond, n 2; Leach and 
Sabatier, n 76, chapter 8.
343 Raymond, n 2 at 37,40-41, 50, 54; Cook, K, Hardin R, and Levi M. Cooperation Without Trust? (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2005).
344 Leach and Sabatier, n 76, p 249.
345 Lubell et al, n 342, p 277.
346 Leach and Sabatier, n 76.
347 Lubell et al, n 342, p 277.
348 Raymond, n 2 at 54.
349 Bonnell and Koontz, n 63 at 164.
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NEG.350 As suggested above, adhering to the conditions does not assure success, but the analysis 
suggests it will improve the likelihood of effective organisations being developed.351 
Necessarily, these conclusions are tentative and further research is necessary to investigate a 
broader range of variables and confirm the extent to which the findings described above have a 
wider application.352
Understanding the conditions that support the emergence of these collaborative 
institutions, however, is just an initial step in the process of analysing collaboration in NEG.353 
For collaboration to fulfill its role as a feature of “good” NEG, groups must have the capacity to 
monitor and adjust their progress, implement actions and continue to hold the group together to 
operate effectively. These are issues taken up in chapter 7 and 8. For now, the next chapter turns 
to a closely related but distinct feature of “good” NEG - participatory and deliberative 
aspirations- to take a more detailed look at precisely which non government actors participated 
and were represented in these programs and the opportunities they had to meaningfully engage 
and input into deliberative decision making.
350 Similar findings have been made in watershed context in Samuelson C, Vedlitz A, Whitten G, Matlock M, Alston 
L Peterson T and Gilbertz S, “Citizen participation and Representation in Collaborative Engagement Processes” in P 
Sabatier, W Focht, M Lubell, Z Trachtenberg, A Vedlitz and M Matlock (eds) (2005) Swimming Upstream: 
Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 166.
351 Margerum, n 11 at 164.
352 Raymond, n 2 at 54.
353 Heikkila and Gerlak, n 5 at 606-607.
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Chapter 6: Participatory and Deliberative 
Aspirations
The Challenges Confronting High Ideals 
6.1 Introduction
Having gleaned some empirical insights into the conditions under which NEG can achieve 
the emergence of successful collaboration in chapter 5, this chapter turns to the second of the 
defining features of “good” NEG, namely participation and deliberation.
Although NEG aspires to a more participatory and deliberative approach to governance, 
there are many seriously under-researched questions and gaps in the literature. For example: 
who participates in NEG?1 If there are gaps in representation why is this so?2 How much 
opportunity do citizens and/or other non-governmental stakeholders have to contribute in 
meaningful ways to decisions?3 What are the forms, sources and impacts of countervailing 
powers in the distinctive structure and politics of NEG?4
This chapter provides insights into these issues through an examination of the three case 
studies. Its investigation is guided by the third of the 5 sub-research questions: what conditions 
foster meaningful participation and deliberation in NEG?
Following this introduction, the analysis proceeds in three sections. Mindful that there is 
often extensive variation in the extent and nature of participation and deliberation in various 
NEG initiatives, section 6.2 takes a close look at these issues for each case study. The 
discussion begins by exploring for each program exactly which non-government actors are to be 
included and/or represented to fulfil the cases’ respective participatory aspirations. The features 
of the cases’ legislative and policy framework that may impact on participation are also 
evaluated. The section continues by describing the nature of deliberative process prescribed by
1 Collaborative Democracy Network, “A Call to Scholars and Teachers of Public Administration, Public Policy, 
Planning, Political Science and Related Fields” (2006) December, Public Administration Review 168 at 169; 
Karkkainen B, ‘Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso 2003) p 222-223.
2 Leach W, “Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western Watershed Partnerships” 
(2006) December Public Administration Review 100 at 108.
3 Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 239; Collaborative Democracy Network, n 18 at 169; Karkkainen, n 1, p 222-223.
4 The term countervailing power is used to describe a variety o f mechanisms (such as public interest groups) that 
reduce, and perhaps even neutralize, the power advantages of ordinarily powerful actors; Fung A and Wright E, 
“Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 260, 286; Shane P, 
“Review Essay Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic 
Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy Reviewing Archon Fung And Erik Olin Wright, Eds.,
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations In Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003)” (2005) 1(1) 
I/S: A Journal Of Law And Policy 147 at 154-155.
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each program and considers how the design of each case may counter potential problems such 
as power imbalances between parties.
Section 6.3 then turns to evaluate the successes and limitations of the three NEG cases in 
meeting these objectives in practice. It commences by taking a snapshot of representative 
patterns across the cases5 to investigate when, whether and how inclusive and representative 
participation was achieved. The findings resonate with strands of the NEG literature that raise 
doubts as to whether “open door” participation, government support and prescribed membership 
requirements can successfully secure meaningful participation in the face of the demands of 
volunteerism and the relative stakes actors have in participating. These findings, and a range of 
other empirical insights relating to the representation of “ordinary citizens” lead the chapter to 
suggest some modifications to the conditions for achieving inclusive and representative 
institutions. The findings also point to the potential limits of local environmental interest groups 
as countervailing powers and suggest that continuing imbalances in knowledge and power will 
often enable government agencies and industries to skew decision-making toward their own 
agendas. The chapter concludes in section 6.4 by summarising these and other implications of 
my findings.
Before commencing the analysis, a few words about the focus of this chapter are 
necessary. There is some overlap between the issues discussed here and the previous 
examination of collaboration in chapter 5. Nonetheless, what separates the two chapters is the 
questions they emphasise.6 The previous chapter examined the case studies and provided 
insights into what made collaborations successful in coming together to formulate a plan. In 
contrast, this chapter looks at the case studies through a different set of lenses to focus on and 
examine moral and democratic issues such as “fair decision making”, inclusiveness and 
“representativeness”.7
6.2 What kinds of “participation” and “deliberation” do 
the cases pursue?
As we saw in chapter 4, the EIP, NEIP and RNRM programs all share broad participatory 
and deliberative aspirations to deepen the ways in which non governmental actors influence the 
environmental problems and policies that affect their lives.8 However, as with many NEG
5 See chapter 3 for the precise period of research and investigation into each case study.
6 Trachtenberg Z and Focht W, “Legitimacy and Watershed Collaborations: The Role of Public Participation” in 
Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative 
Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) p 53.
7 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 6, p 53.
8 Fung A and Wright E, ‘Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), 
Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 5.
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initiatives, fulfilling these aspirations involve the cases imposing procedural criteria9 that 
require non-government participation to be inclusive and representative, and for decision 
making to adhere to conditions laid out by deliberative ideals.
There are both similarities and variations in the specific nature of these criteria across NEG 
experiments,10 and the case studies are no exception. This section accordingly clarifies the 
procedural criteria of inclusiveness, representation, and decision-making applied in the cases. 
By doing so it provides the necessary background for the empirical investigation of whether 
“meaningful” participation and deliberation was or was not achieved in the 3 case studies. In 
addition, this section evaluates the relevant features of the cases’ legal framework in order to 
facilitate an examination of the institutional conditions that impacted on the attainment of the 
participatory and deliberative aspirations in practice.
6.2.1 Participation - inclusiveness and representation
6.2.1.11nclusiveness
The criterion of inclusiveness relates to the issue of who is eligible to participate" and like 
most NEG approaches, all three cases define this to be all non-governmental actors who are 
“affected” .12 Of course this begs the question: who is “affected”? Akin to NEG theories that 
emphasise loca l13 and/or place based14 approaches, all three cases prim arily define the 
“affected” actors in terms of general or specific geographic demos (eg. local community in 
EIP;15 a neighbourhood in NEIP; regional community in RNRM). However, none of the three 
cases expressly exclude the possibility of “affected participants” being defined so as to extend 
to those who live outside the geographic demos.16 For example, as detailed in Table 6.1 below, 
the cases note that participants may include “people who may have an interest or be potentially 
affected” such as NGOs (EIP), those who may “work and play” in the neighbourhood (NEIP) or 
“relevant stakeholders” (RNRM).
9 While the procedural requirements discussed here are far from the only structural representation available, it has the 
considerable virtue of highlighting a central concern in the NEG literature while facilitating discussion of case- 
specific arrangements.
10 Moore S, “Regional Delivery of Natural Resource Management in Australia: Is it Democratic and Does it Matter?” 
in Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 127.
11 Fung A, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance” (2006) December Public Administration Review 66 
at 67.
12 See for example: Cohen J and Sabel C, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3 Euro L J 313 at 332-333; Fung 
and Wright, n 8, p i5, 16, 18; Karkkainen B, “Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance” (2004) 4(1) Global 
Environmental Politics 72 at 75; Karkkainen, n 3 at 218-219; Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance In The 
Administrative State” 45 (1997) UCLA Law Review 1 at 22; Leach, n 2 at 101.
13 Fung and Wright, n 8, p 16, 18.
14 Cannon J, “Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management”, (2000) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev 
379.
15 While the EIP case does not set a formal geographic boundary like the other two cases, the guidelines contain an 
emphasis on the local “affected” community surrounding the industry.
16 See for example Moore, n 10, p 127-128.
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The cases have been designed to place few restrictions on which of these “affected” non­
government actors can be included as participants. While RNRM cases do impose a skills 
requirement17 on participants that may restrict which “affected” actors are included (discussed 
further below), for the most part the cases aim for openness and equality in participation. For 
example, as Table 6.1 illustrates below, the EIP program is to involve forums for selecting 
participants that are “open”; the NEIP process is to remain “open to all parts of the community”; 
and the RNRM program is to use a system of selecting participants that is “transparent, open to 
all who wish to nominate and to be impartial”. This openness appears generally consistent with 
many NEG theories,18 and ideally would allow participants from any affected group or person, 
including the socially disadvantaged, and “ordinary citizens”.19 Indeed the cases’ aspirations for 
“community empowerment” discussed in chapter 4 suggest that mobilising “average” citizens is 
vital to meaningful participation. Moreover, the openness of the cases expressly seeks to include 
affected green and conservation interests,20 which may not only provide a voice for future 
generations and nature, but could potentially act as a form of countervailing power.21 In doing 
so, they may reduce, and perhaps even neutralize, the power-advantages of ordinarily powerful 
actors such as industry and thus yield the benefits of democratic governance.22
6.2.1.2 Representativeness
The second procedural criterion - “representativeness” - intersects with the first and is
employed in the cases to try and overcome the fact that differences in power and capacity will
23often mean that not everyone who is affected may or can participate.
Although some NEG scholars emphasise the importance of ensuring that represented 
interests are “precisely” balanced (such as in proportion to their numbers in the population)24 
this does not appear to be the central focus in these cases. It is at best unclear from the case 
study data precisely how this balance is to be struck. It is also unclear what proportion of 
representatives are aimed for across the three cases, which are either silent on representative 
numbers (NEIP), provide vague statements such as “majority community” representation
17 Moore, n 10, p 130.
18 See for example: John D “Civic Environmentalism” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O’Leary R (eds), Environmental 
Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 232; Karkkainen n 12 at 75; Freeman, n 12.
19 As note in Table 6.1 below these would include “Residents” in EIPs, “individuals and householders” in NEIP and 
“community” representation in RNRM; John, n 18, p 232.
20 As demonstrated in Table 6.1, this can be seen in statements such as “representatives of interest groups and NGO 
representatives” (EIP), “local green groups...green peak bodies” (NEIP) and “balancing production and conservation 
interests” (RNRM).
21 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 266.
22 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 260; Shane, n 4 at 154.
23 Parkinson J, Deliberating in the Real World (Oxford UP, 2006) p 23.
24 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 6, p 59.
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(RNRM) or detail guiding numbers but suggest the group remain open to any number of 
representatives (EIP) (see Table 6.1).
Even so the design of the cases appears to aspire to some form of descriptive
representation - non-government representatives ideally reflecting divisions, perspectives and
25interests of those who are affected. This is evidenced in requirements for representation to 
“reflect the demographic”, include the “range of different community interests and 
perspectives” (EIP), “capture and represent the views”, a “cross section of the community”, 
(NEIP) and “majority community membership”, “balance” in conservation and production 
interests and “relevant” stakeholders (RNRM). Such statements appear to suggest an intention 
for at least some rough “balance” in numbers, perspectives and divisions of affected interests in 
these areas (the exception being the need for majority “community” membership in RNRM).
As well as this ambiguity regarding the precise “balance” of descriptive representation,
there is also some uncertainty as to the cases’ aims with respect to representation in principal-
26agent representation. Certainly this form of representation does not appear to be central to any 
of the programs, with none emphasising any formal mechanism (such as elections) for creating 
an accountable relationship between participants and stakeholders from the demos.
Nevertheless, the cases may aim for some degree of informal relationship with participants
27maintaining active communication with those they “represent” (eg. interest group
28representative and members of the group; “ordinary people” and their demos). As illustrated 
in Table 6.1, this is implied in the use of the terms “representatives o f ’, “attend on behalf’ 
(EIP), “representatives from” “represent the views” (NEIP), “representing the” and 
“representation by” (RNRM).
This ambiguity regarding representativeness in the three cases may in part relate to the fact 
that obtaining “true” representation is a very lofty ideal, and perhaps the cases’ participatory
objective is best seen as just that -  an ambitious target (rather than a rigid one) which
29participants will come as close to as possible, but will never reach.
6.2.1.3 Achieve inclusive and representative ideals - impact of 
legislative design
25 Parkinson, n 23, p 30.
26 Parkinson, n 23, p 30.
27 See for example Trachtenberg and Focht, n 6, p 59; Cohen J and Fung A, “Radical Democracy” (2004) 10(4) Swiss 
Journal of Political Science 23 at 30; John, n 18, p 231-232, 236.
28 Parkinson, n 23.
29 Indeed, the EIP seems to admit as much, noting that “a truly representative group is not possible” VEPA, 
Environment Improvement Plans -  An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 3.
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To achieve these inclusion and representation criteria, each case has been designed to
• • 30depend heavily on processes where participants voluntarily self-select to participate.
Such an approach is broadly consistent with many NEG experiments31 (see chapter 2). 
However doubts persist in the literature about whether this approach can achieve inclusiveness 
or relevant representativeness. This is primarily because, like processes of voluntary 
collaboration (see Chapter 5), exactly who volunteers to participate can be influenced or skewed 
by time and costs of participating and preconditions such as how severe the environmental 
problem is and the stake actors may have in it.32
Time and costs of participating may be a particularly significant barrier to achieving 
inclusive and appropriately representative participation for the three cases studies because they 
all place extremely heavy reliance on the skills and resources of those who will volunteer. For 
example, all three cases expect volunteers to attend regular collaborative meetings, as well as 
develop and negotiate complex plans and documents, followed by ongoing monitoring and 
implementation. The demands in NEIP and RNRM appear particularly taxing as volunteers in 
both cases are expected to contribute to wider consultation with their neighbourhood and 
regional communities33 as well as contribute to drafting two complex planning documents34 (as 
opposed to the EIP which only requires one plan to be developed).35
3,1 For NEIPs, participants must volunteer to commence a NEIP and initial organisers must ensure processes are open 
to all. The EIP similarly relies on individuals to volunteer on the back of their own interests and suggests industry 
organiser should be open to new participants who wish to volunteer. RNRM requires representatives to self nominate 
via a processes that is “transparent, open to all who wish to nominate, impartial and conducted in a way which has 
broad community support and confidence”; VEPA, Guidelines for the Preparation o f Environment Improvement 
Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002), p 10; VEPA, Guidelines for Running Community Liaison Committees 
(Publication 740,VEPA, 2001) p 4; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, (Cth, Qld), Attachment D “Key considerations 
underpinning the designation of regional bodies” p 56 (hereafter “Bilateral Agreement NHT”).
31 Fung A, “Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight institutional design choices and their consequences” 
(2003) 11(3) Journal of Political Philosophy 338 at 342.
32 For example, as some NEG scholars argue, participation by “average” citizens as opposed to already active groups 
or associations is far more likely where ordinary citizens have a high “stake” in a environmental issue and/or the costs 
and demands of participating are minimal; Abers R, “Reflections On What Makes Empowered Participatory 
Governance Happen” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) at 207; Fung, n 31 at 
342.
33 In NEIPs, collaborative groups are to conduct a process of community consultation, ensuring there is ample 
opportunity for participation; VEPA, Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans -  Developing a Voluntary 
Proposal (Publication 846, VEPA, 2002) p 4- 6. In the RNRM program the body is to consult with Local 
governments; State and Commonwealth agencies; Indigenous communities; key industry, environmental and 
community development groups; relevant natural resource management community groups; and the relevant 
academic/scientific community (Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, Attachment F, p 74-75).
34 NEIPs impose requirements for both the development of a proposal and a plan, that must meet a number of 
requirements including: the community and sponsor drawing a “neighbourhood boundary” around an issue; 
identifying where the problems are, and what the possible solutions may be; engaging and obtaining formal sign-on 
of so called NEIP “partners”, such as business and community groups, and government agencies; establishing a 
steering committee made-up o f key partners; and determining a “vision” for it; determining how the vision may be 
achieved through the efforts of the whole community; identifying the financial or other resources needed to fund the 
development of the NEIP plan; identifying the likely nature of involvement and resource commitments to be made by 
the partners; detailing the proposed process for developing the plan; and ensuring that the process is open to all parts 
of the community. The RNRM case imposes requirements for the regional body to develop a plan and a Regional 
Investment Strategy. The plan must cover the full range of NRM issues; be underpinned by scientific analysis o f  
natural resource conditions, problems and priorities; have effective involvement o f all key stakeholders in plan
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Unlike EIP and NEIP cases, the RNRM case also makes the capacity of participants to 
fulfil program requirements a relevant consideration in whether they can be represented. This 
arises through a state government power to “designate” a regional body as suitable for the 
RNRM program, which essentially gives it the capacity to appoint representatives, albeit in 
consultation with the regional community.36 While RNRM does not specify any specific skill 
required of a representatives per se, it does suggest representation selections should not 
compromise merit, and that the representatives as a whole must have the capacities and skills to 
meet the regional program requirements (ie. advance the overarching objectives of the program 
and fulfil the accountability responsibilities).37
These skill and time demands in RNRM, as well as those of the other cases, may of course 
be reduced via (i) sharing tasks among the collaborators; (ii) government assistance such as 
technical information; (iii) government funding for the regional body and small rebates to 
participants to cover travel costs in RNRM;38 or (iv) the short term seed funding provided 
during plan development in NEIP (see Chapter 5).39
However in the event that such support is insufficient to adequately offset the time and 
resource burdens of the cases, the three programs have been designed to establish a range of 
“procedural check” conditions to try and resolve potential representation deficits that may 
consequently arise. Akin to recommendations in NEG literature,40 both the EIP41 and NEIP42
development and implementation; focus on addressing the underlying causes rather than symptoms of problems; 
include strategies to implement agreed NRM policies to protect the natural resource; demonstrate consistency with 
other planning processes and legislative requirements applicable to the region; set targets at the regional scale; 
identify strategic, prioritised and achievable actions to address the range of NRM issues and achieve the regional 
targets: this includes an evaluation of the wider social, economic and environmental impacts of such actions, and of 
any actions needed to address such impacts; and provide for continuous development, monitoring, review and 
improvement of the plan. If the plan is accredited a Regional Investment Strategy must also be developed by the 
Regional Body, in consultation with government, community and key stakeholders; VEPA, n 33, p 4- 6; Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(3); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30 s 87, Attachment E, p 59-60.
35 In the EIP program, the plan must include a number of minimum processes, namely: undertakings to comply or go 
beyond compliance with licences and regulations; emission and waste production standards; monitoring of 
compliance; audits and assessments; improvement project details including what needs to be done, how it will be 
done and by when; provision for upgrading of plant; assessment of new and emerging technology; emergency and 
contingency plans; enhanced response to community complaints; community relations, health and safety issues; and 
community reporting requirements on progress; VEPA, n 29 at 2; VEPA, Guidelines for Running Community Liaison 
Committees (Publication 740,VEPA, 2001) p 5.
36 An Agreement between the Commonwealth o f Australia and the State o f  Queensland fo r the Implementation o f the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, March 2001 (Cth and Qld), 
ss 7 .1(f),(g); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, ss 67, 68(b), 71, Attachment D p 56 (hereafter Bilateral Agreement 
NAP); Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in 
Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 145.
37 Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36 See also Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 7.1(f) (g); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 
30, ss 67, 68(b), 71, Attachment D p 56.
38 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 95; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 9, 24.
39 VEPA, n 29, p 1, 3, 5; VEPA, Guidelines for the Preparation o f Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, 
VEPA, 2002) p 10; VEPA, n 33, p 9; Bilateral Agreement NHT, s 101.
40 See for example: Karkkainen, n 3 at 236-237, Cohen and Sabel, n 12 at 332-334.
41 In EIPs, the guidelines suggest industry should ensure “membership always reflects the range of different 
community interests and perspectives”; VEPA, n 35, p 6; VEPA, n 29, p 3.
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programs’ have been designed to impose procedural requirements on key organisers of the 
collaborative group that require them to seek out representatives (eg. publicly advertising 
meetings). Both cases also rely on VEPA officers to enforce these requirements43 and, 
consistent with Freeman and other NEG authors’ recommendations,44 directly assist the group 
to ensure representativeness (eg. contact parties directly to see if they would be interested in 
volunteering).45
Similar to EIP or NEIPs, the RNRM approach also relies on government oversight,46 and 
akin to the precepts of some democratic experimentalists,47 makes funding for the collaborative
4 0
group activities conditional on the group meeting its representation requirements.
As outlined in chapter 2, a range of doubts remain regarding whether these types of 
“procedural check” conditions applied across the cases are sufficiently sound to secure 
representativeness,49 and I return to consider these issues in section 6.3 below.
6.2.2 Deliberative decision making
6.2.2.1 Negotiation processes
In addition to criteria of inclusiveness and representativeness of participation, criteria of 
decision-making are also relevant. Like many NEG processes, all three cases involve ongoing 
processes of decision-making (some taking months or years just to develop a plan, before many 
subsequent years of adaptive implementation). As such, the deliberative criteria of the cases are 
taken to be an overarching goal for the many decision-making processes that occur throughout 
their operation.
Both the EIP and NEIP cases’ design emphasise processes of “negotiation”, “mediation” 
and similar forms of deliberative and cooperative and consensus based decision-making (see
42 Initial NEIP organisers are required to ensure the NEIP includes “groups, businesses or people contributing to the 
environmental problems...as well as those concerned about it and with the responsibility to act on” ;VEPA, n 33, p 5, 
9.
43 The VEPA agency has responsibility for endorsing and approving the respective plans developed by the 
collaborative groups. This role and power effectively give the VEPA both an ongoing opportunity, and a final check 
on whether these procedural arrangements are followed and met; VEPA, A Guideline for Submitting a Voluntary 
Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan Proposal (Publication 847, VEPA, 2002), p 5-6; Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(1); VEPA, n 39, p 2.
44 Freeman, n 12 at 31-32; Moore, n 10, p 129; Moore S and Rockloff S, “Organizing Regionally for Natural 
Resource Management in Australia: Reflections on Agency and Government” (2006) 8(3) Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning 259; Leach, n 2 at 101-102.
45 VEPA, n 43 p 3; VEPA, n 29, p 3.
46 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 68(b), (c); Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 7.1(b).
47 Cohen and Sabel, n 12 at 332-334.
48 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, Attachment D p 56.
49 Steinzor R, “The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10909 page 22 of 
“p df’; Farber D, “Models of Reinvention” (1999) October/November Boston Review 24 at 24.
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Table 6.2).50 In the RNRM case, the fact that regional bodies are required to be incorporated51 
means their decision-making will often be governed by their own constitution. This is likely to 
involve some form of discussion and deliberation over issues, underpinned by agreement 
through voting. Even so, the RNRM program emphasises broadly cooperative decision making, 
particularly during consultation processes to develop the plan, that will involve “facilitated 
negotiation” and “negotiations with community, industry, private sector and philanthropic 
organisations” (see Table 6.2).52
The specific procedures and criteria of these deliberative processes in the cases are not 
spelled out in the legislation or guidelines. However the general intentions of the cases to 
“empower communities”53 and references in the guidelines that emphasise clear communication 
without jargon, shared decisions and fairness (see table 6.2) appear to suggest that the cases 
share with NEG theories an aim to avoid adversarial, zero sum strategic negotiation and foster a 
process that allows government and non governmental stakeholders to give their free (i.e.. non 
coerced) and informed consent to some form of feasible agreement(s), typically through sharing 
information, and conducting fair and reasoned debate as “rough equals”.54
6.2.2.2 Achieve fair and reasoned negotiation - legislative design
While the cases may aspire to these deliberative ideals, a major challenge and criticism of 
such processes is that they will be undermined by the reality of power and capacity imbalances 
among decision makers (see chapter 2).55
The designs of the cases were clearly alert to such issues. Indeed, to level power 
imbalances created by differences in technical knowledge and skills,56 the frameworks establish 
government support (office assistance57 and in RNRM government funding58) to assist non­
50 VEPA, n 29 p 4 (“negotiations with residents”, “Decision-making is a particularly important aspect to consider. 
Ideally this should be by consensus”); VEPA, n 33, p 5 (“facilitation and mediation” may be required);
50 VEPA, n 35, p 4-6.
51 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 68; Bilateral Agreement, n 36, s 7.1.
52 In addition, the RNRM case refers to decision making and discussions during plan development as involving 
“effective participation by all key stakeholders” guided by principles of “fairness [and] equity of opportunity for 
involvement”; Cth and Qld, Guidelines for community engagement by RNRM bodies (Cth/Qld, 2004) p 4-6; See 
Table 6.2 below.
53 In addition the general intention of all three cases to achieve “consensus” (EIP and NEIP) and “cooperative 
partnerships” (RNRM) suggests that government will ideally engage in meaningful negotiation with non-government 
actors. For further see Table 6.1 below.
54 Trachtenberg and Focht, n 6, p 60-64; Fung and Wright, n 8, p 23-24.
55 Sturm S, “Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture o f Learning” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds) Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 331.
16 See for example: Freeman, n 12 at 32 (“In order to prevent well-resourced groups from dominating deliberative 
processes, the agency may provide technical assistance grants or other needed support to consumer or community 
groups”).
17 VEPA, n 29, p 5; VEPA, n 33, p 9; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, slOl.
58 This takes the form o f foundation funding. See: Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 95, Bilateral Agreement NAP, n
36, s 24.2.
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governmental representatives to gain scientific, legal or other technical information. The role of 
government officer support is particularly emphasised in EIP program where VEPA officers 
may act as independent brokers to support the local residents negotiating with the better 
resourced and knowledgeable industry representatives.59 The EIP framework also contains other 
“power balancing” features recognised in the NEG literature, including harsh “default” style 
sanctions invoking the VEPA’s legal power and community pressure that may pressure industry 
to negotiate genuinely and reveal information (see the discussion in Chapter 5).60 Whether these 
conditions are sufficient to prevent industry advancing collective decisions that unreasonably 
favour their interests is investigated in detail below.
In addition to the above, the design of the three cases raises questions61 about the potential 
for government actors to unreasonably dominate decision making.62 To some extent these have 
been recognised and addressed. For example, VEPA officers and government officers of the 
RNRM Regional Coordination Group are entrusted to assist, but not unfairly use their 
knowledge of technical or regulatory issues to dominate non government actors in 
negotiations.63 Nevertheless there are many ways in which government actors might dominate 
or unduly influence the decision-making process. For example, the VEPA and RNRM Joint 
Steering Committee in the cases have formal “vetos” over plans (and in RNRM directly 
controlled not only how regional boundaries were established but also subsequent funding).64 
While these powers may be vital for issues such as accountability, they may also operate to give 
a number of government actors an opportunity to exercise both direct or indirect control over 
key decision making stages. In addition, the requirement in NEIPs for a governmental body to 
“sponsor” NEIP,65 and the fact that they typically receive “seed” funding designed to assist the 
group in the early stages of operation (see Chapter 5), also places the “sponsor” in a privileged 
position from which they potentially could dominate non governmental actors.66
59 VEPA, n 29 p 5; VEPA, n 35, p 4.
60 Fung and Wright, n 8, p 23.
61 Head, n 36, p 148 -149; Head B “Letting the Locals Lead” (2004) 112 Ecos 30 at 31; Lawrence G and Cheshire L, 
“Managing Nature: The Promises and Problems of Regional Environmental Governance in Australia” Plenary 
Address at the Ecopolitics XV Conference Environmental Governance: Transforming Regions and Localities, 
Macquarie University, Sydney 12-14, November 2004, p 7.
62 Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 240; Fung and Wright, n 8, p 34.
63VEPA, n 39, p 11; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH(2), 19AI(2); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 
80-81, 89; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, ss 7 ,12.
64 Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), ss 19AH(2), 19AI(2); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 69, 71, 80-81, 89; 
Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 7, 12; Karkkainen, n 62 at 240.
651 note that such sponsor may however aid community members in the NEIP process by providing added technical 
expertise and resources; VEPA, n 33.
66 John, n 18, p 239.
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Whether the sponsor and other key government officials use such opportunities to advance 
their agencies interests and outcomes, and/or substitute their decision for the group, are 
examined in full in the next section that explores the experience of the cases in practice.67
6.2.3 Summary
In summary, this section has explored the relevant procedural criteria of the cases designed 
to contribute to the achievement of their participatory and deliberative aspirations. As we have 
seen, all cases aspire to participation that is open, equal, involves a degree of principal agent 
representation and strikes a rough balance between affected non government actors that come 
primarily from inside (but also outside) a geographically defined demo. Furthermore, all three 
cases appear likely to embrace deliberative criteria for decision making that pursues fair and 
reasoned debate among “rough equals” to reach some form of feasible agreement.68 As pointed 
out, these criteria share a number of commonalities with those identified elsewhere in the NEG 
literature.
Despite pursuing these various aspirations, there are many questions about whether all 
elements of the legal framework can be expected to further the criteria of inclusiveness, 
representation, and deliberation. Among other things, the heavy time and resource demands 
imposed by the cases and the privileging of government actors appear likely to create tensions 
with these objectives and their successful implementation. How these tensions play out in 
practice is considered in the next section, which turns to discuss the findings and commences 
with the issue of participation.
67 Steinzor, n 49 at fn 41, page 9 of “p df’; Defilippis J, Fisher R and Shragge E, “Neither Romance Nor Regulation: 
Reevaluating Community” (2006) 30(3) International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 673 at 684; Abers R, n 
32, p 200-201.
68 Fung and Wright, n 8, p 23.
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E IP
EIP group should include  
the “affected community”, 
in the “local area”.
Group numbers are flexible 
but workable sizes include:
5 to 6 “community”; 2 to 3 
industry; 2 government 
(local/S tate); and 2 to 3 
“other interested groups”. 
Forums should be “open”, 
and industry “welcom es 
approaches by the 
community”.
D escrip tive  represen tation  
should:
o “ideally reflect the 
demographic o f the 
community” including 
“as much resident 
participation as 
possible”, 
o include “different
community interests and 
perspectives” including 
“community interest 
groups” and “NGOs”.69 
1 P rincipa l agen t 
represen ta tion : 
o “some residents will 
attend on behalf of 
others” and “report back”, 
o “representatives o f
interest groups and NGO 
representatives”.
N E IP
NEIP group will include “the 
people who live, work and 
play” in neighbourhood and 
“those groups, businesses or 
people contributing to the 
environmental problems in 
your neighbourhood as well as 
those concerned about it and 
with the responsibility to act 
on it”. 70
Group numbers flexible, and 
should remain “open to all 
parts o f the community”. 
D escrip tive  represen tation  in 
the group should: 
o “capture and represent the 
views o f the community”, 
o involve the participation 
of a broad range o f people 
in the neighbourhood, 
including “individuals 
and households, industry 
and business
organisations, local green 
groups, state and local 
government agencies, 
green peak bodies, 
professional associations, 
and financial institutions. 
P rin cipa l agen t represen tation  
should involve “representation 
from a cross [section] of the 
community”.71
R N R M
RNRM group should include 
“community membership” 
from the prescribed region 
and “relevant stakeholders”. 
The process of representation 
should be “transparent, open 
to all who wish to nominate, 
impartial”.
D escrip tive  represen ta tion  in 
the group should: 
o include “a majority
community membership, 
balancing production 
and conservation 
interests”, and “relevant 
stakeholders” including 
at minimum “Indigenous 
interests, and local 
government, without 
compromising merit”, 
o as a group, have the 
adequate skills and 
capacity to “advance the 
overarching 
objectives...and fulfil 
the accountability 
responsibilities”72and 
“facilitate the 
development of a draft 
NRM plan that meets 
the agreed accreditation 
criteria”.
P rincipal A gent 
representation  in the group 
should include 
“representation by relevant 
stakeholders”.
Table 6.1: Illustrative Quotes from Guidelines Regarding Criteria of Inclusiveness
and Representation.
69 VEPA, n 35, p 1-3, 4, 6; VEPA, n 29 p 3-4; VEPA Publication 739 “ Guidelines for the preparation of an 
environment improvement plan” June 2002 at 10
70 VEPA, n 33, p 5, 8, 9.
71 VEPA, n 20, p 8. Although the quote from the second reading speech above suggests “community” includes 
“residents, industry and local government”, at other times “community” is juxtaposed with “industry and local 
government”. See for example VEPA, Annual Report 2003-2004 Community and Environment Report (Publication 
962, VEPA, 2004) p 10.
72 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 67, 68(b), Attachment D p 56; Clause 16 IANAP; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 
36, s 7.1 (b) and (f); http://www.nrm.gov.au/about-regions/index.html; Cwth and Qld Government, Guidelines for  
Community Engagement by RNRM bodies ( 2004) at 3.
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E IP N E IP R N R M
• Clear and comprehensive 
information sharing, 
particularly from industry, 
who will ideally be “open 
and honest” and “work to 
make technical information 
more easily understood” so 
that community and EPA 
can make fully informed 
decisions.
• Decision making through 
“negotiation” and 
“consensus” or some other 
agreed “decision making 
procedure” regarding both 
procedural (eg. who will 
chair meetings, who will 
take minutes, where 
meetings will be held, 
dealing with disputes etc) 
and substantive issues (eg. 
objectives and targets, 
defining the order of 
proceedings).73
• Discussion (including in 
proposal and plan 
consultation processes) that 
makes decisions through 
“negotiation”, “mediation” 
and “consensus” on both 
substantive and procedural 
issues (eg. achieving 
“shared aims and 
objectives” shared vision 
and issues definition, and 
determining places to meet, 
group facilitation etc).
• Conducting “full 
community consultation and 
engagement” in proposal 
and plan development, 
ideally gaining “an accurate 
representation of the needs, 
aspirations and values of the 
diverse people and groups 
in the neighbourhood”, 
ensuring “a full public 
process to develop a shared 
vision and scope”, thus 
“confirm[ing] community 
wishes”. 74
• Decision making in 
incorporated regional bodies 
governed by their 
constitution, but the aim is 
to achieve “cooperative 
partnerships between 
communities, industry and 
all levels of government”.
• Discussion (including in 
plan consultation processes) 
that makes substantive and 
procedural decisions 
through “negotiation”, 
“facilitation”, “resolving 
conflict”, including 
“effective participation by 
all key stakeholders” where 
the “general public and 
stakeholders [are] provided 
with adequate opportunities 
to participate in defining the 
problems, setting the 
region’s vision and 
targets... developing 
solutions”.
• Communication and 
consultation with the 
community guided by 
principles of “fairness, 
equity of opportunity for 
involvement, inclusiveness, 
cultural sensitivity, 
relevance, and early and 
ongoing involvement in the 
whole planning and
75implementation cycle”.
Table 6.2: Illustrative Quotes from Guidelines Regarding Deliberative Criteria.
73 VEPA, n 35, p 4-5; VEPA, n 29 p 3-4; VEPA, Ten steps to successful community/industry consultation 
(Publication 520, VEPA, 1996) pp 1-2.
74 VEPA, n 33, p 4-6, 9; VEPA, p n 43, p 6 ; Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) sl9AI(3)(d).
75 NNRMTF (National Natural Resource Management Taskforce) (1999) Managing Natural Resources in Australia 
for a Sustainable Future, (DAFF, Canberra) p 27; Cwth and Qld Government, Guidelines fo r  Community 
Engagement by RNRM bodies (2004) at 2, 4-5; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 83, Attachment E, p59-60, 62, p 
121. Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 12.5, Attachment 3, sl2 . See also Commonwealth Government (2004) 
NHT&NAPSWQ at 7 available at http://www.deh.gov.au/discussion-groups/ausrivas/doc00005.doc accessed on 20 
August 2004; Council of Australian Governments (COAG), A National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality, 
(COAG, 3 November 2000) plO.
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6.3 Participation and Deliberation in Practice -  EIP, 
NEIP and RNRM
6.3.1 Participation -  include and represent all affected interests
This section investigates the degree to which the cases achieved their overarching aim of 
including and representing all affected interests of non governmental actors. More specifically, 
this involves considering whether the cases were able to achieve a requisite degree of equality, 
roughly balanced interests and perspectives, as well as some degree of informal principal agent 
relationships.76
This analysis proceeds in three parts. The first provides a context as to the nature of the 
actual non-government representation across the cases, and the patterns of representation in a 
descriptive sense. The second, examines when or how these patterns arose. Finally, the issue of 
representation in a principal agent sense is considered, along with a discussion of a sub case that 
bucked wider trends in representation patterns.
6.3.1.1 Representation patterns across the cases -  inclusion, 
equality and rough balance of interests?
The findings across the cases revealed that non government actors and stakeholders were 
collectively the largest group of participants in the programs (see Figures 6.1 to 6.6 in Appendix
2 that provide an overview of representatives in each of the cases, and the actual numbers for 
each sub case respectively). It is somewhat unsurprising then that respondents from all three 
cases reported that with one exception,77 represented non government interests had gone a long 
way towards including a variety of relevant perspectives and knowledge to advance a goal of 
problem solving. Nevertheless, many respondents’ reported a lack of genuine inclusiveness and 
representativeness of these non governmental stakeholders across nearly all of the cases. To 
illustrate, respondents from each case generalised:
78• “it’s not a representative [EIP] group by any means”;
79•“as a [NEIP] group we're never a representative sample”; and
80•“it’s hard to get a balanced representation” in RNRM.
76 Mansbridge J, “Practice-Thought-Practice” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 194.
77 This exception was the lack of industry participation in NEIP sub case 1. For further see chapter 5.
78 Interview 121, EPA.
79 Interview 221, Coordinator.
80 Interview 321, Government Agency.
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Many respondents pointed to the stark under-representation of green and conservation 
interests across all three cases. This included having no specific environmental representative on
the regional RNRM body,81 5 of the 8 EIP sub cases and 1 NEIP sub cases. An under
82representation of environmental interests on regional bodies was also reported across the State, 
and those interests that were represented in EIP and NEIP occupied approximately 6% and 3% 
of membership across those cases as a whole (see Figures 6.1, 6.3, 6.5).
83Consistent with scholars’ hypotheses regarding environmental groups in NEG, the 
environmental interest groups that were represented were local environmental groups either 
“home-grown” in the area or local factions of state and national environmental groups (see 
Table 6.3 below for overview of the characteristics of the groups).84
Group Type General Overview of Group
“Home
Grown”
• Set up in 2000, their mission is “to protect our ocean ecosystem and establish 
sustainable water management practices”.
• Run a number of major campaigns to implement a National Ocean Outfall 
Closure Strategy.85
“Home
Grown”
• Set up in 1991. The aim of the group is to protect the local beach.
• History of protests and legal action regarding decision about outfalls, shipping 
and local development of land.86
Local 
faction of 
state group
• State group is “dedicated to the future of the Australian flora and fauna.
• Aims to promote the appreciation, study, conservation and management of
87Indigenous flora and fauna through research and advocacy.
Local 
faction of 
state group
• Established 1901. Dedicated to the conservation, study and enjoyment of 
Australia's native birds and their habitats.
• “Premier advocacy body for the conservation of birds”.88
Local 
faction of 
state group
• Dedicated to “the protection and enjoyment of Australia's oceans, waves and 
beaches for all people through Conservation, Advocacy and Education”.
• Activities include monitoring beach condition, education, and advocacy
89activities regarding the sustainable management and use of the coastal zone.
81 I note that the membership of sub regional bodies contained environmental interests. However, as discussed below, 
their numbers were usually small, and other interests outweighed them.
82 Interview 318, Environmental Group; see also Whelan J and Oliver P, “Regional Community-Based Planning: The 
Challenge o f Participatory Environmental Governance” (2005) 12 Australasian Journal of Environmental 
Management 126 at 31-32.
83 Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded 
Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 943 at 961-962; Fung and Wright, n 4, p 282-283; Seidenfeld M, 
“Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation” (2000) 41 Wm and Mary 
L.Rev. 411 at 487-500.
84 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 282-283.
85 http://cleanocean.org/.
86 Community Liaison committee Newsletter, Autumn 2006, EIP 2.
87 http://www.iffa.org.au.
88 ttp://www.birdsaustralia.com.au/.
89 http://www.surfrider.org.au/.
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“Home
Grown”
• Objectives include: “Promote and encourage the protection, rehabilitation and 
enhancement of the wetland area for the benefit of Indigenous flora and 
fauna”.90
Local 
faction of 
state group
• Founded 1800s.91 State group describes itself as “a vigorous and practical
92advocate of conservation and the study of natural history to this day”.
• Local branch has a history of public battles, actively lobbying authorities, and 
conducting media campaigns.93
“Home
Grown”
• Founded in late 1960s. 94 The group is dedicated to protecting Indigenous flora 
and fauna, They play an active educational role, and have made policy 
recommendations to government.95
“Home
Grown”
• Formed 1993. Group aims to “raise the profile of the creek” and “advocating 
for the protection of the Creek and its catchment”.
• History of legal challenges and lobbying councils and agencies.96
Table 6.3: Overview of Environmental Interest Group Membership in C ases.97
A second deficiency in inclusiveness and representation was a noted lack of equality in 
representatives. While there was no hard data relating to inequalities stemming from income or 
education, respondents did point to a range of affected, but typically socially disadvantaged 
interests that lacked representation.98 For exam ple," in EIP and NEIP sub cases involving 
significant numbers of affected migrant populations100 the findings indicated migrants lacked 
any direct representation.101 According to research by Oliver and W helan,102 Indigenous 
Australians were also under represented in RNRM across Queensland (see Figure 6.5), however
90 http://edithvale-seaford.melboumewater.com.au/.
91 http://home.vicnet.net.au/~fncv/.
92 http://home.vicnet.net.au/~fncv/.
93 Interview 131, Industry; Interview 132, EPA; Interview 133, Local resident.
94 http://users.pipeline.com.au/~angair/.
95 h ttp://users.pipeline.com .aU /~angair/m ainpage.htm #M em bership.
96 http://au.geocities.com/stonyck/information.html.
971 note that one environmental group was present in both an EIP and NEIP sub case.
981 note that there was little reliable and detailed demographic data of the newly defined local, neighbourhood and 
regional demos. As the EIP, NEIP and RNRM demos are defined by participants or government, they rarely mapped 
onto traditional political jurisdictions from which independent demographic data was usually compiled. While there 
was some rough statistical data available for the areas, they were rarely sufficiently detailed regarding issues such as 
age, income, and gender from which to draw conclusions.
99 Across all three cases the number of women represented was proportionally smaller than men, however there were 
no hard opinions as to why this was this case. Women made up approximately one third o f representatives in EIP sub 
cases, less than one third of the membership in RNRM case, and less than half across the NEIP sub cases. The 
findings in RNRM appear roughly consistent with the findings across Queensland, where one-fifth of regional 
bodies’ members were women; Whelan J and Oliver P, The Place, Limits and Practice o f Collaboration: Lessons 
from Case Studies in Community Participation in Natural Resource Management (CRC for Coastal Zone, Estuary 
and Waterway Management, 2005) p 31-32.
100 Interview 211, EPA. In NEIP sub case 1 migrant population comprised almost 20% of local population, including 
7% Vietnamese, 6% of Greek and 5%  Italian; Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, Stony 
Creek Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Maribymong City Council, 2004) p 86 .
101 Interview 182, Local Resident.
102 Whelan and Oliver, n 99, p 31-32.
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in the specific RNRM sub case Indigenous interests were considered to be adequately 
represented by 2 Indigenous individuals on the board (See Figure 6.6).
A third and final representation deficiency related to the desire to obtain a “rough balance” 
of all affected interests from both within and outside of their respective geographic demos. With 
the exception of all but a handful of EIP sub cases that involved leading industries (discussed 
below), all three cases reportedly lacked any significant representation from outside their 
immediate local geographic area. This included103 state and national environmental groups (as 
mentioned above), regular visitors to the area such as recreationalist/tourists in NEIP,104 and in 
RNRM case urban interests or consumers of agricultural products.105
In the EIP case, most sub cases106 involving good and poorer performing industries lacked 
representation of local residents and groups that lived slightly further away from the industry 
but reportedly experienced its “periodic” impacts (eg. occasional noise or odour events).107 This 
led some respondents to suggest that representatives constituted only a limited number of 
“views” and “values” of known affected interests, despite attempts to obtain a greater range:
you got to wonder whether they represent the negative aspects of the 
community, ‘cos they don’t...w e had people sitting on the sidelines sniping 
a bit at some of the things we weren’t doing but they weren’t prepared to put 
their hand up.108
While a higher level of involvement in these EIPs had been attained from the local demos, 
respondents still questioned whether theses actors were representative.109 Those that participated 
frequently included retired individuals110 and technically trained people with an interest in the
1(13 Others potential interests not mentioned by respondents but recognised in the literature may have included people 
with an interest in how public funding was being spent, or concerns with biodiversity or cross boundary issues; 
Moore, n 10, p 128.
104 For example in NEIP 2 a significant portion of people regularly used the township as a “weekender” or holiday 
destination. This tourism had been a particular cause of the environmental issues in the township. The NEIP group 
had tried to engage with tourists, however at the time of research they had not been able to gain a formal 
representative on the NEIP: “Yeah, we try and talk tourists around to what's going on....our big challenge is going to 
be when the tourists come down, because they haven't had the education that the locals have had.” Interview 212, 
Local Resident.
105 For example, one respondent explained “it is not really engaged with the urban communities at all”; Interview 338, 
Local Government.
106 In a minority of sub cases, interested actors and groups from outside the local area had some involvement in the 
EIP, however even then such participation had often been minimal and intermittent; Interview 174, Industry.
107 Interview 173, Local Resident (noting “There’s a few live out there past us. They go over the overpass, so as you 
go over the top they got the window down on the car. They’ll get the formaldehyde come through the window. They 
know the smell o f formaldehyde because they work at the hospital, so you can’t deny the fact. They say we smelt it 
but they don’t want to get involved... A lot of people don’t want to go to meetings all the time.”).
108 Interview 131, Industry.
109 “Not a representative group by any means. It’s a group of interested people”; Interview 121, EPA.
110 Interview 15/62, Local Resident noting: “we still don’t get people coming and joining up and w e’re all older, 
w e’re all old now”.
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industry or pollution issues.111 As such, they were rarely considered to reflect the wider 
demographic of the local affected community.112
Despite these shortcomings, a positive finding in the EIP case was that most cases (see 
below for the exceptions) had significant success in gaining participation by “ordinary citizens”. 
Indeed, the majority of EIP sub cases reached near the recommended number of 5 
community/resident representatives (see Figure 6.2). Most of these residents had no previous 
connection to organised community groups or any previous influence over decision-making 
regarding industry environmental performance. As one resident put it, prior to the EIP:
the residents had no idea at all about any EPA regulations, noise limits or the 
right boundaries... we just used to ring the EPA 113
These findings can be contrasted to NEIP sub cases 1 and 2. Here, in addition to a failure 
in NEIP 1 to obtain sufficient representation of industry stakeholders (as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5), non-government representatives tended to be limited to the “usual suspects” .114 
These were local residents and other participants who were already active and networked 
around the environmental issue at stake.115 Further, they were not seen to be typical of the 
communities from which they came, and far from representing a desired “cross section” of the 
community or “ordinary citizens”. As one NEIP participant put it:
[The NEIP] has been preaching very much to the converted. The 
engagement has been very much among the people who were already 
involved in a lot of similar activities.116
Similar “usual suspects” were evident in some EIP sub cases involving leading industries. 
In these sub cases, there was generally a noticeable gap in representation from ordinary citizens, 
local residents and industry “neighbours”.117 Accordingly in an effort to bolster group numbers, 
these industries had often engaged experienced and interested representatives from other EIP
111 “They are all ex engineers who have all worked in the industry and they still want to play trains you know...they 
are interested in how the industry is going and they provide input into how things work”; Interview 132, EPA.
112 “One of the things is the demographics of the community reps....Most of them are all retired people... so we tend 
to have older people... [they’re] not going to give us a good view of a cross-section of the neighbourhood as such”, 
Interview 161, Industry.
113 Interview 112, Local Resident.
114 For further discussion of the term “usual suspects” see: Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave, 2003) 
p 133; Parkinson, n 23, p 57.
115 “Most o f the people who were actively involved in the development of the NEIP are people who have an interest 
through other established community groups”, Interview 215, Local Government; Taylor, n 114 p 133; Parkinson, n 
23, p 57.
116 Interview, Industry from: Environment and Natural Resources Committee, Inquiry into Sustainable Communities 
(Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2005) p 124.
117 “It would be good to have more involvement of our neighbours, we have tried hard to get the people across the 
road involved but we have struggled with that”, Interview 151, Industry.
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groups that lived some distance from the industry.118 As one respondent described these 
representatives, they were “semi-professional [EIP group] members... they’re actually not 
[local] residents”.119
A pattern not unlike these EIPs and the 2 NEIP sub cases was evident in RNRM. In this 
case, “ordinary citizens” such as urban residents or “average” farmers from the region did not 
appear to be specifically represented on the RNRM body.120 Rather, representation was 
dominated by existing subregional catchment management groups (CMA groups) and land care 
groups that were already active and networked around natural resource management issues and 
had previous input into NRM decision making. These stakeholders comprised almost half of the 
requisite “community” membership (see Figure 6.6). According to empirical research by Oliver 
and Whelan, this trend appeared consistent across many other regional bodies in Queensland 
(see Figure 6.5).121
While the regional body had successfully obtained representation of scientific interests, 
respondents reported that the body had otherwise failed to meet its requirement for balanced 
representation of stakeholder’s interests. This included reported gaps in representation of 
affected mining and tourism interests on the regional body,122 a lack of specific representation of 
all affected Landcare or CMA groups,123 and a dominance of production interests in subregional 
group membership.124 As one respondent put it:
If you look at the make up of the regional board I see such a strong lobby 
from agriculture and pastoral industry.125
Contrary to these findings in RNRM, EIP and NEIP sub cases 1 and 2, respondents in 
NEIP sub case 3 reported that largely equitable and “balanced” representation from affected non
118 “The community members we have got are very experienced because of their involvement with the [other EIP 
groups]” Interview 151, Industry.
119 Interview 161, Industry.
120 That is, those people with no affiliation to groups or previous connection with natural resource management (NRM) 
issues.
121 Whelan and Oliver, n 99, p 31-32.
122 “There is some real gaps there in tourism”, Interview 341, Regional Body. Somewhat perversely, the tourism 
industry appeared to be a major stakeholder in the RNRM case and employed the most people within the region. 
Indeed, the Gross Value of Production (GVP) for tourism was $640 million, which exceeded the GVP of sugar, 
horticulture and beef combined for the region; BDTNRM, Burdekin Dry Tropics Natural Resource Management Plan 
2005-2010 (BDTNRM, 2005) p 34; Access Economics, Measuring The Economic & Financial Value O f The Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Report For Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (Access Economics, 2005) at II.
123 “What they didn’t realise is, they had a group come forward, say [Subregional Group A]...[Subregional Group A] 
is not representative of all the NRM groups in the subregion, not at all” Interview 341, Regional Body.
124 While the Landcare and CMA groups that comprised the subregional bodies were arguably at the vanguard of 
NRM, their membership tended to be dominated by industry /primary producers rather than urban or conservation 
interests. For example, the networking of a typical subregional group in the case study included, inter alia, 3 local 
citizens, 4 environmental/water groups, 3 Indigenous groups, 4 local farming members, 1 tourism industry body, but
27 farming/fishing/agricultural industry representatives. As such, these groups were considered to tend toward 
representing the interests of industry, over other interests. See similar discussion in: Whelan and Oliver, n 99, p 31-32.
125 Interview 341, Regional Body.
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government stakeholders and a cross section of the neighbourhood community had been 
obtained (save for environmental interests groups as noted above).126 According to respondents, 
affected interests in urban areas and rural areas were represented largely equally,127 while 
representatives from key central businesses, community groups and other collaborations had 
also been obtained.128 While some of the local resident representatives were considered by some 
to be “the outspoken people”129 about the environmental problem, many were ordinary citizens 
who had not previously been active or had any influence over relevant decision making on the 
issue.
Overall, the experience of the three cases generally corroborate concerns in NEG literature 
that representation in collaborative groups is rarely inclusive of all affected interests.130 Further 
as appeared in many cases, the findings suggest NEG may compound social inequalities, and 
often fell back on the same people and groups that were already involved in decision-making.131 
At the same time, at least some cases bucked these trends, such as NEIP sub case 3 where 
respondents were largely satisfied with the representative structure, or the EIP case, which 
appeared better equipped in involving ordinary citizens. What we can learn from the conditions 
that created both these exceptions and the general weaknesses in representation is examined in 
the following section.
6.3.1.2 Explanations for representation patterns
Based on the findings, it was a range of interrelated and overlapping factors that 
contributed to the various patterns of representation across the cases. One of the factors, for 
example, was the leverage and incentives available to gain industry representation in EIPs and 
NEIP 1 (see chapter 5 for further information). A second issue (raised by only a few 
respondents)132 related to how the cases’ emphasis on local, neighbourhood and regional scales 
could be used to preclude relevant interests from outside these areas. However, it was a range of
126 This is not to suggest that perfect or ideal representation had been achieved. Indeed some respondents questioned 
whether local citizens saw themselves as “representing the community” (Interview 231, CMA). However compared 
to the other cases and sub cases assessed in this thesis, respondents were far more positive about representative 
structures and pointed to very few gaps in representation in NEIP 3.
127 Interview 235, EPA.
128 Interview 231, CMA.
129 Interview 235, EPA.
130 Steinzor, n 49 at page 22 of “pdf’.
131 Tushnet M, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton UP, 2003) p 170; Steinzor, n 49, at page 20 of “p df’; Cohen
J and Rogers J, “Power and Reason” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) p 245.
132 For example, in one atypical EIP sub case, an industry respondent recalled how, for a number of years, the local 
focus of the EIP had been used to exclude certain interested members o f the community from participating: “There 
was initially a radius put around that plant and anyone inside that radius was invited to attend, I think that original 
radius would rule out <Community member A> who lives quite a considerable distance away...we don’t see any real 
problem with him being on the committee, but the previous management did”. This practice was subsequently 
abolished following a change in Industry management. Interview 171, Industry.
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other factors discussed in detail below which appeared to be more influential causes of the 
exclusion of interests. I consider these factors, first, in relation to representation of 
environmental groups, before turning to discuss “ordinary citizen” representation, equality and 
descriptive representation across the cases and the (limited) impact of government checks and 
support to try and secure adequate representation.
Consistent with the expectations of some NEG scholars, the under-representation of 
potential “countervailing power” environmental interest groups reportedly arose due to either 
their absence from “local” demos and/or their adversarial cognitive frames.133 Unorganised and 
absent environmental interests were particularly challenging in rural areas such as NEIP sub 
case 3 and the RNRM case. As one government respondent explained:
[Regional Body] can’t get a greenie on their committee because no one will 
stand up and say I ’m a greenie and so they have a void there134
Other respondents from EIP135 and RNRM also suggested the under-representation of 
localised and state environmental groups arose from their adversarial nature and their “deeply 
entrenched attitudes and belief systems” :
some of the [environmental groups] have made the strategic decision not to 
engage in the process because they feel that they’d have more value staying 
outside of that regional NRM delivery and continuing to criticise and 
advocate and agitate on the outside of the process.136
Turning to other representation issues, many patterns arose from specific preconditions 
such as how pressing the environmental problem was and the stake local actors’ had in it. 
Indeed, as discussed below the higher rates of participation of “ordinary citizens” in EIP and 
NEIP 3 sub case appeared in part to result from the urgency of the problem and the high stakes 
these non-government participants had in the problem.137
As we saw in chapter 5, both poor and ‘good’ (as distinct from leading) industry 
performers in EIPs typically had a significant adverse impact on the local area, such as noise 
events or odour releases. Ordinary citizens living near industry were understandably attracted to
133 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 283.
134 Interview 321, Government Agency.
135 In one EIP sub case for example, a number of state, national and even international environmental interest groups 
had regularly and repeatedly targeted the industry through the media, protests and legal action regarding its 
greenhouse pollution. As one group put it: “[The National Environmental Interest Group] has been working with 
other environmental groups for over two years to try and stop [this Industry]”. As one national newspaper reported 
“Four activists chained themselves to [machinery] while dozens more staged a protest outside [Industry]”; (Lahey K 
“Activists target 'dirty' coal plant” The Australian August 11, 2005; http://www.wwf.ore.au/articles/feature34/) As is 
evident, their stance was primarily adversarial - wanting to close down and “stop” the industry - which 
unsurprisingly meant they had little interest in seeking to be represented on an EIP group to collaborate with industry.
136 Interview 318, Environmental Group.
137 Abers, n 32; Fung, n 31 at 342-343, 352.
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participating in EIP as it provided an avenue for them to try and resolve industry’s direct 
impacts on their daily lives.138 The motivations and passion for local residents to resolve such 
impacts is evident in the following anecdote from one industry respondent:
We called a public meeting to discuss the issue. About 50 local residents 
showed up...a t the meeting we were given the rounds of the kitchen. The 
focus was on the past. Many of the residents had been round here before the 
company, they gave us a potted history of the business, and they vented their 
spleen on the company’s past and the problems. We were big brother and 
they didn’t trust us.139
In contrast, “leading” industries often had a negligible impact on the local area, giving 
affected neighbours little motivation to participate in the EIP. This accordingly left the door 
open for the “usual suspects” to make up the numbers.140
In the NEIP case, high stakes for ordinary residents were present in sub case 3 where the 
personal health and/or income of average residents and farmers was impacted upon by an 
increasingly degraded water supply. Indeed, residents had a particularly high stake in this issue 
because the risk of tourists getting sick threatened the town’s income from tourism and raised 
public liability issues (as discussed in chapter 5).
In contrast, the environmental issues addressed in the other two NEIP sub cases (a creek 
which largely served as a stormwater drain for urban and industrialised suburbs, and the broad 
issue of sustainable coastal township) were considered comparatively less important141 to most 
“ordinary people”.142
“Ordinary” urban consumers from within and outside the region in the RNRM program 
appeared to be underrepresented for similar reasons. Indeed, the stakes of urban consumers in 
natural resource problems remain largely diffuse, not least143 because the RNRM program is 
predominantly focused on rural problems such as salinity and biodiversity.144
138 Fung, n 31 at 359.
139 Interview 111, Industry.
140 “Its a bit of a struggle here as well even with residential members as well because we are sitting in very dirty area 
there is a lot of high risk activity occurring in the area, [Industry] in comparison is a much lower risk for them so we 
are down on their list of priorities you know they are more interested in the chemical complexes”, Interview 151, 
Industry.
141 As discussed in Chapter 5, in both these cases there was certainly community concern about these issues (eg. 
community complaints in NEIP 1 about spills in the creek were common, and residents in the NEIP 2 were found to 
be particularly environmentally aware). However, concerns about the appearance of a local creek, or that people in 
the town acted “unsustainably”, are comparatively less important to most “ordinary people” than exposure to poor air 
quality and amenity on a daily basis, or the chance o f getting sick from drinking water from their household tap.
142 “We have people with and underlying concern about sustainability, but they’re not outraged about it...relatively 
speaking it’s a fantastic environment here so it’s like “what’s the problem?”, Interview 224, Government Agency; “I 
don’t think you necessarily have that group of concerned residents. Yeah, I mean, a little concerned, but not that 
concerned”, Interview 211, EPA.
143 In addition, while natural resources are degraded, they are not yet so spoiled as to give most ordinary consumers o f
agricultural products any major stake in acting to protect the environment. Indeed, according to some respondents, 
people from urban areas were unlikely to even come into direct contact with such issues in their daily lives: “80% of
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It is also possible that the under-representation of average farmers in the RNRM program 
is attributable to a similar lack of “stake”. Indeed, for many farmers (but certainly not a ll) ,145 
unless their short term economic interests are impacted they are unlikely to identify an 
immediate stake in what are typically longer-term NRM issues addressed under the RNRM 
program. Even so, as explained below, the lack of “ordinary” farmer representation appeared to 
be more attributable to other factors.146
Indeed, echoing the fears of some NEG commentators,147 the time and skill burdens 
imposed by all three cases (even with government support and funding) was widely reported as 
a primary impediment to both obtaining greater participation from “ordinary” citizens and 
farmers, as well as more equality and balance in representation from both inside and outside the 
local area.148
In older EIP cases, a number of respondents reported that over the long term operation of 
the EIP group, the ongoing time and costs of participating had been too much for some 
participants, leading to a reduction in participation numbers and thus the cross section of 
interests currently represented in the group.149 In younger EIPs, respondents generally did not 
report EIP transactions costs to be overly onerous per se (see chapter 5). Instead, a common but 
similar explanation150 for the lack of more balanced representation of interests and local 
residents was citizen apathy: “I can’t be bothered”.151
While such apathy may have also been a problem in NEIP, respondents regularly blamed 
the time and cost demands imposed by NEIP, which were notably much more onerous than the 
EIP: “it’s a big time commitment for individuals to put in ...it’s a big ask”.152 The fact that 
participants in the cases saw the commitments required to participate in a NEIP as a bigger
the public that live in urban areas and a lot of these people in the big urban cities don’t have opportunity to get out on 
the land”; Interview 344, Subregional Group.
144 “risjrm  is very rural orientated, rather than urban orientated... most of the urban community wouldn't even know 
it existed” Interview 337, Local Government.
145 A number of respondents pointed out that many farmers care about their land and longer term resource 
management issues. However as discussed below even these actors found the time and skills demands of RNRM too 
overwhelming to participate.
146 It is also likely that affected farmers would already have been linked to, or members of, the existing subregional 
CMAs or land care groups that had been active on these issues for at least decade. See also the discussion in chapter 5 
raising a number o f other issues for why farmers may not have engaged in RNRM.
147 Steinzor, n 49, page 19, 20 of “p d f’. Tushnet, n 131, p 170; Steinzor R, “Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation: the Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control” (1998) 22 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 103 at 142.
148 See Thomas C, “Habitat Conservation Planning” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: 
Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 166.
149 For further on this issue see chapter 8.
150 For example: ‘They are not totally representative and that can maybe be the process that we set up, and sometime 
it can just be the general ambivalence or apathy that a lot of community members have, I mean I don’t participate in 
things that might happen in my backyard but those that I am passionate about I do, so it would be nice if you had a bit 
more representation”; Interview 141 Industry.
151 Fung and Wright, n 8 at 37-38.
152 Interview 211,EPA.
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barrier than participation in an EIP may explain why the EIP’s primary weakness was gaining 
more balanced representation, while many NEIPs struggled to secure participation from 
ordinary citizens at all.
Respondents from both NEIP and EIP also saw skills and time commitments as a particular 
barrier for migrants153 because they “didn’t have the language skills”154 to participate in the 
process and were “probably just trying to survive and get their heads round being in a new 
country...they don’t have time for [the NEIP].” 155
Time demands were similarly reported as too much for ordinary farmers: “it’s hard to get 
the real honest toilers to sit on these things because they’re too busy earning a quid”.156 Indeed, 
although the RNRM program provided a small rebate to representatives to offset what are often 
significant time and travel costs,157 this was seen as largely incommensurate with demands and 
tasks expected of representatives.158 Other respondents also suggested the responsibilities and 
skills associated with RNRM may have also prevented ordinary farmers from volunteering to 
participate. As one respondent reflected:
the [RNRM] process involves a lot more strategic, strategic planning...that 
is sort of difficult for people who are particularly sort of say practical cane 
farmers, if they can’t resolve something over a cup of tea that night, well 
move on, better do something else you know.159
Ideally mitigating most of these apparent impediments were government “checks” and 
support mechanisms. Some respondents certainly saw these as useful for seeking out and 
encouraging broader representation. For example, government funding was used to overcome 
barriers to Indigenous representation in the RNRM case.160
Although one can speculate why Indigenous interests remained under represented across 
regional bodies in Queensland,161 the data from my one case study revealed little hard evidence
153 As the plan notes, they still need to engage “Migrant Groups...including Vietnamese, a major ethnic group” in the 
area; Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 100, p 12, 20.
154 Interview 182, Local Resident.
155 Interview 211, EPA.
156 Interview 321, Government Agency.
157 All but one receiving less than $5000 per annum, with one receiving less than $20 000 per annum; BDTNRM, 
Annual Report Financial Statements (BDTNRM, 2005) p 12.
158 Indeed, the positions were described as “not very well paid”; Interview 3210, Science.
159 Interview 332, Local Government.
160 Government funding was used to develop “a structure [for] enabling improved Traditional Owner involvement”. 
This included securing two Traditional Owner Directors on the body and the formation of a Regional Traditional 
Owner Management Group to advise the regional body. The regional body was also “the first in Queensland to 
employ a full-time permanent Aboriginal Land Management Facilitator to liaise with Traditional Owners”;
Traditional Custodians of Country in the Burdekin Dry Tropics Region, A Caring for Country Plan (BDTNRM, 2005) 
p 1, 6; BDTNRM, Annual Report 2004-2005 (BDTNRM, 2005) p 15-16.
161 Some speculative reasons may include that supportive funding was not applied for, or was received in lower 
amounts in other regions (compared to the RNRM case, which is one of the largest regions and better funded groups
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on the issue. Whatever the reasons were, one cannot avoid the conclusion that these and the 
other representation inadequacies discussed above 162 were not adequately resolved by 
government oversight and government in each case did not view such representation deficits as 
a reason for withholding support or delaying implementation. Indeed, despite the deficits in 
inclusiveness and representation across the cases, the VEPA approved all plans in EIPs and 
NEIPs and the Queensland government designated and provided funding to all regional 
bodies.163
Certainly government agencies in RNRM recognised the need and importance of ensuring 
adequate representation, and on all accounts they had held multiple forums throughout the 
RNRM region to select representatives that had the necessary “skills” and were supported by 
the community.164 However they felt there were distinct limits to their role of ensuring requisite 
balance and inclusiveness if certain interests were too unorganised, not present in the region or 
did not agree to volunteer:
[Its] very hard to manage at a regional level ...You could be selected but you 
can refuse. The point I would make is that in some cases it’s hard.165
This problem certainly appeared to explain the absence of tourism interests who were seen 
to be such a “poorly organised, poorly structured industry”166 that appropriate representatives 
either could not be identified or had failed to come forward.
Similar impediments were identified regarding government officers’ assistance and 
procedural requirements in EIP and NEIP cases. For example, despite industry and collaborative 
group attempts to try and improve representation, the time, resource and skill demands 
ultimately constrained who volunteered.167 As one respondent described their failed efforts to 
expand the interests represented on their group:
in Queensland). Or it may relate to contextual issues, such as the nature and level of organisation of Indigenous 
interests across different regions.
162 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 30, s 68(b), (c); Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 36, s 7.1(b).
163 Indeed, the representation deficits in the RNRM sub case remained despite reported revisions to representation that 
occurred as the body moved from a primarily NAP focused body in 2001/2002 to jointly delivered NAP/NHT body 
in 2002/03; See BDTNRM, n 122, p 8-9; Head, n 36, p 148; Head B and Ryan N, “Can Co-Governance Work? 
Regional Natural Resource Management In Queensland, Australia" International Symposium On Public Sector 
Management VIII, 31 March - 2 April 2004, Budapest at 16; Raymond L, “Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming 
Collective Action Barriers to Endangered Species Protection” (2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37 at 50.
164 Gilbey P, “Rights And Duty Of Care A Queensland Perspective” (2002) ANCID, Townsville, 
http://www.clw.csiro.au/lbi/publications/ANCID2002paper-Gilbey.pdf viewed 10 May 2008.
165 Interview 321, Government Agency.
166 Interview 338, Local Government.
167 Another respondent from the oldest EIP pointed out “contacting the community is something I feel w e’ve failed in 
because we still don’t get people coming and joining up”, Interview 15/62, Local Resident.
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we were only able to get back the members we had in the first place really 
with one additional one so that hasn’t been as successful as it should have 
been.168
VEPA officer assistance and the efforts of local government sponsors in NEIP 1 and 2 169 
also had limited impact in terms of broadening representativeness. In particular, VEPA support 
appeared to actually reinforce overrepresentation of usual suspects as officers tended to rely on 
existing networks to select participants they already knew:170
the EPA, actually specifically making the phone calls to people, “How 
would you like to be involved”, because I guess the EPA had a lot of contact, 
industry contacts, and also residents that we knew had an interest in the 
creek and that sort of thing... sitting down and saying, right, who do we 
want to be involved.171
A similar trend was evident in the EIP sub cases involving leading industries where VEPA 
was most heavily relied upon across the EIP cases to fill significant gaps in representation.172 
Here, VEPA officers connected industry with the semi professional EIP participants known to 
them through other EIP processes.
Taken as a whole, the key implication of the above findings is that government imposed 
membership conditions, procedural requirements and/or officer assistance ultimately took a 
back seat to the very issues they were meant to overcome, namely imbalances caused by 
different personal stakes in problems and/or the time, skills and resource demands of 
volunteering.173 While these government mechanisms may encourage and achieve some limited 
improvement in representativeness, both government and/or collaborative groups ultimately 
settled  to do the best with what they got.
Before I turn to consider explanations for representation in NEIP sub case 3 and principal 
agent representation, one final interesting finding is worth mentioning about RNRM 
representation patterns. That is, the significant control over and access to government funding 
associated with membership on the regional body was reported to be a powerful incentive for 
subregional CM As to secure representation (see chapter 5). This appeared to be because these
168 Interview 131, Industry.
169 In NEIP sub case 1, the local government organiser also attempted to survey and meet with the local migrant 
populations at numerous public meetings, however this process was regarded as a failure with an extremely minimal 
turn out; Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 100, p 12 and 20.
170 To illustrate an EIP case, one EPA officer commented how membership was determined: “Well it’s just selection 
and identifying through what those people know about their community networks, about people who might have an 
interest", Interview 121, EPA.
171 Interview 211, EPA.
172 These findings are similar to Taylor, n 114, p 133.
173 Tushnet, n 131, p 170; Farber, n 49 at 24.
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“usual suspects” were commonly dependent on government or outside funding for their survival 
(rent and staff) and their activities.174 As one respondent put it:
A lot of them were in there to lobby to make sure that those organisations 
got money.175
6.3.2 NEIP sub case 3 and principal-agent representation
With the exception of environmental interests, the findings indicated that NEIP sub case 3 
had achieved a largely balanced representation from affected non government stakeholders as 
well as a cross section of the neighbourhood community. One reason for this was the above 
mentioned high stake local residents had in resolving the local environmental problem. 
However other factors also played an important role.
In particular, NEIP sub case 3 had an extremely small affected population (approximately 
100 people) that reportedly reduced the potential range of “affected interests”. This made it 
comparatively easy to achieve relatively balanced descriptive representation in the face of time, 
skills and resource demands of the NEIP. Indeed, respondents suggested it had been relatively 
straightforward to identify and include not only those already known to VEPA, but also those 
that were missing, and how they should be balanced. As one officer reported: “we can go 
through every single person and I can tell you where they stood on [the NEIP issues]”.176
Of course this is not to claim that NEIP 3 had flawlessly and wholly met the idealised 
criteria for representation and captured all intimate interests and views of the 100 people 
affected in the area. However, when compared to the experience of the other cases discussed 
above, NEIP 3 had achieved considerable success in including and representing key affected 
urban and rural interests in the sub case, as well as incorporating a cross section of the views of 
many affected “average” farmers,177 ordinary citizens and businesses.
The small size of the NEIP 3 population had also allowed government organisers to bolster 
this descriptive representation through establishing a credible and low cost principal agent 
representation system. This involved holding an initial town public meeting that reportedly
174 Taylor, n 114, p 185-186; Gaventa J, “Representation, Community Leadership and Participation: Citizen 
Involvement in Neighbourhood Renewal and Local Governance”, prepared for the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, 
Office of Deputy Prime Minister (Institute of Development Studies, 2004) at 15,
http://www2.ids.ac.uk/loeolink/resources/downloads/JGaventa%20NRU%20Studv%20Julv%202004.pdf viewed 10 
May 2008.
175 Interview 341, Regional Body.
176 Interview 231, CMA.
177 This included farmers who were wary of government agencies and the NEIP program. As they reported they 
participated to: “keep an eye on it to see what’s going on”, Interview 233, Farmer.
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included nearly the entire affected population. At the meeting an initial 6 of the total 18 local 
residents were nominated and elected as formal representatives (see Figure 6 .4 ).178
Respondents suggested that those representatives who had been elected were happy with 
their role as a representative 179 and that they (and even many other local resident 
representatives) had maintained largely “good communication”180 with non-participants.181 This 
was naturally because of the extremely small size of the community, which meant 
representatives could rely on existing community networks, open meetings and public notices 
(in the only “general store” in town) to generate quite effective and wide reaching two way 
communication. As one NEIP 1 respondent reflected on the difference between their NEIP and 
NEIP sub case 3:
the other country ones, you’ve got a lot more of that connected community 
already...which is why I think that the country ones are probably better - 
you’ve already got that community feel and things already established. So in 
the city it’s more difficult.182
In contrast to NEIP sub case 3, there was no evidence of formal election of representatives 
from their interest sectors or demos across the other cases.183 Even so, it is important to ask 
whether there was any evidence of informal relationships, such as volunteers, or appointed
• • 184participants maintaining active communication with those they “represent”.
While practicalities prevented a full exploration of all informal principal-agent 
relationships,185 the findings did reveal some modest insights into a selection of these 
relationships. First, most (but not a ll)186 representatives from organised groups (eg. community, 
environmental and sub regional CMA and land care groups) were reported to have maintained 
relatively effective communication and accountability with their membership.187 However,
178 Interview 231, CMA.
179 As one interviewee responded to the question “Do you see yourselves as representing the rest of the people in the 
community?”: “Yeah I do yes most definitely, especially the town...I don’t have a problem with that” Interview 232, 
Local Resident.
180 Interview 235, EPA.
181 However, at least one respondent questioned whether all of the community were really interested in the NEIP: “So 
all of the community is aware of the NEIP. I would imagine that some of them wouldn’t give a rats though” 
Interview 231, CMA.
182 Interview 211, EPA.
183 As one government respondents from RNRM put it: ‘T hey’re not elected so they have no accountability.” 
Interview 321, Government Agency.
l84See for example: Trachtenberg and Focht, n 6, p 59; Cohen J and Fung A, “Radical Democracy” (2004) 10(4) 
Swiss Journal of Political Science 23 at 30; John, n 18, p 231-232, 236. Mansbridge, n 76, p 194.
185 Without directly speaking to non-participating members the thesis could not discern whether such informal 
channels of communication and accountability were always operative or effective.
186 There were some doubts about whether all subregional CMAs in RNRM had communicated effectively with their 
membership: “you got a committed few people on the management committee...they are not always truly 
representative of the membership”, Interview 341, Regional Body.
187 In NEIPs for example, interest group respondents noted that representatives were “out talking” with their “own 
groups”, Interview 221, Coordinator.
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informal principal agent relationships between individual local residents and people in the wider 
demos were reportedly much more uncommon.188 This appeared to be attributable to both the 
practical cost and time limitations of an individual’s capacity to maintain active communication 
with the wider community and the fact that most participants were often reluctant to take on a 
representative role. Indeed, nearly all189 local residents who had volunteered in EIPsl90and the 
usual suspect residents in NEIP 1 and 2 reportedly did not “take any particular responsibility 
and accountability back to anywhere else”.191 Certainly some residents were there to “try and 
help the neighbourhood”,192 but for the most part representatives appeared to have participated 
as individuals. As one VEPA respondent explained: “ [they] say I am representing my own view, 
not everybody else”.193
While these findings are perhaps predictable, it does at least provide one modest, but 
valuable, empirical insight by pointing to what appears to be, in these NEG conditions, the very 
real limits of individual citizens taking on a role as an informal and accountable representative 
of those who do not directly participate in NEG.194
Having considered the nature of both descriptive and accountable representation, and 
explanations for these patterns in the above sections, the next section turns to consider the 
second objective of the cases relating to deliberation.
6.3.3 Deliberative decision making processes
This section focuses on deliberation objectives of the cases and examines the extent to
which non governmental stakeholders who were represented or participated in decision making
195processes were able to do so effectively, and as “rough equals” to reach feasible agreement. 
The investigation of these matters proceeds in two parts.196 First, I investigate decision-making
188 The obvious exception was NEIP 3 as discussed above.
189 A small minority of residents did report that they at least talked to a few other residents in the local area, however 
this appeared to be quite limited contact, such as bumping into someone in the street. For example on Community 
respondent noted: “A couple o f years ago I was walking to get the paper or walking the dog or something, someone 
would pull me up and say what was the smell last night or what was the noise and things like that”, Interview 162, 
Local Resident.
19(1 As one resident noted: “w e’re signing the EIP for ourselves not for the other community members” Interview 112, 
Local Resident.
191 “They keep pointing that out -  w e’re not community representatives, w e’re representatives from the community”, 
Interview 161, Industry.
192 Interview 221, Local Resident.
193 Interview 181, EPA.
194 Mansbridge, n 76, p 194.
195 Sturm, n 55, p 331.
196 Consistent with the cases’ intentions, negotiation and decision-making was an ongoing process that ranged from 
many months to many years. The findings below are accordingly based on respondents’ comments and 
generalisations regarding the general flavour of these various decision-making processes, rather than specific analysis 
of the formal procedure o f decision making at any one forum or meeting.
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processes in both NEIP and RNRM cases, followed by the EIP case. I then turn to examine the 
issue and impact of countervailing powers on the deliberative negotiation processes. Notably the 
findings below are based on respondents’ comments and generalisations regarding the general 
flavour of the various decision making processes that occurred during planning and over the life 
of the case, rather than specific analysis of the formal procedure of decision making at any one 
forum or meeting.
6.3.3.1 Differences in power and capacity among decision makers 
Decision making in NEIP and RNRM
Despite the impressive deliberative achievements described in Box 6.1, the findings 
suggested that fair and equitable deliberative processes were difficult to achieve in practice in 
both NEIP and RNRM.
Respondents in both NEIP and RNRM suggested that their various decision making processes 
had at times involved some conflict (as we saw in Chapter 5), and self interested bargaining between 
parties.197 However, most respondents reported that decision making forums had predominantly been 
characterised by degrees o f non-adversarial, problem solving negotiation and/or mediation processes.
In NEIPs, community forums, and meetings between representatives were reported to have involved 
“lots o f talking over the issues”, 198 and “significant negotiations”.199 Based on the available data, these 
negotiations, over time, were characterised less by simple strategic argument from preconceived 
positions and more by participants discussing, reasoning, sharing information and ultimately adjusting 
their positions to “agree on something”.200 As one respondent reflected on the various negotiations and 
meetings that occurred to develop their plan:
all o f us now understand a bit more about where everyone else is ...th ey ’d say 
“Let’s think about this, what do people want to see? Let’s see if we can do 
that” ...they sat down around the table and up on the whiteboard, talking through 
the issues, they narrowed it and said what do you think.201
Similarly in RNRM, respondents variously pointed to forums, discussions and workshops that
197 For example one government agency in NEIP pointed out: “our involvement was very much managing the 
expectations o f the various stakeholders so it’s consistent with what we would be doing into the future”; Interview 
214, Government.
198 Interview 212, Local Resident.
199 Interview 213, Local Government.
200 Interview 235, EPA; Thomas, n 148, p 159.
201 Interview 211, EPA.
202 Interview 341, Regional Body; Interview 327, Government Agency.
203 BDTNRM, n 122, p 197.
204 Interview 331, Science.
205 Interview 331, Science.
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involved both subregional and regional level “negotiating with the property owners”, 02 “negotiation 
between community sectors, stakeholders and individuals” 203 and “negotiated solutions” among 
different sectors in the region.204 As one science respondent described their experience with negotiating 
overarching regional targets with agriculture and industry:
the meeting that happened I reckon sorted this out, well no meeting actually 
formalised it...industry said yeah we are willing to admit that there are things that 
can be improved, so we got away from “you are wrong you are wrong” situation 
to one o f well “what can we do205
Box 6.1: Illustrations of Positive Achievements in Deliberation in the NEIP and 
RNRM Cases.
Some respondents in the cases certainly suggested that the negotiation processes had 
sometimes been undermined by a power imbalance 206 between different types of 
nongovernmental representatives. 207 However a more dominant concern and theme in 
respondents’ comments related to problems arising from power imbalances between the non 
government and governmental representatives.
In this context, it is important to remember that both RNRM and NEIP were about 
combining government priorities and community priorities.208 Further, as the above findings 
indicated, non-governmental stakeholders reportedly were able to input into decision making in 
various ways and impact on decisions.
Nevertheless, respondents in both the NEIP and RNRM cases reported that government 
agencies often tended to dominate the negotiation and decision making process in ways that 
marginalised discussion of non governmental interests, promoted government programs, and/or 
simply overrode decisions without discussion, which ultimately undermined the genuineness of 
non governmental consent and their “empowerment”. Echoing the reservations of some NEG 
authors, this domination arose from two overlapping sources.209
First, the technical knowledge and skills of government officers who participated in the 
process often overwhelmed most (but as discussed below not all) non governmental 
stakeholders in decision making. This was most frequently raised in the NEIP sub cases, where 
non governmental stakeholders asked to reflect on the decision making, consultation and plan
206 Sturm, n 55, p 331.
207 For example, one respondent in RNRM suggested that the overrepresentation of agricultural and primary industry 
interests on the regional body might have influenced the consultation process during plan development (Interview 
341, Regional Body).
208 Interview 235, EPA.
209 Steinzor, n 49 fn 41, page 9 of “p df’; Head, n 61 at 31; Lawrence and Cheshire, n 61, p 7.
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writing process described it as “mainly a place of agencies”, 210“experts”211 and “people who 
were used to doing that sort of thing as part of their job”. 212 The result was that “it all became a 
bit high brow”213 for non governmental respondents, who, while they could express their point 
of view, felt that they couldn’t “drive” the decision making and instead were “sitting back and 
watching the process”.214
There were few similar concerns of such “technical” dominance in the RNRM case, most 
likely because regional bodies had been better supported with government investment to 
conduct their own science research and form a technical advisory panel to assist them in their 
decision making.215
The more prevalent concern in RNRM arose from the Regional Coordination Group and 
Joint Steering Committee utilising other institutional opportunities to dominate decision 
making. These groups reportedly played an important “policing role”216 that entailed ensuring 
groups met standards and procedures set in NRM legal framework, and approved plans 
accordingly. However, the findings indicated that government had used these powers to 
override a number of decisions made by regional groups (in consultation with the regional 
community) without providing them with any reasoning, opportunity for fair negotiation or 
cooperative discussion. As one respondent put it:
some of the [plans and targets] have been really good but then it gets down 
to the point that these targets are written, and its something the group and the 
community agrees with, it goes to the JSC and the Cwth say that’s not good 
enough, crosses it out, rewrites it, signs the plan off and sends it back.217
Similar problems arose in NEIPs regarding both local government sponsors and the VEPA 
who had privileged institutional and decision making positions in the NEIP process. Indeed, on 
all accounts the VEPA and local government used this power to “drive” 218 the NEIP planning
219and proposal process and dominate issues. As one officer commented:
210 Interview 221, Local Resident.
211 Government agencies confirmed as much: “[The community] saw us as being the experts and we had the ideas...I 
think they had difficulty seeing how they could make a contribution”, Interview 231, CMA.
212 Interview 227, Local Resident.
213 Interview 227, Local Resident.
214 Interview 221, Local Resident.
215 Technical Advisory Panel comprised members from the biophysical and socioeconomic sciences from a range of 
academic, research institutions, government and non-government organizations. BDTNRM, n 122, p 12, 185-190, 
196; Lawrence G, “Promoting Sustainable Development: the Question of Governance” Plenary Address XI World 
Congress of Rural Sociology, Trondheim Norway, 25-30 July 2004 at 8.
216 Interview 3211, Government Agency.
217 Interview 311, Industry Body.
218 They “chaired and ran the meetings and really drove the agenda”, Interview 231, CMA.
219 For example officers conducting consultation process reportedly “got [the community’s] opinion on things rather 
than active participation. It was more that traditional, let’s just give people a whole heap of objectives and get a feel 
for what they think of it.” Interview 211, EPA.
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it was driven by myself, [VEPA and another local government officer]... 
and all of the meetings and all the agendas and topics were really driven by
us.220
Further, the fact that government bodies controlled “seed” funding in NEIP meant that the 
coordinator they employed to assist with the consultation and plan drafting process was also 
often less than “independent”, and acted as another officer of government that often “push[ed] 
the community into something they didn’t necessarily want”.221
Decision making in EIP
There was a similar potential for government to dominate decision-making in the EIP case. 
However, respondents suggested this was extremely rare. One possible reason for this appeared 
to be that unlike the NEIP or RNRM case where government agencies either commit to take 
actions and integrate their organisation’s goals and programs with non governmental 
stakeholders (NEIP) or invest significant public funding (RNRM), in EIP the VEPA has a much 
lower “organisational” stake in the program: investing no direct funds beyond officer attendance 
at meetings, making no direct commitments themselves to take actions other than existing 
responsibilities to monitor industry and attend the collaboration. Furthermore, as I discuss in the
next chapter on accountability, the VEPA took a minimal role in holding groups accountable for
222substantive targets. As such they rarely sought to intervene in negotiations regarding targets.
The findings in the EIP case instead resonated with a different line of concern in the 
literature regarding power imbalances between industry and non governmental actors. As we 
saw in chapter 5 the various processes of decision-making were reported to have involved high 
conflict in the majority of sub cases (see chapter 5). Strategic bargaining was also evident. For 
example, in many EIP sub cases involving good and poor performers,223 some local residents 
continued to argue for their passionate and pre-established position of shutting industry down.224
However, in general the process for most local residents and other stakeholders had 
involved relatively fair and genuine negotiation to reach agreement on how to address local 
issues, such as noise, amenity, odour and dust impacts. As the following anecdote from one 
industry illustrates, this process involved reason giving, debate and discussion:
220 Interview 221, Coordinator.
221 The result was that “solutions [were] coming by the coordinator rather than the community” Interview 237, EPA.
222 Interview 141, Industry.
223 Strategic bargaining was less common in EIP sub cases involving leading industries. Here, the higher levels of 
trust and lack o f conflict appeared to foster a relatively effective negotiation process; Interview 151, Industry.
224 As one respondent explained: “There were a few early on that wanted the site shut down. We told them that wasn’t 
possible, but a few still want us to close.” Interview 111, Industry; Another pointed out: “some o f the community 
members still see the EIP as an opportunity to close the industry down” Interview 141, Industry.
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if we couldn’t do something the community wanted we would agree to 
understand with them and say look we are listening to you, but right now this 
is what we are facing and we would explain our rationale for our decision
225making, we wouldn’t say “No! We don’t want to!”.
Further, these processes of negotiation resulted in residents and industry adjusting their 
pre-established positions based on the insights and new information they gained through the 
negotiation:
my line is now “run the place and run it properly”. You know, it’s about 
change...I understand their point of view now ...7-8 years ago I wanted to 
close them down.226
These findings may appear surprising given that the discussion in chapter 5 suggested that 
in many cases industries blatantly abused their power over information by telling “lies” about 
the nature and extent of their pollution impacts. However the reasons successful negotiation on 
local issues was achieved against these odds included at least three conditions noted in the new 
governance literature for balancing such power disparities.
First, echoing some NEG authors,227 respondents suggested that most negotiation processes 
were underpinned by “power balancing” mechanisms including background rules,228 court 
orders, and subtler forms of VEPA persuasion and threats to reputation and social license.229 
These ensured that industry, at the very least, had been induced to come to the table, disclose 
some information and negotiate.230
Second, echoing recommendations in the dispute resolution and deliberation literatures,
• • 231VEPA, local government or a hired mediator, reportedly assisted parties to reach a decision. 
These “neutrals” were considered particularly vital in EIP sub cases characterised by high 
severity problems and conflict. A minority of respondents raised concerns regarding the 
neutrality of professional mediators where they had been hired by industry.232 However, on the 
whole these and other types of mediators were still considered to be “very important” 233
225 Interview 141, Industry.
226 Interview 111, Industry.
227 Fung and Wright, n 8, p 23.
228 See for example Karkkainen B, “Information -Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burca G 
and Scott J (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 2006) p 295-296.
229 These conditions did not apply to all sub cases. For example, negative incentives for industry to participate were 
largely relevant to sub cases involving poor and good performers, rather than ones involving leading industries. 
However, as discussed below negotiation processes were generally effective in the latter sub cases due to 
significantly lower degrees o f conflict.
230 Karkkainen, n 228, p 296.
231 O’Leary R, Nabatchi T and Bingham L, “Environmental Conflict Resolution” in R Durant, D Fiorino D and 
O’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT, 2004) p 332-333.
232 Interview 182, Local Resident.
233 Interview 162, Local Resident.
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“effective”234 and vital to “control the debate” 235 and allow representatives to “negotiate the 
high level objectives”. 236
In those EIP sub cases involving lower severity problems and less conflict, “impartial” 
mediators were rare. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 5, industries in these cases tended to be more 
reputation conscious, “very open and transparent”, 237 and built trust quickly with non 
governmental actors. Under these conditions, non-governmental stakeholders and VEPA 
reportedly agreed to allow industry representatives to chair the meetings and suggested they
238 239were “very fair” and called “a spade a spade even to [their] own s ta ff’.
Third, the risk of such industry chairs, or less than “neutral” hired mediators, to act in a 
biased manner was reportedly checked by the presence of a VEPA officer. Indeed, consistent 
with expectations of some authors, this final condition was reported to ensure a degree of 
fairness to the process in both types of EIP sub cases.240 As one industry respondent explained, 
they saw the VEPA officer’s presence as:
Mak[ing] sure that we’re consulting and that we’re being reasonable and 
listening and where opportunities for improvement are available that we take 
those on board.241
These three elements were reported to have resulted in local residents being able to 
genuinely participate in decision making, setting and consenting to targets, and shaping 
substantive agendas on local pollution issues such as noise, amenity, odour and dust.242
However, the findings suggested that such conditions for balancing power were not always 
effective in fostering fair negotiation processes. For instance, when it came to broader and more 
technical issues such as greenhouse gas and waste water, industry appeared to often dominate 
decision making and overpower non governmental actors’ decision making capacities. 243
In addition to the issues regarding countervailing powers raised below, three main reasons 
appeared to explain this occurrence. First, even though “power balancing” mechanisms 
encouraged industry to reveal information to non-governmental actors about these technical
234 Interview 174, Industry.
235 Interview 174, Industry.
236 Interview 182, Local Resident.
237 Interview 151, Industry; Interview 133, Local Resident; Interview 132, EPA.
238 Interview 133, Local Resident; Interview 132, EPA.
239 Interview 132, EPA.
240 Freeman, n 12 at 32.
241 Interview 142, Industry.
242 Cohen and Sabel, n 12 at 323; Gray B, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground fo r Multiparty Problems (Jossey- 
Bass, 1989) p 8-9.
243 Farber, n 49 at 24; Steinzor, n 49 fn 97 page 18 o f “p df’.
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issues, non-governmental stakeholders who were interested in such issues commonly reported244 
that such information was “too technical for us to say what to do”.245 VEPA officers confirmed 
this fact, suggesting: “with technical details and the actual actions and improvements, the 
community has a very minor input”.246
Respondents also reported that a second reason why industry tended to dominate this 
decision making process was that they either consciously or unconsciously exploited their 
knowledge advantage. Indeed, consistent with some authors’ fears247 one industry respondent 
suggested they could dazzle and placate local residents easily enough by using technical 
information and setting targets that were largely in the industry’s interest. As they implied: “if 
you get out ahead of them, then they’ll just sit there and listen”.248 Such direct intent to 
manipulate appeared rare, and capture certainly appeared to be the exception rather than the rule 
(see chapter 7). Even so, most industry respondents did admit that they made the majority of 
decisions in the EIP on technical issues, with either cursory or no input from local residents. As 
one industry put it “to be candid I would say most of the time about 85-90% is generally 
prepared by us”.249
Of course it is not entirely surprising that industry would make a greater contribution to 
technical decisions about its own performance and operations than residents or other non 
governmental actors who know nothing about industry itself. However, most respondents felt 
that industry tended to assert their targets and actions on these broader environmental issues 
without much genuine discussion or negotiation. As one VEPA officer described their 
perception of the decision making process regarding such technical issues:
when [the industry] would come in and they’d give a presentation on each 
part of it, like biosolids or effluent needs, there wasn’t a great deal of
250discussion - so then it would go into the EIP.
The final reason that industry was able to exploit their technical knowledge advantage in
25 1 m itheir favour echoes concerns such as those expressed by NEG commentator Steinzor. That is, 
government officers were “overwhelmed” or too passive in their role of evaluating technical
244 There was a minority o f respondents who suggested local residents were able to question leading industries about 
setting targets on some broader issues, however in general this appeared to be rare and limited in impact; Interview 
211, EPA.
245 Interview 162, Local Resident; Another respondent pointed out: “They use words that you don’t understand and 
that’s where you get caught”; Interview 173, Local Resident.
246 Interview 181, EPA.
247 Farber, n 49 at 24.
248 Interview 184, Industry.
249 Interview 131, Industry.
250 Interview, 123, EPA; Similar forms of dominance are discussed in: Fung A, Empowered Participation Reinventing 
Urban Democracy (Princeton UP, 2004) p 25.
2:11 Steinzor, n 49, page 19 of “pd f’; See also Fung and Wright, n 4, p 265.
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issues at stake than acting in the public interest (an issue I return to discuss in the accountability 
chapter). Indeed, some VEPA officers characterised their role as little more than to “sit there 
and watch and let the parties sort it out between them”.252 Further, they reportedly provided little 
of the needed and expected technical support (see above section 6.4), nor training to improve 
the capacity of non governmental stakeholders to meaningfully participate in the process. As 
one local resident lamented:
the majority of time it's the company that formulates what they can rectify 
and what can be put on the EIP to be done. Now this is where I think EPA 
should come in and say hey what about having a look at that area down there 
but they haven’t done that.253
Given these power imbalances in EIP decision-making, as well as problems raised in 
RNRM and NEIP, I want to now turn to consider the extent and impact of the countervailing 
power role played by environmental interest groups that were present in 2 NEIP sub cases and 3 
EIP sub cases.
6.3.3.2 Environmental interest groups as countervailing powers
Comparative findings between these few sub cases involving countervailing powers 
suggest that consistent with Fung and Wright’s expectations “home grown” or local factions of 
state environmental groups possessed some of the necessary organisational competencies to 
collaborate in a countervailing role.254 To illustrate, across the 3 EIP sub cases, local adversarial 
groups concerned with nature conservation were reported to be able to directly engage with and 
push industry on certain technical and bigger picture “environmental issues” such as 
biodiversity, the impacts of sewage on oceans or impacts on the local fauna and flora. As one 
EPA officer from EIP sub case 3 explained:
[the environmental groups] provide guidance to the [industry] about how to 
select the species and that type of thing, biodiversity is another one... So 
they do drive the company.255
Although the dominance of industrial or development interest was of less concern in the 
NEIP sub cases, local environmental interest group were still heralded as a key non 
governmental stakeholder who could engage more directly with government agencies on 
environmental issues, rather than “sit back” as local residents had done. For example, as one 
VEPA officer illustrated:
252 Interview 113, EPA. Steinzor, n 49, page 19 of “pd f’; Fung and Wright, n 4, p 265.
253 Interview 162, Local Resident.
254 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 266, 284.
255 Interview 132, EPA.
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the [government] organisations would put themselves forward, saying, “yes,
we can do this”...and during that, you’d have [environmental group] going
256“well, how about this, can you do this?”.
However, the findings suggest that this countervailing power role was limited in two 
respects. First, echoing the concerns of some authors, some groups did not always appear to 
have the skills or “vision” to represent the “full” public interest, and tended to “countervail” 
predominantly on technical issues close to the group’s heart, as opposed to the full range of 
technical issues or speaking for “the environment” more generally.257 As one respondent put 
it:258
sometimes these groups can be fairly single-issue focused and, as long as 
they’re part of the environment, is doing all right, bugger the rest, if you
2 5 9know what I mean.
The second and overlapping limiting feature on the countervailing role of these groups was 
that the collaborative nature of the NEG process appeared to limit the “advocacy” or “outsider” 
role for environmental issues (eg. public awareness campaigns, protests).260 Although the 
findings are limited to the extent that there was insufficient data on the experience of all 
environmental interest groups in the sub cases, at least some groups reported becoming 
frustrated and excluded themselves altogether from the collaboration to pursue an advocacy role 
outside the group.261 At the time of my research they had returned to the group to try 
collaborating again. Others continued to participate but pointed out:262
The advocacy role, you’ve almost got to be confronting people. The NEIP 
plan is not about confrontation; it is more about co-operation between the 
groups. You tend to lose that edge to you as a group. It is a very fine line to 
actually tread. We should try to be more active in the NEIP process itself,
256 Interview 211, EPA.
257 Defilippis et al, n 67 at 684; Farber D, “Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of 
Environmental Protection” (2000) U. 111. L. Rev. 61 at 75; Seidenfeld, n 83 at 477; McCloskey M, “The Skeptic: 
Collaboration Has Its Limit”. (1996) May 13 High Country News, www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 
viewed 30 May 2008.
258 “The [local environmental groups]...all lovely people, fairly parochial but that’s their role in life “ Interview 214, 
Government Agency.
259 Interview 123, EPA.
260 Sturm, n 55, p 331.
261 As one respondent put it: “it got to a point where [the environmental interest group] used to come to some of these 
neighbourhood meetings and it was very acrimonious, very acrimonious. They play the man, not the ball as a 
tactic...[they] wouldn’t speak to anybody at [the industry] and I’d be trying to again mediate saying to both [industry] 
and [the environmental interest group], for goodness sake get your head out o f the trenches and just realise that 
you’ve probably got more in common than not...eventually they excluded themselves from this process”; Interview 
121, EPA.
262 Even in RNRM case similar reflections were made by state level representatives about the difficulties faced by the 
few environmental groups that were represented in regional groups: “the conservation groups are struggling because 
its difficult to get their views through”; Interview 324, State Government Agency.
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probably more advocating than just what we’ve been doing...I think we need 
to have a stronger view outside the NEIP as an advocate group.263
As the quote above suggests, even though collaboration may constrain the advocacy role, 
some groups were clearly aware of this challenge and were reflexively thinking about or 
actively trying to resolve the two approaches. It may be that as collaboration proceeds, groups 
develop greater capacity to synthesise their dual roles. Exploring this issue should be an 
important priority for future research. Nevertheless, based on the available findings it appears 
that while groups can perform countervailing power roles, the extent and success of these roles 
may be constrained by local groups in limited skills or political vision and/or their capacity to 
“walk the fine line” of collaborating and advocating.264
Arguably a far more pressing weakness across the cases is the sheer absence of any form 
of countervailing power (no matter how limited). The question that accordingly needs to be 
asked is “what others forms or ways of mobilising countervailing powers may be available?” In 
this regard, the findings in the RNRM case pointed to the development of what appeared to be a 
promising and somewhat novel structure for mobilising countervailing powers.265
This structure initially emerged at the Queensland state level in 2002 in the form of 
“Regional Groups Collective” (RGC). The RGC is a collaborative organisation comprised 
primarily of the chairs of each regional body in Queensland. It operates at the state, as opposed 
to the regional scale, and thus created a new “higher” level institutional organisation in 
RNRM’s nested governance arrangements.266 The reason this organisation was created included 
giving regional bodies “a joint voice”,267 however, it also provided “communication networks at 
a state level with key stakeholder organisations” in RNRM.268
This networking provided the opportunity for state based sources of countervailing powers 
to enter RNRM. In particular, because RCG was “removed” from collaborative regional 
decision making (i.e. environmental groups were free to work with it without becoming a 
formal member of a collaborative group), and operated at the state level, the barriers of scale
263 Interview 218, Environmental Interest Group.
264 Farber, n 257 at 75; Sturm, n 55, p 331; Taylor M, “Community Participation in the Real World: Opportunities and 
Pitfalls in New Governance Spaces” (2007) 44(2) Urban Studies 297 at 312.
265 While novel in its design, the structure discussed below appears to resonate with the broad vision of national 
environmental organisations working to ensure a deeply participatory local process as discussed in Sabel C, Fung A 
and Karkkainen B, “Beyond Backyard Environmentalism” (1999) October/November Boston Review 1 at 12.
266 Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources
135 at 143.
267 Interview 341, Regional Body.
268 Indeed the RCG is to act on behalf o f the regional bodies across the state and conduct “advocacy on issues of  
common interest to Regional Bodies at a state level”; Interview 349, Regional Group Collective; Queensland 
Regional Natural Resource Management Groups Collective, Strategy
http://www.regionalgroupscollective.com.au/01 cms/details.asp?k id=29 viewed 30 May 2008.
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mismatches and adversarial framings that had prevented state groups from participating in 
RNRM were side stepped.
RGC accordingly was able to link with state based environmental groups which had not 
participated in regional decision-making.269 Using a government grant obtained through the 
RNRM program to support the RCG and more importantly the public environmental group 
(which are notoriously under resourced),270 the two bodies used the funding and their respective 
networks and knowledge to improve engagement of environment interest groups at lower 
regional levels of collaboration, taking on something of a capacity builder role for 
countervailing powers.271 This included flying environmental interest groups into regions to act 
as “proxy” representatives on regional bodies that lacked environmental representative. As the 
environmental group reported:
they’ve got people from the [city] flying into the [regional area] to engage 
with the [regional body]. W e’ve got people from [environmental interest 
group in regional A] going into [regional group C] to engage there as well.272
At the time of research, the data remained limited in terms of how successful or sustainable 
these attempts to improve environmental representation had been, or whether RGC had opened 
up other ways for state groups to be involved in RNRM. However, at the very least the above 
structure provides a demonstration of the kinds of avenues that may provide opportunities for 
greater environmental voice in NEG processes. Based on the above, the key elements to this 
support structure for countervailing powers were (i) a nested collaboration approach, with levels 
that provided different avenues for different environmental groups to determine the scale and 
nature of their participation; and (ii) availability of government funding to support under funded 
groups.
6.4 Summary and implications
This chapter has examined the conditions under which NEG can achieve meaningful 
participation and deliberation. It did this by examining the experience of non-governmental 
actors involved in the three case studies and revealed a range of insights into these under 
researched but vital processes for achieving “good” NEG.273
269 Interview 318, Environmental Group.
270 “So [we’re] skating on very thin ice in regard to it’s financial viability, so w e’re busily trying to get out there with 
the begging hat, begging bowl in a sense.” Interview 318, Environmental Group.
271 Margerum, n 266 at 141.
272 Interview 318, Environmental Interest Group.
273 Collaborative Democracy Network, n 1 at 169; Karkkainen, n 3 at 239; Karkkainen, n 1, p 222-223.
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Taken as a whole, the above analysis suggests that in all but rare cases, there are very 
substantial difficulties in fully satisfying the participatory and deliberative aspirations of 
NEG.274 These relate in particular to the challenges of negotiated decision making and achieving 
“balanced” representation and inclusiveness of affected actors within (but also outside) a 
geographically defined demo.
Resonating with recent empirical research in other NEG contexts, 275 the investigation 
identified deficits in all cases regarding inclusiveness and representativeness, and pointed to the 
potential for NEG to largely disenfranchise environmental interest group stakeholders.276 
Among these gaps, NEIP sub case 3 and the majority of EIP sub cases were the only NEG 
examples where “ordinary” citizens were mobilised to such an extent as to approximate an 
“empowered community” as conceived by NEG theorisation.277 Even so, it was only in the rare 
example of the NEIP 3 sub case that these citizens were considered to have achieved a degree of 
balanced representation. Furthermore, more powerful interests often stymied the opportunities 
for those who did participate (and even those who were consulted) to input into decisions. The 
EIP case appeared to give non-government stakeholders opportunities to meaningfully engage 
in decision making on issues that impacted upon them. However, their impact and influence 
over broader environmental issues appeared to be constrained by inevitably more powerful 
industry. NEIP and RNRM case also evidenced the tendencies of government to constrain 
opportunities for meaningful non-government input.
Critics of NEG and doubters of its participatory and deliberative aspirations might 
conclude from the above that their concerns are well founded.278 However, it does not necessary 
follow that the three cases were completely undemocratic in their processes, entirely lacking in 
significant participation or wholly subject to the whim of the most powerful.279
On the contrary, it is important to remember that inclusive, representative and deliberative 
criteria are ideals that may never be fully realised in practice. All three cases did include 
representation from a wide array of affected individuals, non-government organisations, and
274 Samuelson C, Vedlitz A, Whitten G, Matlock M, Alston L Peterson T and Gilbertz S, “Citizen participation and 
Representation in Collaborative Engagement Processes” in P Sabatier, W Focht, M Lubell, Z Trachtenberg, A Vedlitz 
and M Matlock (eds) (2005) Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 
2005 )p 166.
275 Abel T and Stephan M, ‘T he Limits of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 44 American Behavioral Scientist 614 at 
625; Moore, n 10.
276 McCloskey, n 257; Koontz T and Thomas C, “What Do We Know and Need to Know About the Environmental 
Outcomes o f Collaborative Management” (2006) December Public Administration Review 111 at 113.
277 Fung and Wright, n 8; Collaborative Democracy Network, n 1 at 168.
278 Steinzor, n 49, page 19, 20 of “p d f’; Tushnet, n 131, p 170; Steinzor, n 147 at 142-143; Lane M, “Critical issues in 
regional natural resource management”, Paper prepared for the Australian State of the Environment Committee 2006 
(DEH, 2006) at 7-9, http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/nrm-issues/pubs/nrm- 
issues.pdf viewed 20 May 2008.
279 Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and Matlock M, “Conclusions and Recommendations” 
in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: 
Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 282.
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private interests. Further, the deficits in the array of interests and/or
underprivileged/marginalised stakeholders did not appear to arise from calculated efforts to
280 281 exclude them. Indeed, the opposite appeared to be the case. Organisers and government
officers all sought to include wider representation, but failed primarily due to matters of prior
institutional design and/or other capricious factors beyond their control.282 Moreover, although
negotiations and decision-making were often disproportionately shaped by more powerful
interests, non-government respondents in EIP, NEIP and RNRM were still able to input their
views and impact on actions to resolve pertinent environmental problems.
Most importantly, the weaknesses identified above do not imply that NEG’s desires for 
enhancing participation and deliberation more generally are necessarily a sham or somehow 
inherently flawed per se. Rather, the above findings serve to raise questions about how far the 
mechanisms and conditions for enhancing meaningful participation and deliberation might be 
reshaped so as to further contribute to achieving “good” NEG. Some suggestions for 
“reshaping” these conditions are outlined below, commencing with the issue of participation.
In broad terms, the findings are consistent with the limited empirical research so far 
conducted on the issues of participation and inclusiveness. This suggests that “open door” 
policies are unlikely to be sufficient in themselves to even loosely approximate the 
representative ideal283 and that the deficits of this approach are not adequately resolved by 
government support, oversight and imposed procedural requirements. Indeed, the findings 
suggested that in all but the most exceptional circumstances,284 these conditions were ultimately 
beholden to (i) the urgency of the problem and the stake people had in it; and (ii) the time, 
resource and skills burdens imposed by the NEG program.
The key implication here is the importance of designing and contextualizing mobilization 
efforts to account for both the nature and impacts of the environmental issue and the relevant 
socio demographic characteristics of desired participants.285 For example, the findings suggest 
that time and skill demands act as significant impediment to representation from ordinary 
people, marginalised populations and other affected groups. What may be needed then is 
appropriate training, language support and/or funding (eg. rebates more commensurate with 
time and skill demands) to reduce these barriers and impart the necessary foundational
280 Parkinson also points to the need for them to be sufficiently stable; Parkinson, n 23, p 25.
281 Lubell et al, n 279, p 281-282.
282 Lubell et al, n 279, p 281-282.
283 Abel and Stephan, n 275 at 625; Bidwell, R and Ryan C, “Collaborative Partnership Design: The Implications o f  
Organizational Affiliation for Watershed Partnerships” (2006) 19(9) Society and Natural Resources 827 at 840; 
Marshall B and Jones R, “Citizen Participation In Natural Resource Management: D oes Representativeness Matter?” 
(2005) 25 (6) Sociological Spectrum 715 at 733.
284 That is, where affected interests are extremely small and have high stakes in the problem (e.g. NEIP 3).
285 Marshall and Jones, n 283 at 733; Fung, n 31 at 342.
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capacities. These inferences resonate with similar suggestions made by other NEG authors.286 
Notably, such funding support may be vital if NEG experiments expect citizens to act as 
informal accountable “representatives” of non-participants.287 As we saw, the findings suggest 
individual citizens, as opposed to groups, are unlikely to have the capacity or desire to fulfil a 
principal agent representation role.
Furnishing NEG with funding, however, introduces complicating factors.288 Among other 
dangers, the findings in RNRM cases revealed that adequately reimbursing volunteers might not 
be sufficient to overcome representation deficits. Indeed, confirming Taylor’s work in the UK, 
the RNRM findings suggest that such a strategy may do more to reward “usual suspect groups” 
than to encourage new and more representative participants.289 The findings caution theories and 
experiments that advocate additional funding, suggesting it will serve to further skew
290representation.
Where interests are diffuse (such as in RNRM and the other NEIP sub cases) the findings 
also suggested there may be a need for institutions and efforts to link people’s everyday 
concerns with the environmental and natural resource issues being addressed.291 This may 
involve ongoing and extensive “educational programs” or other community events that cater to 
affected citizens within and/or outside the local area such as suggested by Abers292 and Marshall 
and Jones.293 Without these features, the findings reveal that NEG participation may well be 
confined to “usual suspects”, rather than achieving popular participatory governance.294 In short, 
most citizens at a local level will be unlikely to have a greater voice, and those people who are 
already active on the issue will continue to be the major political players.295
Turning to decision making, all three cases found evidence of deliberative negotiation, 
albeit sometimes lapsing into strategic bargaining.296 However, the findings in the NEIP and 
RNRM cases suggest governmental agencies may often dominate decision-making processes. 
As in some other NEG studies297 this occurred because of an imbalance in skills and capacities
286 Taylor M and Warburton D, “Legitimacy and the Role o f UK Third Sector Organizations in the Policy Process” 
(2003) 14(3) International Journal o f Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 321 at 331; Bidwell and Ryan, n 283 at 
840; Fung and Wright, n 8, p 29; Thomas, n 148, p 166.
287 Taylor M, W ilson M, Purdue D and W ilde P, Changing Neighbourhoods Lessons from  the JRF Neighbourhood  
Program  (Policy Press, 2007) p 29; Strum, n 55, p 331; Mansbridge, n 76, p 194
288 Taylor, n 114, p i 85.
289 Taylor, n 114, p 185.
290 Cohen and Sabel, n 12 at 335.
291 Abers, n 32, p 207.
292 Abers, n 32, p 207.
293 Marshall and Jones, n 283 at 733-734.
294 Abel and Stephan, n 275 at 625.
295 Abel and Stephan, n 275 at 625.
296 Sturm, n 55, p 331.
297 Whelan and Oliver, n 82 at 133. See more generally: Steinzor, n 49 at fn 41, page 9 o f  “p d f’; Head, n 61 at 31; 
Lawrence and Cheshire, n 61, p 7.
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and/or opportunities to control decision-making afforded by the legal framework. How far 
governments are willing or even capable of assuming the supportive and empowering role 
expected of them by NEG experiments is an open question.298 Certainly in the present study, 
power was at times abused by government to undermine genuine input of non-governmental 
stakeholders in decision-making.299 This was most common where government had a veto 
power over decisions, citizens receive no funding for technical research/knowledge, and the 
government had a high “stake” in the issue (i.e. agencies made significant public investment in 
the program and/or undertook to implement actions and policies).
Of course, in such cases, government is often endowed with veto powers for vital 
accountability purposes (as we will see in chapter 7). However, from the perspective of this 
chapter, alternative institutional designs and mechanisms for ensuring such accountability may 
be needed if government is to be disabused of the notion that it simply knows best (as in 
R.NRM) or to otherwise avoid tendencies for it to indirectly exploit its “trump card” (as in 
NEIP) and thus allow non governmental actors to achieve meaningful input into decision 
making. Analysing what these structures may be is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the 
tendency for government to dominate decision-making revealed by the study does highlight this 
issue as a priority for future research.300
The findings also imply the importance of designing other mechanisms canvassed in the 
'JEG literature to enhance the meaningful input of non-governmental stakeholders. For 
example, provision of education and training in deliberation and problem solving may improve 
x)th government and non-government actors’ adherence to ideals of negotiation.301 Funding and 
echnical support, such as provided in RNRM, may also play an important role in avoiding 
government officers dazzling the uninitiated.302 As the experience of “civic environmentalism” 
n the United States also suggests, opportunities for non governmental actors to input into 
lecision making may be more likely to arise under conditions where decision making is centred 
iround a more “independent” person who represents no particular substantive interest (as 
>pposed to a local government sponsor whose stake in the issues that were being dealt with lead 
hem to dominate NEIP decision making).303 Finally, countervailing power structures may also 
provide a promising way to help balance power disparities (I return to summarise these below).
38 Defilippis et al, n 62 at 684; Abers, n 32, p 200-201.
39 Head, n 36, p 148 -149; Head, n 61 at 31; Paton S, Curtis A, McDonald G and W oods M, “Regional Natural 
lesource Management: Is It Sustainable” (2004) 11 Australasian Journal o f  Environmental Management 259 at 263; 
Vhelan and Oliver, n 82 at 133
30 Leach, n 2 at 108.
31 Fung, n 250, p 26.
32 Fung, n 250, p 25; Steinzor, n 49 at fn 41, page 9 o f  “p d f’.
33 John D and Mlay M, “Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic Environmentalism” in 
¡exton K, Marcus A, William Easter K and Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental D ecisions Strategies fo r  
•overnments, Businesses and Communities (Island Press, 1999) p 360; John, n 18, p 234.
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Beyond this, the findings in the EIP case partially  confirmed suggestions in the literature 
that the use of mediators, agency assistance, and mechanisms such as VEPA and community 
pressure can effectively balance power differences which are sufficient for the purposes of 
negotiation.304 However, while these conditions were effective for local issues, when knowledge 
and capacity differences between non governmental stakeholders and industry were amplified 
(i.e. more technical issues), the findings suggested that industry was able to exploit their 
technical knowledge and capacity to dominate decision making and overwhelm government 
officers.305 Indeed, where knowledge imbalances are large (eg. between industry and local 
resident) then fair deliberative decision-making may require conditions such as funding for 
technical assistance, training in deliberation (as discussed above), and effective countervailing
306power.
In terms of the latter, the findings provide empirical support for a range of conjectures 
made in the NEG literature regarding environmental interest group participation. First, it was 
clear that national or state located groups are typically adverse to or incapable of collaboration 
at local levels.307 Second, local or local factions of environmental groups were more inclined 
than state/national groups to participate in NEG, 308 and were found to have played a 
countervailing role on a number of issues, offsetting the dominance of both industry and 
government.
However, echoing the concerns of other authors,309 and empirical research in watersheds in 
the USA,310 the findings also revealed that local groups were widely underrepresented across the 
cases, either because they were absent in locales or possessed cognitive frames incompatible 
with collaboration.311 Further, the countervailing role of these groups was constrained by a 
narrow political vision and/or by the challenges of synthesising a collaborative and advocacy 
role, suggesting there may be limits to the capacity of local environmental groups to act as a 
countervailing power.312
As to how the lack of countervailing power (at both local and state level) might best be 
mitigated, the RGC example within the RNRM study suggested two key factors. First, nested 
collaborative organization operating at multiple scales appeared to provide more opportunities 
for engaging state based environmental groups that were typically mismatched with NEG in
304 Farber, n 49 at 24; Steinzor, n 49 at fn 97 page 18 o f  “p d f’.
305 Farber, n 49 at 24; Steinzor, n 49 at fn 97 page 18 o f  “p d f’.
306 Fung and Wright, n 4 p 265; Steinzor, n 49 at page 19 o f “p d f’.
307 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 280-282.
308 Fung and Wright, n 4, p 284.
309 Defilippis et al, n 62 at 684; Farber, n 257, p 75. Seidenfeld, n 83 at 477; M cCloskey, n 257.
310 Leach, n 2 at 108.
311 Karkkainen, n 83 at 962-963; Fung and Wright, n 4, p 283-284.
312 Karkkainen, n 83 at 962-963; Fung and Wright, n 4, p 283-284.
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scale and framing.313 As we saw, this engagement at higher levels can also have benefits for 
mobilising countervailing powers at lower levels. However for this to occur, the second key 
factor appeared vital, that is, government funding. This was needed to support an under 
resourced environmental group to both enhance their involvement and to actively engage other 
local groups in collaborative forums. These two key elements resonate with those aspects of the 
NEG literature that suggest (i) nested structures may improve representation of environmental 
or other groups in collaboration;314 and (ii) funding is important to assisting cash strapped 
environmental groups to participate in NEG.315
To conclude, this chapter has identified and elaborated the challenges NEG experiments 
confront in pursuing the ideal of participatory and deliberative governance. It has critically 
examined a range of mechanisms that many in the NEG literature suggest might lead to “good” 
NEG and approximate a participatory and deliberative ideal. Departing from some of these 
proposals, its analysis suggests that there are a number of key conditions that, individually or in 
combination, might best be used to mitigate, if not overcome these participatory and 
deliberative challenges.316
However, what this chapter hasn’t done is examine the consequences of the identified 
deficits in participatory representation and deliberation, both of which have the potential to 
undermine the public interest and result in underperformance. This is part of the task of the 
following chapter, which along with examining “learning and adaptation”, assesses the efficacy 
of “new” forms of accountability that have been designed to prevent such defects across the 
cases.
313 Margerum, n 266, at 148.
314 Margerum, n 266 at 145.
3,5 Farber, n 257 at 75.
316 Samuelson et al, n 274, p i 66.
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Chapter 7: Accountability and Learning
7.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the empirical investigation of the question: under what conditions 
can “good” NEG be achieved. It focuses on two characteristics of good NEG: “new” forms of 
accountability and learning and adaptation.
Accountability itself is one of those concepts that is hard for anyone to be against.' It is 
intended to prevent the abuse of public authority, ensure that public resources are used 
appropriately, and secure performance expectations of governance endeavours.2
Accountability in NEG tends to emphasise flexible rules and deference to the discretion of 
agencies and non-government actors.3 This is commonly played out within two broad regimes, 
namely process and performance based approaches. Process approaches involve management- 
based systems where industry is given responsibility for adhering to a plan to limit regulated 
harms.4 Performance-based approaches give regulated actors discretion to determine how best to 
achieve prescribed results, rather than following processes or implementing prescribed actions 
or technologies.5
Some authors suggest there is significant potential for rent seeking behaviour, unprincipled 
deal making and capture under NEG process or performance based approaches.6 Others claim 
NEG in fact offers new opportunities for accountability to be secured and even enhanced 
through replacing or supplementing traditional accountability controls with a range of “new” 
forms and mechanisms of accountability, such as “mutual” accountability between
' Bovens M, “Analysing and A ssessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” (2007) 13(4) European Law  
Journal 447 at 448.
2 May P, “Regulatory Regim es and Accountability” (2007) 1 Regulation & Governance 8 at 11.
3 Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” (1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 1 at 2, 96;
Posner P, “Accountability Challenges o f Third-Party Government” in Salamon L (ed), The Tools o f  G overnm ent a 
Guide to the New Governance  (Oxford UP, 2002) p 524; May, n 2 at 9,11; Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem  
Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review  
943 at 961.
4 May, n 2 at 8.
5 May, n 2 at 8.
6 See for example discussions o f  these concerns in Steinzor R, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: the 
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control” (1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103 at 141-43; Farber D, 
“Triangulating the Future o f Reinvention: Three Emerging M odels o f  Environmental Protection” (2000) U. 111. L. 
Rev. 61 at 74; Dana D , “The N ew  "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation” (2000) U. 111. L. Rev. 35 
at 52-57; Fung A and Wright E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening D em ocracy: Institutional Innovations in Em powered P articipatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 21- 
22, 36-37; Markell D, "Slack" in the Administrative State and its Implications For Governance: the Issue of  
Accountability” (2005) 84 Or. L. Rev. 1 at 56-57; Doremus H, “Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, 
and the Institutional Challenges o f "New Age" Environmental Protection” (2001) 41 Washburn L.J. 50 at 52, 88; 
Karkkainen, n 3 at 963.
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collaborators7 and “professional” accountability of industries.8 This chapter examines the 
operation of these “new” forms and approaches to accountability in practice.
In addition to focusing on accountability, this chapter also focuses on learning and 
adaptation (“learning”). 9 Learning approaches vary between NEG experiments. Some 
emphasise “process based” learning - establishing management frameworks to guide and 
encourage industries to undertake self-reflective thinking and learning about their 
environmental impacts.10 So-called “passive” adaptive management is also common to NEG, 
which involves heightened monitoring of key indicators and subsequent adjustments to policies 
in light of what is learned.11 Finally, some experiments utilise “systemic” learning, which is 
designed to share information between adaptive collaborative groups and agencies, diffusing 
innovation and facilitating the continual adaptation of policy.12
Regardless of the approach, learning is vital for equipping NEG to manage and respond to 
the inevitability of change and the complex and dynamic nature of environmental problems.13 
Accordingly, this chapter examines the challenge of implementing effective learning in 
practice.14
One may of course ask why this chapter has paired accountability and learning as the focus 
of inquiry? At a general level, the answer is that these two issues are broadly interrelated. They 
often depend on the same monitoring processes to produce information vital for both holding
7 See for example Weber E, “The Question o f Accountability in Historical Perspective: from Jackson to 
Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem Management” (1999) 31(4) Administration and Society 451 at 453;
W ondolleck J and Yaffee S, Making Collaboration Work L essons from  Innovation in Natural Resource M anagement 
(Island Press, 2000) p 238; Freeman J and Färber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law  
Journal 795 at 905-908; Freeman J, “The private role in public governance” (2000) 75 N .Y.U. L. Rev. 543 at 665.
8 Freeman, n 7 at 665; Freeman J, “The Contracting State” (2000) 28 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 155 at 198-201; Weber, n 7 
at 455; Freeman, n 3 at 22, 96.
9 For convenience the term “learning” will be used to refer to learning and adaptation throughout this chapter.
10 See Holley C and Gunningham N , “Environment Improvement Plans: Facilitative Regulation in Practice” (2006)
23 EPLJ 448; Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002) p 180; Fiorino D, 
“Flexibility” in Durant R, Fiorino D and O ’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered  (MIT Press, 
2004) p 415-416; This is similar to reflexive law approaches - see for example: Orts E, “Reflexive Environmental 
Law” (1995) 89 Northwestern University Law Review 1227 at 1253-1254.
11 For use o f the term “passive” as it relates to adaptive management see Karkkainen B, “Panarchy and Adaptive 
Change: Around the Loop and Back Again“ (2005) 7 M innesota Journal o f  Law, Science & Technology 59 at 62, 70- 
72.
12 See for example Karkkainen B, Fung A and Sabel C, “After Backyard Environmentalism Toward a Performance 
Based Regime of Environmental Protection” (2000) 44(4) American Behavioral Scientist 690 at 691; Karkkainen B, 
“Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia Environmental 
Law Journal 189 at 243.
13 Orts, n 10 at 1238.
14 This has been raised as a vital question for inquiry by a number o f  scholars. See for example: Head B, 
“Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R and Martin 
J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional D evelopm ent (Ashgate, 2005) p 146; Karkkainen, n 12 at 243; 
Paton S, Curtis A, M cDonald G and W oods M, “Regional Natural Resource Management: Is It Sustainable” (2004)
11 Australasian Journal o f  Environmental Management 259 at 262; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 32; Sturm S, “Gender 
Equity Regimes and the Architecture o f  Learning” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds) Law and New Governance in the 
EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 326-327.
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actors to account and to inform learning.15 They also can share a subtler interrelationship. The 
provisional decision making associated with leaning necessarily requires traditionally strict 
accountability controls to be relaxed in order to provide greater flexibility and room for revision 
as new information comes to hand. While the “new” forms and approaches to accountability16 
discussed above seek to ensure sufficient flexibility for learning, they must do so while 
simultaneously exerting sufficient control to secure accountability.17
As intertwined and distinct features of “good” NEG in their own right, there has been little
• 18research into the existence and operation of accountability, learning and adaptation in practice. 
Under researched questions include: how effective are NEG experiments at monitoring19 and 
what impact does that have for both accountability20 and learning?21 How effective are “new” 
approaches and forms of accountability at preventing perverse outcomes22 without unduly 
constraining the flexibility that is essential for learning and the successful performance of 
NEG?23 How, and to what extent, can local experiments be linked and central monitoring 
conducted successfully to foster effective systemic learning?24
This chapter provides insights into these and other questions by examining three case 
studies in the following three sections. First, section 7.2 begins by taking a close look at the 
legislation and guidelines of the three cases to evaluate how each case was specifically designed
15 W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 241; Thomas C, “Habitat Conservation Planning” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), 
Deepening Dem ocracy: Institutional Innovations in Em powered Participatory Governance  (Verso, 2003) p 153.
16 As others have discussed, accountability can also be a tool to induce learning. For further see Bovens, n 1 at 463- 
464.
17 Freeman, n 3 at 87-91; W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 231-237; Karkkainen, n 3 at 963; Ruhl J, “Regulation by 
Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?” (2005) 7 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 21 (2005) at 54.
IS In relation to the issue o f learning see for example Head, n 14, p 146; Karkkainen, n 12 at 243; Paton et al, n 14 at 
262; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 32. In relation to accountability see for example Weber, n 7 at 454; Fung and Wright, 
n 6, p 37; Karkkainen, n 12 at 237; Sturm, n 14, p 331-334.
19 Gaines S, “Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development” (2002/2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 16; Ewing S, “Catchment Management Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River
S (eds), Managing A ustra lia ’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 408. This included questions relating to how  
and to what extent can government or collaborators meet the significant costs and technical challenges o f  generating 
data to set meaningful baselines on which to judge performance. See Steinzor R, “The Corruption o f  Civic 
Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10909 at page 15 o f “p d f’.
20 Head, n 14, p 145-146; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 31-32; Gaines, n 19 at 16; Sturm, n 14, p 333.
21 Collaborative Democracy Network, “A Call to Scholars and Teachers o f Public Administration, Public Policy, 
Planning, Political Science and Related Fields” (2006) December, Public Administration Review 168 at 169; Head, n 
14, p 145; Thomas, n 15, p 154; Ruhl, n 17 at 5; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 31-32; Sturm, n 14, p 328; Dovers S, 
“Reflecting on Three Decades: a Synthesis” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), M anaging A ustralia’s Environment 
(Federation Press, 2003) p 522-523; Sturm, n 14, p 328.
22 Lane M, “Critical issues in regional natural resource management”, Paper prepared for the Australian State o f  the 
Environment Committee 2006 (DEH, 2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/integrative/nrm- 
issues/pubs/nrm-issues.pdf view ed 20 May 2008; Steinzor, n 19 at page 17 o f  “p d f’; Steinzor, n 6 at 142-143; Fung 
and Wright, n 6, p 36-37.
23 Lawrence G, “Promoting Sustainable Development: the Question o f  Governance” Plenary Address XI World 
Congress o f Rural Sociology, Trondheim Norway, 25-30 July 2004 at 13-14; Sturm, n 14, p 333; Thomas, n 15, p 
156; Freeman J, “Remarks by Professor Jody Freeman to Japanese American Law Society” (2005) 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 
1859 at 1871-1874; Head B, “Letting the Locals Lead” (2004) 122 ECOS  magazine (CSIRO) 30 at 31; Freeman, n 3 
at 96; W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 235-237.
24 Head, n 14, p 146; Karkkainen, n 12 at 243; Paton et al, n 14 at 262; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 32; Dovers, n 21, p 
522-523.
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to achieve accountability and learning. Section 7.3 then analyses how effective both the 
accountability mechanisms and learning approaches were in practice.
While the findings from each case throw up a range of different issues, all three programs 
reveal shortfalls in their different approaches to learning and accountability, the latter in 
particular giving rise to potential capture, unprincipled deal making and rent seeking. Drawing 
from the comparative findings, the chapter’s analysis leads it to identify a number of insights for 
achieving effective learning and accountability. These insights fall into 5 main groupings, 
namely (i) establishing effective monitoring processes; (ii) setting overarching performance 
goals; (iii) fostering effective professional and mutual accountability; (iv) assisting or 
encouraging actors to implement process and adaptive learning approaches; and (iv) designing 
systemic learning structures. These lessons for the NEG literature are summed up in Part 7.4.
Before commencing this analysis a few words are needed to clarify the scope of this 
chapter. While concerned with issues of accountability and learning, properly examining these 
broad, complex and multifaceted concepts for each program would require a far more expansive 
study than the present one. This is particularly the case with issues of accountability as it would 
have been impractical to empirically investigate the full gamut of plausible accountability 
mechanisms and relationships within the scope of this thesis.25 Accordingly, the chapter does 
not evaluate whether each case evidenced a suitable degree of “accountability” per se. Rather its 
analysis is limited to evaluating the effectiveness of some specific forms and mechanisms of 
accountability, most prominently professional accountability, mutual accountability and 
upwards accountability of collaborative groups to agencies.
7.2 Designing “new” forms of accountability and 
learning
In order to facilitate an analysis of whether and how the cases were able to foster 
accountability and learning, this section examines the relevant features of the cases’ legal design 
that may impact on accountability and learning in practice. It proceeds in two main parts. The 
first focuses on accountability. It commences with a general overview of the cases’ approach to 
and “new” forms of accountability, before focusing on some of the more specific design aspects 
of performance based accountability. The second part turns to focus on the cases’ varied 
approaches to learning.
25 For example, this chapter does not investigate accountability structures that relate to political, administrative, 
financial and legal accountability o f  government agencies. Nor does it examine transparency issues relating to 
collaborative groups.
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7.2.1 Accountability
7.2.1.1 Overview of accountability mechanisms
Astute to the risks of capture and rent seeking, the cases have been designed in different 
ways to secure accountability. All tend to relax rigid and traditional bureaucratic controls in 
favour of more flexible standards, discretion,26 and “new” forms of accountability.27 As we saw 
in chapter 4, these include mutual accountability between the collaborators, professional 
accountability of industry, and different forms of government oversight.
These various forms of accountability focus on relationships between different sets of 
actors, for example professional accountability relationships are derived from “internalised” 
sources based on professional norms, while mutual accountability relates to checks and balances
arising between individual collaborators. These relationships can also focus on different aspects
28of conduct. For example, actors may be held to account for economic values. This is evident 
in RNRM where regional bodies are accountable to the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) for
financial probity. Accountability may also relate to social values like fairness and
29effectiveness. For example, industries in EIP may be held to account by local residents for 
successfully reducing local pollution impacts.
For the purposes of this chapter, it is useful to think of these various accountability 
relationships and foci as falling within two broad “groupings” of accountability.30 The first 
grouping consists of accountability relationships regarding rules.31 A key issue here is the 
appropriateness and fairness of the rules developed, such as whether targets or management 
systems developed avoided capture by private interests.32
The second “grouping” of accountability relationships is concerned with the 
implementation of the rules.33 A central concern here is ensuring actors comply with 
implementation requirements or are held accountable for non-compliance so that governance 
ends are achieved.34
26 O f course agencies already had significant discretion under traditional command and control approaches regarding 
the appropriate enforcement response; Markell, n 6 at fn 239.
27 Freeman, n 3; May, n 2 at 23.
28 Bovens, n 1 at 454-455; Scott C, “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27(1) Journal o f  Law and Society
38 at 41; M ay, n 2 at 12.
29 For further see Bovens, n 1 at 454-460; Scott, n 28 at 40-43; M ay, n 2 at 11-12; Fisher E, “The European Union in 
the A ge o f  Accountability” 2004 (24) Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 495 at 501-503; Posner, n 3, p 524.
30 May, n 2 at 11-12.
31 May, n 2 at 11.
32 May, n 2 at 11-12.
33 May, n 2 at 11-12.
34 May, n 2 at 11-12.
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An important distinction between how these two groupings of accountability relationships 
are applied in the cases relates to their focus on process and/or performance based approaches to 
governing. Although all three cases emphasise performance based approaches, the EIP case is 
the only one to include an overlapping “process based” regime. An overview of the basic 
accountability relationships for each case are summarised in Table 7.1 below.
Broadly speaking, the EIP process based approach is underpinned by a prescription of
minimal environmental management processes (e.g. audits and assessments of performance,
35setting environmental objectives and actions, and monitoring of compliance). Industry is to 
develop a management system in accordance with these processes, employing their professional 
expertise in designing the system.36 Industry is also accountable upwards to the VEPA who are 
to ensure the contents of the plan is fair and appropriate.37
Industry is required to adhere to the management system and periodically evaluate and
38report on its implementation to the VEPA. Horizontal accountability relationships between 
industry and independent environmental auditors are also used to evaluate the effectiveness of
the management system. Industry is to make necessary changes based on the auditor’s report,
39but the VEPA has ultimate responsibility to ensure industry implement the plan.
As a number of authors have pointed out, the difficulty with focusing on accountability for 
processes rather than environmental outcomes is that adherence to the process may not always 
guarantee results.40 There is a danger that industries will simply go through the motions, set 
tokenistic goals and pay lip service to the process, ultimately failing to engender any real 
improvements in environmental performance.41
However in contrast to other process based systems such as ISO 14001, the EIP has been
expressly designed to combat this weakness by employing a complementary performance based
42regime that seeks to ensure environmental targets and outcomes are identified and achieved. 
The difference between this approach and the overlapping process based approach in EIP is its 
emphasis on outcomes rather than processes.
Along with the EIP, the other two cases also follow a performance based approach. The 
first “grouping” of accountability here involves setting performance targets. The three cases all
35 VEPA, Environment Improvement Plans -  An O verview  (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 2.
36 Manring N, “The Politics o f Accountability in National Forest Planning” (2005) 37(1) Administration and Society
57 at 61; May, n 2 at 10, 13.
37 Scott, n 28 at 43.
38 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f  Environment Improvement P lans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) at 10.
39 VEPA, n 38, p 9-10.
40 Fiorino, n 10, p 415.
41 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 180.
42 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 170.
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43require collaborations to set measurable targets to achieve minimum performance outcomes. 
Collaborators are horizontally accountable to each other, and vertically accountable to 
government agencies with oversight of the targets (the VEPA in EIP and NEIP and the JSC in 
RNRM) who are to ensure standards are fair and appropriate.
Having developed targets, collaborative groups are then required to adhere to them and 
monitor, evaluate and report on their progress. This can involve monitoring actual 
implementation of actions designed to achieve performance standards, as well as monitoring the 
impact of these actions and whether they are achieving the intended targets and outcomes. 
Again, collaborators may hold each other to account for their performance, using shaming or 
peer pressure if compliance is not forthcoming.44 The collaborative is also accountable to the 
overarching government agency, which can intervene to address non-compliance.45
As discussed in chapter 4, in the EIP program, underperformance can lead to VEPA
threatening to amend industry’s licence and/or pursue regulatory sanctions.46 In NEIP, the
program has been designed to utilise an as yet untested contractual mechanism, which involves
the NEIP plan being gazetted by the VEPA, making the voluntary actions signed on by the
partners binding at law and thus subject to consequences if the plan is breached.47 Finally, in
RNRM, problems in regional body expenditure or achievement of targets is to be addressed by
48the JSC utilising an administrative “destabilisation right”. This gives the JSC the power to
intervene on evidence of underperformance or financial impropriety to conduct an evaluation,
critique procedures, skills and capacities of representatives or membership structure of the body.
It is then left to the regional body to respond to the critique and improve its performance,
49subject to ongoing reports to JSC on improvements.
43 W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 240; Karkkainen, n 3 at 993-997.
44 O f course there are other “forums” to which actors may be held accountable (e.g. collaborators representing a non 
government group may be accountable to the wider group members) however for the purposes o f  this chapter’s 
research the two m ost important forums include collaborators them selves, and government agencies.
45 May, n 2 at 10-11.
46 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 180.
47 While this mechanism remains untested, the intention appears to be that a failure to fulfill the terms o f  the plan will 
constitute a breach o f  law, ideally giving VEPA something o f  a “whip hand” to discipline actors and ensure 
accountability for implementation and performance. Environment Protection A ct 1970  (Vic), s 19AI(4) Karkkainen B, 
“Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and New  
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006) p 316-317.
48 While there are multiple government agencies and ministerial bodies that have a role in overseeing aspects o f the 
program, the JSC has the most direct accountability relationship to regional body. This relationship exists pursuant to 
a “partnership agreement” between regional body and government; see B ilateral Agreement between the 
Commonwealth o f  Australia and the State o f  Queensland To D eliver the Natural H eritage Trust, August 2004  (Cth, 
Qld), ss 69, 71, 94, Attachment J, 8.5 (hereafter Bilateral Agreement NHT); An Agreem ent between the 
Commonwealth o f  Australia and the State o f  Queensland fo r  the Implementation o f  the Intergovernm ental Agreement 
on a National Action Plan fo r  Salinity and W ater Quality, March 2001  (Cth and Qld), ss 8.1, 14.1 (here after Bilateral 
Agreement NAP).
49 For a discussion o f its operation and relevant section numbers in Bilateral Agreements see the discussion o f  
accountability mechanisms in RNRM in chapter 4. For a general discussion on destabilisation rights see Karkkainen, 
n 47, p 317-320.
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Accountability
grouping
EIP -  Process and 
Performance
NEIP
Performance
RNRM
Performance
Accountability 
for rules and 
standards
• Process: 
o guidelines set
minimum processes to 
be followed (e.g. audits 
and assessments; 
assessment o f  new and 
emerging technology 
etc), 
o Professional 
accountability o f  
industry to develop 
management system in 
accordance with 
guidelines, 
o VEPA determine 
adequacy o f  plan.
• Legislated outcome 
to be achieved: 
“improve the 
quality o f  the local 
environment”.5
• Measurable targets 
to meet this 
outcome are to be 
set (eg. improved 
water or air quality, 
improvements in 
levels o f  
biodiversity, 
reduction in 
pollution).
• Mutual 
accountability 
between 
collaborators to 
ensure standards are 
fair and apposite.
• VEPA retain 
ultimate approval 
over targets.
• Guidelines identify eight 
national outcomes to be 
achieved (eg. ecosystem  
services and functions are 
maintained or 
rehabilitated; the impact o f  
salinity on land and water 
resources is minimized, 
avoided or reduced).
•Guidelines identify 10 
minimum sets o f  matters 
(eg. soil condition, land 
salinity) for which 
measurable long and 
medium term targets for 
improvements in resource 
conditions are to be set (X 
hectares o f  specific native 
vegetation type within 
region at year Y. 
maintained or regenerated)
• Measurable targets for 
shorter term management 
action targets designed to 
progress towards resource 
condition targets are to be 
set against 3 matters (eg. 
improved land and water 
management practices 
adopted, critical assets 
identified and protected).
• Resource condition targets 
are to be informed by 
nationally agreed 
indicators o f  resource 
conditions and these 
indicators are to be used to 
measure the result o f  
management practices.
• Regional body and 
stakeholders mutually 
accountable to each other 
to ensure standards are 
adequate.
• JSC retain ultimate 
approval over targets.
• Performance: 
o Guidelines identify 
outcome to be 
achieved is “improve 
environmental 
performance”, 
o Measurable targets 
are to be set that 
include complying 
and going “beyond- 
compliance” with 
licences and 
regulations, 
o Targets can be stated 
as outright change 
(e.g. Ensure no 
offensive odours are 
discharged beyond 
the boundaries o f  the 
premises) or as a 
percentage (Reduce 
the volume o f  sludge 
wastes by 20 per cent 
within the next two 
years), 
o Mutual accountability 
between collaborators 
to check standards are 
fair and apposite, 
o VEPA retain ultimate 
approval over targets.
50 VEPA, N eighbourhood Environment Im provement Plans -  D eveloping a Voluntary P roposal (Publication 846, 
VEPA, 2002) p 1; Garbutt The Hon. S, Environment Protection (L iveable Neighbourhoods) B ill 2000 (Vic) 2nd 
Reading (Hansard Extract, Legislative Assem bly, 2 /1 1/2000) at 2, 
http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/proiects/NEIPS/docs/protec.pdf viewed 31 May 2008.
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Accountability
grouping
EIP -  Process and 
Performance
NEIP
Performance
RNRM
Performance
Accountability 
in the 
implementation 
o f
Provisions
•Process:
o Industry to follow  
processes, and be 
monitored and 
evaluated by 
independent auditors to 
determine whether plan 
has been adequately 
implemented and is 
operating properly to 
manage environmental 
performance, 
o VEPA and industry 
ensure new system  
redesigned appositely.
• Collaborative group 
is to monitor, 
evaluate and report 
on adherence to 
performance targets 
and compliance 
with actions under 
the plan.
• Mutual 
accountability 
between 
collaborators to 
hold each other to 
account.
•VEPA ensure 
compliance o f  
group to
implementation o f  
actions and 
adherence to 
performance targets.
• Regional bodies to conduct 
and coordinate monitoring, 
evaluation and reporting to 
government regarding:
o in the short term, 
progress against 
management action 
targets, outputs, and 
finances, 
o over the longer term, 
changes in resource 
conditions.
• Regional body 
representatives to hold 
each other to account on 
performance.
•JSC controls investment 
and ensures regional 
bodies’ financial probity 
and performance.
• Performance: 
o Industry self 
monitoring and 
reporting to VEPA and 
collaborative group on 
adherence to 
performance targets, 
o Non government 
collaborators and 
VEPA to evaluate and 
hold industry to 
account for 
implementing actions 
and achieving targets.
Table 7.1: Overview of Accountability Relationships in the EIP, NEIP and RNRM
Cases.51
While the features of performance accountability are broadly similar across the cases, the 
next section takes a closer look at the design of each case to illustrate some subtle (but 
important) differences that may impact on the effectiveness of performance accountability in 
each program.52
7.2.2 Designing accountability for performance
7.2.2.1 Setting performance targets
Fundamental to all three cases’ performance based approach is setting targets which 
collaborative efforts must adhere to. In an attempt to protect the public interest and ensure the 
standards set by groups are fair and credible, legislatures “bound” the decision space of 
collaborative groups and agencies. That is, targets are required to be consistent with relevant
51 May, n 2 at 13.
52 May, n 2.
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environmental quality standards,53 must be set for specified matters, and must contribute to an 
overarching outcome(s).54
The difficulty legislatures face in this process is striking the right balance between 
specificity and generality.55 Overgeneralisation of outcomes could effectively allow them to be 
ignored and invite abuse, such as unprincipled deal making or capture by industry.56 In contrast, 
too much specificity may impede creativity, stymie flexible revision of targets and marginalise 
local context.57
For the present cases, it is the risks associated with overgeneralisation that are of most 
significance. This is particularly so in NEIP and EIP where legislated outcomes are extremely
58broad. EIPs must “improve environmental performance” and set measurable targets. NEIPs are 
required to “improve the quality of local neighbourhood environment” and set measurable 
improvement targets for the issue at hand.59
Neither case provides any further detail on outcomes or matters for target, nor do they 
recommend any indicators to be used in measuring specific issues.60 In contrast, the RNRM 
program offers a significantly greater level of specificity than either NEIP or EIP. For example, 
rather than setting an overarching goal to “improve the quality of the regional environment” the 
program details 8 national outcomes to be achieved, specifies specific natural resource and 
management action matters for targets and recommends indicators to guide the setting of 
measurable targets (see Table 7.1 above and chapter 4).61
53 The EIP involves minimal baselines in so far as targets must meet or go beyond all existing licence or other legal 
requirements (VEPA, n 38, p 7); NEIP collaborations must set objectives that are consistent with and take account of 
applicable laws eg. planning schemes, protection policies or regional catchment strategies (Environment Protection  
Act 1970  (Vic), ss 19AI(3)(b), (h), (i)); RNRM requires consistency with other planning processes and legislative  
requirements (Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, Attachment E, National Guidelines For The Accreditation O f 
Integrated Catchment/Regional Natural Resource Management Plans, p 64).
54 VEPA, n 38, p 11; Environment Protection Act 1970  (Vic), ss 19AH(2), 19AI(2); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, 
ss 80-81, 89; Intergovernmental Agreement NA P, n 48, ss 7, 12;W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 241.
55 Dana, n 6 at 53-54.
56 See for example M cCloskey M, “The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Lim it”. (1996) May 13 High Country News, 
www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article7article id= l 839 viewed 30 May 2008; Farber, n 6 at 74; Koontz T and Thomas C, 
“What do we know and need to know about the Environmental Outcomes o f  Collaborative Management” (2006) 
December Public Administration Review 111 at 113; Karkkainen, n 3 at 961; Dana, n 6 at 53-53; May, n 2; Freeman, 
n 3 at 92-95; Doremus, n 6 at 82.
57 Dana, n 6 at 53-53; Freeman, n 3 at 93.
58 VEPA, n 38, p 9.
59 VEPA, n 50 at 1.
60 For example, there is no requirement for industries to reduce specific em issions such as greenhouse gas in EIP, or 
for NEIP groups to address specific issues such as salinity in creeks. Nor does either case recommend exactly what 
kind o f indicators for say salinity should be used when seeking to measure such conditions (e.g. using electrical 
conductivity to measure salinity in a creek).
61 Cth and Qld, M onitoring and Evaluation Implementation Plan fo r  the N ational (Australian and State) Program s 
(Draft, Cth& Qld, 2004) p 13.
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Whether and to what extent these different degrees of generality in overarching goals are 
successful in bounding decision making by agencies and collaborative groups to avoid “abuse” 
is an issue that is returned to below.62
A second barrier the cases may face in setting appropriate performance targets relates to 
the technical and financial challenges of monitoring environmental conditions to collect 
sufficient data to actually set targets.63 Some authors suggest that the costs and technical skills 
needed to gather data on baseline environmental conditions may overwhelm the resources and 
capacities of groups and even governments, leading to gaps in information needed to measure 
progress and hold groups accountable for achieving results.64
Seemingly aware of these challenges, the cases have all been designed to utilise different 
incentives or provide support to overcome cost and technical deficiencies in these monitoring 
tasks.
The EIP program is the only case which did not provide any direct support for data 
collection.65 This is understandable66 given monitoring requirements under industries’ 
regulatory licences ensure extensive existing data records of point source pollution releases.67 
There will of course be environmental issues for which existing data may not exist,68 however in 
these situations the program’s capacity to harness community pressure or VEPA regulatory 
powers may be effectively utilised to “compel”69 and encourage industry to undertake the costs
70and burdens of baseline data collection.
In contrast to EIP program, the NEIP and RNRM programs have been designed to provide 
collaboratives with more extensive support in the form of available government data on 
environmental conditions,71 as well as varying degrees of funding (RNRM providing
62 Karkkainen, n 3 at 979; Dana, n 6; Markell, n 6 at 56-57.
63 Steinzor, n 19 at page 15-16 o f “p d f’; Steinzor R, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: Back to the Past by 
Way o f the Future” (1998) 28 ELR 10361; Gaines, n 19 at 16; Ewing, n 19, p 408.
64 Steinzor, n 19 at page 15-16 o f  “p d f’; Steinzor, n 63; Gaines, n 19 at 16; Ewing, n 19, p 408.
65 VEPA, n 38, p 7.
66 O f course, in most cases industry is only measuring their pollution releases. It would be far more complicated if, for 
example, industry was expected to measure the changes in environmental conditions brought about by their pollution 
releases.
67 This is due to “assessment and monitoring” requirements under existing industry licences; VEPA, n 38, p 9.
68 Similarly, some negotiated targets may be more com plex, such as managing with biodiversity in wetlands 
established by industry another example in the case studies concerned the impact o f  ocean outfall on aquatic ocean 
environment.
69 This is all the more so in the sub cases involving the most recalcitrant industries which have been compelled under 
law to complete an EIP as the whole EIP process forming apart o f the industry’s licence)
70 See generally discussion in chapter 5. This has been spelled out aptly by Karkkainen, n 3 at 993-997; Karkkainen, n 
47, p 310-314. Others emphasise similar although less developed concepts. See W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 240; 
Karkkainen; Freeman, n 7 at 666; Lobel at 452.
71 State agencies may often have ongoing statutory responsibilities or partnerships with other stakeholders for 
monitoring; Cth and Qld, n 61; In NEIP this involves “EPA may be able to offer expertise in areas such as scientific 
monitoring and assessment, environmental auditing” VEPA, n 50, p 9. In RNRM this involves data such as National 
Land and Water Resources Audit (see for example http://www.nlwra.eov.au/) . Other information support may 
include State o f  Environment reporting (see http://www.environment.gov.au/soe/index.html); Bilateral Agreement
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comparatively more than NEIP)72 for additional monitoring and data collection. Such support is 
vital given the significant costs and technical challenges associated with setting performance 
targets for these complex, multifaceted and dynamic environmental and natural resource issues.
Notably, the RNRM case has also been designed to approve regional plans without all 
baseline data and targets being set, provided there are commitments to rigorous monitoring over 
the first few years of RNRM to collect missing data.73 The findings below return to examine the 
extent to which the support mechanisms are sufficient for the cases to set credible performance 
standards.
7.2.2.2 Monitoring implementation and progress against targets
Beyond setting targets, achieving effective accountability for performance also depends on 
collaborative groups conducting ongoing monitoring, evaluation and reporting on their progress 
against targets and their implementation of projects and outputs.
The design of each case imposes quite different monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
demands on groups.
The billions of dollars invested in the RNRM program have led policy designers to impose 
strict monitoring and reporting requirements on collaborative groups. 74 Regional bodies must 
develop a monitoring and evaluation strategy to gauge their performance.75 They receive 
funding and in kind government support (eg. agency monitoring of resource conditions) to assist
NHT, n 48, Attachment C Developing A Set o f Indicators For The National Framework For Monitoring and 
Evaluation p 113.
72 In NEIP this involves “seed” funding, leaving it to collaborators to use their own resource or identify external 
resources such as government grants to support “data collection and analysis, and technical support and advice” likely 
to be needed to set baselines for measurable targets; VEPA, n 50 p 9. In RNRM foundational funding is provided for 
planning and data collection; Interim Financial Agreem ent to D eliver the Natural H eritage Trust Extension in Q ld 27  
June 2003  (Cth/Qld), s 51.
73 As the guidelines in RNRM point out, many regions will not be in a position to set natural resource condition 
targets at the time their regional plans are put forward for accreditation. To address this situation, for accreditation, a 
regional plan will need to contain, inter alia, a commitment to the early establishment o f  monitoring systems to 
collect/analyse baseline and trend information, to enable setting o f  resource condition targets see also Bilateral 
Agreement NHT, n 48, Attachment E National Guidelines for the Accreditation o f  Integrated Catchment/Regional 
Natural Resource Management Plans, p 65; Doremus, n 6 at 72.
74 These arrangements are established under national frameworks (see for example NRMMC (Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council), National Fram ework fo r  Natural Resource M anagem ent (NRM) Standards and  
Targets (NRMMC, 2002) www.nrm.gov.au viewed 10 March 2008; NRMMC, National Natural Resource  
M anagement M onitoring and Evaluation Framework  (NRMMC, 2002) www.nrm.gov.au viewed 10 March 2008), a 
draft state monitoring and reporting strategies (Cth and Qld, n 61) and contractual “partnership agreements” between 
government and regional body. There may also be additional accountability mechanisms and legal responsibilities for 
incorporated regional bodies, including discharging reporting and financial accountability requirements under 
relevant corporate law C orporations A ct 2001 (Cth); see Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, ss 68, 69, 71, 94, 134, 135; 
Bilateral Agreement NAP n 48, ss 7.1, 8.1, 14.1, 30.
75 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, Attachment E National Guidelines fo r  the Accreditation o f  Integrated 
Catchment/Regional Natural Resource Management P lans, p 68.
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with monitoring, evaluation and “upwards” reporting to the JSC.76 Such reporting occurs on a 
quarterly,77 six-monthly and an annual basis regarding progress against management action 
milestones, their outputs, the use of government investment78 as well as ongoing monitoring of
79 •changes in environmental conditions on which to judge progress against targets. Data is 
aggregated at state and national levels for ministers and public reports and informs regional,80 
as well as state and national level evaluation processes.81
As some NEG scholars have queried, these palpably onerous requirements may in fact 
hamper the intended flexible, community-oriented nature of regional bodies.82 Whether this is 
the case in practice is explored below.
In stark contrast to the prescriptive tasks of RNRM, the NEIP and EIP program imposes 
very few prescriptions on collaboratives. Rather, both programs expect collaboratives or 
industry to develop their own processes for monitoring, evaluation83 and reporting,84 subject to 
the approval of the VEPA.85
Notably, although neither program offers funding or assistance to collaboratives, the EIP 
program is intended to harness community or VEPA pressure to persuade or compel industry to 
bear the ongoing monitoring and reporting costs.86 In contrast, the NEIP program expects 
groups to meet their own costs or find external funding. Whether NEIP groups have sufficient 
resources themselves to achieve successful monitoring is examined in the findings below.
7.2.2.3 Summary
To sum up this discussion, the programs involve two broad groupings of accountability 
relationships -  accountability for setting standards and targets, and accountability for 
implementation of rules. The EIP program is the only case to employ a process based approach,
76 Indeed, the state takes responsibility for measuring and monitoring resource condition and trend in many areas 
Cth and Qld, n 61, ss 6.6.1, 8.2.7.
77 For financial reporting. Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, s 94; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 48, ss 14, 30.3.
78 See Cth and Qld, n 61, ss 5, 5 .1 .2 , 6.1.1, 6.2.1-6.2.3.
79 This is generally required to accord with indicators and data collection and storage protocols; Cth and Qld, n 61 s 
5.1.3-5.1.5 http://www.nrm.gov.au/me/index.html; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, s 146; Bilateral Agreement NAP, 
n 48, s 17.6.
80 For example, reviewing their regional NRM  plans; Bilateral Agreement NHT; Cth and Qld, n 61 s8.2.6
81 Cth and Qld, n 61 s 7; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, s 137; Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 48, s 30.
82 Lawrence, n 23 at 13-14; Head, n 14, p 146; Head, n 23 at 31.
83 This will involve developing their own indicators for ongoing evaluation, as well as developing a process for 
“review” o f their plans. VEPA, n 50, p 1, 10; Environment Protection Act 1970  (V ic), s 19AI(e)(f); VEPA, n 38, p 9.
84 In NEIP there are no specific requirements on what the report should contain. Environment Protection Act 1970  
(V ic), 19AI(3)(c). In EIP the requirements include a summary o f complaints and follow-up actions; data on the 
performance in meeting the objectives and targets; an account o f the causes and effects o f  any failings, and actions 
taken to remedy them; an overall assessment o f the environmental performance; an assessment o f  opportunities to 
improve the environmental performance; and changes to the EIP suggested as a result o f the review. VEPA, n 38, p 9.
85 Environment Protection Act 1970  (V ic), 19AI(e)(f), 19AJ; VEPA, n 38.
86 See discussion in chapter 5. See generally, Karkkainen, n 3 at 993-997; Karkkainen, n 47, p 310-314.
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however, all three programs emphasise accountability for performance.87 As we have seen, 
significant questions remain about the effectiveness of both approaches, including risks of 
industry paying “lip service” to management systems; potential capture or unprincipled deal 
making pursuant to generalised performance outcomes; and the costs and demands of 
monitoring both baseline data and implementation. These issues are returned to in the findings 
below. For present purposes, the next section turns to briefly evaluate the legislative design 
relating to learning.
7.2.3 Learning and Adaptation
As we saw in chapter 4, the cases’ learning aspirations vary widely from “passive” 
adaptive management, reflexive process based approaches and “experimentalist” styles of 
systemic learning. The design of the cases with respect to each of these approaches is briefly 
discussed below. A number of questions are also raised regarding when and whether the design 
is supportive of the learning approach.
The “passive” adaptive management approach employed by all three cases involves 
collaborative groups developing processes to monitor and evaluate activities and make 
subsequent adjustments in light of what may be learned.88 This is to be an ongoing process.89 It 
is also to occur formally as a part of required plan review at the end of each plan 
implementation.90 However at the time of research only the 15 year old EIP case contains sub 
cases which have so far carried out such reviews.
For all three cases, adaptive management may utilise local knowledge of collaborators as 
well as the baseline data and ongoing monitoring and evaluation process central to performance 
accountability discussed above. As such, adaptive management processes, particularly in NEIP 
and RNRM may face similar challenges in meeting costly monitoring of baselines data and 
implementation.
Overlapping with adaptive management approaches of the three programs, are two 
additional forms of learning.
In the EIP program, a process-based approach to learning is to be employed. Here 
industry’s design of and adherence to a minimum set of processes (eg. identifying impacts and
87 May, n 2 at 10-11.
88 Karkkainen, n 11 at 70-72.
89 See VEPA, n 38, p 10; VEPA, n 50, p 1; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48, Attachment E p 68; Cth and Qld, n 61 
s7.1.
90 Across all cases, this adaptive approach is checked by collaborative group and government agency, the later being 
required to approve any major changes to plan; VEPA, n 38, p 10-11; Environment Protection A ct 1970  (Vic), ss 
19AI(e)(f), 19AJ; Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 48 , Attachment E, p 68-69; Cth and Qld, n 61, s 8.2.6
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
l.
I
286
risks, setting of objects and targets and measurement techniques to ensure that they are reached) 
is intended to influence industry attitudes and create a framework for better environmental 
organisation. For the purposes of learning, these processes ideally will stimulate industry to 
conduct a systematic search within the organization for environmental impacts that fall outside 
of current regulation, encourage system self-correction and a commitment to continuous 
improvement.91
A different form of learning goal is evident in the NEIP and RNRM cases where both 
cases aspire to “systemic learning”.92 In NEIP this involves VEPA and groups sharing 
information and innovations between collaborations to create more effective and efficient 
collaborative problem solving.93 Despite such a laudable aspiration, however, there appears to 
be a significant “gap” between this vision and the legislative and policy processes designed to 
implement it. Indeed, beyond stating the goal of sharing leaning,94 the guidelines and legislation 
somewhat surprisingly establish no formal procedures or processes to facilitate or require 
collaborative groups or VEPA to share learning between neighbourhoods. Whether this “gap” 
between “vision” and implementation mechanisms is detrimental to the success of systemic 
learning is examined in the findings below.
Notably, much greater detail is offered in RNRM’s approach to systemic learning, which is 
focused on assessing the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the program in the 
achievement of its objectives, and adapting the program accordingly to improving design or 
delivery.95 This would involve regional bodies conducting ongoing monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting, as well as higher levels of government following established evaluation management 
procedures for periodic reviews and evaluations at “key decision points” throughout the life of 
the program.96
To sum up this brief discussion on learning, the cases different approaches to learning vary 
in their focus and also in detail of legislative arrangements designed to support them. Questions 
were raised regarding monitoring processes in adaptive management and whether NEIP can 
implement a goal of sharing learning without any legislated processes to facilitate action. These 
and other issues are explored in the following section that turns to examine how the learning 
and accountability arrangements played out in practice.
91 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 180; Fiorino, n 10, p 415.
92 Karkkainen, n 12 at 243.
93 Fung and Wright, n 6, p 25; VEPA, n 50, p 4, 6.
94 VEPA, n 50. See generally chapter 4.
95 Cth and Qld, n 61, s 7.1; NRMMC, National Natural Resource Management Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework (NRMMC, 2002) www.nrm.gov.au viewed 10 March 2008.
96 Cth and Qld, n 61, s 7.2.2.
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7.3 Accountability and learning in practice - findings
This section examines whether, and to what extent, the cases’ approach to accountability 
and learning were effective in practice. This investigation proceeds in three parts, examining 
EIP, NEIP and RNRM respectively. For each case the discussion is divided into two sections, 
accountability and learning. Notably, as both the NEIP and RNRM cases are at a much earlier 
stage in their development than EIP, the findings in these two programs are necessarily more 
tentative.
In analysing whether effective “new” forms of accountability were achieved, the focus is 
on whether accountability mechanisms prevented the abuse of authority, ensured that public
resources were used appropriately (where relevant), and/or secured reasonable environmental
97performance expectations. In terms of effective learning, the investigation judges whether
relevant actors gathered (and where relevant dispersed) sufficient information, analysed it and
98then made relevant adjustments to their behaviour.
7.3.1 EIP -  Accountability and learning
7.3.1.1 Accountability - achievements and limitations in a process 
and performance based regime
At the core of accountability in the EIP program is the complementary interaction of 
“new” accountability mechanisms in both process and performance based approaches. The 
findings indicated that agency oversight, as well as mutual and professional accountability 
employed in EIP were effective in addressing some, but not all risks of capture and tokenism." 
These findings are outlined below, focusing first on accountability for process then 
performance. While these two approaches overlap, for heuristic purposes they are treated 
separately below.
Commencing with EIP’s process based approach, accountability arrangements were 
reported to have been largely effective.100 While questions are raised below about the adequacy 
of systems designed by poor performers,101 most leading and good performers adequately 
discharged their professional accountability responsibilities to develop reportedly adequate 
management systems. As one VEPA officer explained, these industries often developed their
97 May, n 2 at 11.
98 Sturm, n 14, p 327.
99 Farber D, “M odels o f  Reinvention” (1999) October/November Boston Review 24 at 24; May, n 2 at 12.
100 May, n 2.
101 Indeed, respondents suggested poor performers often required close VEPA scrutiny to try and ensure adequate 
systems were developed. As one VEPA officer explained: “we have quite a strong role helping them develop it”, 
Interview 181, EPA.
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EIP by drawing on their own accredited management systems (eg. ISO 14001),102 which gave
1 QT
VEPA added “satisfaction...[and] some comfort that the EIP [was] adequate”.
Auditors also monitored subsequent EIP implementation,104 ensuring either that industries 
followed adequate processes or that recommendations were made when they weren’t. As one 
industry explained:
[We get] reviewed by an EPA approved auditor and then take on board his 
comments, modify the program and once he is happy with it we then forward 
it onto the EPA and put that into our system.105
For all industries, these “checks” on their management system, combined with their own 
professional judgement in designing them, had ensured subsequent improvement in local 
impacts. Further, for good and leading firms, the process approach had assisted industry to 
achieve improvements in environmental performance on broader impacts such as carbon 
emissions and natural gas usage.
However, when it came to poor performers, professional judgement “went out the 
window” when designing processes to manage broader environmental issues. Indeed, deliberate 
subterfuge by industry saw both the VEPA and auditors reportedly struggle to address these 
management system shortcomings.106 As one respondent described:
industry were trying very hard to have enough items on the EIP plan to make 
it look like a really good plan ... they did some very minor things and... sort 
of passed it off as a plan... sometimes the form overcomes the substance.107
Such shams are a common complaint levelled at process-based systems, even accredited 
ones.108 However, it is somewhat surprising that such tokenism was able to occur in EIP given 
that it had expressly been designed to address this weakness through a complementary 
performance based accountability regime.
Why had some aspects of laggards’ environmental performance sometimes slipped through 
the performance accountability net? And was the accountability regime able to sufficiently 
address other defects in performance? The following paragraphs turn to answer these questions.
102 “W e had ISO [and] I think that gave us our framework so the EIP really slotted in there”, Interview 151,
Industry; “the EIP is generally borne out o f  the Environmental Management System ... The EMS is certified”, 
Interview 132, EPA.
103 Interview 132 EPA. The respondent further described the VEPA’s role as follows: “W ell the EPA actually signs 
o ff on the EIP so we have to approve the EIP so to that end w e’ll review the E IP .. .w e’ve got our guidelines there and 
w e’ll tick off the various items o f the EIP to see that it satisfies that”, Interview 132, EPA.
104 «'pfjg g jp  obviously needs an audit program in there and the audit program is generally signed o ff by an EPA  
approved auditor. So that’s another area that provides us with some certainty”, Interview 132, EPA.
105 Interview 131-2, Industry
106 May, n 2 at 22.
107 Interview 15/62, Local resident.
108 See Fiorino, n 10, p 413-416.
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At the core of successful performance accountability approach is setting credible targets 
against which performance is judged. As expected, the costs and technical skills associated with 
collecting baseline data to set targets posed few problems in EIPs. Ample data was either 
available under existing licence monitoring requirements, or had been collected via hired 
consultants or newly installed monitoring devices109 as a result of pressure110 on industry from 
VEPA and local residents.111
The accountability arrangements had also been able to avoid industry dominating local 
performance targets. Certainly some of the respondents warned that local non government 
interests were vulnerable to capture by industry,112 however this appeared to be more the 
exception than the rule.113 Indeed, even after long term collaborative involvement, individual 
collaborators had reportedly maintained their independence from industry.114 As one respondent 
put it:
we work with them so there’s a friendly enough relationship, but they’ll turn 
hostile like that [clicks fingers] if they’ve got good reason.115
This independence ensured non government collaborators were effective in a “mutual 
accountability” role, and had helped secure appropriate and measurable local environmental 
targets.116 Testament to this fact was noted improvements in local environmental conditions 
across all EIPs.117 As one local resident summed up:
109 One industry installed ambient monitoring and load control devices for problematic em issions in their local area; 
Interview 141, Industry.
110 The exception here was leading performers who had often sought to monitor local environmental problems 
without pressure from the community.
111 As one respondent explained: “So it was a combination o f EPA taking a bit more action...The community being 
quite noisy and vociferous about it...and the company board rep on these m eetings...he could see that the company 
needed som e outside help to understand how to solve the problem, he got a couple o f  different consultants... these 
people really had free run o f  the plant and worked with their engineering people”, Interview 182, Local Resident. As 
another explained: There had been a definite build up o f  emotion from local residents regarding noise leve ls... so we 
have worked very hard at reducing noise. A noise consultant does surveys...and out o f  that com es priorities for 
addressing noise issues”, Interview 111, Industry.
112 “Your local mum and dads, they are probably more interested about industry being maintained in the area...that 
are actually pro-industry”, Interview 132, EPA.
113 Indeed, respondents across all three cases reported that it was more common for local collaborators and local 
government to want to improve industry performance rather than protect local “jobs” or econom ic welfare. Interview 
111, Local Resident; Interview 141, Industry; Interview 15/62, Local Resident; Interview 174, Industry.
114 One respondent reflected on a long standing EIP reflected on a original participant “h e’s been fighting them for 
years...and he was a welcom e member o f  the [EIP groupl”, Interview 133, Local Resident.
115 Interview 161, Industry.
116 As discussed in chapter 6, to do so they were often assisted by mediators and VEPA officers.
117 For example: “Industry is conscious o f  noise, they’ve built mounds and, you know, things have improved...and  
they’ve got some o f the sm ells”, Interview, 15/62, Local Resident; “All the big problems for the community basically 
have been fixed. The smells, noises things like that have basically been fixed...there hasn’t been much that hasn’t 
w orked.... you wouldn’t know [industry] were here half the time now” Interview 162, Local Resident; “[Odour] 
really came down”, Interview 184, Industry;. Even in sub cases still implementing their first plan, respondents were 
cautiously optimistic o f  improved performance on local issues. For example: “I think there’s less noise. I think there
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We go to meetings and whinge and complain...and we got what we wanted 
as the complaints about noise got ironed out.118
When it came to setting environmental performance targets relating to industry’s impacts
119on the wider environment, the findings indicated much more mixed results.
On the one hand, it appeared atypical for good and leading performers to try to “capture” 
and distort the process.120 Indeed even with what is argued below to be a significant shortfall in 
both mutual accountability and VEPA oversight, respondents reported that the performance 
targets like those illustrated in Box 7.1 below121 had gone significantly beyond compliance for
these industries. Based on the findings, this was due to industries’ existing professional
122judgement and norms, including their commitment to environmental performance, identified
costs/reputation benefits, and as elaborated in learning section below, a drive for continuous
123improvement fostered by the process based approach to learning.
In EIP sub cases involving leading and good performers, industries set the following
objectives relating to issues not covered by their licence or that went beyond licence standards:
• keeping stack So2 emissions at levels 10% lower than licensed requirements,
• over 5 years reduce gas, electricity and water usage each by 10% with achievement to target 
reviewed and if  targets are exceeded, a further 2% reduction is applied to maintain 
continuous improvement
• retain secondary effluent treated during storms that occur less than once in 50 years (as 
opposed to licence requirements o f  once every 10 to 20 years storms).
• reduce benzene and butadiene emissions by 10% and 25% respectively over three years
• achieve 50% reduction o f  landfill use by 2003 compared to 1997
• achieve 20 % water recycling o f its total effluent production
• reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 35 % by 2006
Box 7.1: Example of Objectives that Go Beyond Compliance.
are less blowouts. I think there’s less fibre about than there used to be...and w e’ve asked them to remove the lights 
and they have begun to do that. They have taken some steps... [But] the jury is absolutely out on whether it’s been 
effective or not”, Interview 173, Local Resident.
118 Interview 112, Local Resident.
119 These were typically given more focus in later iterations o f plans as local issues were progressively resolved.
120 Only one or two respondents suggested performance targets had sometimes erred on the side o f  industry’s 
econom ic interest, with few positive externalities for environment.
121 Although there was no available independent, hard data available on which to judge the “appropriateness” o f  the 
targets set, the interviews with VEPA, local resident and industry stakeholders suggested many o f these targets had 
gone considerably beyond licence requirements; see also Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 168.
122 For leading performers, most o f  these targets had been rolled into EIP from existing environmental management 
system s or corporate plans: “w e had a lot o f projects already... w e already knew what we were doing”, Interview 151, 
Industry. In terms o f good performers, most o f these industries were reputation conscious and environmental 
management had long been an important part o f  their business. As one VEPA respondent described their EIP, “its just 
an outlet for communicating what they have done anyway”, Interview 113, EPA.
123 As one VEPA officer pointed out regarding process based approach: “its good for com panies...it helps them think 
about how they can improve by focusing on process rather than outcom es...and once companies start on the path o f  
improvement they realise there are business benefits”, Interview 181, EPA.
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Unlike either leading or good performers, poor performers typically lacked commitment to 
environmental management and, as noted above, had not readily embraced opportunities to 
improve overall environmental performance under the process based approach.124 The result 
was manifest inadequacies in broader environmental performance targets - setting tokenistic 
objectives that rarely went much beyond compliance. As one VEPA respondent explained:
the company gives a long list of EIP items...but it is very weak in terms of
125environmental improvements, most are just house keeping items.
Although the VEPA and collaborators had sometimes identified these weaknesses, the 
findings suggested their capacity to actually take action to resolve such defects was severely
limited.126 Indeed, nearly all non government collaborators had either a noted indifference to
127broader environmental issues or lacked technical knowledge to play an effective mutual
128accountability role to push industry to set higher targets on these issues. As one VEPA 
respondent put it:
there’s no one really who’s got the strategic big picture... from that point of 
view I didn’t think anybody in the [collaboration] has really made much of 
an impact...[industry] stayed very much in control over the process.129
The VEPA also reportedly had “underplayed their accountability hand” and failed to
address tokenism by poor performers.130 While a few respondents suggested this was
131attributable to long term dealings between VEPA and industry, blatant agency “capture” 
appeared rare. As a number of respondents pointed out, VEPA officers undertook their role with 
sincere intention to protect the environment and there was almost always a “regulator - industry 
tension”132 in EIP process.133
124 As one respondent put it: “environment was not such an important aspect o f  the business... I don’t think there was 
the commitment to improve the situation”, Interview 174, Industry.
125 Interview 181, EPA.
126 May, n 2 at 17.
127 As one local resident explained: “It’s just the dirty o n es ...I f  they’re not noisy, they don’t stink and they don’t 
cause a nuisance and don’t have any effect on our lifestyle, they’re not a problem”, Interview 173, Industry.
128 See discussion in chapter 6, noting that industry had typically been able to determine majority o f  targets on 
broader environmental issues.
129 Interview 123, EPA.
130 May, n 2 at 17, Doremus, n 6 at 61.
131 For example: “For the EPA, their client is the offending industry and they’re the ones that are being looked after. 
Not the environment, not the people that live in the environment” Interview 173, Local Resident.
132 Interview 121, Industry.
133 As one respondent pointed out “the regulator wouldn’t be doing its job if it didn’t say those things or require those 
th ings...it’s advocated for the environment here”. Interview 121, Industry; As another respondent put it:
“Our role is to make sure what the company is committed to accords with what the VEPA expects o f  them” Interview 
123, EPA; Doremus, n 6 at 61.
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The real difficulty appeared to arise from the overly general performance requirement that 
had afforded very broad discretion to VEPA officers to assess the matters for target and the 
extent they should go beyond compliance.
The VEPA did not appear to have the capacity to exercise this discretion effectively. 
Certainly VEPA officers had tried to ensure that where there were obvious opportunities for
improvement, industry implemented them .134 However officers appeared to lack detailed
135knowledge of the many technical issues associated with each individual industry operation.
136This made it difficult to meaningfully direct each industry on relevant target setting. As one 
representative from a poor performer noted:
Unfortunately you don’t get VEPA people who try to impose, what you tend 
to get is people who don’t know a lot and are not helpful because they can’t 
help you because they don’t have a knowledge base and all they do is just 
refer to the book.137
This tendency to refer to “the book” saw officer’s stick to their “traditional role” of 
enforcing minimum legislative standards and focus less on the issues and magnitude of 
“beyond” compliance targets. As one respondent lamented:
it would be great if the EPA was saying we want it too look like this or have 
you considered this...but I think that the EPA trusts the licence process 
supports what the regional priorities are.138
Indeed, as a range of respondents confirmed, VEPA representatives typically took a 
“backseat”,139 “caretaker” 140 and “passive,” 141 role when it came to setting beyond compliance 
targets on broader environmental issues.142 While one could argue that this “hands o f f ’ 
approach was in fact a conscious effort to ensure sufficient flexibility, innovation and learning, 
the unfortunate result appeared to be a subtle form of “capture” where poor performers were
134 Interview 142, Industry.
135 One VEPA officer was responsible for approximately 10 different industries, ranging from a car manufacture, a 
rendering plant to a plastics manufacturer; Doremus, n 6 at 82.
136 As one VEPA officer explained, they tended to act as a check on the process, and play less o f  a role in holding the 
groups accountable for substantive targets: “ [I] sit there and watch and let the parties sort it out between them, and 
throw in a comment from our perspective now and then, but its more “let them go to it”, Interview 113, EPA.
137 Interview 184, Industry.
138 Interview 141, Industry.
139 Interview 181, EPA.
140 Interview 113, EPA.
141 Interview 131, Industry.
142 As one industry respondent explained: I mean, when it’s com e to approval they’ve had a couple o f minor 
suggestions about the looks o f graphs and a few words here and there but they’re not really there driving it”, 
Interview 142, Industry.
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essentially free to manipulate beyond compliance targets. This fact was confirmed by strong 
opinions from both local residents and industries that VEPA should and could have done more:
with the EPA, they could be proactive in formulating EIP’s. What it's left to 
mainly is the company and the residents.143
Putting to one side these difficulties, the findings indicated the program’s “new” forms of 
accountability were far more successful in ensuring all industries achieved targets and were held 
accountable for non compliance.144
Vital to this success was the fact that all industries had reportedly carried out effective 
monitoring and reporting processes in a “very open”145 manner and provided “quite detailed” 
information146 on their performance against targets.147 While these responsibilities added costs to 
industry,148 they had been able to reduce these burdens by drawing on pre-existing monitoring 
and reporting processes.149
According to respondents, industry had credibly and willingly discharged its monitoring 
responsibilities because the validity of its data was potentially subject to scrutiny by the VEPA 
and/or local collaborators.150 If industry could not show whether and for what reasons targets 
were or were not being achieved, subsequent pressure would be forthcoming.
Indeed, both VEPA and non government collaborators were reportedly effective in holding 
industry to account in the event of non compliance.151 As one industry respondent reflected, in 
the event of default, local collaborators could bring significant pressure to bear on industry:
143 Interview 162, Local Resident.
144 May, n 2 at 12.
145 Interview 133, Resident.
146 As one respondent described the process: “W e have a [EIP meeting! every two months which focuses on the EIP, 
in the meantime we update the progress to each o f those items that was in the EIP, each o f  the projects listed in the 
EIP to update where we are at and present those to the meeting, usually it would take 15 minutes out o f the meeting, 
to track progress a couple o f  questions, we only look at the changes that have moved between, we highlight those in 
red, this is what has changed from one to the other”, Interview 151, Industry.
147 Interview 132 EPA; Interview 133, Local resident; W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 241.
148 “They put a fair bit o f resources into holding these meetings, into having the staff to collate all the information, to 
look at the EMS and pull out the relevant bits that need to be investigated or view ed further in terms o f  trying to get 
the action items up and I think it’s a pretty amazing process actually”, Interview 132, EPA.
149 This was evident in different planning periods (eg. 1, 2 or 3 year length plans) and monitoring and evaluation 
cycles across sub cases. These were reportedly adapted to suit individual environmental monitoring and management 
systems, business reporting cycles, and corporate monitoring and reporting. For example one industry commented 
how their earlier EIPs had been based on 3 year plans, but with change in business profitability they had com e back 
to focus on 1 year EIP plans: “we actually bought them back to only going to put what we can do the next year as part 
o f  the business planning cycle. I guess that’s come around from the business underlying factor that w e’ve had for a 
few years o f financial survival, where w e’ve got to get the business refinanced”, Interview 161, Industry.
150 “The com pany’s open, from my point o f  view  it’s transparent because w e get on the ground there a bit and have a 
look around and see what’s going on and see that it does translate down onto the ground what’s [reported] on paper”, 
Interview 132, EPA.
151 Bovens, n 1 at 450. Karkkainen, n 47 , p 317.
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the consequences of not achieving that target...you know you are audited 
very very heavily by the community...so there is an accountability.152
VEPA supervision was also vital to ensuring overall compliance with targets, particularly
in cases involving poor performers, where community pressure per se had less of an impact on
these typically less reputation conscious companies. In these sub cases, ensuring even basic
153compliance with minimal targets required the VEPA to “keep a close eye” on industry, 
threatening or carrying out licence changes or other enforcement. As one VEPA respondent 
illustrated regarding a poor performer:
They were in denial...They’ve committed $5million plus [over two 
EIPs]...and it hasn’t worked...The community meanwhile is trying to be 
patient...so we’ve actually changed the licence, amended the licence and had 
severe discussions with them.154
To sum up the discussion of accountability in EIPs, the above investigation revealed some 
considerable success, but also some key limitations of NEG’s “new” forms and mechanisms of 
accountability. Industry’s professional judgement often accorded with established norms of 
environmental management such as ISO 14001, and auditors and VEPA oversight were largely 
successful in ensuring accountability for processes. A combination of mutual accountability and 
VEPA oversight ensured industry set adequate targets on local issues and were held accountable 
for overall performance. Real or implied community and VEPA pressure had also been vital to 
industry successfully meeting the costs and technical challenges of gathering baseline data and 
carrying out ongoing monitoring.
However, this success was limited by significant shortfalls in accountability mechanisms, 
which gave rise to a subtle form of capture by poor performers on broader environmental issues. 
The findings suggested this was attributable in part to highly general legislated goals and 
extensive VEPA discretion, as well as shortfalls in professional accountability155 and oversight 
of process based approach by the VEPA (even with advice from auditors). Mutual 
accountability was also ineffective in ensuring adequate performance targets were set due to a 
mismatch between environmental issue and the knowledge and interests of non government 
participants.
Having examined EIP accountability regime, the next section turns to consider interrelated 
issue of learning.
152 Interview 141, Industry.
153 Interview 181, EPA.
154 Interview 121, EPA.
155 May, n 2 at 21.
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7.3.1.2 Learning -  success and limitations of process based 
learning and adaptive management
The EIP case was designed to employ two forms of learning - a processed based approach 
and a “passive” style of adaptive management. The findings indicated that process based 
approach and adaptive management can successfully provide a useful approach to learning, 
however as we will see below, both appear to have some limitations. While the two approaches 
overlap, for heuristic purposes they are treated sequentially and separately below.
When it came to good performers, the findings indicated that a process based approach had 
provided a structure that had improved industries’ capacity to detect and develop solutions to 
environmental problems in a more strategic and reflexive manner.156 Indeed, respondents 
suggested the EIP processes had allowed industry to become more sensitised to its 
environmental impact, and to the risks to its social and regulatory licences. This in turn 
impressed upon it the “business case” for continual learning about their impacts and subsequent 
environmental improvement.157 As one respondent put it:
it helps [industry] think about how they can improve by focusing on process 
rather than outcomes...and once companies start on the path of improvement 
they realise there are business benefits...from an environmental perspective 
but also from a financial perspective.158
In addition, their long term participation in the EIP process, with the requisite search for
environmental aspects, target setting, planning, priority-setting and risk analysis that it entailed,
159had reportedly served to improve their self regulatory capacities. This enabled them to better 
learn about the effectiveness of their environmental management systems and refine and adapt 
internal approaches.160 According to one industry representative:161
internally within the industry [EIPs] just make you think so laterally and so 
broad about the way your business needs to be performing in the future from 
a social and environmental point of view ... I am thinking about things that 
are going to bite us in 6 or 7 years times if we don’t start acting on them
156 This finding corresponds to Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 177.
157 This finding corresponds to Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 177.
158 Interview 181, EPA.
159 Holley and Gunningham, n 10.
160 Holley and Gunningham, n 10.
161 Holley and Gunningham, n 10.
162 Interview 141, Industry.
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Notably, these EIP achievements appeared to be far more limited in sub cases involving 
leader performers. This was, however, not because of some inherent failure in process based
learning, but because these industries were already following existing “reflexive” environmental
163management systems, and had “slotted” their EIP into them.
More significantly, the process based approach to learning was reportedly ineffective when 
it came to poor performers. Certainly, some of these industries recognised the benefits of the 
management system. 164 However their general lack of commitment to environmental 
improvement reportedly translated into a strong reluctance to embrace a goal of learning and 
continuous environmental improvement. As one poor performer put it: “environment was not 
such an important aspect of the business... I don’t think there was the commitment to improve 
the situation”.165
To some extent, industry’s commitment to process based framework and environmental 
improvement appeared to have been influenced through external VEPA or community pressure. 
As we saw above in the accountability section, such pressure had motivated all industries to 
follow processes to identify local environmental impacts, develop credible performance targets 
and implement new management response to these local impacts.
However when it came to looking at broader environmental impacts, the absence of any 
meaningful pressure from VEPA or local residents on broader environmental issues meant these 
already reluctant industries simply went through the motions to meet the process requirements - 
basically remaining unchanged by the experience.166
In short, consistent with findings in other contexts,167 process based regulation appears a 
valuable tool for learning only when it is placed in the “right hands”,168 or there is sufficient 
pressure or incentive169 to ensure commitment to its precepts.170
163 However leading performers did recognise the process based approach had made positive albeit limited 
contributions, such as integrating their management systems to better achieve environmental outcomes. As they 
explained: “so [in the second and third EIP] we didn’t have two programs running side by side with overlaps between 
the tw o ...it meant we could actually capture, monitor and report more combined in our operation rather than having 
two different systems”; Interview 131, Industry.
164 For example: “The EIP process puts things on the agenda . . .  it requires you to identify objectives and targets and 
so forth so the EIP is good for making sure that improvement initiatives are identified and remain on the radar so it 
gives you a structure in which to improve your environmental performance” Interview 174, Industry
165 Interview 174, Industry; “Look I think the site had a lot o f  management problems, there was management issues to 
back here that didn’t help and then there was a whole lot o f  things, there was the markets, the management issues, 
yeah”, Interview 184, Industry.
166 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 10, p 166.
167 See generally discussions in Fiorino, n 10, p 415-416.
168 Holley and Gunningham, n 10.
169 See Parker C, The Open Corporation  (Cambridge University Press, 2002) p 275-288.
170 Holley and Gunningham, n 10.
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Turning to the overlapping approach of adaptive management, although doubts are raised 
in chapter 8 about the ability of EIP program to sustain effective adaptive management over the 
longer term, for the most part collaboratives appeared to have been relatively successful in 
adapting plans in response to information.
Informal monitoring by local residents reportedly assisted industry to re-evaluate the 
actions taken to reduce local impacts.17’in addition to using local knowledge of residents, the 
collaborative group also drew on industry’s monitoring data to collectively evaluate the success 
of strategies, and develop new plans of action where they were failing. This included a detailed 
review at the completion of each plan where groups “looked at the bigger picture” to determine 
whether the EIP is achieving what the group wanted it to achieve and subsequently redrafting a 
new plan.172 In between such formal evaluations the groups also conducted a variety of 
successful collaborative evaluations and adaptations. Some illustrations of adaptive 
management in practice are detailed in Box 7.2 below.
Despite this success, there was little evidence of collaborative group engaging in “adaptive 
management” processes beyond local issues. This is arguably unsurprising given that the groups 
were predominantly comprised of local stakeholders who tended to lack the capacity or 
willingness to engage with broader issues.
Illustration 1
Two years ago we were having a number of incidents...So our environmental impact had hardly 
changed, but we were having a string of these little things and they just got on the radar and the EIP 
group just said “we’re concerned with the number of these things and as it goes, the more incidents 
you have sooner or later you have a big one, so ideally you want to have none”. So they raised this 
with us, we’re really concerned and we want to know what’s going to be done. So out of that we 
volunteered to do a full review of all the incidents we’d had on this site, going back over a number of 
years and out of that came - we identified some specific trends and it looks like we’re having more of 
this particular type of thing, so it helped us to identify where we needed to focus... two or three of the 
group were involved and sat in on all the discussions and part of the feedback to the whole group and 
every thing... there were a number of improvement opportunities which were identified and 
implemented as a result of that, ...there was about 14 items on that list. Some were soft culture stuff 
and some were real field items, but there were a number of new items that were identified and that 
actually added some re-emphasis to some existing ones and they’ve been implemented and they’ve 
resulted in less impact and less incidents. So it’s a real example of them raising their concern, getting 
involved in a process that leads to some outcomes which then reduced the impact - it closes the loop -
Illustration 2
One respondent described the ongoing learning process of one industry which had significant impacts 
of odour on the local area: “Industry invested heavily in concrete batts, plastic conduits out of odour 
sources into these biofilters and found that they can’t get the bits to join properly so odour vapours 
leaking out and now putting stainless steel pipes in... they had tried to solve some of the problem and 
they invested in what they called an RTO, which was “something or other Thermal Oxidise”. It was a 
new incinerator that they had sent some people to America to look at. It was a gas fired thing and it
171 “The factory will say ...we fixed up this fan or replaced the conveyor belt that was squeaking....and 
then they get our complaints on it ...and then they say righto, well we’ll try to fix that and so at our next 
meeting they say yeah we fixed that.”; Interview 173, Local Community.
172 Interview 151, Industry.
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was going to solve the problem -  collect as many odours gases as they could and wack it into this 
thing. And they described that to us. Do you think this will ever work?..., Turned out after a year or 
two o f  trying that the gas burners were clogged up by the fat so the damn thing never worked...They  
had consultants and thing to try and make it work and it took a long time to work out that this wasn’t 
going to be the solution....And after a couple o f  years o f trying with this thing they found it didn’t 
work. ... the EPA’s solution when they got me involved in it was what we need to do is put a big shed 
around all this, suck up the air and bum it or treat it and that was what they were trying to do so they 
agreed that they would try and enclose much o f  their operations -  which they did spent a bit o f  money 
on it too -  but there is a lot o f  hydrogen sulphide in there apparently , gets up the top with a bit o f  
moisture and causes corrosion so just recently they have had to replace the roof o f  this relatively new  
thing....So they are now doing that so they are learning a lot through the process”
Box 7.2: Illustrations of group review and adaptation in the EIP case.173
In summary, the EIP program appeared to have achieved some success in fostering 
effective learning. Industry and local residents monitoring had informed an effective adaptive 
management process for local impacts of industry. Process-based strategies had also 
successfully provided a framework for many enterprises to identify and think through new 
solutions to environmental problems, stimulating reflective management, and continual 
processes of adaptation and environmental improvement.
However, it was far less clear that process-based approach was effective in circumstances 
where industry have little commitment to achieving environmental improvement -  as with poor 
performers. While external pressure appeared to help foster such commitment for local 
issues,174 weaknesses in collaborator and VEPA oversight meant laggards lacked the incentive 
to further engage. Adaptive management also appeared limited to local issues because 
collaborators’ lacked knowledge and interest in the broader environmental impacts of industry.
7.3.2 NEIP - accountability and learning
7.3.2.11mprecise targets and inept monitoring-the failings of new 
forms of accountability
Despite some limitations, the “new” accountability mechanisms in EIP were able to 
achieve a considerable degree of success in securing effective performance. In contrast, the 
experience of the NEIP evidenced imprecise target setting and inept monitoring that appeared 
likely to undermine effective accountability for performance.
As we will see, these weaknesses did not appear to arise from malevolence per se, but were 
attributable to a shortfall in VEPA oversight and insufficient support and resources for 
monitoring and data collection. The discussion below flushes out these flaws by first
173 Interview 161, Industry.
174 See Parker, n 169, p 275-288.
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considering accountability for setting targets, before turning to consider accountability for 
implementation. Notably, much of the analysis draws on NEIP 1 and 2, as at the time of 
research they were the only sub cases to have progressed substantially into implementation.
The primary task in any performance based regime is setting performance targets. Like the 
EIP program, the NEIP face risks of empowered economic or other interests capturing agendas. 
However this was less of a problem in NEIP than EIP because most NEIP collaboratives did not
175have specific “industry” interests actively engaged in decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, respondents suggested that the participation of multiple government agencies with
responsibilities for the environment, including the VEPA, had ensured that targets set by the
176group respected “broader regional wide context” and accounted for wider environment
177priorities, planning schemes and other existing laws.
Despite avoiding any evident distortion by industry interests, the performance targets set
178by collaboratives and approved by the VEPA were extremely vague. As illustrated in Box 7.3 
below, many targets aimed to achieve an “improvement” in a stated environmental quality 
variable, but few provide any direct quantifiable measures regarding the level o f  improvement to 
be realised.
A sympathetic reading of these targets would suggest the collaboratives were striving to 
achieve as much “improvement” in the given environmental conditions as humanly possible.
However, a more critical stance may raise questions about the possibility of “unprincipled deal
179making” among collaborators to try and avoided any significant improvements. Certainly
groups could achieve the most minimal of improvements to environmental quality and still
180formally claim to have met their respective targets.
Only time will tell if the reality lies at the optimistic or pessimistic extreme, or somewhere 
in-between. Regardless, the significant scope for negligible environmental improvements is 
arguably a worrying possibility, at least in terms of ensuring accountability for reasonable levels 
of environmental performance.
175 Perhaps the greatest risk was in NEIP 3 were a number o f  farmers were represented on committee. H owever 
here, as one respondent illustrated, risks o f  capture had been averted by mutual accountability between partners: 
“some things that started becoming very apparent as far as E. coli levels were concerned. People started pointing 
fingers and it perhaps created a little angst amongst one or two rural landholders...and blow me dow n...they asked 
VEPA “How can we do things better?”” Interview 231, CMA. For further on industry involvement in NEIP see 
chapter 5.
176 Interview 214, Government Agency.
177 Dana, n 6 at 54; Thomas, n 15, p 163.
178 While there are many different social and environmental targets, for the purposes o f this chapter the focus is 
placed on arguably the most significant and ultimate measure o f  performance, targets relating to environmental 
performance.
179 Karkkainen, n 3 at 963; Doremus, n 6.
180 Steinzor, n 19 at page 15 o f “p d f’; Doremus, n 6. Karkkainen, n 3 at 963.
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According to respondents, the reason such nebulous targets were set included a lack of 
relevant data to inform measurable targets (discussed further below) and a break down in 
VEPA’s accountability responsibilities.
Akin to the findings in the EIP program, the sweeping legislative statements regarding
expected outcomes in the NEIP program had left significant discretion to VEPA officers on the
nature and magnitude of performance targets. While this is not inherently a problem per se, the
findings suggested the VEPA lacked internal direction or technical capacity to exercise their
discretion effectively and identify what targets should contain, and the extent of improvement
181that should be expected. As one VEPA officer reported:
there weren’t really detailed guidelines of what you needed to include.
...[so] you want to improve water quality, but how are we going to measure 
that? That in itself posed certain problems.182
NEIP 1
Vision: A clean Creek corridor that is the pride of all our community.
• Improve water quality.
• A reduction of the number of pollution incidents.
• Improvement in baseline water quality defined by an index of Stream Condition tool.
NEIP 2
Vision: A proud and connected community creating a prosperous and sustainable future in a 
healthy and beautiful environment.
• Protect natural ecological values.
• Reduce ecological footprint defined by baseline of a cross section of households and 
businesses then estimating the town’s footprint.
NEIP 3
Vision: A healthy Creek that supports a range of uses and is managed in a cooperative and 
considerate manner for the benefit of all.
• To improve the stream health of Creek and consequently improve water quality:
o reduction in the level of nutrients entering the Creek from farming practices in 2004 
levels in 5 years.
o Improve water quality within three years by reducing sediment load from 2004 levels 
using turbidity as a measure,
o Reduce the amount of grey water entering the stormwater system without treatment to 
10% of properties or less within 5 years.
• To provide clean, drinkable water.
Box 7.3: NEIP Vision, Targets and Objectives.
181 In part, this was a reflection that NEIP 1 and 2 were pilot cases and VEPA was still learning about the NEIP. 
However similar problems have persisted in later EIPs, such as NEIP 3 where targets (although showing slightly 
greater specificity) still evidenced a high level o f  generality, without directly quantifiable improvements.
182 Interview 2 1 1,E PA .
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An overlapping cause of imprecision in performance targets was manifest gaps in baseline 
data. Certainly, the VEPA and other well resourced agency collaborators had tried to assist 
collaborative groups by providing very limited available monitoring data and/or facilitating 
modest short term grants to support additional monitoring. This ranged from $40 000 to 
complete baseline water quality monitoring (NEIP 1), funding for a water monitoring kit and 
training for local non government volunteers (NEIP 3) and funding and in kind support for 
“VEPA ecofootprint calculators” to measure towns’ ecofootprint (NEIP 2).183
However, respondents reported that this support and funding was insufficient. For 
example, the eco-footprint calculators in NEIP 2 were reportedly underfunded and contained 
underdeveloped “metrics” 184 that led the group to shelve the tool and fall back on extremely 
imprecise estimates of the town’s ecofootprint.185 Similarly a lack of technical skills of 
volunteer m onitors186 and inadequate funding in NEIP’s 1 and 3 lead to scientifically 
questionable measurements and significant gaps in water quality data collected. As one NEIP 1 
respondent put it:
we were doing some base line monitoring [but] there was a bit of a stuff-up 
on that ...we need[ed] some more sophisticated systems... the issue was the 
cost of collecting that data and how we’re going to do that.187
As will be apparent, without the existence of credible or complete baseline data, it is
virtually impossible to realistically achieve accountability for performance and judge whether
188progress toward even vague targets is being made.
Surprisingly, even some years after having their NEIP approved, collaborators had neither 
taken steps to try and improve baseline data, nor set up or conducted any monitoring of 
environmental indicators to try and judge whether progress was being made against what 
limited baseline data had been generated.
Certainly all three sub cases had developed monitoring frameworks (see Box 7.4 below). 
However these processes appeared to fall short at the implementation stage due to a lack of
183 Notably no attempt was made to measure “natural ecological values” in NEIP 2.
184 Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, P roposal to D evelop a Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plan (Surf Coast Shire Council, 2002) p 14.
185 “W e were using the E PA ’s eco foot print calculator. And again it was another example o f  one o f X ’s awesome 
ideas that just weren’t resourced properly, so the foot print calculator that we were waiting for just took forever to 
arrive. So we kept saying to people w e’ve got this rough model that we can calculate the foot print and what w e ’d 
like to do is w e ’d like to look at your behaviour and see how that influences your foot print and then w e’ll say if  you 
change your behaviour it’ll reduce your foot print. And we were waiting for this model from the EPA to arrive [but it 
didn’t]” Interview 224, EPA.
186 “[We] never wanted to put too much emphasis on the use o f that data to say too m uch... so there’s a hell o f  a lot o f  
variables and w e’re only doing it as a [volunteer] level”, Interview 234, Local government.
187 Interview 215, Local government.
188 Doremus, n 6 at 62.
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funding and technical capacity - a damning finding for a program premised on accountability
189for performance. As one respondent explained:
I don’t think that we've come up yet with a system that we think is 
sustainable in terms of the cost of getting that data with the access and 
measurability and us being able to interpret and use it... I would accept that 
as a bit of a criticism.190
• NEIP 1 for example required, annual reporting to the VEPA and a meeting every three months 
between collaborators. This meeting was to involve a formal “progress review” that consisted o f “an 
evaluation o f compliance and an evaluation o f effectiveness”. Compliance would relate to how well 
partners have achieved what was stated in the Neighbourhood EIP, within the timeframes set in the 
Plan, and in cases where actions have not been completed, establish why this is the case and decide 
on what action should be taken to make sure that the action(s) do happen to ensure accountability. 
Effectiveness meanwhile was to “assess whether the approaches taken to achieve the aims and 
visions were the most appropriate and effective ones or whether other alternative approaches are 
preferable”. This effectiveness assessment was to be informed by an ongoing water quality 
monitoring program to reflect trends in water quality. This progress review was to inform a “partial 
review” where results and recommendations were to be made on updating the plan and then 
incorporated into the NEIP to improve its capacity to achieve the outcomes the partners seek .191
• NEIP 2 developed a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) framework to direct “the collection  
of evidence about program activities participation, intermediate and final outcomes”. This framework 
was to be implemented at the completion o f each project “to assess the effectiveness o f the NEIP” 
and track changes in longer term sustainability. At a yearly evaluation this evidence is to be reflected 
upon, to inform a planning session for the following year to bring about “continuous improvement” 
and adaptation. Reporting to VEPA was to be through meetings and/or periodic reports.192
• NEIP 3 required project partners to report to a steering collaborative group every 6 months on the 
progress o f actions so that “the progress o f the NEIP can be tracked in all its stages and emerging 
problems can be detected early”. Monthly data on water quality was also to be collected by a 
volunteer group. This would be supported by annual review of project milestones and targets with 
subsequent adjustments if necessary. Reporting to VEPA occurred through a VEPA officer using 
internal agency reporting procedures.193
Box 7.4: Monitoring and Evaluation Approaches of NEIP Sub Cases.
189 Even in NEIP 3 where community monitoring o f  water quality had continued, there were ominous signs of  
volunteer burnout with monitors dropping from 10 people to 2 people during the research period. This led one 
respondent to speculate that the monitoring group “may well fold”, Interview 234, Local government.
190 Interview 215, Local Government.
191 Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, Stony Creek Neighbourhood Environment 
Im provement Plan  (Maribymong City Council, 2004) p 77-78; Interview 215, Local government.
192 Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Anglesea Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan 
(Surf Coast Shire Council, 2004) p 35-36; Interview 225, EPA.
193 Towong Shire Council and Partners o f Little Snowy Creek NEIP, Little Snowy Creek Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plan  (Towong Shire Council, 2006) p 42; As VEPA respondent explained in NEIP 3: “it w ill get 
written into my performance assessment to say how is the Eskdale NEIP going? Progress needs to be made on the 
Eskdale NEIP will be in my performance plans so that’s more or less how it’ll happen”; Interview 237, EPA.
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Until more effective monitoring mechanisms are developed, outputs remained the primary 
“indicator” of performance in NEIP.194 However even monitoring outputs and implementation 
appeared to face significant difficulties in NEIP.195
While key collaborators such as NEIP “sponsors” provided in kind administrative support 
and had obtained a few short term grants,196 in general the groups relied on their own resources 
to monitor implementation.197
However on all accounts, respondents suggested these resources were insufficient to 
implement formal monitoring and reporting on implementation. Indeed, collaborators’ 
“monitoring” and reporting of compliance was generally verbal and informal198 or conducted 
“behind the scenes”.199 As one NEIP 1 respondent pointed out:
there’s a kind of a policing/monitoring role that is important, that’s part of 
the nature of the NEIP, but that slipped without funding.200
Unsurprisingly, with little formal monitoring, holding collaborators and the collaborative
201group accountable for implementation and outputs was difficult at best.
The result was that many (but not all) collaborators in NEIP 1 failed to deliver actions and 
outputs “on time”.202 Similarly in NEIP 2, accountabilities for implementing the plan had 
reportedly “got a bit lost”,203 and the collaborators themselves were beginning to drift away 
from some of the formal actions and objectives of the plan:204
194 Interview 237, EPA; Markell, n 6 at 62.
195 The analysis that follows draws primarily on NEIP 1 and 2 as at the time o f research they had progressed 
sufficiently into implementation. In contrast, NEIP 3 had only just begun implementation when the research was 
being conducted.
196 When grants had been obtained by a specific collaborative partner (usually an agency), the partner themselves took 
on formal monitoring and reporting duties to the funding body and on all accounts had discharged these 
responsibilities adequately. H owever such monitoring and evaluation did not appear to flow back to the group; 
Interview 218, Local government.
197 “Seed” funding that had originally supported NEIP operations “dried up” upon approval o f  the plan.
198 “There’s a requirement for a review process in there and we are meeting on a 2 monthly basis but the level o f  
reporting back by the various partners whether they be agencies or community groups is very much verbal at the 
meeting and I think it needs to be more robust”, Interview 214, Government Agency.
199 As one respondent pointed out in NEIP 2, “evaluating doesn’t really occur” (Interview 227, Local resident). The 
unfunded coordinator reportedly was continuing to collate information on group participation rates and activities, 
however they rarely attended meetings; Interview 228, Local government.
200 Interview 215, Local Government.
201 Reporting to VEPA also naturally suffered. In NEIP 1, for example, the group missed an entire year o f reporting 
“because [they] didn’t have the resources” (Interview 215, Local government). In NEIP 2 respondents suggested 
reporting had also “peeled o f f ’ (Interview 228, Local government); Bovens, n 1 at 450. Karkkainen n 47, p 317.
202 O f course some partners may have had valid reasons for non compliance, however respondents suggested that 
mostly partners had simply let time lines slip: ‘T h e  initial plan had a lot o f  outcomes, a lot o f  date lines o f targets to 
be met. That fell by the wayside a bit. Some o f  the targets were pretty far in the future, but a lot were supposed to be 
done in the first couple o f  years after NEIP and they weren’t really actually done”; Interview 218, Environmental 
Interest Group.
203 Interview 228, Local Government.
204 If such changes were occurring in accordance with an “adaptive management” approach they may be entirely 
justifiable. However as explained in more detail below adaptive management appeared to be rare - rather the group
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they’re supposed to be implementing their plan now but it’s like they haven’t
205even looked at the plan.
It is important to be clear that there was no evidence of deliberate collusion to hide this 
underperformance - many in fact expressed a desire for a better monitoring and reporting 
system.206 For collaborators, their inability to address these defects appeared attributable to the 
fact that the verbal and informal process of monitoring each other’s behaviour was insufficient 
to “catch out” collaborators who were skilled at “hiding” behind their words.
One may however rightly wonder why the VEPA had not tried to take a more active role in 
encouraging partners to remain accountable to their commitments. In part, the VEPA officers 
appeared to want to avoid too much control over the group in the first few years of 
implementation of the 5 year and 3 year plan of NEIP 1 and 2 respectively. Furthermore, the 
VEPA may well have held back from trying to persuade parties to keep to the commitments 
because they were aware the NEIP had been designed so that specific parties could ultimately 
be held accountable for performing their actions at the end of the plan under the contractual 
NEIP mechanism.207
Notably, recent short term grants to NEIP 1 and 2 appeared likely to turn around abysmal 
monitoring of implementation and reduce the likelihood that such enforcement would be 
needed. While NEIP 2 had only just received the grant at time of research, NEIP 1 had applied 
their grant earlier to hire a coordinator, who had in turn implemented a new monitoring
protocol, developed and distributed a formal register of actions and produced a report for the
208VEPA. This appeared to provide partners with information they needed to shame and exert 
pressure on under performers. As one respondent described:
Things are starting to happen now....the coordinator has spent the last six 
months now just chasing up what previously hadn’t been done and what 
each partner was supposed to do. ...they have re-initiated that process.209
appeared to be simply heading in its own direction to try and undertake new “sustainability” projects with little direct 
regard to the specific plan objectives.
205 Interview 241, EPA.
206 Interview 214, Government Agency. Further, many partners had actually continued to implement actions, 
particularly government agencies.
207 “I guess the power that the NEIP does have is it’s a statutory EPA document so I guess we see as being a 
responsible authority that we need to be seen to be keeping our end o f  the bargain ... So there’s a degree o f statutory 
obligation to ensure that we do it”; Interview 214, State Government.
208 “So that was one of the first things the coordinator did. Was just to update that and report back to VEPA”, 
Interview 215, Local Government.
209 Interview 218, Environmental Group.
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To summarise the above discussion, while it is still in the early stages of the NEIP 
program,210 the findings suggest it has laid quite ineffective and unstable foundations for 
ensuring the program will be able to hold collaborations accountable for performance in the 
future.
Although risks of capture evident in the EIP program were avoided, the NEIP faced a raft 
of other challenges that were attributable to two broad weaknesses. Akin to the EIP program, 
the first weakness arose from broad performance requirements, and the fact that the VEPA 
lacked the guidance or knowledge to meaningfully exercise their associated discretion to ensure 
appropriate targets. Second, in contrast to the EIP program, the findings revealed that complex 
second generation problems posed significant and costly monitoring demands. As we saw, these 
demands were not sufficiently met in the NEIP program, with resulting weaknesses in baseline 
data collection, and monitoring of environmental indicators and implementation. Without this 
data and monitoring, it was commonly difficult for collaborators to fulfill mutual accountability 
roles or for agencies to ensure even basic accountability for implementation, let alone hold 
groups accountable for environmental results.
7.3.2.2 Learning -  failure to implement adaptive management and 
systematic learning
Learning in the NEIP program takes two forms, namely a passive form of adaptive 
management and an overlapping form of “systemic learning” that aspires to spread learning and 
information between different NEIP collaborations. While it is still early days, the findings 
suggest that neither learning approach had been successful, nor was it likely to be successful in 
the future without significant changes to the NEIP program.
Regarding adaptive management, there had been at best, very modest attempts at learning 
that had relied on partners’ perceptions of what had or had not been working,211 whether 
improvements to local environment were occurring and whether behaviour should be adapted in 
response.212 As one respondent illustrated:
210 W hile the signs from funding are positive, only time will tell whether this funding will be sufficient to ensure the 
partners complete their actions under the current plan. Indeed, as the grant itself is short term, the groups’ capacity to 
ensure long term accountability appears questionable in light o f  the findings in this chapter.
211 For example: “they looked at sort o f what they learnt as a group and what they’d have done differently, all those 
sorts o f  things...[but] they didn’t do evaluation and assessment formally and monitoring” Interview 225, EPA.
212 Karkkainen, n 3 at 952-953.
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issues that come up as part of the meetings...we’ve noticed that there’s a 
problem here; how about you go check it out or what other things can we 
do.213
However, as the above discussion revealed, a lack of funding produced ineffective 
monitoring processes, particularly regarding baseline environmental conditions and ongoing
progress against targets. This effectively prevents the generation of detailed and meaningful
214data on which to base robust attempts to learn and adapt behaviour.
A further constraint on adaptive capacities of groups related to the nature of external 
funding obtained by the group to fund projects. Here, respondents suggested that the monitoring 
requirements for the short term government grants were typically focused on the requirements 
of the funding body, and provided little opportunity for the groups themselves to monitor, test 
by results, and learn adaptively from their experience. As one respondent explained:
there isn’t a single funding opportunity at the moment where they go, ‘Here 
is $20K to roll out a project and here is $5K more to do monitoring and 
evaluation for it after you finish’... there’s no monitoring and evaluation 
cycle.215
Turning to systemic learning, there was no evidence that even the most basic learnings and 
experiences of collaboratives had been diffused among NEIP groups. Certainly, early NEIPs 
had been encouraged by VEPA to adopt “sharing learning” as a primarily objective. A common 
statement of this goal was as follows:
[the NEIP] is to use what has been learnt from the process to develop the 
potential for other Neighbourhood EIPs to assist in the management of other 
urban waterway corridors.216
However, respondents reported that VEPA officers had not provided any direct guidance 
or support to the group to assist them in meeting such goals. As the following comments from 
one respondent explained, the result was predictable:217
there’s never been any sort of communication between groups or between 
any of us with other groups...! don’t think the EPA actually knew how to
213 Interview 213; Local government.
214 Ewing, n 19, p 407-408.
215 Interview 222, Local government.
216 Maribymong City Council and Stony Creek NEIP Partners, n 191, p 25; In NEIP 2 the plan notes: “The 
knowledge, skills, strategies and tools that are applied and developed as a part o f  this project need to be captured and 
shared for the benefit o f  other communities”, Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, n 192, p i4.
217 When collaborators were asked about it, they responded: “Yeah we probably should do that” Interview 215, Local 
government.
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support these groups in terms of building the capacity of these groups or 
providing strategies for these groups to fulfil their needs.218
Like the collaborative groups, the VEPA had also failed to hold up its end of the systemic 
learning bargain, sidestepping any “information pooling” role, and making no attempt to
monitor or feed lessons back to collaboratives. As one VEPA respondent put it: “[Learning] is
219not going on at the moment”. Another noted:
[the VEPA] sort of left us to our own devices. They haven’t run a 
monitoring and evaluation program to see how we went and what works and 
what didn’t.220
The above weaknesses were arguably attributable to the abovementioned “gap” between 
the vision of sharing learning and the lack of mechanisms to implement it in practice. According 
to respondents, one source of this “gap” between vision and practice appeared to be that policy 
designers and VEPA officers who were charged with developing institutional mechanisms and 
carrying them out in practice were embedded in an old culture - being a “regulator” - and were 
unsure how to step into a new role that involved facilitating learning. As one VEPA respondent 
explained:
EPA is so confused about its role in NEIPs... traditionally we were regulator 
a stick waving role and now we’re much more touchy feely, but when it 
comes down to it I think we’re plain scared to leave that regulation role 
behind because that’s what we see as giving us strength.221
As the above quotes suggest, VEPA was “self aware” and acknowledged the challenges it 
faced in changing its culture to better support NEIP aspirations such as systemic learning. 
Indeed, at the time of research the VEPA had begun to try and change its culture and better 
support NEIPs through re-training staff, hiring “community development” officers and 
providing greater funding to groups to assist with implementation and sharing lessons between 
NEIPs.222 Whether these changes will lead to improved systemic learning overtime is unclear, 
however it does suggest that change is occurring.
To summarise the above discussion, the experience of the early years of the NEIP suggest 
that both systemic learning and adaptive management have so far evidenced little success. The 
findings regarding adaptive management revealed that anaemic learning processes are likely to 
arise where there is insufficient funding specifically designated to support groups in data
2,8 Interview 225, EPA.
219 Interview 237, EPA.
220 Interview 222, Local government.
221 Interview 241, EPA.
222 Indeed, both grants to in NEIP 1 and 2 noted above are intended in part to contribute to improved learning between 
groups.
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collection and monitoring and evaluation processes. The analysis of systemic learning added 
support to these claims, and pointed to the very real challenges that policy makers and 
regulatory agencies face in implementing new approaches to learning.
7.3.3 RNRM Accountability and learning
7.3.3.1 Accountability -  success and limitations of performance 
based accountability in natural resource management
Unlike either the NEIP and EIP programs, the RNRM program emphasises financial 
accountability, as well as accountability for performance. The findings indicated that most 
aspects of these accountability mechanisms were effective, at least compared to the experience 
of EIP or NEIP. Performance targets appeared to avoid distortions from “industry” stakeholders. 
Furthermore, although the collection of baseline data and ongoing monitoring of environmental 
indicators evidenced some shortcomings, the program appeared to have taken far more 
significant steps towards establishing effective monitoring than the NEIP program, and had 
resolved evident “rent seeking” at the regional body level. Despite this general success, the 
findings revealed that effective accountability mechanisms in RNRM may have come at a price. 
According to respondents monitoring and reporting obligations were too onerous, and likely to 
turn the supposedly flexible, community based regional bodies into bureaucracies. The 
discussion below outlines these findings, commencing with setting performance targets.
The setting of resource condition and management action targets in RNRM was guided by 
a regional body that contained predominantly primary producer interests. While this created
significant risk of distortion, respondents reported government oversight had largely addressed
223such defects. As one JSC respondent explained, they had used their veto over targets set by 
the group (see Table 7.2 below) to ensure they were consistent with existing laws and 
maintained credible environmental standards:
The plan would say ...“change the vegetation management act,” and we’d 
say “why did you waste the ink that is not a decision that is appropriate to
t • 224this group.
Most respondents suggested the JSC had ensured targets were appropriate, measurable and 
quantifiable. As another JSC respondent explained, this success was partly attributable to the 
specificity in RNRM frameworks regarding expected outcomes and matters for target, which
223 One respondents also suggested effective targets arose from having scientific interests on regional bodies, and the 
wider community consultation process; Interview 323, State Government.
224 Interview 323, Government Agency.
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appeared to ensure the JSC had a relatively clear picture of the issues to be measured and 
magnitude of targets expected:
the regional bodies planning is largely operational...all the decision making
will be taken in the government framework, veg management, water
225planning, for example: there’s no discretion.
Illustration of resource condition targets Illustration of management action target
• By 2024, achieve a 10% improvement in 
soil health in extensive and intensive 
agricultural areas.
• By 2024, the conservation of naturally 
occurring aquatic organisms and ecological 
values of 80% of priority, permanent, 
natural waterholes will be ensured.
• By 2012, the health and diversity of 75% 
of the mapped key groundwater dependent 
ecosystems (eg springs, wetlands, wonky 
holes) is stable.
• By 2020, 40% of landscapes in poor 
biodiversity condition, focusing on 
endangered and of concern regional 
ecosystems and riparian areas are 
rehabilitated to a good biodiversity 
condition.
• By 2015, ensure 90% of all threatened flora 
and fauna species in the region will be 
represented in conservation reserves or 
under voluntary conservation agreements.
• By 2020, C 02 and other greenhouse gas 
emissions in the regional air shed are 
reduced by 5% from 1990 levels.
• By 2010, 75% of landholders in cropping 
areas are implementing farm management 
systems.
• By 2010, facilitate the development of a 
regional (surface and ground) water 
management organisation.
• By 2010, 1 000 OOOha of land is managed 
for nature conservation purposes under 
voluntary management agreements
• By 2010, complete state agency pest 
management planning.
• By 2008, assess the impact of climate 
change on the region.
• By 2008, a strategic plan for the removal of 
impediments (either by complete removal of 
modification to structures) between marine 
and freshwater environments will be 
completed for the BDT regions.
Table 7.2: Illustration of Resource Condition and Management Action Targets in 
RNRM.
Successful target setting was also attributable to quite significant baseline data and
monitoring mechanisms established by the RNRM program. Vital here was the provision of
2^ 6
existing environmental monitoring data from state government agencies, ~ as well as quite
225 Interview 321,Government Agency.
226 As one state government member confirmed: “W e assist by providing actual information or data, w e provide 
science support or undertake science projects on their b ehalf’ Interview 3211, Government Advisor.
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extensive funding made available to the regional body to seek scientific advice and conduct
228multiple studies on regional resource conditions, as well as social and economic issues.
This is not to suggest that this support had been used to overcome all technical constraints
229and scientific uncertainties characteristic of such a complex ecosystem management system.
230Like many NEG experiments, RNRM operated on “best available science”, a fact that led
231some to question the scientific appropriateness of some targets.
A number of other problems were also apparent. These included insufficiencies in funding
for monitoring. As one respondent simply put it: “we really need a lot more resources than
232we’ve got”. State agencies also reportedly prevented access to some of their data. As one 
respondent pointed out:
the agencies had done a lot of work...but you know they were keeping it, 
they had decided they had the intellectual property on it so it wasn’t going 
out to bodies.233
These problems contributed to a number of gaps in baseline data, preventing targets being 
set for issues such as dry land salinity, terrestrial weeds, acidity, biodiversity in flora and fauna, 
wetlands and hydraulic links, ground water and water bodies, coastal condition and water 
quality.234
Of course, the RNRM program had anticipated gaps in data. Much will accordingly hang 
on whether commitments to fill these gaps are funded by the government and successfully 
implemented by the regional body over the next few years.
227
227 The funding had been used in part to form a “technical advisory panel”, comprising biophysical and socio­
economic scientists, which provided useful scientific advice on targets; BDTNRM , Burdekin D ry Tropics Natural 
Resource M anagem ent Plan 2005-2010  (BDTNRM , 2005) p 32.
228 See generally reports contained in BDTNRM , n 227.
229 As one government respondent put it: “the reality is that in NRM there are huge information gaps and we have 
done lots o f really good science work” Interview 323, Government Agency.
230 Interview 341, Regional Body.
231 For example, som e respondents raised concerns about links made between management action targets and resource 
conditions outcomes (Interview 311, Peak industry body), while others raised questions about the monitoring and 
“hydrological m odels” associated with load based end o f  river targets (Interview 341, Regional Body). See also the 
general concerns raised regarding science underpinning RNRM  targets in Watts M, Getting on Track? (Australian 
Conservation Foundation, 2004) p 36-37.
232 Interview 317, Peak Industry Body /Regional Body. See also discussions regarding RNRM generally in Keogh K, 
Chant D and Frazer B, Review  O f Arrangements For Regional D elivery O f N atural Resource M anagement 
Programmes (Cth, 2006) p 78.
233 Interview 315, Peak Industry Body.
234 BDTNRM , n 227, p 81-82. Similar gaps findings have been made in a range o f national evaluations o f RNRM.
See for example RM Consulting Group with URS, Rural Directions, Griffin NRM  and Mark Gardner & Associates, 
Evaluation o f  Sustainable Agriculture Outcom es from  Regional Investment (NAP and NHT) (Cth, 2006) p 15-17; 
Bellamy J, M etcalfe D , Weston N and Dawson S, Evaluation o f  Invasive Species (W eeds) Outcomes o f  Regional 
Investment Final R eport to the D epartm ent o f  Environment and Heritage and Departm ent o f  Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry  (Cth, 2005) p vii, viii; Keogh et al, n 232, p 7; For further reports see 
http://www.nrm.gov.au/me/evaluation/national.html.
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In addition to filling baseline gaps, an equally important task for delivering accountability
in RNRM is ongoing environmental monitoring of indicators to enable progress to be judged
235against resource condition targets.
The findings suggest regional body and state agencies had made some significant progress
in developing long term data capture processes, including obtaining satellite imagery of the
236region, implementing drilling programs and building-in monitoring components to projects. 
However, the findings indicated that such ongoing monitoring was likely to face two key 
difficulties. First, respondents suggested there was a lack of coordination in ongoing monitoring 
by agencies. As one respondent explained regarding water monitoring:
one of the problems I suppose is there are so many different agencies doing
so many different things. There is no commonality, or no communication
237you know bringing them together.
The second challenge related to funding. Available funding was seen by many to simply be
too small and too “short term”, for regional bodies to sustain long term monitoring and
238implementation responsibilities to ultimately achieve their targets (for further see chapter 8). 
Without further funding or improved coordination, these barriers to monitoring may reduce the
capacity of government and public to be able to judge whether they are getting good value for
239expenditure and whether progress is being made toward national outcomes.
Compared to setting and measuring progress against performance targets, the RNRM 
program appeared to face fewer problems in monitoring financial activity, outputs and 
adherence to management action milestones. The effectiveness of this monitoring process is 
best illustrated by exploring how these monitoring processes successfully facilitated the JSC to 
step in and rectify emerging rent seeking behaviour at the regional body level.
Two unique factors appeared to give rise to the problem of rent seeking in the case study. 
The first was the regional bodies’ “nested” structure. As we saw in chapter 5, this nested 
structure involved giving majority membership to 5 sub regional groups. While this structure 
was useful for planning, when it came to the regional body managing the roll out of government 
investment to implement the plan, it gave rise to potential conflicts of interests. As one
235 BDTNRM , n 227, p 146.
236 Interview 334, Regional Body; Interview 341, Regional Body. See for example 
http://www.burdekindrvtropics.org.au/gisweb/gis w eb/.
237 Interview 342, Subregional Body.
238 As one respondent explained “in theory there should have been considerably investment into these regional bodies, 
its really quite a tiny investm ent...it is really “vegem ite” [spread too thinly]” Interview 3210, Science.
239 Interview 3215, Government Agency.
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respondent explained, this was because the sub regional bodies were potential recipients of the 
funding that their representatives on the regional body controlled:
when it came to actually roll out and receiving the money and making the 
decision you all of a sudden had a structure that was full of conflict of 
interest... [because] the board of directors consists of 99% of potential 
providers of services to the organisation.240
Compounding this problem was the fact that many of the subregional representatives had 
not only sought representation on the body to obtain “money” for their groups,241 but they often 
lacked the knowledge or training for managing an incorporated body.242 This appeared to 
stymie any mutual accountability between partners and reportedly created “incompetence at a 
board level”.243
The result was governance and management problems regarding the use of public funds, 
sparking concerns of “rent seeking” behaviour. As one respondent explained:
out of the funding available they decided to fund a [capacity building project] 
for each of their organisations ...but that was the funding that was supposed 
to be used for setting up the roll out of the plan.244
Fortunately, the regional body had received sufficient funding to complete administration 
tasks and hire staff to meet monitoring and reporting expectations on finances and 
implementation.245 This monitoring in turn alerted the JSC to the above problems, and it 
accordingly exercised its “destabilisation right” to initiate a review of governance and 
operational arrangements.246
This involved government officers working with regional body directors and staff to 
identify a range of potential improvements, setting out 23 general recommendations and a 
number of actions to be addressed by the participants.247 As one respondent explained:
so that review actually pointed out the need to change the focus, structure
and the composition of the board... and put in place some policies 248
240 Interview 341, Regional Body; this problem appears to resonate with concerns raised in Paton et al, n 14 at 265.
241 See chapter 5 and 6.
242 As one respondent explained, “the 5 subregional bodies and other organizations [had] nominate[d] people on the 
board regardless o f  qualifications or their background their ability to govern...there was plan and they had written a 
regional investment strategy, but no-body had thought how they actually were going to roll the money out or the 
structures or the system they may needed to actually do that”, Interview 341, Regional Body.
243 As the respondent explained: “drawing from the community is a really good thing but you need people who know  
how to sit on a board. And once you start getting out o f  cities and large regional areas. The capacity for someone to 
not carry their individual hats onto a board, so you have incompetence at a board level”, Interview 3210, Science.
244 Notably there was no deliberate misappropriation o f  funding. Interview 341, Regional Body.
245 This was supported by government based Regional Coordinating Group and Regional Body Advisors who 
reported that they kept the JSC informed on whether “projects were being implemented, conducted successfully/not 
successful and whether there were problems.” Interview 3211, Government Agency.
246 The review was conducted early in 2005, and the government also conducted a program o f Business Improvement 
Reviews o f  Regional Bodies in late 2005.
247 BDTNRM , Annual R eport 2004-2005  (BDTNRM , 2005) p 7, 9; BDTNRM , Business Plan  (BDTNRM , 2007) p 3.
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The precise details of the new structure, composition and policies were largely left to the 
regional body. However the JSC retained the ongoing right to review the changes as they were
i • 249made over time.
At the time of writing, the regional body had successfully responded to many of these 
recommendations.250 Although there was a degree of disappointment from some sub regional 
group members about the changes that had occurred, most remained actively engaged and 
continued with the process, but with greater awareness about issues such as conflict of 
interest.251 As the following comment from one subregional group illustrates:
I sat on the board the other day and I thought I can’t think for [subregional 
group] anymore...you can’t push our own barrow you know.252
Despite successfully preventing rent seeking, there was at least one downside253 to 
RNRM ’s accountability arrangements. That is, respondents suggested accountability 
requirements were “smothering” 254 regional bodies, imposing excessive “red tape” 255 and 
onerous obligations with negative impacts upon adaptive management processes (discussed 
further below).256 As one respondent put it: “its just quite a burden, you’re just sticking that 
bureaucratic stuff into a really small organisation that doesn’t have the capacity.257
Many respondents suggested such bureaucratic monitoring and reporting, combined with 
tight government controls over investment decisions, had left regional bodies “over governed”
248 Interview 341, Regional Body
249 Karkkainen, n 11 at 68.
250 Am ong other things, a new CEO and staff were appointed, along with new membership o f  the board including an 
independent chairperson, and the completion o f corporate governance training. There were also commitments made 
to rewrite the body’s constitution to change the structure o f the board and to develop various governance and business 
plans (eg. corporate strategic plan). BDTNRM , Annual R eport 2004-2005  (BDTNRM, 2005) p 7, 9; Interview 341, 
Regional Body; BDTNRM , Business Plan  (BDTNRM , 2007) p 3, 15.
251 What is also notable about the success o f this process was that government intervention via the “destabilisation” 
right did not appear to have created resistance or thwarted the necessary openness and engagement for accountability 
and devolved collaboration problem solving to work; Sturm, n 14, p 333.
252 Interview 342-1, Subregional Body 1.
253 A small minority o f  respondents also pointed to a second accountability concern relating to the use o f  public 
resources. A s one respondent put it: “I think there has been considerable devolution o f responsibilities from 
state government to [regional groups] to pick up works...they have been taken advantage o f  in that regime I 
would say, there is cost shifting associated with that”, Interview 3210, CSIRO. Based on the data in this study it 
was difficult to determine the extent and magnitude o f this cost-shifting problem, however recent studies have 
raised this as an issue in RNRM. See Paton et al, n 14 at 261, 263; Keogh et al, n 232, p 60; Posner, n 3, p 529.
254 Interview 349, Regional Groups Collective.
255 To be clear, respondents believed accountability in RNRM was important. As one respondent explained:
“everyone sees the va lu e ...it’s not your money, you have to be accountable for it” Interview 349, Regional Group 
Collective.
256 Beyond regional bodies operations themselves, the monitoring and reporting requirements for individual projects 
were also considered far too onerous for partner implementers on the ground. As one respondent pointed, applications 
for funding were often extremely difficult and the reporting burdensome: “I have noticed with any o f  the applications 
that com e though they seem to keep getting incredibly hard...I understand why you have to go through more and 
more hoops ...[but] the way the applications read its like the people are out to rip o ff  all the grant systems which I 
don’t, don’t think they are”; Interview 345, Subregional Group.
257 Interview 349, Regional Groups Collective.
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258 259by government. The risk here was that too much government control was beginning to 
morph regional bodies into the very government bureaucracies that these supposedly flexible 
and participatory organisations were designed to replace.260 As one respondent summed up:
It’s getting to the stage now where the board was starting to look as if it’s 
just another state department and if that is going to be the case we may as 
well not wasted all our money.261
To conclude the above discussion, accountability mechanisms in RNRM appeared to avoid 
many of the problems that plagued the other case studies. The RNRM program appeared to 
secure credible, measurable targets free from blatant industry dominance. This was achieved in 
part because of the greater level of specificity in performance expectation and outcomes that had 
assisted JSC to effectively exercise its discretion. Furthermore, dedicated funding and state 
government monitoring ensured regional bodies had greater success than NEIP in seeking 
scientific advice, collecting baseline data and conducting ongoing monitoring of indicators, 
milestones, finances and outputs. Moreover, the RNRM program had been able to successfully 
intervene to ensure regional bodies complied with their responsibilities and were held 
accountable via destabilisation rights for rent seeking behaviour.262
Such success must however be weighed against the identified challenges faced by RNRM. 
Uncertainties remain about the scientific basis of targets. Indeed, holding bodies accountable for 
delivery of results is likely to face difficulties in the future if evident gaps in baseline data, and 
uncoordinated or inadequately funded long term monitoring processes are not resolved in the 
immediate future. Shortfalls in mutual accountability were also evident, in part because of 
mutual interest of regional body members and a lack of necessary knowledge and skills to check 
rent seeking tendencies. Moreover, distinct from both NEIP and EIP programs, the RNRM 
program appeared to be overly obsessed with tight accountability controls, which the findings 
suggested may stymie the unique contribution of regional bodies, and as discussed in the next 
section, marginalise their learning processes.263
258 Interview 313, Peak Industry Body.
259 Lawrence, n 23 at 13; May, n 2 at 23.
260 Lawrence G and Cheshire L, “Managing Nature: The Promises and Problems o f  Regional Environmental 
Governance in Australia” Plenary Address at the Ecopolitics XV Conference Environmental Governance: 
Transforming Regions and Localities, Macquarie University, Sydney 12-14, November 2004 at 9; Lawrence, n 23 at
13.
261 Interview 342, Subregional Body.
262 O f course issues remain with the fact that monitoring and reporting processes that underpinned the destabilisation 
right were too onerous and, as discussed below, had a negative impact on effective learning.
263 Lawrence and Cheshire, n 260 at 9.
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7.3.3.2 Learning -  adaptive management and systemic Iearning
The learning aspirations of the RNRM program were two fold: “passive” adaptive 
management at regional body level, which is overlayed with a form of systemic learning at the 
program level. These two approaches to learning are discussed in turn below. As we will see, 
adaptive management at the regional body level appears likely to face more difficulties in 
getting off the ground and being carried out effectively than systemic learning. However, the 
findings also indicated that systemic learning in RNRM could have been improved if the 
program had aspired to share experiences between regional bodies.
Although at an early stage, the RNRM program appeared to have laid some important
foundations for implementing adaptive management process, at least compared to the NEIP
program. As discussed above, significant levels of funding provided to the regional body, along
with government monitoring, had both ensured at least some baseline data had been collected
and some longer term monitoring infrastructure had been put into place. These elements should
assist regional bodies to gather data on ongoing implementation, conduct evaluations regarding
264the suitability and achievement of regional targets, and thus facilitate adaptations as needed.
However the findings suggest that regional bodies may also face a number of significant 
hurdles that may limit the achievement of effective adaptive management. Some of these have 
already been pointed out above regarding RNRM monitoring processes. For example, gaps in 
baseline data, and lack of coordination and funding threaten to weaken the availability and
adequacy of data vital to bodies’ determining the effectiveness and appropriateness of actions
265and when adaptations need to be made.
A second hurdle raised by respondents regarding adaptive management was that many of 
the environmental monitoring processes established were designed to monitor environmental 
conditions at a regional level for regional resource condition targets. This means the data being 
produced was not always considered suitable to facilitating effective adaptive management 
regarding more localised  environmental changes. As one respondent put it:
the plans put in monitoring points that are well down stream of farms, they 
are [regional] catchment scale... if we are going to get continuous 
improvement we need something that is giving us feedback...because all this 
catchment planning, basin planning is too broad scale.266
A third and final hurdle to achieving adaptive management related to the capacity of 
regional bodies to actually act as effective adaptive managers.267 Certainly, the RNRM program
264 Cth and Qld, n 61.
265 Ewing, n 19, p 408.
266 Interview 314, Peak Industry Body
267 It is worth noting that because the case study involved such a large region, the members o f the regional body (and 
even their subregional group’s members) are unlikely to have the capacity to constantly bring all the necessary
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had taken some important steps to ensure bodies were equipped with necessary skills and data, 
including training regional body staff in monitoring processes.268 However the regional body 
appeared to be making slow progress in implementing procedures necessary for the body to 
follow an adaptive approach. Not least, they were well over a year behind in developing (let 
alone implementing) a formal monitoring and evaluation strategy that was to guide learning and 
adaptation.269
The capacity of the body to perform adaptive management also appeared to be constrained 
because of an overemphasis on financial accountability and management action milestones. 
These requirements appeared to overwhelm regional groups resources and capacity and skewed 
time and effort in these directions, reducing opportunities for them to operate as effective and 
adaptive natural resource management organisations.270 As one respondent put it:
you are constantly under review and how can you do your business if you
27 1are constantly writing your reports for the “feds” ...so that’s a shame.
Turning to systemic learning, at the time of writing the first scheduled program evaluation
272had taken place. Following procedures laid out in overarching frameworks, government
bodies had engaged consultants and set the scope, objectives and terms of reference for 6
273comprehensive national evaluations.
Many of these evaluations brought to light a number of successes, but also areas for 
improvement, including issues raised in this chapter regarding baseline data gaps, and overly
onerous accountability requirements. The as yet unanswered question is whether having
274identified these weaknesses, the government will agree to improve program delivery. The 
government has recently committed to a “new phase” of the program for 2008 -  2013, which 
suggests some promise for change; however at the time of writing the precise details had yet to 
be released.275
Despite conducting comprehensive reviews of the program, many respondents were critical 
of the program’s failure to actually aspire to sharing learning and experiences between regional
“local” knowledge to the table regarding relevant environmental conditions. However, formal reviews o f  the plan 
every 5 - 7  years involving multiple regional stakeholders may go some way to filling this gap.
268 The regional body had also begun to develop a database to provide a central source o f data.
269 In draft form at the time o f writing; see http://www.burdekindrytropics.org.au/initiatives/com.html
270 Rather, all regional “monitoring and evaluation... has been in the form o f quarterly performance and financial 
reports”, Interview 341, Regional body; BDTNRM , Annual report 2004-2005 (BDTNRM, 2005) p 7, 9.
271 Interview 313, Peak Industry Body.
272 http://www.nrm.gov.au/me/evaluation/national.html
273 Cth and Qld, n 61, s 7.1-7.3.
274 Farrelly M, “Régionalisation o f  Environmental Management: a Case Study o f  the Natural Heritage Trust, South 
Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393 at 403.
275 See generally http://nrm.gov.au.
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bodies.276 The fact that there were 56 regions across Australia with bodies that varied in age and 
experience suggests there was significant opportunity for sharing different processes, structures,
and the various challenges and lessons learned by each to improve the overall effectiveness of
277program. As one respondent explained:
lot of these kind of groups are just working in a vacuum and it [would be] 
really helpful for them to hear what other people are doing.278
With no formal information sharing, the Regional Group Collective (RGC) in Queensland 
had taken matters into their own hands. The RGC was comprised of representatives of each 
regional body in Queensland and was underpinned by government funding directed by regional 
bodies to hire staff and an office for the RGC.279 Utilising these resources, the body provided a 
forum at the state level for “regional bodies to share what they’re doing”, and learn and build 
capacities to face their many similar challenges.280 As one respondent explained:
the groups are so diverse and the regions so diverse, so you get a lot of good
ideas...I was looking for position description for some positions and just
sent message through to the collective and I pull in ideas, when I was 
• • • 281 reviewing the constitution.
As the above quote suggests, the information sharing facilitated by RGC was largely
practical, and far more limited than say democratic experimentalist vision of sharing of
282standards, targets and measures to achieve them. However, at a minimum, the RGC embodies 
at least a nascent form of information sharing that appeared comparatively more effective than 
relying on government agency efforts such as in NEIPs.
To summarise the above discussion, adaptive management and systemic learning both 
appear to be underpinned by some promising foundations. In contrast to the NEIP program, 
RNRM funding and government support appeared to have positioned regional groups with 
comparatively greater access to necessary information for learning processes. Further, the form 
of systemic learning in RNRM involving policy review and adaptation was also implemented
276 There had been som e national seminars and other events organised that allowed regional bodies to share 
information and experience (eg. National Monitoring and Evaluation Symposium for Natural Resource Management 
held in Hobart, Tasmania 30 August to 1 September, 2005); Head, n 14, p 146.
277 Paton et al, n 14, p 262.
278 Interview 349, Regional Group Collective.
279 See also Chapter 6.
280 Interview 349, Regional Group Collective.
281 Interview 341, Regional Body.
282 Karkkainen et al, n 12 at 691.
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more successfully than NEIP’s attempts to share learning among co llab o ra tes , in part because 
of the presence of formal procedures to guide agencies in these tasks.283
Despite this comparative successes, RNRM appeared likely to face a number of bumps on 
the road to achieving effective adaptive management. These include gaps in baseline data due to 
insufficient funding, inadequacies in monitoring at multiple scales, and lack of capacity at 
regional body level to conduct adaptive management tasks. The findings also suggested that 
systemic learning aspirations lacked what many respondents suggested were vital information 
sharing goals. To fill this void the RGC structure appeared to offer some promise, at least 
compared to the comparable attempts by VEPA in the NEIP program.
7.4 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter investigated the conditions that fostered effective “new” forms of
accountability and learning in practice. Its analysis of three cases studies has provided a number
284 285of insights into the operation of accountability and learning mechanisms in practice.
Some findings were necessarily more provisional than others and/or focused on approaches 
and mechanisms unique to each case. For example, the findings in EIP touched on
accountability and learning in process and performance based approaches, pointing to the risk of
286laggards paying “lip service” to processes and pursuing tokenistic targets. The NEIP findings 
reflected on systemic learning, revealing what the chapter termed a “vision deficit”. 
Insufficiencies in funding and support for NEIP collaborative groups were also found to have 
undermined effective monitoring of performance. Meanwhile, the findings in the RNRM 
program evidenced far more effective monitoring and accountability mechanisms, however the 
program appeared to have imposed quite onerous controls, threatening flexibility and learning at 
regional body level.
Despite these variations, at a broad level there were a number of common issues and 
problems raised across the cases relating to “new” forms of accountability and learning.
Regarding accountability, the findings spoke to concerns in the literature that “new” forms 
and approaches to accountability in NEG create significant risks of agency capture, unprincipled
287deal making and rent seeking. While the chapter did not seek to determine whether some
283 Ewing, n 19, p 407.
284 Weber, n 7 at 454; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 37; Karkkainen, n 12 at 237; Sturm, n 14, p 331-334.
285 Head, n 14, p 146; Karkkainen, n 12 at 243; Paton et al, n 14 at 262; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 32.
286 See Fiorino, n 10.
287 Doremus, n 6; Karkkainen, n 3 at 961; Posner, n 3, p 529; Steinzor, n 19.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
319
level of “perfect accountability” was achieved in each case, it was clear from the findings that 
there was one or more shortfalls in accountability that had exposed each program to such risks. 
Certainly, all cases appeared to conform with existing legal baselines, however overly 
generalised performance standards, and shortfalls in agency oversight, mutual and/or 
professional accountability were all found to have left the door open to risks of capture and 
unprincipled deal making, undermining environmental outcomes likely to be achieved in both 
EIP and NEIP. Similarly, the findings in RNRM pointed to a failure in mutual accountability 
that saw regional bodies pursue rent seeking behaviour. However as we saw, RNRM was able to 
successfully address this weakness through an accountability regime that had provided greater 
specificity in expected performance outcomes, and imposed stricter monitoring and reporting 
requirements.
At a broad level, these findings may be seen to support claims that NEG is prone to capture
289or unscrupulous behaviour by private interests and suggests that more, rather than less formal
accountability safeguards are needed in NEG, including heightened scrutiny such as in RNRM,
290less deference to discretion and more precise statutes to guarantee accountability.
291Yet, as the findings in RNRM warned, the risk with stricter controls is the potential to
undermine the creativity and flexibility that is essential to successfully address diverse localised
292problems. Given this, it is arguably better to view the findings as reinforcing the widely 
recognised difficulties faced by any governance regime in balancing sufficient accountability
controls (to ensure consistency) with sufficient discretion (to promote flexibility and
293innovation). In other words, the findings reinforce to scholars and practitioners the need to 
design accountability mechanisms to address what appear to be very real risks of capture and 
other distortions in NEG, but suggest that they do so with an awareness of the trade-off between
accountability and arriving at and implementing creative agreements in a provisional and
294adaptive manner.
Regarding learning, this chapter has reflected on and provided insights into three broad 
approaches to learning: process based learning, passive adaptive management and attempts at
288
288 Freeman and Farber, n 7 at 908.
289 See M cCloskey, n 56; Farber, n 6 at 74; Koontz and Thomas, n 56, at 113; Karkkainen, n 3 at 961.
290 Freeman, n 3 at 94.
291 In view  o f similar experiences in UK and elsewhere, it is o f  little surprise that the program with the most funding -  
RNRM -  also imposed the strictest upwards performance and financial monitoring and reporting requirements on 
collaboration. Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave, 2003) p 229; Head B, “Governance” in Saunders 
P and Walter H (eds), Ideas and Influence Social Science and Public Policy in Australia  (UNSW  Press, 2005) p 58.
292 W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 241; Freeman, n 3 at 93; Steinzor, n 19, page 15 o f “p d f’.
293 May, n 2 at 23; Freeman, n 23 at 1871-1872, 1874; Head, n 23 at 31; Freeman, n 3 at 96; W ondolleck and Yaffee, 
n 7, p 235-237.
294 Freeman, n 23 at 1871.
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systemic learning. In its own way, each learning approach appeared to achieve only limited 
success.
Process based learning in EIP appeared effective only when it was placed in the hands of 
industries with a commitment to environmental outcomes. The “passive” adaptive management 
approach pursued across the cases appeared effective in some circumstances, with collaborators
across the cases using their local knowledge and/or available monitoring data to identify
295shortcomings and assess alternatives to reach feasible approaches that worked. However the 
approach generally fell short of complete success due to either (i) a lack of capacity by 
collaborators such as local residents in EIP who failed to engage with broader environmental 
issues; and/or (ii) insufficient funding and support for data collection and ongoing monitoring 
such as in NEIP and RNRM. Finally, systemic learning approaches appeared effective in 
RNRM, while NEIP evidenced a complete failure by government and collaborations to pool and 
share information.
Seen at a broad level, these approaches all failed because those charged with learning
296lacked the capacity or incentives to gather, analyse and act on information about practice.
These findings bolster claims that scholars and practitioners need to acknowledge that the
297capacity for learning is not a given, and that NEG accordingly must ensure appropriate 
incentives, capacity building and support is built into programs to ensure effective learning is 
achieved.298
Given these general conclusions regarding accountability and learning, were there any 
specific lessons from the findings about the conditions likely to assist in skillfully balancing 
controls with discretion, or designing apposite incentives and capacity building for the purposes 
of learning?
Based on the above analysis, a number of lessons can be identified that fall under 5 main 
themes. Some of these themes relate exclusively to learning or accountability and others relate 
to both. The first theme relates to both learning and accountability, namely designing effective 
monitoring processes. For accountability specifically, two primary themes raised by the cases
relate to (i) setting overarching legislative goals; and (ii) achieving effective professional and
299mutual accountability. The final two themes relate to learning, namely (i) assisting or 
encouraging actors to effectively implement process and adaptive learning approaches, and (ii)
295 Sturm, n 14, p 326.
296 Sturm, n 14, p 327.
297 Sturm, n 14, p 327.
298 Sturm, n 14, p 327.
299 May, n 2 at 23-24.
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designing systemic learning structures. For each of these issues, the findings provide some 
important empirical based lessons for NEG theory and for policy makers.
First in terms of monitoring, the NEG literature has raised many questions about the 
conditions under which collaborative groups will best conduct necessary monitoring vital to
both learning300 and performance based accountability.301 Based on the above analysis, NEG
302experiments that focus on point source pollution like EIP appear to face fewer direct 
monitoring challenges, not least because the environmental problems are “simpler” and
industries will often have well established monitoring processes under traditional regulatory
303regimes.
In contrast, the challenges of monitoring understandably appeared much greater in NEG 
experiments like NEIP and RNRM that focused on complex and diffuse environmental issues. 
Relevant data on these multifaceted and dynamic problems was scarce. Even with varying 
degrees of support, both cases evidenced significant gaps in baseline monitoring, ineffective or 
limited ongoing monitoring of environment conditions, and in the NEIP case, weak monitoring 
of outputs. These findings are generally consistent with other NEG research, which suggests in 
similar ecosystem focused experiments monitoring is often weak, and can have negative impact 
on securing effective accountability and learning.304
Based on the above discussion, a number of conditions appear likely to improve the 
chances of successful monitoring. At the broadest level, there is clearly a need for policy makers
to give earnest attention to improving the extent and effectiveness of basic environmental
305 • •monitoring in order to better support NEG experiments. As the difficulties in coordination,
relevancy and access to monitoring data in RNRM revealed, it is vital that there is clarity on
306why data is collected, who will and is collecting it and who must have access to it.
A second insight into conditions supportive of effective monitoring was revealed in the 
EIP program. As we saw, the program’s capacity to harness community and VEPA pressure on 
industry was useful for encouraging effective monitoring. This resonates with suggestions in the
300 Collaborative Democracy Network, n 21 at 169; Head, n 14, p 145; Thomas, n 15, p 154; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 
31-32; Sturm, n 14, p 328; Dovers, n 21, p 522-523.
301 Fung and Wright, n 6, p 31-32; Gaines, n 19 at 16; Sturm, n 14, p 333.
302 O f course this will vary depending on what is being monitored. The EIP was focused on point source em issions, 
not ambient conditions which would be far more complex.
303 Dovers, n 21, p 521.
304 Thomas, n 15, p 153-156; Karkkainen B, ‘Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening D em ocracy: Institutional Innovations in Em powered P articipatory Governance  (Verso 2003) p 
218; Ewing, n 19, p 407-408. See also arguments in Steinzor, n 19 at pages 15, 21 o f “p d f’; cf. W ondolleck and 
Yaffee, n 7, p 136-137.
305 Dovers, n 21, p 522.
306 Karkkainen B, “M anaging Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great Lakes” (2006) 19 Pacific 
McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209 at 230- 231; Dovers, n 21, p 521.
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literature that negative incentives such as “penalty default” style rules can be used to great effect 
to ensure appropriate monitoring.307
Third, and finally, as some have pointed out in the literature, in the absence of specific
incentives, support and funding will be needed for collaborative groups if they are to fulfil
308monitoring of environmental conditions and implementation. Without sufficient funding, 
NEG experiments risk abject breakdowns in monitoring processes as evidenced in the NEIP 
program, or at best are left with significant gaps to fill as evidenced in RNRM.
Turning to the second set of lessons, the findings shed some light on the challenges of 
securing accountability in performance based experiments by setting overarching outcome 
expectations. Many in the literature suggest legislating the outcomes to be achieved by 
collaborative groups (as opposed to preordaining solutions to be followed) can protect public
interest, while imparting discretion needed to develop innovative and tailored solutions to
309environmental problems. However, consistent with the concerns of other authors, the findings 
in EIP and NEIP demonstrated that overly general outcomes (i.e. “improve local neighbourhood 
environment”) create very real risks of “abuse” by collaborators, industry and overworked or 
inexperienced government officers.310
One general rule of thumb for overcoming this problem suggested by the findings is that
legislatures avoid broad sweeping statements such as evidenced in EIP and NEIP and instead
specify as clearly as possible the outcomes expected - an approach which appeared to contribute
311to a more successful target setting process in RNRM.
Alternatively, legislatures could simply choose to live with such broad statements, but 
instead ensure that additional accountability mechanisms and checks exist on the final decision 
approved by an agency like the VEPA. As some authors have argued, this may involve
appropriately designed ex post citizen’s lawsuits, or independent scientific review of
a  • • 312 decisions.
A more extensive reform suggested in the literature for improving outcome specificity 
while retaining sufficient flexibility would be for NEG experiments to adopt a form of systemic 
learning structure. This would involve various collaboratives functioning as information 
gathering mechanisms to inform processes of benchmarking, and the periodic overhaul of
307 Karkkainen, n 3 at 996.
308 Thomas, n 15, p 167-169; Ewing, n 19, p 408.
309 Freeman, n 3 at 94; W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7; Dana, n 6 at 53-54.
310 Dana, n 6 at 53-54; Freeman, n 3 at 94; W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7.
311 See similar suggestion by W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 241.
312 Dana, n 6 at 55-56; see also Manring, n 36 at 78; Freeman, n 3 at 92; 1 Karkkainen, n 3, W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 
7, p 241.
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acceptable outcomes and targets. For example, instances of tokenism in the EIP program 
would arguably have been less if targets set by comparable industries had been pooled and 
benchmarked, leading the VEPA to periodically refine and specify minimal “beyond 
compliance” targets.314 Indeed, such a process would likely have provided greater guidance and 
information for VEPA officers who otherwise appeared to lack the time, knowledge or skills to 
know what level of environmental improvement was or was not capable of achievement by 
industries, and subsequently bring poorer performers into line with others. The difficulty 
however with this approach is that such information gathering structures may pose significant 
problems for agencies, as discussed further below.
Beyond setting overarching performance goals, the findings also provide some insights 
into conditions for effective professional and mutual accountability. Of course, few NEG 
experiments are likely to rely solely on either professional or mutual accountability per se. Even 
so, given their increasingly central role in NEG, and the evident weaknesses revealed in the 
findings, it is useful to explore some of the conditions that may be supportive of these forms of 
accountability.
Professional accountability was most prominent in industries’ design of management
315frameworks in the EIP program. Here, the professional expertise of most industries appeared 
capable of successfully designing and implementing adequate management systems. However
shortfalls in professional accountability were identified with poor performers, who appeared to
316purposefully deceive others and often flout their responsibilities.
The implication here is the need for NEG programs to compensate for such “bad apples”
317by enhancing a sense of “professional accountability”. As some authors have suggested, this
may involve either education programs or increasing the economic or regulatory consequences
318for failing to meet particular norms or codes of practice. To some extent, the latter approach 
was evident in the EIP case where process and performance based systems operated together in 
unison. Here, social and regulatory consequences for failing to deliver improvements in local 
environment outcomes were effective in ensuring industry designed and implemented systems 
to improve their management of local environmental impacts. However, as we saw, without 
effective pressure from local residents or government on broader environmental issues, the 
professional accountability of poor performers slipped into tokenism.
313
313 Freeman, n 3 at 93; Karkkainen, n 3; Karkkainen et al, n 12.
314 Cohen J and Sabel C, “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy” (1997) 3 Euro L J 313.
315 May, n 2 at 13.
316 May, n 2 at 24.
317 May, n 2 at 24.
318 May, n 2 at 24.
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Turning to mutual accountability, many in the literature suggest that mutual accountability
between multiple actors can ensure environmental considerations are not neglected in target
319setting and that actors achieve effective implementation. This appeared to be confirmed in the 
EIP program, at least to the extent that local residents appeared capable of ensuring local 
environmental considerations were not neglected in industry targets and ensuring that industry 
was accountable for their achievement.
It was, however, more common for the findings to reveal significant shortfalls in mutual 
accountability, with public and private actors failing to enforce compliance or ensure apposite 
targets were set.
As we saw in EIP, local resident and local environmental interest groups appeared to lack 
technical knowledge and capacity to meaningfully engage with the full range of broader 
environmental issues, leaving targets open to industry domination. In NEIP, inadequate 
technical skills and inadequacies in funding for monitoring and administrative assistance 
appeared to effectively blunt mutual accountability and allow some partners to fall behind in
320implementation. In RNRM the findings also suggested problems of mutual interest and a lack 
of technical skills and training on corporate governance had reduced the capacity of regional 
body members to prevent rent seeking behaviour.
The key implication here is that effective mutual accountability is only likely to be
achieved where mutual interest can be subverted and monitoring and technical capacities
321secured. One way of achieving this may be to ensure collaborations contain representation
322from non local environmental interests, who may be more likely to question the kind of self
interested behaviour evident in RNRM and/or bring greater skills and capacities to the table to
323input into non local issues in experiments like EIP.
Alternatively, training and information provision324 may help to improve capacity of local 
stakeholders to deal with complex issues. Basic core funding to support effective monitoring
319 W ondolleck and Yaffee, n 7, p 238; Freeman and Farber, n 7, p 908; Braithwaite J “Accountability and 
Governance Under the New Regulatory State” (1999) 58(1) Australasian Journal o f Public Administration 90 at 92.
320 Acar M and Robertson P, “Accountability Challenges in Networks and Partnerships: Evidence from Educational 
Partnerships in the United States” (2004) 70(2) International R eview  o f  Administrative Sciences 331 at 336-337.
321 See Harlow C and Rawlings R, “Promoting Accountability in M ultilevel Governance: a network approach” (2007) 
13(4) European Law Journal 542 at 545; Freeman and Farber, n 7 at 908.
322 However as discussed in chapter 6 , this may be a difficult task in itself.
323 Fung A and Wright E, “Countervailing power in empowered participatory governance’ in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), D eepening Dem ocracy: Institutional Innovations in E m pow ered Participatory Governance  (Verso, 2003) p 
271; Karkkainen, n 3 at 961-962.
324 Even with perfect support, the findings suggest mutual accountability in some circumstances may sometimes also 
need to be supported by other forms o f accountability if formal authority or salient pressure is lacking. As we saw in 
EIP without agency support there may be little citizens can do to a truly recalcitrant industry to pressure them and 
shame them into compliance. This finding points to the importance o f  designing new forms o f  accountability 
structures with such issues in mind, ensuring such potential gaps in accountability relationships and authority are 
covered.
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and reporting is also needed to impart basic capacities and avoid weaknesses in mutual
325accountability like those experienced in NEIP.
Turning to the issue of learning, at a broad level the findings raised the need to assist or
326encourage actors to fulfil process based learning and adaptive management.
Commencing with process based learning, the key implication raised by the findings was
327that its success depended on industry’s commitment to environmental improvements. Policy 
makers accordingly need to compensate for inevitable “bad apples” like poor performers in EIP
through designing sufficient incentives to both drive these actors to improve environmental
328performance and/or ensure their commitment to using and following the process.
Turning to passive adaptive management, there were a number of conditions suggested by 
the findings that may lead to more effective adaptive management processes. Data gaps and 
limited or partial monitoring mechanisms evidenced in NEIP and RNRM for example, suggest
that adaptive approaches are unlikely to be effective without relevant funding for and effective
329coordination of monitoring. The findings in the EIP case also suggest the importance of 
ensuring training or sufficient representation from actors capable of engaging with broader 
environmental issues to foster more complete processes of adaptive management. Finally, as we 
saw in RNRM, NEG experiments may need to reduce onerous accountability obligations so as 
not to divert the group’s time and capacity away from acting as adaptive managers.
Finally, the above analysis also provided insights into forms of systemic learning. At
present, the implementation of systemic learning aspirations have remained largely unexplored
330in NEG. The few that have been examined have largely been disappointments in practice and
331the findings in the NEIP case were no exception. Indeed, NEIP evidences what we can think
of as a “vision gap” that has occurred in the translation process from a vision of sharing learning
332and adaptive programs through institutional mechanisms to practice. An important source of 
this gap was that those who were charged with developing implementation mechanisms were 
embedded in a culture of how things were done that arose out of an older set of understandings
325 Acar and Robertson, n 320 at 336-341.
326 See discussions in Thomas, n 15, p 153-154; Sturm, n 14, p 327,328.
327 Fiorino, n 10, p 413-416.
328 Fiorino, n 10, p 413-416.
329 Thomas, n 15, p 167- 169; Freeman and Farber, n 7 at 889.
330 Collaborative Democracy Network, n 21 at 169; Head, n 14, p 145; Fung and Wright, n 6, p 31-32; Sturm, n 14, p 
328.
331 Camacho A , "Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management" (2007) 55 UCLA Law 
Review available at http://ssm.com/abstract=969676 viewed 10 May 2008; Karkkainen, n 12 at 243; Paton et al, n 14 
at 262; Dovers, n 21, p 522-523.
332 Gunningham N , Holley C and Shearing C, “Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans: Community 
empowerment, voluntary collaboration and legislative design” (2007) 24(2) Environmental and Planning Law  
Journal 125
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333 • • • •and visions. This led to NEIP legislation that lacked formal procedures for fostering its vision
and VEPA officers who lacked the skills to develop and implement it further.
Overcoming this vision gap will require changing implementation mechanisms and 
developing and experimenting with new mechanisms for information sharing in NEG 
experiments. This is an important call to arms to those concerned with systemic learning and 
adaptation, where so far much has been said about the vision but little about the mechanisms. 
One potential step towards developing an institutional structure for sharing learning was 
demonstrated in RNRM cases, where the RGC achieved considerable success in sharing 
information between groups. This approach avoided relying on agencies per se, and instead used 
government funding to set up a state level forum comprised of representatives from each 
collaborative group. While questions remain about the extent of information sharing capable 
through RGC structure, it may offer a novel avenue for NEG approaches to fostering a form of 
systemic learning.
The RNRM case also demonstrated that government agencies, with properly designed 
procedures for conducting periodic evaluations, could successfully seek to evaluate and 
potentially adapt government policy prescriptions (as opposed to sharing information among 
collaborative groups themselves). The more formal system of evaluations and requirements for 
evaluations at stated periods had taken some important steps to ensuring this form of systemic 
leaning was possible.
To sum up, this chapter has examined the operation of a range of features of accountability 
and learning, revealing the many challenges they face in practice. Nevertheless this chapter has 
pointed to a number of conditions and mechanisms that might foster more effective learning and 
accountability relationships and contribute to “good” NEG.
Given the limited scope of the analysis, these conclusions are necessarily tentative and 
further research is required. In particular, the findings relating to accountability are limited to 
the extent that the chapter has focused on some specific instances and relationships of 
accountability and has not offered a definitive view on how “accountable” the cases were per 
se.334 Further the findings on learning offer only a snapshot of these evolving processes that may 
or may not improve over time. Time is, in fact, a vital issue from the perspective of successful 
learning approaches as many of the impacts of governance efforts, and accordingly the 
opportunities to learn from them, are only experienced over the longer term. Given this, an 
important remaining issue for exploration is whether collaborations are sustainable over time to
333 Similar arguments have been made in Trubek D and Trubek L, “The Coexistence o f New Governance and Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity or Rivalry?” Paper presented at Annual M eeting o f  the Research Committee on 
Sociology o f Law, Paris, July 2005; Camacho, n 331.
334 Freeman and Farber, n 7 at 908.
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chapter.
327
335
335 Dovers S, “Processes and Institutions for Resource and Environmental Management: Why and How to Analyse?” 
in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), M anaging A ustralia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 6.
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Chapter 8: Maintaining and 
Sustaining Collaboration
8.1 Introduction
So far this thesis has investigated a number of key features for “good” new environmental 
governance (NEG) and drawn lessons as to the conditions that promote them. It has examined 
the emergence of collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and adaptation and 
accountability.
This chapter revisits NEG’s “collaborative” approach to governing discussed in chapter 5. 
As that chapter illustrated, there are many challenges faced by NEG experiments in the early 
stages of forming a collaborative group and developing a guiding plan. Yet, even after a group 
coalesces, the challenges posed by collaboration do not miraculously dissipate.' Collaborative 
groups must still seek to sustain their efficacy, maintain the interest of volunteer collaborators, 
and continue to operate as an organisation,3 including administrating ongoing meetings, hiring 
staff, fundraising and financial management.4 These tasks are critical to achieving a successful 
collaboration5 that implements actions, conducts adaptive management and forms an enduring 
niche in the governance landscape.6 Accordingly, this chapter examines the challenge of 
maintaining and sustaining collaboration.
This is an important task because there remains a “knowledge gap” in the NEG literature 
regarding the challenges of sustaining collaboration. Many of the under researched questions 
that remain include: under what conditions and to what extent can the engagement of volunteer
' Note however that some collaborative groups may only exist for a short term rather than take on a long term role in 
implementation, monitoring and adaptive approaches to governing; Lubell M, Sabatier P,Vedlitz A, Focht W, 
Trachtenberg, Z and Matlock M “ Conclusions and Recommendations” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, 
Trachtenberg, Z , Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed 
Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 287.
2 Bonnell J And Koontz T “Stumbling Forward: The Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining 
Collaborative Watershed Management” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources 153 at 154.
3 Of course the survival of a particular collaborative organisation against all odds may not always be a good thing. 
Some authors for example argue against relying too much on one organization. See discussion in Taylor, M Public 
Policy in the Community: Public Policy and Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p 153; Bonnell and Koontz, n 2, p 
720.
4 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2, p 153 at 154.
5 As implied above, successful collaboration is defined here as involving (i) ongoing and active involvement of key 
significant stakeholders who came together to collaborate; and (ii) effective organisation processes that enabled the 
group to continue with their cooperative efforts to implement actions and solve their environmental problems over the 
longer term; Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in 
Eversole R and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 148; 
Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 27 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 240; Varughese G and Ostrom E, “The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in 
Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal” (2001) 29 (5) World Development 747 at 
752.
6 Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg, Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M, “Collaborative Approaches to 
Watershed Management” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg, Z , Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), 
Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 11.
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collaborators be sustained? What forms of government assistance might address organisational 
challenges that groups face? How long do collaborative institutions generally survive and how 
long should they survive to be useful? What happens to the participants when a collaborative 
initiative has achieved its goals?7 This chapter provides insights into these questions and helps 
build a more complete picture of collaboration in NEGby examining the three case studies and 
their efforts to sustain a successful collaboration.8
Following this introduction the chapter proceeds in 3 sections. Section 8.2 begins by taking 
a close look at the legislation and guidelines of the three cases to evaluate how each case is 
specifically designed to sustain collaboration. Section 8.3 then analyses how ongoing 
collaboration was sustained in practice in each of the case studies, examining the conditions that 
promoted or detracted from the survival of the collaborative groups. This examination focuses 
on both younger and more mature collaborations. For example, research into the mature, fifteen 
year old EIP program reveals insights into the “life cycle” of collaboration9 which, after an 
invigorating youth, may sometimes lapse into a comfortable middle age before finally 
succumbing to senility. In contrast, research into the comparatively younger six year old NEIP 
and RNRM programs reflects on the initial challenges and emerging issues for sustaining their 
collaborative groups into the future.
While each case throws up a range of different issues, the analysis reveals insights into two 
common and interrelated challenges faced by all three cases, namely maintaining the 
involvement of volunteer collaborators and gaining adequate support and funding for effective 
organisation. Section 8.4 sums up these findings and suggests some important lessons for the 
conditions under which successful collaboration may be sustained.
Before commencing this analysis it is important to clarify the scope of the chapter. There 
are inevitably a substantial range of potential exogenous and/or endogenous conditions10 that 
can impact the sustainability of collaborative institutions in the long term.11 Analysing all of
7 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 154-155; Lubell et al, n 1, p 294-295; KoontzT, Steelman T, Carmin J, Korfmacher K, 
Moseley C and Thomas C, Collaborative Environmental Management: What Roles fo r  Government? (RFF, 2004) at 
27; See also Head, n 5, p 145-146; Homstein D, “Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law” (2005)
54 Duke Law Journal 913 at 946 at 959-960.
8 Lubell et al, n 1, p 295
9 Lubell et al, n 1, p 295; Fung A and Wright E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A 
and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance 
(Verso, 2003) p 38.
10 For example, population shifts or changes in related government policy can impact on sustainability of  
collaboration; Ostrom E, “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms” (2000) 14 (3) The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 137 at 153-154.
11 Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
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these factors is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead the emphasis is on the conditions of 
institutional and legal design.12
8.2 Designing sustainable collaboration: How do the 
cases intend to sustain collaborative groups?
In contrast to NEG experiments that involve short term voluntary cooperation around a 
specific task, the three cases all aim to establish effective collaborative groups with long term 
roles in implementation, monitoring, and “adaptive management” to try and tackle intractable 
and/or complex environmental issues (see chapter 4).13 In order to facilitate an analysis of 
whether and how this objective was achieved, this section examines the relevant features of the 
cases’ legal design that may impact on the survival of collaboration. It commences by providing 
a general overview of these design features before focusing on some of the more important 
features in depth.
8.2.1 Overview of design feature that support survival
As we saw in chapter 5, the architects of the three programs targeted a variety of strategies 
to support the emergence of successful collaboration, including: harnessing community and 
regulatory pressure;'4 funding and assistance to reduce initial transaction costs; building trust; 
and pursuing “consensus” decision making among parties to ensure some form of commitment 
to targets and actions. Many of these strategies that contributed to the emergence of 
collaboration can also contribute to its maintenance and survival15 For example, it is arguable 
that trust shares a reciprocal relationship with collaborative success over time.16 That is, after 
building trust to reach an agreement through negotiation, the group’s subsequent successful 
implementation of a project spawns trust because it demonstrates that stakeholders honour their
12 There is obviously some overlap between the conditions that contributed to the emergence of collaboration and 
those that impact on its maintenance and survival. However the two sets of goals are far from identical and for 
present purposes, the latter are the primary focus; Trachtenberg Z and Focht W, “Legitimacy and Watershed 
Collaborations: The Role of Public Participation” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and 
Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 
2005) p 53.
13 Head B, “Governance” in Saunders P and Walter H (eds) Ideas and Influence Social Science and Public Policy in 
Australia (UNSW Press, 2005) p 57.
14 Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002); Selin S and Chavez D, 
“Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning and Management” (1995) 19(2) Environmental 
Management 189 at 191.
15 Sabatier P, Leach W, Lubell M and Pelkey N, “Theoretical Frameworks Explaining Partnership Success” in 
Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative 
Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 184.
16 Leach W and Sabatier P, “Are Trust and Social Capital the Keys to Success? Watershed Partnerships in California 
and Washington” in Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming 
Upstream: Collaborative Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT, 2005) 234.
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commitments and work competently. 17 Such trust may serve to increase the ability of 
collaborators to work together and carry out the next project and so on.18
There is, however, more to sustaining successful collaboration than these supporting 
strategies. For example, as the literature on “common pool resources” suggests, enduring 
institutional structures are likely to succeed when they contain a number of additional design 
features, including: (i) affected interests can participate in decision making and modifying rules;
(ii) there are efficient and low cost conflict resolution mechanisms available; (iii) government 
authorities do not significantly challenge the collaboration’s decisions and actions; and (iv) the 
benefits individuals receive from the collaborative process are commensurate with the 
contributions they make toward managing the resource.19
The architects of the EIP, NEIP and RNRM process were mindful of these sorts of 
principles, at least in broad terms. All three cases target a variety of the above conditions, 
including requiring ongoing cooperative, negotiated style decision making20 and sanctioning the 
work of the collaborative endeavour as a government based program.21 The programs also 
require collaborators to continue to welcome interested stakeholders and include affected 
interest in reviewing and updating plans.22 Such openness and participation can enhance 
stakeholders’ perceptions of fairness and contribute to wider acceptance and legitimacy of the 
collaboration, which is vital to its survival.23
However it is design principle (iv) above that is perhaps the most relevant and challenging 
issue for successfully sustaining the type of collaboration pursued by the case studies. This is 
because the majority of volunteer collaborators in the cases are unlikely to bear the many 
ongoing costs of actively collaborating if they do not receive some form of benefit in return, be 
it the protection of resources they value,24 personal satisfaction from focusing on “their”
17 Leach and Sabatier, n 16, p 234.
18 Leach and Sabatier, n 16, p 234.
19 Ostrom, n 10 at 149; Schlager E, “Common Pool Resource Theory” in Durant R, Fiorino D, and O’Leary R (eds), 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 154-162; Sabatier et al, n 15, p 184.
20 See chapter 6.
21 Nickelsburg S, “Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of Community-Based Environmental Protection” (1998)
84 Virginia Law Review 1371.
22 VEPA, Guidelines fo r  the Preparation o f  Environment Improvement Plans (Publication 739, VEPA, 2002) p 10; 
Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic) sl9A I (3); Bilateral Agreement between the Commonwealth of Australia and 
the State of Queensland To Deliver the Natural Heritage Trust, August 2004 (Cth, Qld) Attachment E p 68 (hereafter 
“Bilateral Agreement NHT”)
23 Lubell et al, n 1 ,p 287-288.
24 Or the resolution of an environmental problem that impacts upon them.
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physical place and community,25 or additional benefits provided through the NEG program such 
as access to grant money, new knowledge or new social and professional networks.26
The cases have accordingly been designed to impart support and resources (discussed 
below) to try and reduce the burdens imposed on collaborators and thus increase the chances of 
maintaining volunteer involvement. In addition, such support is intended to contribute to the 
efficacy of the collaboration by bolstering its capacity to sustain an active and effective 
organisation (eg. maintain communication between partners and recruit support staff) and thus 
successfully carry out ongoing implementation. Such successful implementation should in turn 
contribute to the sustainability of the collaboration by delivering environmental improvements.27
The discussion that follows outlines in more detail for each case the potential benefits 
collaborators may receive, the costs and burdens associated with collaboration and the 
mechanisms designed to provide resources and support to the group. Focusing first on EIP and 
NEIP, then RNRM, the investigation reveals that the three case studies are similar in many 
respects but also quite different in others, in terms of the mechanisms that are invoked to 
support collaboration. A number of questions are also raised about whether these mechanisms 
are likely to effectively sustain successful collaboration in practice.
8.2.2 Resources and support and the costs and benefits of 
collaborating
8.2.2.1 EIP and NEIP cases
The design of the EIP and NEIP case share a major similarity in so far as both place almost 
exclusive reliance on the contributions of collaborators to support the organisation and its 
activities.
Collaborators in both cases must collectively contribute their own time, resources and/or 
identify external funding sources28 to support a range of organisational actions and projects over 
the life of the collaboration. These actions include basic administrative tasks such as facilitating 
communication between collaborators, calling and attending regular meetings, taking minutes,
25 Other benefits may include career advancement for government officers; John D, “Civic Environmentalism” in 
Durant R, Fiorino D, and O’Leary R (eds), Environmental Governance Reconsidered (MIT Press, 2004) p 237-238; 
Sabatier et al, n 15, pi 84.
26 According to some authors, institutional structures that provide such additional “rewards” for collaborating may 
accordingly be more likely to succeed in the longer term.; Sabatier et al, n 15, pl84.
27 Isaac T and Heller P, “Democracy and Development: Decentralized Planning in Kerala” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) at 93, 
101; John, n 25, p 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n l ,p 2 8 8 .
28 Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources
135 at 141; John, n 25, p 239.
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and managing budgets. Collaborators must also use their own resources or identify external 
funding to maintain the momentum of the group to conduct ongoing projects, carry out 
monitoring and adaptation processes, review and update plans, and fulfil ongoing 
communication and reporting to the wider public about activities.29
Both cases have however been designed to lessen the magnitude of many of these burdens 
for volunteers such as local residents and community groups. Ongoing VEPA assistance (eg. 
provision of technical information) is likely to be provided across both cases.30 Further, many of 
the more expensive administrative and organisation tasks are imposed on those with greater 
resources and capacities.
For example, in EIP case the industry partner is expected to fund and/or perform the 
majority of administrative31 and implementation tasks.32 To ensure this occurs, the EIP,33 has 
been designed to incorporate mechanisms that change industry’s cost/benefit equation, 
providing reputation incentives to leading industries, and/or utilising regulatory, social or 
economic threats34 (even the direct application of law35) to ensure “good” and poorer performing 
industries see benefits as outweighing the costs of collaborating (for further see chapter 5). 
Beyond this, the guidelines suggest industry may also be motivated to support the collaboration 
because ongoing benefits from collaborating,36 including improved environmental performance, 
can lead to better relationships with the local community, reduce environmental impacts and 
liabilities and improve financial performance.37
In the NEIP framework, the intention is to harness and lock in the resources and capacities 
of a governmental partner known as a “NEIP sponsor” who is responsible for obtaining
29 VEPA, Ten Steps to Successful Community/Industry Consultation (Publication 520, VEPA, 1996); VEPA, 
Environment Improvement Plans -  An Overview (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004) p 5; VEPA, n 22, p 9; Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 19AI(3)(c); VEPA, A Guideline fo r Submitting a Voluntary Neighbourhood 
Environment Improvement Plan Proposal (Publication 847, VEPA, 2002) p 6.
30 VEPA, Environment Improvement Plans -  An Overview  (Publication 938, VEPA, 2004); VEPA, A Guideline for  
Submitting a Voluntary Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan Proposal (Publication 847, VEPA, 2002) p 
6-9.
31 In the EIP program, industry is required to make “contact with the community” (eg. letter box drops and 
advertising) as well as be responsible for “circulation of agendas and minutes of the meetingfs] as well as providing 
refreshments and any other administrative support” the collaborative group may require, VEPA, Guidelines for  
running a community liaison committee (Publication 740 VEPA, 2001) p 5.
32 VEPA, n 22, p 9.
33 The guidelines provide very little information on benefits government bodies who collaborate may receive - simply 
suggesting they will have and maintain “an interest” in the industry, the most obvious being VEPA who has direct 
responsibility over environmental performance, VEPA, n 22, p 2.
34 For example: changing a licence, pursuing prosecution or imposing a compulsory EIP effectively allow the VEPA 
to compel an industry to continue an EIP process. Citizens’ capacity to generate negative publicity may also be used 
to threaten a company’s social licence.
35 See chapter 5.
36 In certain instances, reputation benefits and less prescriptive regulatory requirements are also touted. These later 
benefits arise where an EIP is undertaken as part of an “accredited licence” scheme; VEPA, n 22, p 1; Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 26B(2)(c).
37 VEPA, n 22, p 1.
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approval of the plan. As we saw in chapter 4, this “sponsor” agency or government body38 must 
volunteer to take on this role and is encouraged to provide leadership and support to the group, 
and is granted relative autonomy as to how to do so.39 This design feature of the NEIP resembles 
John’s emphasis on the important role a “sponsor” of collaborations can fulfil, such as obtaining 
or providing funding and information to support the collaborative process.40 But in contrast to 
John’s work, which contemplates the key sponsorship roles of elected officials and top agency 
managers, NEIPs have been designed to lock in government organisations like local 
governments. Whether these organisations are similarly willing and capable of committing 
sufficient resources and information to support the maintenance of the collaborative process is 
an important issue that is examined below.41
If these sponsors decide not to directly support the group,42 the design of the NEIP does not 
contemplate any alternative sponsorship mechanism.43 Surprisingly, this is directly contrary to 
the NEIP’s approach when it came to supporting the initial emergence of collaboration, where 
both officers and seed funding were provided to reduce transaction costs.44 However upon the 
approval of the NEIP plan by the VEPA, such seed funding ceases and the resource burden of 
continuing collaborative momentum and organisation falls to the partners. This approach is 
common to other NEG experiments where short term funding for coordinators is used to “kick 
start” the collaboration, with the expectation that over time the group will become independent 
of funding and support themselves.45
Whether the NEIP group can rise to this challenge is unclear. Certainly it is likely that the 
NEIP partners will implement actions they committed to in the plan by virtue of NEIP’s 
contractual accountability mechanisms that make failure to complete actions a breach of law. 
However this check does little to ensure the collaborators will pool sufficient resources together 
to maintain the groups’ organisation, or indeed recommit to the effort after the initial plan has 
been implemented.46
38 As discussed in chapter 4 this body must be a “protection agency” and have responsibilities for the environment.
39 VEPA, Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plans -  Developing a Voluntary Proposal (Publication 846, 
VEPA, 2002) p 7.
40 Note John emphasises an “outside sponsor” such as an official or agency manager, while NEIP views the sponsor 
as a partner and an organisation like a local government; John, n 25, p 239.
41 John, n 25, p 239.
42 For example, they may not be able to stretch their limited resources to continue to support the NEIP over the longer 
term.
43 VEPA, n 39, p 9.
44 For further see chapter 5.
45 Curtis A, ‘The Landcare Experience” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment 
(Federation Press, 2003).
46 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 154-155.
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Of course, both NEIP and EIP collaborators may well be more than compensated for such 
organisational burdens by the long term benefits of collaboration.47 Such benefits however, are 
unlikely to include continuing access to grant money, which is not contemplated in either case.48 
Instead, the two programs assume that continuing collaboration will be sustained by the 
possibility of beneficial program outcomes. For example, local residents in EIP may gain 
benefits from reducing industry’s deleterious impacts on their day to day life.49NEIPs may 
provide local resident and community groups benefits by addressing environmental issues of 
importance to the community at the local scale.50
Of course the VEPA recognised that the benefits may be insufficient or the practical 
demands may be too great to sustain participation of all volunteer collaborators. As one 
guideline notes, a “common occurrence” is “membership reduction over time”, particularly by 
less well resourced local residents.51 For this reason, the guidelines require the collaboration to 
seek out additional collaborators over the longer term to prevent the collaboration from 
collapsing and ensure it remains effective and legitimate by reflecting the range of different 
community interests and perspectives.52
It is unclear how long these efforts to renew collaborative participation are to continue, not 
least because the guidelines remain silent on the precise length of any specific EIP or NEIP 
collaboration. This lack of clarity raises a number of questions. For example, in what 
circumstance and for how long are these collaborations capable of being sustained in this 
manner? Indeed, if a collaborative initiative achieves many of its goals over the longer term will 
the collaboration dissolve or will collaborators or others in the community still identify 
sufficient benefits in collaborating?53 As the NEIP program is only a few years into 
implementing its first plan it is still too young to consider many of these issues. However the 
EIP program, with a 15 year history I is capable of providing important insights into many of 
these questions54 and they are accordingly explored in the findings section below.
8.2.2.2 The RNRM case
The RNRM case presents a far more complex and onerous set of ongoing responsibilities 
for collaborative bodies than either the EIP or NEIP frameworks. However RNRM also
47 Fung and Wright, n 9, p 27.
48 Fung and Wright, n 9.
49 VEPA, n 39 p 1; VEPA, n 22, p 1.
50 VEPA, n 39, p 1.
51 See VEPA, n 22, p 3.
52 See VEPA, n 22, p 3, 6; VEPA, n 39; Lubell et al, n 1, p 287.
53 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 154; Lubell et al, n 1, p 294.
54 Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
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provides far more direct governmental support and “benefits” for collaborators such as access to 
grant money.
In terms of the tasks and costs associated with collaborating, volunteers are required to 
manage their regional body as an incorporated body, as well as carry out administration tasks 
such as hiring and managing staff, balancing budgets of many millions of dollars, and managing 
and implementing projects. In addition, regional collaborations are required to conduct ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation, and multiple reporting processes,55 as well as communication and 
reporting to the wider public about their activities and spending.56 These tasks are likely to be a 
significant burden for even the most committed and skilled volunteers, particularly if, as some 
NEG scholars assert, rural Australia is fast approaching the limits of volunteerism.57
To mitigate this potential problem, RNRM case has been designed to offset many of the 
ongoing costs of collaborating. Indeed, the nested structure of RNRM acts to enhance 
sustainability of lower level collaborative bodies by providing greater access to pooled 
resources of governments and support services.58 This includes governments providing a small 
ongoing remuneration to collaborators (eg. funding to cover travel costs), as well as providing 
funding for regional organisations’ core operations.59 Core operations comprise activities such 
as plan evaluation, integrated monitoring and reporting, communication, board functions and 
meeting requirements, employing staff (eg. Executive Officer, Finance officer, Administrative 
Assistant) and paying rent.60 Regional communities are however expected to seek investment 
from other external sources (and their capacity to do so may be vital to sustaining RNRM if 
dedicated government funding were to cease some time in the future).61
Regardless of the funding source, the regional body must not only maintain its own 
collaborative structure, but it must also liase, engage, work with and oversee timely 
implementation of government funded projects by other regional stakeholders (such as farmers 
or other stakeholders that were involved in the development of the plan and committed to its 
targets, actions and priorities).62 Depending on the arrangements developed by a given regional 
community, the body’s relationships with these lower level implementers may take on a number
55 See for example: Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 22, ss 69, 83, 94; Attachment E, p 65, 68, 70,
56 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 22, s 68, Attachment E, p 62; An Agreement between the Commonwealth o f Australia 
and the State o f Queensland for the Implementation o f the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Action Plan 
fo r  Salinity and Water Quality (Cwth and QLD, March 2001), s 7.1 (hereafter referred to as “Bilateral Agreement 
NAP”).
57 Lawrence G and Cheshire L, “Managing Nature: The Promises and Problems o f Regional Environmental 
Governance in Australia” Plenary Address at the Ecopolitics XV Conference Environmental Governance: 
Transforming Regions and Localities, Macquarie University, Sydney 12-14, November 2004 at 9; Curtis, n 45.
58 Margerum, n 28 at 141; Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons From The Great 
Lakes” (2006) 19 Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209 at 235-236.
59 Interview 323, Government Agency.
60 See BDTNRM, Regional Investment Strategy (BDTRNM, 2005) p 8-9, 57.
61 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 22, ss 71,117, 118, 119 Attachment A, p 40.
62 Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 22, Attachment E p 62-63.
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of different forms. For example, some may be characterised by close collaboration between 
regional bodies and “sub regional” groups, while others may involve a service provider style of 
relationship where projects are sub-contracted out by the regional body to individuals. Other 
bodies may employ a mix of these or other strategies. Despite such variation, all these 
relationships are central to the success of RNRM in the long term and for the purposes of this 
discussion they are all considered to fall under RNRM’s broad idea of “cooperative 
partnerships”.
The RNRM program may succeed in sustaining such broader collaboration because access 
to and use of government funding is likely to act as a key benefit in return for collaborators’ 
efforts.63 As we saw in Chapter 6, securing funding was a strong motivator for sub regional 
groups.64 Notably, these types of rewards would also be in addition to any personal benefits 
participants receive from collaborating, such as protecting a natural resource they value.65
Of course, even with rewards such as government funding, it is possible that personal 
benefits may change over time, or the costs of collaborating may become too much and 
participants on the regional body may seek to disengage. The RNRM program is accordingly 
designed to maintain numbers and stakeholders on the body to ensure effectiveness and 
legitimacy, and thus its survival, by giving government an ongoing commitment to ensure 
membership on a regional body remains “appropriate” and the body remains designated.66
Despite the extensive support and benefits RNRM may provide to collaborators, the 
literature suggests the program’s arrangements may still face a number of challenges in 
sustaining broad collaboration. Among other things, the nested structure may be weakened by 
conflict and unwillingness of governments and agencies to share power at “higher levels” in 
nested arrangements (a problem that also beset the emergence of successful collaboration in 
RNRM as discussed in chapter 5).67 Inadequacies in the magnitude of government support may 
also undermine the chances of sustaining successful collaborative organisation. The findings 
below return to consider whether and when these issues were problematic in RNRM.
8.2.3 Summary
To summarise, while the cases employ a number of strategies to sustain their respective 
collaborative approaches, all three cases intend to make the benefits individuals receive from the 
collaborative process commensurate with the contributions they make toward managing the
63 Sabatier et al, n 15, pi 84.
64 Sabatier et al, n 15, pi 84.
65 Sabatier et al, n 15, p i82-185.
66 Bilateral Agreement NAP, n 56, ss 7.1(f)and(g); Bilateral Agreement NHT, n 22, ss 67, 68.
67 Margerum, n 28 at 141.
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resource.68 To do this, the cases have been designed to reduce costs of collaborating and 
increase its efficacy in implementation through the provision of funding and/or designing 
support structures.
EIP and NEIP have been designed to depend heavily on industry and sponsors’ support 
and encourage groups to renew participation if drop off occurs. Comparatively, RNRM may be 
more successful over the long term,69 not least because of its nested support and funding 
arrangements, and the provision of additional “benefits” such as access to grants for 
stakeholders.
However as we have seen, there were questions raised about some of the features across 
the cases. For example, in EIP and NEIP, it is unclear whether sponsors and efforts to renew 
participation will be effective. Further, in RNRM, conflicts between government and/or 
insufficient funding may undermine the program’s sustainability. How these issues played out 
in practice is examined in the next section, followed by a conclusion of the implications for the 
literature.
8.3 Sustaining successful collaboration in practice
This section examines when and to what extent the cases were able to sustain successful 
collaboration in practice. This analysis proceeds in three parts, each focusing on EIP, NEIP and 
RNRM sub cases consecutively and examining both their challenges and accomplishments in 
sustaining successful collaboration.
8.3.1 EIPs -  the “lifecycle” of collaboration
This thesis’ 8 EIP sub cases contained one of the oldest EIPs,70 along with 4 others that had 
sustained their collaboration over second and third iterations of plans and ranged in age between 
4 to 10 years.71 Even the remaining 3 sub cases that were implementing their first plan had been 
operating as a collaborative group for over 3 years.72 Across these sub cases, the findings 
indicated that all had achieved substantial success in maintaining an effective collaborative 
organisation during the implementation and monitoring of their initial plans. As we will see, this 
success was attributable to a number of factors, including securing sufficient commitment and 
support from industry, stability in local residents’ numbers and efficiently implementing actions
68 Ostrom, n 10 at 149; Schlager, n 19, p 154-162; Sabatier et al, n 15, p 184.
69 Sabatier et al, n 15, p 184; Margerum, n 28 at 141; John, n 25, p 239.
70 EIP Sub case 6.
71 At the time of writing the ages were as follows: EIP sub case 1 (7 years), EIP sub case 3 (10 years), EIP sub case 8 
(6 years), EIP sub case 4 (4 years).
72 EIP sub cases 2, 5 and 7.
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to reduce industries’ impact on the local environment. However as discussed further below, 
having achieved such success in the early stages of EIP, long standing EIP collaborations 
sometimes produce diminishing returns and suffered from a number of other flaws.
A central strategy to sustaining EIP collaborations was securing industry resources and 
support to facilitate the collaborative group’s organisation and administration. Most respondents 
reported this strategy had been effective. Leading, “good” and poor performing industries had 
all provided or paid for an appropriate room or office to conduct regular collaborative 
meetings.73 They facilitated the administration of meetings, including minute taking and paying 
for an ongoing negotiator (who often successfully resolved ongoing conflicts),74 as well as 
funded internal communications between group members by circulating agendas and 
monitoring data. Industry funding and support also ensured the group was effective in 
conducting monitoring and implementation.75
Certainly respondents recognised that providing support for these activities and tasks had 
imposed significant costs on industry.76 Industries in better financial positions77 were 
accordingly often better placed to fund both the collaborative group’s implementation activities 
and administration.78 However most respondents were of the opinion that industry had done the 
best they could79 with available resources to support the collaborative organisation.80 As one 
local resident stated: “you’ve got to work within budgets”.81
Aside from the most recalcitrant performers that had been directly compelled to conduct an 
EIP under their licence,82 most industries were motivated to make these resource contributions 
to support the group because they generally saw the benefits of collaborating in the EIP program 
as far outweighing the costs.
73 Interview 161, Industry.
74 Interview 133, Resident.
75 Local government sometimes assisted with administrative tasks, particularly where they took on a role of being an 
“independent” chair person. However in general it was more common for industry to fund the majority of 
organisation and administration tasks.
76 Interview 151, Industry; Interview 184, Industry.
77 As one respondent pointed out: “I think the company probably they have been in a very good financial position so 
they’re able to invest money to do that” Interview 181, EPA.
78 Interview 173, Local Resident.
79 See for example Interview 184, Industry: “it’s all dependent on how much money you spend, you can do a lot if 
you spend a lot o f money but if  there’s only a certain amount of money in the pot then, you know I mean if you’ve 
got a business that generates a thousand dollars you’re not going to go and spend five million dollars to make a, to 
balance a return...people aren’t in the business for losing money”.
80 ‘They vary from degree to degree depending on what resources the company can put in and some of them are 
pretty simple and it’s perhaps appropriate for the site” Interview 132, EPA.
81 Interview 162, Local Resident.
82 For background on this issue see chapter 5.
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All industries pointed to gains that had materialised from ongoing collaboration with local 
residents, including accessing local 83 and “outside” knowledge 84 of non-government 
collaborators, which had helped industry to identify its impacts on the surrounding community 
and encouraged innovation.85
Other benefits that motivated industries’ continued commitment and support for their 
collaborative groups tended to vary between industry types. For leading and “good” performers 
it was respectively the ongoing “reputation” benefit from having an EIP and Accredited Licence 
(see chapter 5 )86 and the protection of industry’s public and commercial profile, (“social 
licence”)87 achieved through ongoing engagement of otherwise aggrieved local communities.88 
For most poor performers, however, many of their motivating “benefits” were induced by 
VEPA leverage that shifted industry’s cost benefit equation and made continued collaboration a 
more attractive option than prosecution or harsh licensing conditions.89 Such leverage reportedly 
allowed VEPA to ensure poorer performing industries provided appropriate support for the 
collaborative group.90
Direct community involvement and pressure also reportedly provided motivation for 
poorer performing industries to sustain their funding commitment and involvement in the EIP. 
As one respondent explained:
if there weren’t the [local stakeholders on the EIP] then there would be no 
second EIP, the company wouldn’t do it, its costs a lot of money.91
In addition to commitments from industry, VEPA officers also provided ongoing support 
to the group including attending all meetings, assisting in negotiation to resolve periodic 
conflicts and renegotiating many targets (see chapter 6), and reviewing the plans. With such
83 “The people on those committees have become very valuable to [industry] in the sense of a good conduit to be able 
to interact and discuss on the ground issues in the local community”; Interview 121, EPA.
84 “The meetings although sometimes unpleasant are a valuable conduit for the group to identify issues, and some 
issues we might not identify otherwise,...so the community process can be useful”; Interview 174, Industry
85 “I’m talking about walking away from an EIP meeting and saying “hey there’s something to think about, maybe we 
should consider that, isn’t that a good idea”. If you are getting that constant feedback and ideas from outside it almost 
encourages innovation in the organisation and innovation will encourage continuous improvement”; Interview 141, 
Industry.
86 “We get a reputation bonus out o f it, but it’s hard to put a dollar figure on to say “gee do we sell a couple more 
products a year because o f that or what”; Interview 151, Industry.
87 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 14 p 164.
88 “I think the main thing is that it demonstrates to some of our staunchest critics that we listen and we learn and we 
engage...people always assume its just shareholders you look after but if you are not doing a good job by 
communities and they don’t support your licence to operate, you see it affected in the bottom line”. Interview 141, 
Industry.
89 For some highly recalcitrant performers it was the continuation o f conditions in their licence that ensured industry 
sustained their participation. As one respondent explained, “I guess the licence changes have I guess taken that 
voluntary aspect out o f it”; Interview 174, Industry.
90 Interview 182, Local Resident.
91 Interview 184, Industry. Sabatier et al, n 15, pi 84.
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VEPA assistance and industry support provided for organisation, very few non government 
respondents reported that the ongoing time and costs of collaborating were too onerous, or 
outweighed the benefits of progressive improvements being made to the local environment 
through implementation (discussed further below).92 As a result local resident and non 
government membership remained relatively stable during the early stages of implementation.
Despite these members lacking representativeness (discussed in chapter 6), the wider 
legitimacy and acceptance of the collaborative group may have been enhanced by the fact that 
the collaborations had remained open to new participants and the wider local community during 
these stages.93 For example, collaboratives held annual general meetings that were advertised 
and open to all who wished to attend, or published meeting times on public websites allowing 
interested individuals to show up, while others required individuals to express interest in 
attending meetings.
The above features ensured that the EIP groups operated undisturbed, comfortably and 
relatively successfully through their youth and into middle age. During this period the groups 
were able to implement nearly all the actions in their plan or plans.94 The result was respondents 
could point to a range of outputs such as broad plant upgrades,95 staff training,96 replacing 
specific equipment,97 operation changes98 including community complaint procedures,99 as well 
as the conduct of monitoring studies to guide actions.100 These outputs progressively led to a 
range of reported environmental improvements. These improvements often included
92 Sabatier et al, n 15.
93 However, a few local residents in some of the sub cases still tend to complain to the VEPA rather than seek 
participation or action via the EIP: “we will get a few dust complaints from time to time...but those people aren’t 
interested in being any further involved you know getting involved”. Interview 132, EPA.
94 According to respondents, most actions had either been achieved or were on track to be achieved in the current 
plan. Even for projects that had been staged over a number of EIP plans, many had been completed over these later 
iterations.
95 “We spent a lot o f money, boy did we spend some money...we had to fix up pipes hundreds of odour sources, 
hundreds, it’s like spaghetti out there”; Interview 184, Industry.
96 “They spent a lot money in the first 2 years...50% of what they have done is training of workers, fixing how 
doors close, trucks. They’ve been very good” Interview 112, Local Resident.
97 “The last one we had a significant project here with a pump seal upgrade...it was something new so they could 
come away with a real feel for this is something fairly new and cutting edge that’s been put in place”; Interview 161, 
Industry.
98 “So through the EIP process lighting was highlighted as an issue and we have started a program of switching the 
lights so that lights in elevated areas of the plant are only turned on when someone needs to access it” Interview 174, 
Industry.
99 ‘The hotline, that definitely came out of the EIP group and that’s probably been a big community change that 
people can ring a free number and get somebody at any time o f the day and night” Interview 15/62, Local Resident; 
“If someone complains we have the shift manager go to their home to listen with them or smell with them, lovely 
mental image. These managers can be contacted at any time and will go to the residents place at any time. We operate
24 hours so sometimes it is at 3 in the morning” Interview 111, Industry.
100 “We have a report which is forthcoming which reports on some background noise readings that we undertook...we 
are inviting the consultant to the next meeting and give them the results so they can take them away and mull over 
them”; Interview 174, Industry.
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achievements on broader environmental issues,101 but it was more common for industries to 
achieve significant reductions in their impact on the local area. The following comment was a 
common refrain across the cases, sometimes even after the completion of only one plan:
All the big problems for the community basically have been fixed...there 
hasn’t been much that hasn’t worked.... you wouldn’t know [industry] were 
here half the time now.102
Yet it was this progressive success of the collaborative group at resolving local 
environmental issues that resulted in perhaps the most significant challenge to sustaining an 
effective collaboration over longer term. That is, maintaining the interest and involvement of 
local residents in EIP collaboration.
The experience of the five oldest collaborations revealed that as the local impacts of 
industry were gradually solved; many local residents saw very little reason to continue time 
consuming engagement with the EIP. Rather than evolving in their environmental interests from 
local to broader environmental issues or in their expectations of the company’s environmental 
performance, many local residents simply disengaged once the problems that affected them 
personally had been resolved.103 As one respondent explained:
One of our neighbours down there. He has issues with noise at a certain 
frequency. When he told them about his noise issues and they eventually 
fixed it, his issue was pacified. He’s not going to get up every third Thursday 
to go to the meeting.104
Various respondents recounted the decline in interest and participation, particularly those 
from “good” and poor performers where local impacts of industry had been one of the strongest 
motivations for the initial involvement of local residents.105 For example, one told a story of 
how “a core membership of around a dozen ...[had] dropped off because the community... 
concerns have been addressed and it’s no longer a big deal.”106 Other industry participants
101 Although there was no hard data available on how substantial the achievements of EIPs were, good and leading 
industries involved in EIPs for a substantial period were able to point to definite actions and figures (e.g. reductions 
in 10,000 cubic metres of natural gas per day, 33% reduction in freshwater usage, substantial rehabilitation of 
industrial and mining site through developing wetlands and native plant species, 80% reduction in site incidents over 
5 years). Other stakeholders confirmed that these targets were realistic and had substantially been achieved. However, 
as we saw in chapter 7, the EIP was rather less effective in influencing the environmental performance of poorer 
performing companies. Indeed, given their evident tokenism, these industries appeared to achieve minimal to no 
improvement on broader issues.
102 Interview 162, Local Resident.
103 As one respondent put it “The individuals have all got their own agenda”; Interview 161, Industry.
104 Interview 112, Local Resident.
'“ Another reported “the initial EIP meetings “people would turn up and were very irate, you know like you’d get 70 
people at a meeting”. However after many of the concerns of the community had been addressed through the EIP the 
story was different - “not many residents bother to come to our meetings, there’s only a couple o f die hard 
people...we only get two people that come to our residents meetings regularly, w e’ll just poke along with it”. 
Interview 184, Industry.
106 Interview 123, EPA.
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reported that participation of local residents had declined to very small or occasionally zero 
attendance at meetings. 107
As noted above, the drop off in participation from local residents was, to some extent, 
anticipated by the designers of EIPs who required collaborators to try and renew participation. 
However, respondents characterised efforts to generate new participants as unsuccessful and 
often futile.108 In rare situations when an industry committed a localised pollution incident, local 
resident participation would certainly mushroom, but it would quickly plummet as soon as the 
issue was resolved.109 Even extensive efforts to generate new membership110 such as public 
notices in local papers and newsletters, and holding public meetings to find new members met 
with little success.111
The reason such efforts failed was largely attributable to the collaboration’s success in 
resolving local environmental problems. That is, there were no longer sufficient preconditions 
of collaboration such as urgent pressing problems to galvanise concern (chapter 5). It also 
appeared that efforts to renew participation were hampered by the usual cost barriers and the 
tendency of some local residents to “free ride” on the labours of others. II2As one respondent 
pointed out:
We still can't get members to join...People haven’t got time, I can 
understand that....Providing things are running well they say you're doing a 
good job, we’re not interested.113
Yet, despite the decline in participation and a failure to engage new collaborators, all five 
mature sub cases persisted to address any remaining local issues as well as industry’s wider 
environmental performance. This is of significant interest to this chapter because it provides a 
unique opportunity to reflect on the challenges of maintaining collaborative momentum once 
some of the initial objectives of collaboration have been substantially achieved.114
107 “It has been in the last 5 years as we have dealt with many o f the issues, the meetings have been held less and less 
frequently...If no one turns up we have made a commitment to hold them anyway.” Interview 111, Industry.
108 Two respondents did note they had gained one new participation on the EIP committees, however even then one of 
them ended up dropping off; Interview 15-62 Community; Interview 131, Industry.
109 As one respondent explained: “The trouble is with the [EIP collaborative group] if you have explosion or 
something you get 40 or 50 people turn up at the meeting to complain. Or if there is a bad smell goes over or 
something like that you get them all turn up....But not at an ordinary meeting”; Interview 162, Community.
110 Interview 132, Industry.
111 As a respondent from one of the oldest EIPs pointed out “contacting the community is something I feel w e’ve 
failed in because we still don’t get people coming and joining up and we’re all older, w e’re all old now; Interview 
15/62, Resident.
112 Ostrom E, Governing the Commons (Cambridge University Press, 1990) p 6.
113 Interview 162, Local Residents.
114 Lubell et al, n 1, p 295; Dovers S, “Reflecting on Three Decades: A Synthesis” in Dovers S and Wild River S. 
(eds), Managing Australia’s Environment (Federation Press, 2003) at 518.
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Who then bucked the wider trends of decline and what motivated them to continue to 
collaborate to address industries’ wider environmental performance? Non-government groups 
such as the local environmental interest groups in EIPs were the most stable participants, with 
only one reportedly disengaging.115 In part, their ability to sustain their involvement may have 
arisen because these groups had a wider and more experienced membership upon which to 
draw.116 In addition, these groups maintained a genuine interest in wider environmental issues 
(eg. biodiversity, wetlands, and the condition of the marine environment) that were longer term 
and thus remained unresolved. While these issues had yet to be solved, the collaboration had 
nevertheless achieved sufficient success up to this point as to encourage environmental groups 
to continue to collaborate to try and achieve more.
the group members are pretty keen [on biodiversity and wetlands] and want 
to see that further developed117....the [groups’] interest...is ensuring that we 
are going the next step, not just creating a wetland but looking to see where 
the improvements are occurring118
In addition to environmental groups, a number of local residents maintained their 
participation because they had identified a number of longer term benefits that were seen to 
outweigh ongoing costs of collaborating. Without interviewing all collaborators it is of course 
difficult to identify all benefits that local residents pursued. Even so, a number of themes 
emerged from the interviews. Some residents were concerned to fulfil personal interests in 
industry operations,119 while others were reportedly motivated by more altruistic returns.120 
However the most surprising, but one of the most commonly mentioned motivations for local 
residents continuing to collaborate was a lack o f  trust. This motivation was reported in a number 
of mature sub cases121 that had involved “good” and “poor” performers where a high degree of 
mistrust had characterised the initial stages of the collaboration (see chapter 5). While local 
residents confirmed that they had developed “friendships”122 and “mature relationships”123 with 
industry representatives, they were quick to add that this had not mitigated or replaced a
115 For further see chapter 6.
116 As one industry pointed out, such wider membership “is great and they are more valuable” because they connect 
with and can draw on wider community, Interview 131, Industry; Fung A and Wright E, “Countervailing power in 
empowered participatory governance’ in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional 
Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 264.
117 Interview 132, EPA.
118 Interview 131, Industry.
119 Interview 132, EPA.
120 The latter was particularly relevant to those in sub case involving leading performers where such desires had been 
the originally motivation for them choosing to collaborate: “Some people go into the Lions Club, some go to St 
Vinnies, others go to...I think they say okay, I’m interested in how industry works to improving and find that 
interesting ...[they] want to make a difference in contribution”, Interview 161, Industry.
121 A few industries did suggest they had built trust with particular participants, as opposed to all the members of the 
collaborative group (Interview 111, Industry).
122 As one local resident simply put it “w e’re good friends” Interview 15/62 Local Resident.
123 Interview 111, Industry.
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continuing feeling of mistrust for industry itself -  a feeling that had sustained their ongoing 
involvement.124 As one local resident and one industry respondent from different sub cases 
respectively explained:
We still go there [to the meetings] even when nothing’s wrong...If we didn’t 
go some of the guys might revert125
there’s still this element of “hang on, it’s not right to trust you 
completely’’....It’s a funny thing... So it might not be trusting, but certainly 
they are more accepting that we’re here and that we’re doing what we can 
and we’re doing our best.126
The irony of this finding is that although trust is often seen in the literature as a factor of 
successful collaborations, these findings suggest that in circumstances such as EIP cases, 
collaboration may actually achieve quite significant improvement in environmental problems 
and sustain ongoing involvement with very little trust at all, and indeed mistrust may in its own 
right be a substantial driver of ongoing collaboration.127
Regardless of the motivation for collaborators sustaining their involvement, respondents 
suggested the collection of “die hard” stakeholders that remained were unlikely to contribute to 
successful collaboration in the future. There were two main reasons reported for why this was
so.
First in some of the most mature EIPs, some of the residents that continued to collaborate 
had moved well outside of the local area,128 reducing their capacity to bring in local knowledge 
and contribute to adaptive management processes:
they’ve been around for a while and they’re moving away...Outside of our 
influence zone....That’s an issue for us... they’re not going to be in a 
position to tell us what the current most important issue is.129
Second, even in sub cases where local residents had tended to stay in the local area, the 
reduction in numbers and attendance at meetings, combined with lack of technical knowledge
124 Interview 112, Community; A local resident from a different case expressed similar lack of underlying trust. 
“Noise-wise, they used to have lots o f bells and sirens and lots of all those air pressure valves, you know, so you were 
also conscience of them and suddenly you’re hear this swiisssssh...now they’re invisible and they’re pretty, very 
quiet actually...But I actually can’t bring myself to say good neighbours yet... because I recognise the potential that 
is still there” Interview 15/62, Industry.
125 Interview 112, Local Resident.
126 Interview 161 Industry.
127 Interview 161, Industry.
128 As one respondent pointed out: “so for a large part the neighbourhood committee are made up of community 
representatives who used to be neighbours who now live [elsewhere]” Interview 161, Industry.
129 Interview 161, Industry.
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and/or interest in broader environmental issues (discussed in chapter 6) led some respondents to 
suggest that the collaboration was “losing its punch”.
While this problem of diminishing returns is hardly unique to collaborative approaches, 
they were- in the case of many mature EIPs -  a fundamental limitation. Participating industries, 
even many of those with wider input from environmental group representation, may no longer 
be subject to significant wide ranging pressure to improve environmental performance nor be 
exposed to many novel ideas that can fuel innovation. Notwithstanding, the initial success of 
many EIPs in resolving community concerns, the corollary of this “lifecycle” phenomenon saw 
a substantial dropping off in environmental achievement. One long-term industry participant 
summed up a common situation as follows:
for somebody who’s getting to the mature point in the EIP process, we’ve 
been at it for a while. Like I said before all the low hanging fruit has gone.
Our first EIP had two or three hundred action items ... but now we’re at the 
point we’ve come down the curve and we’re sort of plateauing ... now its 
about what can we do to get the next little step change? 130
This lifecycle from a dynamic youth to a moribund old age raises the obvious question of 
whether it is desirable to continue to sustain the collaboration. Some may argue there are 
inherent democratic values in sustaining collaborative institutions like EIP that give citizens an 
additional channel to express their environmental preferences to government. 131 Some 
respondents also suggested that sustaining the collaborative group had the benefit of providing 
an experienced network to respond to potential new industry projects, such as an expansion of 
the plant,132 which may arise in the future.
Even so, with environmental improvements beginning to plateau, community concerns 
largely having been addressed, and minimal local stakeholder collaboration, it appeared the 
VEPA was no longer getting the “bang for its buck” in continuing to service EIP collaborations 
(eg. attending regular CLC meetings and reviewing industry progress against the plan). 
Furthermore, as some VEPA officers acknowledged, attending EIP meetings of mature EIPs 
diverted their time away from enterprises with far worse environmental records, who did not 
participate in an EIP:
there is not too many company’s out there that would see an EPA officer 
every three months ... the thought has crossed my mind that time [spent on
130 As a different respondent reflected, ‘There is not a lot more we can do to address noise issues.“, Interview 111, 
Industry; Interview 161, Industry.
131 Lubell et al, n 1, p 287.
132 As one industry respondent put it, they saw their collaboration as: “an investment in the past and future. If we have 
a new proposal there is that forum available”; Interview 111, Industry.
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EIPs] would be better spent ploughing into things that are actually burning 
issues at the time.
While VEPA continues to support mature collaborations there appears to be a risk that the 
“over-regulation” of some mature EIPs may be producing the “under-regulation” of other 
environmental problems.134 Of course much depends on individual circumstances. For example 
in collaborations involving more recalcitrant or locally hazardous facilities, continuing resource 
input from VEPA may be more justified than in EIPs involving mature non-hazardous or good 
performing EIP enterprises. Even so the implication of the findings is that in at least some cases, 
collaborations can outlive their usefulness and their continued survival can become an 
imposition (at least in cost benefit terms).135
To conclude, the above analysis suggests a “life cycle” of collaboration136, which, after an 
active youth, lapses into a comfortable middle age before finally succumbing to senility. As the 
findings indicated, for much of its early life the EIP process was able to sustain a successful 
collaborative process. Particularly vital to its success was the EIP’s capacity to secure sufficient 
funding and in kind support from industry by using community and regulatory pressure and/or 
providing benefits to industry.
Unsurprisingly, the gradual success in implementing actions to improve local 
environmental conditions ensured stakeholders identified benefits in continuing to participate.137 
However, once the specific local environmental issues that had originally motivated local 
resident to collaborate were resolved, many disengaged because they saw little benefit in 
continuing to bear the practical demands of collaborative institutions.138 Part of the issue here 
was that many of the local residents appeared to have their own interests and agendas, rather 
than pursuing overall improvement in industry environmental performance or in some cases any 
wider concern about other impacts on the local area. This did not prevent them from making a 
valuable contribution to the broader public interest but it did appear to constrain the overall 
effectiveness of the EIP. Indeed with few preconditions to spark new involvement, the 
collaboration was left largely anaemic.
With reduced collaborator numbers, residents moving out of the local area and a lack of 
technical knowledge, the collaborations’ adaptive management capabilities appeared weakened 
and environmental improvements began to plateau. While there are many possible viewpoints in
133 Interview 113,EPA.
134 Dovers, n 114 p 518.
135 Dovers, n 114 p 518.
136 Lubell, et al n 1, p 295; Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
137 Isaac and Heller, n 27, p 93, 101 ; John, n 25; Lubell et al, n 1, p 288.
138 Margerum, n 28 at 141; Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
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the literature on the benefits of sustaining such collaborations, from a cost benefit perspective of 
the government regulator, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in at least some of these cases 
euthanasia was preferable to ongoing life support.139
Having gained some valuable insights in to the experience of the mature collaboration by 
focusing on EIP program, the next section turns to examine the maintenance of collaboration in 
the much younger NEIP, which at the time of research was still implementing the actions of its 
first plan.
8.3.2 NEIPs -  breakdowns, stoppages and malfunctions
As we saw above, the EIP case achieved considerable success in sustaining an effective 
collaborative organisation in its early stages of implementation. In contrast, the experience of 
the NEIP collaboration during implementation was one characterised by breakdowns, stoppages 
and malfunctions. Indeed, the findings indicated they had been unable to sustain a functioning 
and effective collaborative organisation and fully capitalise on the collaborative momentum that 
had initially been set into motion by government “seed” funding, negotiation, consultation and 
trust building (see chapter 5).
The groups’ struggle coalesced around four interrelated challenges, namely: (i) gaining 
sufficient support from a “sponsor”; (ii) formalising and managing an organisational structure;
(iii) accessing external funding to provide support to the groups’ operations and actions; and
(iv) maintaining stakeholder interest and motivation. Before discussing these issues it is 
important to note that findings below were derived primarily from the two oldest NEIPs, sub 
cases 1 and 2 (being over 6 years of age). This was because sub cases 1 and 2140 had been 
implementing the first of their plans for 2 and 3 years respectively, while NEIP 3 was only 4 
years old and had only just been implemented at the time of this research.
A key feature of the NEIP’s design for sustaining the collaboration was gaining the support 
of a “sponsor”. Around the time plans were finalised and the initial short term “seed” funding 
commitments had ceased (including direct monetary contributions from the sponsor), the local 
government sponsors strove to “facilitate funding applications”141 to maintain the collaborative 
process and its implementation into the future.142 While none committed ongoing financial
139 Lubell, n l ,p 2 8 6 , 295.
140 There is a third NEIP which was of similar age but it had not received approval of its proposal and plan as earlier 
as the other two.
141 Interview 222, Local Government; Interview 215, Local government.
142 “Council has said that they’ll keep providing secretarial assistance”; Interview 237, EPA.
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resources to the group, the sponsors began to provide in-kind support in the form of an 
administrative role (filing, organising meetings and recording information).143
However, unlike the elected official or top agency manager who John envisages as playing 
a key “sponsor” role, these local government sponsors reported that they largely lacked the 
capacity to fully meet such ongoing responsibilities. This is not surprising given that local 
governments are themselves notoriously under-resourced. Indeed, their resources and time were 
already substantially stretched by providing support to a range of other community groups and 
fulfilling their many statutory (and thus higher priority) obligations relating to “rates, roads, 
rubbish”. The result was that local government sponsors144 viewed their long term “sponsor” 
responsibilities under the NEIP as an “add-on”, in an already overloaded schedule:
I don’t see the NEIP as a sustainable, long-term project...[because] if you 
leave it up to local government it’s going to be one of the many projects we 
have to manage... and we can’t continue to support them all145
After voicing these issues to the VEPA, both sponsors were quickly encouraged to submit 
applications to a VEPA grant program to obtain funding for a NEIP project and an associated 
coordinator who could dedicate their time to support the NEIP. While they were successful in 
obtaining the grants, almost 3 years passed between submitting the application and ultimately 
receiving the funding. During this vacuum the collaborations faced three further key challenges.
The first of these challenges related to collaborators’ efforts to maintain effective operation 
and organisation of the collaboration with little of the expected assistance from the sponsor and 
only very limited in-kind support from the VEPA.
The findings indicated that the collaborators largely lacked the necessary time, resources 
and capacities to complete core administration and organisational tasks and make significant 
progress on implementing actions. As one respondent bluntly put it: “I think the lack of support 
to the core function of the NEIP has made it difficult to sustain”.146
Indeed, in NEIP 1 the group struggled to hold formal meetings,147 actively coordinate 
collaborator activities, circulate minutes and carry out public communication.148 With little
143 Interview 215, Local government, Interview 222, Local government, Interview 234, Local government.
144 Another sponsor from NEIP 1 pointed out: “It’s just the time that I can afford in my role and I’m responsible for 
... a very broad agenda [already] so there’s not a lot o f time I can put into it”; Interview 213, Local Government.
145 Interview 222, Local Government.
146 Interview 226, Peak local government Body.
I47As one respondent explained, the meetings that were held were generally informal, involving partners just talking 
about what they may or may not be doing, rather than more robust discussions and coordination on activities: “we 
had no resources and it was just me with very limited time, we were...able to talk about what we were doing...[but]
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coordination to speak of, the group was unable to effectively pool its resources to implement 
actions. Progress was accordingly significantly “slower”149 than expected, with many actions not 
being implemented at all.150 As one respondent explained:
it fell into a bit of a hole... It seems to be dependent on what funds each 
group can scrounge together, but they haven’t really got around to doing 
that...that has probably been the biggest drawback, they can’t follow 
through these ideas.151
In NEIP 2 the collaborators had more success in supporting their operation for a short 
period of time and implementing one project by virtue of a grant they had originally received 
during the planning stages of collaboration (discussed further below). On the whole, 
collaborators still reportedly struggled to maintain effective organisation and momentum.152 
Indeed, as one respondent explained, the time-strapped, and sometimes inexperienced, 
volunteers often lacked a clear sense of how to conduct meetings and coordinate the group to 
implement actions:
not everyone has a professional background where they have sat on 
committees that have to perform a task...the meetings become a bit of talk 
fest_it needs someone pushing the thought into action153
With clear limits to the capacity and resources of groups to sustain an effective 
collaboration, obtaining external funding might have assisted them in better sustaining the NEIP 
and ensuring implementation of more actions. However this was a “catch 22” situation, as the 
weak organisation and administration capacities meant collaborators struggled to obtain the 
necessary information about potential funding opportunities, 154 or meeting the extensive
It may not mean there's a great deal of progress in terms of the impact, a great deal of improvement in water quality 
in the catchment or access” Interview 215, Local government.
148 Since 2005 we've probably went into a bit of a lull in terms o f momentum...The reason for that was that we 
didn’t...Have the resources to employ a staff person anymore, and basically we were waiting for opportunities for 
funding to employ someone .Interview 215, Local government.
149 Interview 215, Local Government.
150 Interview 218, Environmental group.
151 Interview 218, Environmental group.
152 Members o f the NEIP Leadership are presently sharing the administrative functions of the NEIP. In their view 
“this arrangement is unsustainable in that the [NEIP] needs a single point of contact who can arrange and facilitate 
meetings, provide up-to-date and reliable information and undertake ongoing administrative duties”; See Surf Coast 
Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Anglesea Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Surf Coast 
Shire Council, 2004).
153 Interview 223, Industry.
154 As another respondent reflected on the capacity of local resident and non government groups to gain grants: “It’s a 
matter of having someone who understands how the system works, as much as anything, knowing how you go about 
getting funding ...they don’t know when the new buckets of funding come along...I think it is unrealistic to think it 
will work like that” Interview 231, CMA
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demands of application writing.155 As a number of respondents saw it, there were simply too 
many “barriers that volunteer groups have in accessing funding”.156
Even so, both collaborations had early success in identifying and obtaining external 
funding while they had been supported with a coordinator paid for by initial “seed” funding.157 
Yet the findings indicated that this external funding appeared to also have constraints upon its 
use and value for the collaboration. In particular,158 most funding received was short term in 
nature, and focused on implementing one specific project. This resulted in fluctuating 
motivational cycles on the part of the collaborative group.159 That is, when a project grant160 was 
utilised, the collaboration moved from a “lull” into action, sometimes using of a small amount 
of grant funding for a project officer to support the collaboration. However, it would again drift 
towards inertia when the money expired.
This “cycle” was aptly illustrated in NEIP 2. During the period of study, NEIP 2 had 
successfully implemented a “plastic bag free” campaign funded through short term grants and 
some partners’ resources, where a resource project officer assisted the group in coordinating the 
project and implementing action. However upon completion the group immediately fell into a 
lull. While the collaborators had multiple ideas about possible directions for the group, as we 
saw above, they lacked the basic capacity or resources themselves to coordinate and move 
forward to identify a new project. As some respondents pointed ou t:161
we spent at least a year of just having meetings and just going round in 
circles and getting nowhere and in fact we’ve stopped having meetings 
altogether and we’ve only just picked up again.162
The final interrelated challenge to sustaining successful collaboration faced by the NEIP 
collaborators was trying to sustain stakeholder motivation, interest and numbers. On the one
155 For example as one local government officer noted “It would be difficult [to apply for funding]... [because] to 
prepare a decent submission kind of takes, you know a couple of weeks for it over a period of time anyway. So that 
you know what you're talking about”; Interview 215, Local Government.
156 Interview 211, Coordinator.
157 For example, as part of implementing a storm water management plan at NEIP 1, the sponsor was able to secure 
funding from a Victorian State Government initiative for addressing storm water related issues. Similarly, NEIP 2 has 
implemented a range of projects that relied primarily on a variety of external funding sources including the Australian 
Greenhouse Office Cool Communities Program and a plastic bag free campaign. Maribymong City Council and 
Stony Creek NEIP Partners, Stony Creek Neighbourhood Environment Improvement Plan (Maribymong City Council, 
2004) p 25; Surf Coast Shire Council and Anglesea NEIP Partners, Anglesea Neighbourhood Environment 
Improvement Plan (Surf Coast Shire Council, 2004) p 23.
158 For example, respondents reported that the short term nature of grants meant there were few opportunities to 
monitor and learn adaptively from past experience (see chapter 7).
159 Interview 215, Local government.
160 Most often for a single project from which a small part of resources could go toward supporting the group.
161 “Yeah there was a real void there for some time, what are we going to do now?” Interview 228, Local Government
162 Facing these problems, the collaboration stopped having meetings altogether for a period of time, before 
recommencing again later; Interview 227, local resident.
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hand, the legal backing of the plan reportedly ensured that no respondents had totally 
disengaged from the collaboration per se, as distinct from giving it a low priority.163
However both cases reported a gradual decline in stakeholder interest and involvement 
between completing the plan and implementing it. For example in NEIP 2, non governmental 
stakeholders went from over 15 down to “4 or 6” people who were interested in the plastic bag 
project being implemented at the time,164 while NEIP 1 confronted similar problems with 
declining attendance by key stakeholders who had been involved at the planning stage.165
It was the abovementioned organisational and implementation deficits that appeared to be 
the primary cause of this drop off. Indeed, at a practical level, the failure of the group to 
maintain effective communication structures and links between the partners meant some simply 
lost enthusiasm and motivation.166 Further, the periods of inaction and limited progress made in 
implementation produced very few improvements in the neighbourhood environmental issue. 
These in turn were not commensurate with the high costs of collaborating in the unsupported 
NEIP that was “a huge ask” for volunteers.167 Thus many individuals and community groups168 
felt that there simply wasn’t enough likely return to justify bearing these ongoing costs. As one 
local resident explained:
it’s hard for people to get home from work and then go “I’ve got a NEIP 
meeting at seven o ’clock. It’s like for what?169
The unfortunate side effect of this decline in active stakeholder participation (and the 
resources they provided),170 was that it served to further reduce the groups’ capacities to
163 As I discuss below, partners tended not to actively engage in meetings due to fatigue and burnout.
164 Interview 228, Local Government.
165 This included industry, business and non-sponsor local government partners. As one respondent pointed out 
regarding industry: “Industry...signed off on the document but industry involvement in the follow up has been pretty 
conspicuously lacking. And I would think that would be a key. Interview 214, Government Agency; Interview 215, 
Local government; Interview 218, Environmental Group
166 “This appeared to be particularly the case with government officers. “When we had the project officer and a 
clear accountability and point of contact, it was very easy for the government project partners to have a point of 
contact where they run all their programs and administrative requests through. You lose that and it’s suddenly all, 
gee, who do I contact? And I think I’ve seen a bit of a drop in enthusiasm of the project partners to throw 
resources into it over the last probably twelve months”, Interview 222, Local Government.
167 Interview 225, EPA.
168 A few community and environmental groups appeared to find collaborating less rewarding than they had imagined. 
As one respondent from NEIP 2 recounted, during the planning stage of NEIP the group had envisioned and 
commenced a range of activities that gave environmental and community groups “Lots of opportunity to be 
involved...in things that they enjoy.” However when seed funding for the coordinator was withdrawn, the group’s 
general incapacity to engage and coordinate a range of different projects led to them “just going one project at any 
given time”, in this case the plastic bag campaign. Unsurprisingly, it was primarily those interested in the project that 
sustained their active participation, with a drop off in attendance of a range of groups interested in environmental 
projects; Interview 222, Local government, Interview 228, Local government.
169 Interview 224, EPA.
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conduct effective organisational and implementation tasks. Furthermore, with anaemic 
organisational structures, attempts to reignite171 or attract new stakeholders were virtually non
17?existent.
These four interrelated challenges relating to “sponsors”, organisational structure, 
accessing external funding and maintaining stakeholder interest and motivation plagued the 
NEIP groups for nearly 3 years. However near the end of this time both sponsors finally 
obtained a short term grant from the VEPA.173 In NEIP 2,174 the collaboration made a strategic 
decision to fund community events and initiatives175 to re-connect with the wider community176 
and hopefully find new resources, capacities and ideas to reinvigorate and sustain the group into 
the future.
In NEIP 1, where the funding from VEPA had been obtained a few months earlier, a part 
time coordinator was employed for 2 years. On all accounts, even after the lengthy period of 
inaction,177 the NEIP’s momentum and implementation had improved dramatically.178 The new 
coordinator provided administration and organisational support, went back and reviewed where 
partner organisations were in terms of implementation and did some significant “chasing...to 
re-initiate that process” (see chapter 7). The collaboration momentum reportedly “picked up”179 
and began to make “some significant progress”.180
170 Indeed, the loss of additional support placed an increasing strain on the collaborators that remained active, 
resulting in some volunteers getting increasingly “burnt out”; Interview 228, Local Government
171 Notably this included a failure to try and attract greater industry involvement in NEIP 1, despite acknowledgement 
of its importance. As one respondent frankly stated: “what I would say is that we have put no energy into [developing 
partnerships with industry] in the last 2 years. Okay. That’s something that we need to do. W e’re aware of that”, 
Interview 215, Local Government.
172 “Actively getting more people involved...it comes down to the availability of funds and the availability of a body 
to do it, I think everybody has good intentions, but there’s still your core business that you’ve got to take
care...’’Interview 211, EPA; Despite this weakness and the ongoing representation deficits noted in chapter 6, the 
groups had all sought to ensure they remained open to wider community participation, with sponsor and VEPA 
websites documenting the NEIP plans, providing contact details regarding meetings and reporting briefly on 
activities.
173 This is the same grant discussed in chapter 7. It was to be used, in part, to support the collaborative group.
174 This approach echoes Taylor’s findings about successful strategies for sustaining collaborative groups; Taylor M, 
Wilson M, Purdue D and Wilde P Changing Neighbourhoods lessons from the JRF Neighbourhood Program  (The 
policy Press, 2007) p 76.
175 Interview 227, Local Resident.
176 “So w e’re actually going to try a number of just social type activities that are really really low key.. .w e’re just 
going to put on a D VD...you just come down after work and have a beer .. it’s actually enjoying yourself and 
discussing ideas and hopefully those other ideas that they were looking for in the past can come alive. Because 
someone else might say we could really incorporate [art or bike paths and sustainable transport] into that, and 
someone else says oh well I was really interested in that last year and we never heard more about it, that’s great. So 
things might morph from one to the other”; Interview 228, Local Government.
177 Interview 213, Local Government.
178 As discussed din chapter 7, this included improved monitoring, reporting and accountability structures.
179 Interview 218, Environmental Group.
180 Interview 215, Local Government.
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Despite this improvement in NEIP 1 and the potential in NEIP 2, most agreed the short 
term VEPA grant was, by definition, a short term fix for the collaboration. While such support 
may assist the groups to identify new or more stable sources of funding, respondents were 
doubtful and suggested that once the grant had ceased the group would drift back towards the 
struggles of ineffective coordination, slow implementation and missed opportunities for 
funding.181 As one respondent pointed out:
Yeah I think it will probably be cycles....we would hate to be constantly 
dependent upon those kind of [short term] funds.182
Ultimately, respondents believed that sustaining an effective NEIP collaboration required 
sufficient and secure long term funding.183 As one respondent summed up: “I don't believe a 
group like ours is sustainable without funding and without someone to co-ordinate us some 
more”.184
To summarise, while it is still early days in the NEIP case, it appears that in the longer 
term the NEIP is unlikely to sustain effective collaborative organisation. Indeed, it is clear that 
the core strategy of kick starting a group and then leaving it to its own devices185 was flawed. 
Without sufficient provision of resourcing (or indeed through apposite design such as use of 
regulatory pressure in EIPs) successful collaboration appears unlikely.186 Such support may very 
well come from a sponsor, however as the findings revealed it is clear that that not all actors can 
be effective in this role. It is also clear from the above that while small amounts of funding can 
shift the group from inaction to action, the nature of such support is important. Grants that are 
difficult to obtain and short term in nature do little for sustaining collaborative momentum. 187
Finally, unlike the EIP case where gradual improvements in local environmental 
conditions maintained stakeholder interest (at least for early periods), the NEIP faced significant 
difficulty in maintaining stakeholder interest. In part this related to the inability to maintain 
links between partners, but it was also attributable to the fact that the collaborations’ slowed or
181 There were indications that some were looking for more long term sources of funding, ‘That will be one of things 
that we are attempting to focus on in the next few months I think is to secure more regular ongoing funding or a way 
of doing that; Interview 215, Local Government.
182 Interview 215, Local Government.
183 “It’s important to have ongoing and a longer term perspective. The NEIP will fail in the sense if it’s not adequately 
resourced”. Interview 213, Local Government.
184 Interview 221, Coordinator.
185 Curtis, n 45, p 453.
186 Margerum, n 28 at 141; John, n 25, p 239.
187 Margerum, n 28 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 2, p 159; Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental 
Regulation’ (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795, n 139 at 870, 903; John, n 25, p 239, 241.
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limited progress in implementing actions failed to produce significant improvements and returns 
to outweigh the stakeholders costs required to obtain them.188
8.3.3 RNRM -  the benefits and limits of funding support
RNRM, like the NEIP cases, was still in the early stages of implementation at the time of 
research. At the time of writing it had obtained a government commitment to support the 
program until at least 2013.189 This means the RNRM will at minimum likely have a 13 year 
life. This thesis’ sub case study contains a regional body that is approximately 6 years old. 
However, a number of insights can be gained from the respondents’ reflections on the regional 
body’s early experience in trying to sustain the collaborative organisation during plan 
implementation.
As the discussion below reveals, RNRM was in fact quite successful in sustaining its broad 
collaboration. The regional body moved relatively smoothly from planning to implementation, 
maintaining an active regional collaborative organisation and engaging and involving local level 
stakeholders in implementation. However the overall effectiveness of the collaborative process 
appeared to be hindered by a number of inadequacies in funding arrangements for the 
administration of the regional body and its projects. The discussion that follows outlines these 
successes and weaknesses in turn.
On all accounts the regional body avoided the significant periods of in-action and lulls that 
plagued the NEIP groups. For the most part, stakeholder groups such as subregional bodies all 
remained engaged as collaborators. The reasons these groups remained engaged was in part 
because their membership numbers allowed them to replace individual representatives in the 
face of what we will see below, were often onerous underpaid positions. However the groups 
were also motivated to maintain their involvement because of benefits they received from 
collaborating, including potential improvements to natural resources through implementation 
(discussed below) and the potential to control and obtain grant money (which the findings 
suggested remained an ongoing motivating benefit for sustaining involvement despite conflict 
of interest questions being raised about the practice of regional body representatives seeking to 
use government funding to support their groups: see chapter 7).190
188 Isaac and Heller, n 27, p 93, 101 ; John, n 25, p 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 1, p 288.
189 See http://www.nrm.gov.au.
190 As one recent regional body document noted: “For some within these appointing groups or organisations, there is a 
perception that "their" director is in place to represent their interests”. BDTNRM, Business Plan 2007-2010 (prepared 
by Balfour consulting, 2007) p 3.
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As discussed below these conflicts of interest issues may have damaged wider perceptions 
of the regional body’s legitimacy. However it is still early and the regional body has taken a 
number of steps likely to improve wider perceptions of fairness and legitimacy. These included 
actively trying to engage overlooked and/or new stakeholders191 including mining and tourism 
interests, as well as seeking to change its constitution to address conflict of interest issues, and 
encouraging wider “membership” of its incorporated body.
With relatively stable stakeholder involvement, the regional body maintained an active
collaborative organisation, conducting regular board meetings and hiring new staff .192 This
success was due directly to the core government funding the body received to organise and 
1carry out actions.
Box 8.1 below provides an illustration of the collaborative momentum maintained by the 
regional body, including its success in implementation, and its capacity to maintain 
collaborative engagement with regional stakeholders.
•Government investment for implementation had allowed the regional collaboration to make 
substantial progress on the ongoing implementation of around 100 projects. To do this the 
regional body shifted away from a reliance purely on subregional bodies (as used during 
planning stage discussed in chapter 5) to a service provider system of implementation, 
which relied on the most logical actors (eg. farmers, subregional groups, consultants) 
providing services to the regional body for project delivery. At the time of writing the 
regional body had achieved a number of tangible results, including 25 property management 
plans, 23,000 ha of native riparian vegetation protected, 25.7 km of divisional fencing built 
and 90 ha of wetlands cleared of w eeds.194
•Respondents were confident that as long as there was government funding, they would 
continue to have the capability to implement such projects, engage stakeholders in delivery 
and sustain collaborative RNRM.195
•Respondents were also confident that collaboration was possible over the longer term with a 
wide range of regional farmers who had not engaged at the planning stage.196 Certainly, the 
nature of different farming practices and farmer demographics in the region reportedly made
191 Interview 341, Regional Body.
192 Interview 341, Regional Body; BDTB.
193 As one respondent explained such funding ensured: “we can employ the people we need to administer the 
Regional Investment Strategy...we have got strong commitment to traditional owners so we have got a couple of 
people there to do some work...a book keeper and an administration person...we can research, we can subcontract 
out the on-ground stuff, there is logical providers - whether it be property owners or community NRM groups, those 
sorts of things to carry that out”, Interview 342, Regional Body.
194 BDTNRM, Annual Report 2006 -  2007 (BDTNRM, 2007).
195 ‘They [peak industry bodies] are now trying to work with [regional bodies] because they can see the money...so 
there has been quite a significant shift in the attitude of the industry peak bodies” Interview 323, Government Agency.
196 “There will be players who won’t change” Interview 3210 CSIRO; “I don’t think it came as any surprise...we are 
trying to pick up the recalcitrants when we can, [but] there are a lot of good people out there, we try and work with 
them encourage them deliver them the tools, should deliver as incremental increase” Interview 313, Industry Body.
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some farming industries more open to collaborating in RNRM projects to improve farming 
practices than others. However, a number of respondents reported that for the majority of 
the region’s farmers it was “money that talked”197 and relying on the “hip pocket” 198 was a 
suitable approach to initiating and maintaining engagement with the region’s various 
stakeholders in order to successfully deliver on ground projects.199
•One of the primary ways that the regional body made “money talk” was a “win-win” 
approach.200 The term win-win is used for short hand. The idea is that there is no conflict 
between what is best for the environment and what is best for a farmer or industry. 
Respondents were confident that this strategy would be able to engage and involve 
sufficient numbers of farmers from the region in the delivery of projects over the life of the 
collaborative endeavour. As one respondent explained:
we try to be strategic in looking at what the future holds for these people 
and working with them to get NRM outcomes that we want, which also 
benefit them...so we are trying to sell it like that...we will get take up.201
Box 8.1: Early RNRM Success in Maintaining Collaboration.
Even though RNRM appears unlikely to succumb to the type of inaction and lulls that 
characterised the NEIP, the findings revealed that it had faced a number of challenges that 
reduced the likely overall success of the collaboration. These included inadequacies in support 
funding for the regional body, difficulties obtaining external private funding, uncertainties in 
long term support from state and federal governments, and limited funding to implement actions 
and deliver improvements. These are discussed in turn below.
A core exercise in maintaining an effective and robust regional collaborative body 
(particularly one responsible for managing multimillion dollar budgets) is ensuring sustained 
volunteer engagement and staff retention.202 Yet the findings suggested this was a major 
problem for the case study, 203 with high turnover in both representatives from stakeholders 
groups on the body204 and the body’s support staff.205 This led to the regional body reportedly
197 Interview 345, Subregional Group.
198 “So I guess that’s their world, the hook or the driver is where these projects comes along and they can provide 
funding to expedite things they wanted to get done on ground” Interview 344, Subregional Group.
199 “What makes them come...simple it’s this...money. Its all about dollars...they need to survive”; Interview 316, 
Farmer.
200 If farmers can be smart economically they will be more productive, and being more productive means actually 
being more environmentally aware and friendly.
201 Interview 341, Regional Body.
202 Interview 344, Subregional Group; BDTNRM, Business Plan 2007-2010 (prepared by Balfour consulting, 2007) p 
5.
203 See also BDTNRM, n 202, p 3.
204 While regional body members did change after a government review discussed in chapter 7, there had also been 
ongoing changes in group representation.
205 One respondent who had experience working with different regional bodies in Queensland commented that the 
subject case was less stable than others they had worked at before, noting significant “staff turn around” and “new 
positions put on the board”; Interview 345, Subregional Group.
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facing risks of loss of corporate knowledge, difficulties developing and refining its day to day 
operations and experiencing periods that were “a real shemozzle”.206
Despite growth in overall staff numbers,207 the significant turnover in regional body 
support staff was seen to arise primarily from inadequacies in funding arrangements to support 
the regional body’s operations. There were two main inadequacies in arrangements. First, 
remuneration needed to attract and then retain staff was often insufficient compared to 
opportunities in the wider labour market. 208 Second, respondents pointed to the short-term 
nature of funded projects, which reportedly created undesirable job instability.209
the way the projects are run at the moment, for only 12 months at a time, and
only months into that project, the officer will already be looking for the next
job because they know its going to run out... [it] creates a very unstable
210environment.
Further inadequacies in funding and support arrangements contributed to high turnover in 
volunteer stakeholders.211 Certainly regional body volunteers received a small remuneration for 
time and travel costs. However this reportedly did little to compensate many stakeholders who
were already suffering burnout from long histories of involvement in volunteer NRM
212programs:
when people have been involved in the landcare groups and what not for 
years and some have been secretary and chairs, they just get tired and they 
have had enough.213
Even for collaborators who were not suffering such fatigue, the positions were still seen to 
be “not very well paid” 214given the numerous and onerous responsibilities expected of 
collaborators. Indeed, the accountability and money management responsibilities were
206 Interview 344, Subregional Group; BDTNRM, n 202, p 5.
207 BDTNRM, n 202, p 16.
208 As one interview put it: “Attracting sufficient skills, [is difficult] having short term not very well paid positions.
All the same errors of why you don’t get capacity into a region”; Interview 3210, Science; BDTNRM, n 202, p 20.
209 Another respondent exaggerated that the instability and short term nature of funding meant officers were left 
“wondering whether they had a job any other week”; Interview 342-2, Subregional Group.
210 Interview 345, Subregional Group.
211 While individual representatives found it difficult to sustain their involvement the sub regional groups did have the 
capacity to draw on a range of representatives from within their membership; Interview 342 -1, Subregional Group.
212 See Curtis, n 45.
213 Interview 345, Subregional Group. Another respondent pointed out ‘There’s a great deal of planning and 
community fatigue, volunteer fatigue as a product of Landcare, NHT1, part of the roll out of NHT2 all o f the others.” 
Interview 3210, Science.
214 Interview 3210, Science.
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themselves seen to be sufficiently onerous and challenging for often unskilled or untrained 
volunteers. As one respondent simply explained:215
the administrative burden in itself is sufficient to roll the whole process over 
and to give everyone the shits216
Given these burdens, the regional bodies often sought to obtain additional external 
resources to supplement government support and to help them meet their responsibilities217 (a 
move that was encouraged under the RNRM program). By all accounts the regional body had 
experienced some success in acquiring funds (most often for projects) from local peak industry 
bodies, state departments, and the Sugar Research and Development Corporation.218
However, respondents suggested such investment was comparatively minimal compared to 
government investment, and unlikely219 to replace government funds as the primary source of 
support for regional bodies over the longer term.220 Indeed according to recent documentation 
from the regional body, the capacity of the regional body to attract significant external 
investment from the private sector was still severely constrained by perceptions of conflict of 
interest that threatened the general legitimacy and probity of the group (see chapter 7 ) .221
Given such challenges, the regional body appeared to be increasingly obtaining extra 
resources to support their organisation through using government investment in projects. Such a 
response has been particularly documented in the case of Paton et al’s research on regional 
bodies in Victoria,222 but it was also readily apparent in my own research. As one respondent, 
reflecting a common perspective, pointed out:
it is valuable [to the regional body] to manage the projects themselves....pull 
in the 5% or 10% off the projects and sort of self-fund223
215 As we saw in chapter 7, weakness in support for volunteers led to governance and management problems, conflict 
of interest concerns and ultimately changes of board membership (see chapter 7). However even after this change, 
turnover in individual representation has continued to occur. According to some respondents, part of the turn over 
problem was simply that the regional bodies were still “just figuring out how to operate as organisations...[and] think 
long term”. Interview 349, Regional Group Collective.
216 Interview 3210, Science.
217 Paton S, Curtis A, McDonald G and Woods M, “ Regional Natural Resource Management: Is it sustainable” (2004)
11 Australasian Journal o f Environmental Management 259 at 263.
218 BDTNRM, n 60, p 29-30.
219 This finding was confirmed by a recent inquiry into the future of RNRM; Keogh K, Chant D and Frazer B, Review 
o f arrangements for regional delivery o f natural resource management programmes (Ministerial Reference Group for 
Future NRM Programme Delivery, 2006) p 28.
220 “I don’t think you’re ever going to wean yourself away from the government funds in a big way, but for some 
groups that’s all the money they get.” Interview 361, Regional Group Collective.
221 This is a danger raised by Lawrence and Cheshire, n 57, p 9; BDTNRM, n 190 p 15, 16, 22.
222 Paton et al, n 217 at 263.
223 Interview 342, Subregional body.
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While this approach may have aided in sustaining regional body collaboration, some 
respondents suggested too much “centralisation” around the regional body could produce 
negative consequences for engaging and sustaining collaboration with key local level 
stakeholders in the nested arrangement. As one respondent pointed out, if it became a pervasive 
and common practice over the longer term for projects to be delivered through regional body 
staff (rather than through sub regional bodies and other local providers), the danger for 
sustaining successful collaboration over the longer term was the regional body may “shoot the 
process in the foot” :
if they don’t get it done by community groups the chances are they’ll employ 
contractors and the issues then are that there will be no local ownership of 
those projects and further ongoing maintenance and community engagement 
in the process.224
Further threats to the long term sustainability of successful collaboration arose from 
uncertainties about governments’ commitment to funding the program. This occurred both at the 
federal and state level. At the federal level, there was significant uncertainty associated with 
continued government backing and investment in RNRM. Prior to the announcement late in 
2006 that the federal government would extend investment for a further five years (discussed 
above), many respondents were unsure about whether government funding would continue past 
its scheduled completion date in 2007-2008. Such uncertainty did little to create an environment 
of stability and perseverance from stakeholders, with regional bodies and staff reportedly 
speculating that they may have to “close their doors” .225 Even the announcement of a further 
five years of funding arguably does little to overcome this underlying uncertainty if regional 
bodies are unable to successfully wean themselves from government investment. As one 
respondent summed it up:
the biggest problem with RNRM is they don’t have surety of funding. People 
come and people go...who wants to live on soft money you know ...226
At the state level there were different tensions and uncertainties created about the level of 
long term support from the state government.227 Like “turf warfare” among administrative
224 Interview 318, Environmental Group.
225 “Funding. 2007 is just this huge stake for everyone. People talk about ‘are w e’re going to have to close our 
doors?’... you’ve got to hire people, and at the same time you’re hiring people when you’re not even sure how long 
you’re going to be around” Interview 361, Regional Group Collective.
226 Interview 313, Industry.
227 One respondent referred to ongoing debates about agreeing to core funding arrangements under NHT “There is a 
big debate going on between us and Commonwealth, cause there is a view particularly in the central agencies that this 
model was foist on Queensland and as a result the Commonwealth should pay for the administrative cost, particularly 
the NHT groups”; Interview 323, Government agency.
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departments that has undermined sustainability of other earlier NEG experiments,228 state 
agencies reportedly struggled to find agreement regarding their collective approach to RNRM. 
While some agencies with direct responsibility for NRM reportedly wished to pursue a 
collaborative229 and “whole of government”230 approach, others were more resistant to sharing 
their power, leading to a reportedly “disintegrated government system”. 231
With “government solidarity” at a low point, 232 a number of independent reviews of the 
RNRM system were conducted during planning stages. Around the time of transitioning from 
planning to implementation,233 an options paper was subsequently put to the public on the future 
of RNRM for the state. Although the result was overwhelming support for the current system, 
the public review did little to contribute to a stable and sustainable collaborative approach, 
creating significant uncertainty about the future of the program for staff, regional stakeholders234 
and regional bodies:
Queensland government has just reviewed arrangements...that’s added to 
the cynicism of “well shit what are we trying to do here if we are putting all 
this effort into getting partnerships” ... it makes it very difficult...to actually 
get on and commit to something235
The final weakness and challenge to sustainability of successful collaboration relates to the 
ability of the regional body to deliver results. As suggested in both EIP and NEIP, central to 
maintaining stakeholders’ involvement and ensuring a sustainable collaboration was the 
capacity to deliver environmental improvements. However, many respondents questioned the 
capacity of RNRM to actually achieve all its goals to improve resource conditions, not least 
because there were major inadequacies in funding for implementation. As one respondent 
bluntly put it: “there is, quite frankly, sweet fuck all money”.236 Specifically, respondents saw 
government funding as not commensurate with the responsibilities and outcomes to be delivered 
by regional bodies. As one respondent pointed out:
our budget is a few million a year. Now what we are expected to do with a 
few million dollars is make sustainable land use, protect all the biodiversity
228 Ewing S, “Catchment Management Arrangements” in Dovers S and Wild River S (eds), Managing Australia’s 
Environment (Federation Press, 2003) p 406.
229 “They need partnerships to actually operate.” Interview 334, Regional Body.
230 Interview 334, Regional Body.
231 Interview 334, Regional Body.
232 Interview 334, Regional Body.
233 Dept. Natural Resource Management, Options for Future Community Engagement in Regional Natural Resource 
Management (DNRM, 2005) at 7.
234 Interview 311, Industry Body.
235 Interview 311, Industry Body.
236 Interview 334, Regional Body.
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and fix the water quality out to the reef, all within 10 years. That’s a pretty 
big ask.237
A further consequence of this lack of funding is the constraints it imposes on the capacity 
of RNRM to engage a wider range of local stakeholders and environmental and natural resource 
issues. Indeed, while a "win win" strategy may be an important means of engaging many 
farmers (as noted in Box 8.1), there are (as a number of respondents pointed out) only so many 
"win win" situations out there.238 With limited funding, respondents suggested it was unlikely 
that regional bodies could engage seriously with situations where private benefits of farmers 
have disappeared and outcomes become win-lose:
It will probably need more of the cash element to really work...where there 
is a high level of public benefit and no private benefit that’s obviously where 
you are going to need incentives, compensation239
To conclude, the above analysis suggests that RNRM had been able to achieve some 
success in sustaining collaborative momentum of the regional body, facilitating it to implement 
actions and engage and maintain involvement of many farmers and other stakeholders. 
Compared to the NEIP case, these are impressive results and like the early success in EIP, were 
attributable largely to the competent arrangements for funding and supporting organisation and 
implementation.
However, this success must be weighed against the challenges also faced by RNRM. 
Conflict among state government agencies and overall uncertainty about long term funding 
arrangements weakened stakeholder commitment and the stability of the program. It was also 
clear from the findings that the likelihood of sustaining successful collaboration would be 
threatened by insufficient funding, a failure to match support to responsibilities (both for staff 
and volunteers) and like the NEIP experience, a tendency to provide short term rather than long 
term project funding. These problems appear to undermine corporate knowledge, the effective 
operation of the regional body and potentially contribute to the marginalisation of local 
stakeholders. Indeed, if more resources are not forthcoming over the longer term, improvements 
on the ground may decline or disappear, RNRM’s substantive legitimacy may dissipate and 
with it the willingness of stakeholders to remain engaged.
237 Interview 337, Local government.
238 “Maybe we have got the easy yards here, it’s the hard yards...we can’t do any more we squeezed the lemon almost 
dry and we have knocked over 50% of the reef, where does that leave us as a community and a society” Interview 
313, Industry Body.
239 Interview 331, Science.
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These issues are far from being resolved, and it appears that some regional bodies are 
likely to face difficulties at least in the short term trying to gain significant private investment to 
make up the above funding shortfalls. This leaves a large question mark hanging over the future 
of the program in the long term if government decides to scale down or withdraw support.
8.4 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the conditions that contribute to sustaining successful 
collaboration over time. Drawing on the experience of young, middle aged and old collaborative 
efforts, it has provided a range of insights into what remains a significant “knowledge gap” in 
NEG literature.240
A number of significant challenges for the survival of successful collaboration were 
revealed in the finer details of each case. All were at quite different stages in their collaborative 
processes, and the findings raised a variety of issues unique to each program. For example 
RNRM faced challenges of volunteerism and burnout due to a long history of Landcare and 
other volunteer programs in rural Australia. The high conflict collaborations in EIP raised issues 
regarding “lack of trust”, while in NEIP sponsors struggled to support a group not used to 
“going it on their own”.
In its own way, each case appeared to fall short of sustaining successful collaboration. 
Certainly both EIP and RNRM were far more successful than NEIP in this regard, at least in so 
far as both were able to maintain momentum and implement significant actions. However at a 
broad level all cases struggled to maintain volunteer involvement and/or sustain effective 
organisational processes and implementation. Based on the above discussion these problems 
were due to two pervasive and interrelated weaknesses, namely a failure to effectively balance 
costs and benefits to maintain volunteer involvement and/or shortfalls in support and funding 
provided to the group for organisation.241
Indeed, consistent with concerns in the literature, the practical demands of collaborating 
over the longer term quelled collaborators’ enthusiasm across all three cases.242 There was 
evidence of collaborations suffering from high turnover in volunteers (such as in RNRM), 
stakeholders becoming essentially passive (as in NEIP), or volunteers “dropping o f f ’ altogether 
(as in EIP). As we saw above all were detrimental to sustaining a successful collaboration, 
threatening corporate knowledge, and/or reducing the resources and knowledges available to the 
group to make decisions, implement actions and achieve environmental improvement.
240 Margerum, n 28 at 141; Lubell et al, n 1, p 294.
241 Margerum, n 28 at 141; John, n 25, p 239; Dovers, n 114, p 38.
242 Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
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These problems stemmed in part from insufficient support to reduce the costs of 
collaborating. However this insufficiency also had a broader negative impact on organisational 
effectiveness in some circumstances. This was most evident in comparisons between the 
successful organisation and implementation in the adequately supported EIP and RNRM cases 
on the one hand, and the inaction and stoppages in the unsupported NEIP on the other. These 
trends are consistent with research elsewhere in the literature.243
The findings also indicated, however, that even when resources are provided they may not 
sustain successful collaboration.244 As we saw in RNRM, insufficient funding and support245 
made it difficult to retain staff and volunteers, undermining the effectiveness of the regional 
organisation and potentially its future collaboration with lower level stakeholders. Funding 
obtained in NEIP and RNRM was also often reported as being too short term in nature to allow 
collaborative groups to effectively sustain their staff and/or activities.246 The findings in NEIP 
and RNRM247 also confirmed the well recognised barriers and difficulties faced by insufficiently 
supported groups248 when obtaining external funding.249
As pointed out a number of times above, these challenges of volunteerism and/or 
inadequacies in government support and funding 250 are consistent with many broad concerns 
raised in the literature.251 This chapter’s findings accordingly underscore their significance as 
central matters that warrant close attention in the literature if NEG collaborations are to be 
durable and effective over the longer term. Given this, the question that needs to be asked is 
what specific conditions are likely to sustain successful collaboration?
First, in terms of maintaining volunteers,252 it will be apparent that volunteer involvement 
is not simply a question of whether the costs of collaborating are too much to bear for individual 
volunteers, but more a question of how these costs are balanced with the benefits volunteers 
receive.
As we have seen, the cost-benefit trade off varied considerably depending upon the context 
and by no means all collaborators concluded that costs always outweighed benefits. For 
example, some RNRM stakeholders focused on and sustained their involvement in part because 
of rewards (such as access to grant money). 253 Others, such as local residents in EIPs,
243 Margerum, n 28 at 141; John, n 25, p 239 ; Dovers, n 114, p 519.
244 Taylor, n 3, p 153-154.
245 Head, n 5, p 145.
246 Margerum, n 28 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 159.
247 In RNRM the barrier to external funding also related to the perceived legitimacy o f the group.
248 Margerum, n 28 at 149-150; Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 159.
249 Taylor et al, n 174, p 79.
250 Margerum, n 28 at 141; John, n 25, p 239; Dovers, n 114, p 519; Fung and Wright, n 9, p 38.
251 Ewing, n 229, p 393, 405-406; Curtis, n 45, p 447; Lawrence and Cheshire, n 57, 1-6, 9.
252 Ostrom, n 10 ; and Lubell et al, n 1, p 288.
253 Sabatier et al, n 15, p 184.
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maintained their involvement due to personal interest, public regarding interests, and even “a 
lack of trust” in industry. Indeed consistent with the findings in chapter 5, the lack of trust in the 
EIP case suggests that relationship between trust and successful collaboration often posited in 
the literature does not hold in all circumstances.254
More interestingly, the findings confirmed suggestions in the literature that a substantial 
degree of “success” in improving environmental conditions will be a crucial “benefit” to offset 
volunteers’ costs and sustain stakeholder interest and collaboration.255 This was evident in EIP 
where gradual progress in resolving local environmental issues was vital to retaining 
stakeholder interest in the early stages of collaboration. In harmony with this finding, the weak 
and limited environmental improvements in NEIP were seen to be worth less than the 
transaction costs required to obtain them and stakeholders disengaged from active 
participation.256 It is also possible RNRM will face similar problems over the longer term due to 
insufficient government investment constraining successful delivery of resource condition 
improvements.
However, the relationship here may be more complex than a simple linear relationship 
between success and survival suggested by the literature. Although the EIP collaboration 
focused on improving industry’s environmental performance across local and broader 
environmental issues, the substantial improvement in local environmental issues that motivated 
many residents to become involved actually lessened their perceived benefits and returns of 
ongoing participation relative to the time and effort that ongoing collaboration required. Part of 
the issue here was that many of the local residents appeared to pursue their own interests and 
agendas, and disengage once they had been achieved. This decline had significant negative 
impacts on the ongoing success of the collaboration and its ongoing adaptive implementation to 
manage industry pollution.
The implication here - rarely acknowledged in the NEG literature258 - is that in some 
circumstances success can in and of itself, serve to de-motivate further collaboration. Of course, 
this will not be the case in all collaborations. For example, it is important to remember that 
unlike many NEG collaborations, EIP is focused on an industry, not a defined “local area”, 
ecosystem or some other “place” or “community”. In many “place based” collaborations, the 
focus tends to be on forging common visions and goals, developing new neighbourhood or 
regional identities, and partially redefined preferences and interests of stakeholders around the
254 Raymond L, “Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming Collective Action Barriers to Endangered Species 
Protection” (2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37.
253 Isaac and Heller, n 27; John, n 25, p 239, 241-242; Lubell et al, n 1, p 288.
256 Lubell et a l,n l,p 2 8 8 .
257 Head, n 5, p 145.
258 Fung and Wright, n 4 p 38.
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idea of the neighbourhood or region.259 EIP is not however about this kind of “place making”. 
It is more about “place monitoring” a specific industry’s site and the particular impacts it 
produces on the wider area. Thus while the EIP involves collaborators negotiating common 
objectives, these generally relate to shared expectations of industry’s emissions for a specific 
pollutant, not forging a new vision or shared mission for the local area, nor necessarily 
involving reformulated personal and institutional identities. 260 As such, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many local residents’ collaborative vision did not extend beyond mitigating 
industry’s immediate impact on their own life.
In the light of the above, one implication may be that a transformation in personal interests 
and goals - the way participants think and act, individually and collectively, about their local 
environment - may be a desirable base condition for sustained successful collaboration in 
NEG.261 However, further research is required to determine if genuine transformation of 
personal and institutional goals and priorities is possible or even beneficial.262
Beyond this issue, there may be other reasons why a negative relationship between success 
and survival experienced in EIPs may not be generalisable to other NEG initiatives. EIP 
involved mostly individuals focused on improving point source problems of a typically “limited 
duration”. Other collaborations may address longer-term natural resource management issues 
that are typically characterised by intrinsically and fundamentally unpredictable ecosystems 
subject to cycles of “adaptive change” ,263 In these situations, improvements in environmental 
conditions that are sufficient to precipitate collaborator drop off may in fact take much longer to 
achieve and/or may be far more difficult to secure for any extended period of time.
Collaborations involving greater associational participation may also be more resilient than 
EIPs. Certainly, the findings in EIP and RNRM suggested interest groups were often better 
placed than individuals to maintain their involvement, either because of their depth of 
membership or interest in a broad range of longer term environmental issues.264
Ultimately whether participation drops off because of sufficient improvements to 
environmental conditions or a lack thereof, an important condition for ensuring that successful 
collaboration is sustained is the engagement of new stakeholders to compensate for the 
dwindling commitment of some of their predecessors.
259 Karkkainen, n 5 at 242.
260 Karkkainen, n 5 at 242.
261 Karkkainen, n 5 at 242.
262 Karkkainen, n 5 at 242.
263 Gunderson L, Holling C and Peterson G, “Surprises and Sustainability: Cycles of Renewal in the Everglades” in. 
Gunderson H, Holling C (eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Island 
Press, 2001) p 327; Berkes F, “Alternatives to Conventional Management: Lessons from Small-Scale Fisheries “
(2003) 31(1) Environments 5 at 9.
264 As we saw in NEIP a lack of progress resulted in participants disengaging and becoming passive rather than active 
collaborators.
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In the case studies a number of attempts were made by the group to try and reignite 
existing participants’ interest and also to engage new collaborators. However, consistent with 
recent empirical research in the watershed context, the findings suggest this approach will often 
have limited effectiveness. As NEIP experience demonstrated, unless the collaborative group is 
effectively supported they may not have the capacity to conduct an energetic recruitment 
process. Moreover, even if groups have the capacity as in EIP case, such efforts appear largely 
fruitless where there are no compelling environmental issues to galvanise such collaboration.265
What may be needed then is more proactive conditions for sustaining successful 
collaboration. This would obviously focus on supporting and maintaining those actors that 
originally collaborated. As suggested above, one such condition may be to broaden 
stakeholders’ interests from personal to wider issues. Another condition is obviously greater 
funding and support matched to the tasks at hand, which is vital to reducing costs to volunteers 
and ensuring a more effective organisation and implementation process.266
Simply suggesting that more, rather than less government investment is needed in NEG to 
ensure successful collaboration is sustained is, however, a little imprecise. Do the findings allow 
us to be more specific? Certainly the analysis above suggests that such contribution need not be 
large. Indeed, consistent with the findings of Taylor and other authors in different collaborative 
governance contexts, the resources which appear to make the difference between stasis and a 
connected, organised and active group may be relatively small.267 As we saw in NEIP, quite 
significant shifts from lulls into action occurred with the injection of a very modest resource 
input which facilitated the hiring of a single part time staff member whose brief was to keep the 
group in contact with each other, and maintain momentum.
However, in a time of increasing resource constraints on government and government 
agency load shedding, it may be unrealistic to expect even small contributions to support 
collaboration over the long term.268 In this context, and consistent with arguments that NEG 
needs to engage seriously with the issue of how to effectively resource collaborative 
enterprises,269 what is needed is to explore how to create new institutional mechanisms and ways 
of redirecting funding to provide more sustained longer-term resourcing commensurate to the 
tasks and responsibilities.
265 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 158.
266 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 165.
267 Taylor, n 3, p 153-154.
268 For further discussion of this see: Crawford A, The Local Governance o f Crime (Clarendon Press, 1997) at 165- 
168.
269 See: Steinzor R, “Reinventing Environmental Regulation: the Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control” 
(1998) 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 103.
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The findings provide some insights here into a range of possible conditions for better 
resourcing and supporting sustained collaboration. First, broadly akin to suggestions in the 
literature that harsh default rules270 can contribute to the survival and success of collaboration, 
the findings in EIP evidenced that focusing community or regulatory pressure on the most well 
resourced parties (in this case industry) can prove a relatively successful way to resource a 
collaborative group. Such pressure may be used simply to compel the party to commence 
collaboration and then leave it to collaborative benefits to provide motivation for continued 
resource contribution (as was the case with good performers). Alternatively, for reluctant 
collaborators such as poorer performing industries, sustained pressure (direct or implied) may 
be vital.271
While the support and resources provided from industry in EIP were not sufficient to offset 
the costs of many local resident collaborators who eventually disengaged, this is arguably not 
attributable to the mechanism of resourcing itself, but how it was applied in practice. Indeed, 
one could imagine a more apposite application of pressure by VEPA to encourage industry to 
provide minimal financial reimbursement for citizens and other local non-government 
stakeholders for the costs associated with their participation in the EIP process. Apposite 
accountability mechanisms would of course be needed to avoid enhanced risks of capture.272
A second insight into support arrangements arose in the NEIP case. Contrary to claims that 
outside “sponsors” such as top agency managers or elected officials might facilitate funding and 
information to support the collaborative process and implement agreements,273 the translation of 
a similar strategy met with very limited success in the case of NEIPs. Over-stretched, and 
under-resourced local government were largely ineffective as long term sponsors and failed to 
provide long term funding support for the group. Clearly not all actors can be apposite sponsors 
for the purposes of sustaining collaboration, and attention must be paid to selecting the right 
“sponsor” and using apposite incentives structured to harness their support.
The findings also shed some light on the capacity of nested structures to support 
organisational sustainability. Some authors in the literature have suggested nested arrangements 
provide an important avenue to obtain more apposite funding for local collaborations, not least 
because it allows pooling of agency resources for special projects and greater access to support 
services.274 However, as the same authors hypothesise, various parts of this structure may 
impose additional challenges, 275 such as achieving power sharing between
270 Gunningham and Sinclair, n 14, p 149; Selin and Chavez, n 14 at 191.
271 Freeman and Farber, n 187 at 870, 903.
272 Johnston L and Shearing C, Governing Security Explorations in Policing and Justice (Routledge, 2003) p 154.
273 John, n 25, p 239, 241-242.
274 Margerum, n 28 at 141; Karkkainen, n 58 at 235-236.
275 Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 161, 163.
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agencies/governments at higher regional or state scales.276 While such challenges did not 
debilitate the RNRM collaboration, the evident tensions between state government agencies and 
their impact on program stability suggested that such challenges are likely to pose a very real 
threat to the effectiveness of nested arrangements to successfully support sustained 
collaboration.277
The issue of how to support and resource collaborations also raises the important question 
about whether it is always desirable for governments to actually support NEG collaborations 
indefinitely.278 Speaking to questions raised in the literature279 about whether the survival of 
collaborations will always be a worthwhile goal, the findings in EIP suggest that sustaining 
collaboration in the long term is not necessarily desirable. After local problems had been 
resolved and participants disengaged, many of the collaborations that remained were a shadow 
of their former selves. Arguably they had come to the end of their lifecycle and outlived their 
effectiveness to generate innovative proposals and conduct robust adaptive management 
monitoring. Moreover, at least some were becoming an imposition on government resources.
As we have seen there are different positions one can take on the importance of sustaining 
collaboration indefinitely -  from a simple cost benefit view, to seeing the institution as 
enhancing democracy and social capital and facilitating vital ongoing adaptive management. It 
is beyond this thesis to weigh these various values and positions here. Much will likely depend 
on individual circumstances, as well as how effective the collaboration is in addressing the sorts 
of weaknesses that brought about EIP decline, including maintaining volunteer involvement, 
and generating new participants. Even so, the importance of the EIP finding is its empirical 
confirmation that not all situations may justify the survival of collaboration per se.
To conclude, the findings in this chapter have underlined that appositely resourcing 
collaborative organisations and maintaining volunteer involvement are two very serious 
challenges that NEG must overcome to sustain successful collaboration. Nevertheless this 
chapter has pointed to a number of conditions and mechanisms that might contribute to the 
survival of NEG institutions over the longer term, and contribute to “good” NEG. Necessarily, 
given the very limited research on the survival of collaboration, these conclusions are tentative 
and further research is needed to investigate and confirm the extent to which the findings 
described above have wider application.280 In particular, research on the broader range of
276 Margerum, n 28 at 144-146; Bonnell and Koontz, n 2 at 161, 163.
277 Margerum, n 28.
278 Lubell et al, n 1, p 295; Dovers, n 114, p 518.
279 Lubell et al, n 1; Dovers, n 114, p 518.
280 Raymond, n 255 at 54.
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370
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
371
Chapter 9: Conclusion - 
Achieving “good” NEG in practice
9.1 Review and background
A profound transformation in environmental governance has taken place around the 
globe.' Traditional regulatory approaches have proven ineffective for solving many of today’s 
environmental issues leading to a search for viable alternatives.2 The most credible such 
alternative to emerge to date has been NEG3 - an approach characterised by a range of 
innovative properties, including collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and 
adaptation and “new” forms of accountability.
Despite wide divisions of opinion concerning the virtues or otherwise of NEG, there has
been little hard nosed empirical work to test competing normative claims to determine who is
4 5correct about what, or to identify whether, when and how NEG can in fact “work”.
This thesis has sought to address these significant gaps in the NEG literature and to do so 
in a systematic, original and structured manner. Its central concern has been to address the 
question: under what conditions can “good” NEG be achieved? To better answer this core 
question a series of sub-questions have been developed, framed around a selection of key 
elements of “good” NEG, as follows:
•what conditions foster the emergence of successful collaboration?
•what conditions contribute to sustaining successful collaboration?
•what conditions foster “meaningful” participation and deliberation?
•what conditions foster effective learning and adaptation?
•what conditions foster effective “new” forms of accountability?
Rather than addressing these questions in a theoretical vacuum, the thesis’ analysis was 
underpinned by an evolving collection of scholarship outlined in chapter 2. Here, it was made
1 Lobel O, ‘The Renewal Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought
(2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342 at 343.
2 Karkkainen B, “Managing Transboundary Aquatic Ecosystems: Lessons from the Great Lakes” (2006) 19 Pacific 
McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 209 at 209.
3 Karkkainen, n 2 at 209; Gunningham N and Sinclair D, Leaders and Laggards (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002)
4 Koontz T and Thomas C, “What do we Know and Need to Know about the Environmental Outcomes of 
Collaborative Management” (2006) December Public Administration Review 111
5 Karkkainen B, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity and Dynamism” (2001/2002) 21 Virginia 
Environmental Law Journal 189 at 233; Lobel O, “Setting the Agenda for new governance research” (2004) 89 
Minnesota Law Review 498 at 499-509.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
372
clear that NEG scholarship encompassed many different schools of thought.6 However, rather 
than engage with each of the many fragmented and sometimes conflicting strands of NEG, it 
chose to maintain some theoretical coherence. It did so (consistent with emerging 
understandings within the NEG literature itself) by embracing a more generalised 
understanding, based on a collection of recognised principles that loosely connect various NEG
g
theories and which offer a broad alternative vision for approaching environmental governance.
Applying this theoretical orientation, the study went beyond most of the existing empirical
9work, (which has consisted largely of single case studies and a few institutional examples) by 
empirically comparing and contrasting three different NEG programs. This comparative 
approach (spanning point source pollution, second generation and natural resource management 
policy areas) enabled the thesis to make a new and innovative contribution to the NEG 
literature,10 taking a “hard look” at how NEG aspirations and mechanisms fared in practice. It
also made a contribution towards closing the gap between theory and practice11 following a
12methodological approach that emphasised interaction between theory and empirical research.
Commencing the empirical analysis in chapter 4, it was demonstrated that each of the case 
studies aspired to achieve defining features of “good” NEG. Paying close attention to the 
institutional design of the cases, links were then drawn between the design features of the cases 
and comparable recommendations made in the literature regarding how to best achieve “good” 
NEG.
The subsequent analysis of collaboration, participation and deliberation, learning and
accountability in practice accordingly tested and compared how these recommendations played
out in practice. When it came to some features of “good” NEG, the findings from this study
revealed that common recommendations made across many NEG theories rarely “worked” in
13practice. Indeed, it was evident that “open door” policies, government support and oversight 
and imposed procedural requirements were highly unlikely to deliver on participation ideals of
6 Karkkainen B, ‘“New Governance’ In Legal Thought And In The World: Some Splitting As Antidote To 
Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 471 at 472, 496; Lobel, n 5 at 499-501.
7 See: De Burca G and Scott J, “Introduction: new governance, law and constitutionalism” in De Burca G and Scott J 
(eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006); Lobel, n 1.
8 See De Burca and Scott, n 7, p 2; Karkkainen, n 6; Lobel, n 1; Lobel, n 5 at 506, 508.
9 Lubell M, Sabatier P, Vedlitz A, Focht W, Trachtenberg Z and Matlock M, “Conclusions and Recommendations” in 
Sabatier P, Focht W, Lubell M, Trachtenberg Z, Vedlitz A and Matlock M (eds), Swimming Upstream: Collaborative 
Approaches To Watershed Management (MIT Cambridge, 2005) p 294.
10 Trubek D and Trubek L, “The Birth of a Notion: Some Reflections on New Governance and Regulation at the 
Berlin Conference on Law and Society in the 21st Century”, Wisconsin Project on Governance and Regulation, EU 
Centre o f Excellence, UW-Madison, July 31, 2007 at 1.
" Karkkainen, n 2.
12 Layder D, Sociological Practice Linking Theory And Social Research (Sage Publications, 1998) p 167-168.
13 Abel T and Stephan M, “Limits of Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 44 American Behavioral Scientist 614 at 625.
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inclusive and “balanced” representation.14 Common institutional design features such as 
mediators and agency assistance also failed to neutralise gross imbalances of knowledge, 
intensity of interest, and capabilities between deliberators.15
When it came to collaboration, it was evident that many in the literature were more 
shrewdly attentive to the difficulties this process faced in practice. Indeed, recommendations 
regarding funding and incentive structures proved useful for overcoming cooperation dilemmas 
and transactions costs in practice, ultimately leading to varying degrees of successful 
collaboration.
When it came to other features of “good” NEG the results were more mixed. Indeed, while 
many authors were correct in arguing that funding was vital to sustained successful 
collaboration, more optimistic assumptions that collaboration could be maintained on the back 
of interested volunteers appeared to be flawed.
Some accountability designs in the literature were also found to be effective in practice, 
such as destabilisation rights. However, faith in horizontal accountability structures and 
“bounding decision spaces” through goal oriented legislation were shown to have points of 
weakness in practice.
Many different approaches to learning were also found to be valuable in practice, but in 
more constrained situations than many authors suggest. Comprehensive adaptive management 
depended on technical capacities of stakeholders and funding; process-based regulation was 
beneficial only when it was placed in the right pair of hands; and aspects of systemic learning 
worked only where formal procedures and mechanisms were developed for agencies or where 
collaborative groups were supported to fulfil the tasks themselves.
Reflecting on specific findings regarding these features of “good” NEG, the analysis 
chapters drew on theory and practice to provide recommendations on alternative sets of 
institutional conditions and the contexts in which successful collaboration, meaningful 
participation and deliberation, effective learning and new forms of accountability are most 
likely to be achieved.
Having done so, the purpose of this final chapter is to draw the thesis’ findings together 
and to offer some broader reflections and implications for both practice and theory. First, 
section 9.1 reflects on the guiding research question and highlights some of the key “pillars” 
that were central to many of the features of “good” NEG. Section 9.2 then discusses some 
specific theoretical contributions, pointing to the implications of the findings for normative
14 Unless in very small population like NEIP 3.
15 Fung A and Wright E, “Countervailing Power in Empowered Participatory Governance” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso, 2003) p 
259.
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debates within the literature. It also considers some of the broader themes in NEG literature 
raised in chapter 1 regarding the relationship between law and new governance, the role of the 
State, and the involvement of non government actors in NEG. Section 9.3 then outlines some 
areas for further research. Finally, section 9.4 offers some concluding remarks on this thesis and 
the future of NEG.
9.1.1 Conditions for achieving “good” NEG
So far this thesis has analysed the individual features of “good” NEG discretely and has 
drawn a number of distinct implications for practitioners and theorists.16 These implications are 
important in their own right. However17 in addition to focusing on individual elements of 
“good” NEG, there is also merit in stepping back and asking: what are the main lessons and 
recommendations for policy and the literature regarding “good” NEG as a whole?18
This section addresses this question by outlining a collection of conditions or “pillars” that 
were central to achieving “good” NEG, and making a two fold contribution. First, it identifies 
conditions and design features to which policy makers should give serious thought when 
designing new experiments. Second, at an explanatory level, the pillars identified below stand 
as broad, interrelated and overlapping principles which warrant attention by scholars in future 
normative theorising regarding NEG.
Drawing from the findings and analysis in earlier chapters, seven key “pillars” can be 
identified.
Pillar 1 - appropriate background circumstances: in what circumstances is NEG best 
applied? As we saw in chapter 5, collaborative NEG is probably not justified when problems are 
of very modest dimensions,19 not least because there are likely to be few returns from the 
initiative and it cannot be justified in cost benefit terms.20 Beyond this, it was easier to establish 
relatively successful collaboration and participation where environmental problems were 
severe21 (or perceived to be severe by stakeholders),22 where there were high personal stakes for
16 Lubell et al, n 9, p 289.
17 Lubell et al, n 9, p 289.
18 Lubell et al, n 9, p 289.
19 Lubell et al, n 9, p 290.
20 Cannon J, “Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management” (2000) 25 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 
379 at 408.
21 Heikkila and Gerlak, “The Formation of Large-scale Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: Clarifying 
the Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions” (2005) 33(4) Policy Studies Journal 586; Lubell M, Schneider 
M, Scholz J, and Mihriye M, “Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence o f Collective Action Institutions.” (2000) 
American Journal of Political Science 46 (1): 148-63.
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non government actors, a small number of affected actors, and collaborators already had access 
to significant resources.23 These circumstances were exemplified in NEIP sub case 3.
This is not to suggest that NEG is, or should be, limited to these specific circumstances. 
However, as a time and resource24 intensive endeavour, success in other situations will likely be 
difficult without a number of other “pillars”, not least government funding and/or skilfully 
designed incentives.
Pillar 2 -  funding: the importance of funding to NEG was implied in the NEIP and 
RNRM case studies where inadequate government funding 25 prevented successful 
collaboration,26 stymied effective monitoring to fulfil accountability and learning aspirations, 
and constrained commitments and/or action to improve environmental conditions. Moreover, 
across all cases, funding constraints (including its entire absence) stymied wider participation by 
time strapped volunteers.
As with similar forms of “collaborative” governance around the globe, governments 
evidently see many forms of NEG primarily as a means to cap their spending and limit resource 
pressures27 by bringing other sets of resources to the table. This somewhat myopic 
preoccupation with resource savings will commonly have detrimental effects on success judged 
in terms of environmental improvement - demonstrated most clearly in the abject failure of the 
NEIP to fulfil most of its NEG aspirations. Of course, there are draw backs28 and cost/benefit 
considerations when it comes to funding,29 however the harsh reality appears to be that unless 
governments are prepared to spend substantially more on NEG, it is highly likely to deliver sub 
par achievements or even little or nothing of substance.30
Pillar 3 - designing effective incentives: the archetypal illustration of this foundation to 
“good” NEG was found in the EIP case. Here, “negative” incentives were harnessed to ensure
22 The problem must not be so severe that improvements are infeasible; Ostrom E, Governing the Commons 
(Cambridge UP, 1990); Heikkila and Gerlak, n 20 at 586.
23 Of course vital to EIP was also a penalty default rule as discussed further below, however in terms of participation 
of local ordinary citizens it was much easier to generate significant involvement due to higher stakes.
24 Both government and non government.
25 See for example: Farrelly M, “Régionalisation o f Environmental Management: a Case Study of the Natural 
Heritage Trust, South Australia” (2005) 43(4) Geographical Research 393.
26 Bonnell J And Koontz T, “Stumbling Forward: The Organizational Challenges of Building and Sustaining 
Collaborative Watershed Management” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources 153 at 165.
27 For further discussion of this see: Crawford A, The Local Governance o f  Crime (Clarendon Press, 1997) p 165-168.
28 Not least, the tendency o f funding to skew representation towards usual suspects; See also: John D and Mlay M, 
“Community-Based Environmental Protection: Encouraging Civic Environmentalism” in Sexton K, Marcus A, 
William Easter K and Burkhardt T (eds), Better Environmental Decisions Strategies for Governments, Businesses 
and Communities (Island Press, 1999) p 368.
29 Taylor M, Public Policy in the Community (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p 185.
30 This may offer something of a sober reality check for NEG practitioners in a time of decreased taxes and 
increasingly greater expectations on government to “do more with less”. Further, the findings also offer a reminder 
for scholars that there is a need to address more clearly how funding to support NEG can be secured, redirected or 
obtained. See John D, “Good Cops, Bad Cops” (1999) October/November Boston Review 19 at 19.
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that many31 otherwise unwilling industries 32engaged in collaboration, divulged information, 
negotiated on local issues, and invested in monitoring, implementation and sustained 
collaboration.
Of course, it is hardly a new point that incentives structures like “penalty default” rules33 
(or even “positive” incentives such as funding34) are needed to encourage action and change 
behaviour in situations where the self interested economic interests of polluters and the public 
interest in protecting the environment do not substantially coincide.35 However as the 
experience of the NEIP program revealed, unless these issues remain in the forefront of 
policymakers’ consciousness then weaknesses such as a lack of involvement and commitment 
from key industry stakeholders, will continue to bedevil NEG initiatives.36
Pillar 4 - facilitating new capacities for non-governmental actors:37 like pillar 2, this 
foundation for “good” NEG was inferred from the many weaknesses that arose from its absence. 
For example, asymmetries in existing knowledge and skills undermined deliberation;38 
participation by marginalised interests and ordinary citizens was stymied by a lack of interest 
and/or skills; and unskilled volunteers were often ineffective at fulfilling mutual accountability, 
monitoring,39 and maintaining a successful collaborative endeavour.
Thus, we should not assume that the skills, knowledge, capacity and interest of non 
governmental actors will naturally match the expectations and obligations of a particular NEG 
program. Rather, new institutional mechanisms are needed to facilitate new capacities.40 This 
could include training and educating participants in the issues material to NEG experiments; 
imparting deliberative or organisational management skills; 41 and/or providing language 
support.
31 Although not all - as we saw in chapter 5, the most recalcitrant industries required the direct force of law.
32 Karkkainen B, “Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded 
Pragmatism” (2003) 87 Minnesota Law Review 943.
33 Karkkainen, n 32.
34 Karkkainen, n 5 at 229; Margerum R, “Integrated Environmental Management: the Foundations for Successful 
Practice” (1999) 24(2) Environmental Management 151 at 156.
35 Gunningham N & Rees J, “Industry Self Regulation” (1997) 19(4) Law and Policy 36; Gunningham N, “The New 
Collaborative Environmental Governance Paper for the International Meeting on Law and Society in the 21 Century, 
Humboldt University, Berlin, 25-28 July 2007.
36 Gunningham, n 35.
37 See for example: Freeman J, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” (1997) 45 UCLA Law 
Review 1 at 31-32.
38 Fung and Wright, n 15, p 259; Fung A and Wright E, “Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance” in 
Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory 
Governance (Verso, 2003) p 23.
39 Of course governments may also need training themselves as we saw with the VEPA, which lacked the skills 
necessary to know what should or should not be monitored.
40 See for example: Freeman, n 37 at 32 making a similar recommendation.
41 Cohen J and Rogers J, “Power and Reason” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 
2003) p 246.
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Pillar 5 - mobilising environmental interest groups: as others have argued, 
environmental groups can play particularly important roles in ensuring accountability, and high 
standards of environmental outcomes.42 This thesis revealed some key insights into the 
conditions under which this pillar of “good” NEG may be realised in practice.43
As we saw in chapter 6, national and state interest groups were typically hostile to or 
incapable of collaboration at local levels,44 leaving localised environmental groups as the most 
plausible prospective participants in NEG. However, even local groups participated in only a 
minority of cases, more often being absent from the NEG demos or choosing to exclude 
themselves from a collaborative forum.45 While the local groups that did participate were often 
effective in offsetting the dominance of industry and government on some issues, they typically 
held a narrow political vision focused on a single environmental issue and/or struggled to deal 
with the challenges of combining a collaborative role with environmental advocacy.46
One potentially effective way of overcoming the above limitations was demonstrated in the 
RNRM case by the Regional Group Collective. A collaborative organization operating at 
“higher” state scale, this collective was able to link with state based environmental groups47 who 
in turn utilised government funding to assist in better mobilising countervailing powers at lower 
collaborative levels.48
Pillar 6 - operate at multiple scales: overlapping with pillar 5, NEG should look beyond 
an exclusive focus on the local and/or regional, because, notwithstanding scientific, ecological 
and democratic reasons for devolving governance to the “local” level, not all processes, 
problems, or solutions, can be effectively located at this one scale. As we saw in chapters 5 and 
8, larger ecosystem scale experiments may reap benefits from working simultaneously at 
smaller scales to reduce transaction costs and maintain active involvement of local actors in 
implementation. This is consistent with a number of findings by NEG scholars.49
Less widely acknowledged however, are potential benefits that can arise from NEG 
programs seeking to develop collaborative institutions at high state or even national scales.50 
While creating additional transaction costs and power sharing problems, collaborating at high 
scales may help reduce overall transaction costs of interactions between local collaborators and
42 Fung and Wright, n 15.
43 Karkkainen, n 32 at 961.
44 Fung and Wright, n 15 p 280-282.
45 Fung and Wright, n 15, p 284.
46 Similar findings have been made by Taylor regarding community based organisations ; Taylor M, “Community 
Participation in the Real World: Opportunities and Pitfalls in New Governance Spaces” (2007) 44(2) Urban Studies 
297 at 312.
47 Margerum R, “Overcoming Locally Based Collaboration Constraints” (2007) 20 Society and Natural Resources
135 at 145.
48 Margerum, n 47 at 145.
49 Margerum, n 47.
50 Margerum, n 47 at 145.
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governments, help pool agency resources to provide greater access to support services,51 foster 
information sharing between groups, and link local groups to mobilised state environmental 
groups.52
Pillar 7 - fostering information flows: as we saw in chapter 7, many respondents argued 
that enhancing the flow of information and experience between collaboratives would have 
significant benefits, not least enhancing capacities, diffusing innovations and reducing costs. 
Chapter 7 also argued that enhancing the structured flow of information from collaboratives to 
agencies could deliver accountability benefits, fostering benchmarking so as to better inform the 
exercise of agency discretion. Such benchmarking processes may also aid in fostering a system 
of accountability that depends more on “peer review” between collaboratives, helping to lessen 
the need for blunt, anti-deliberative and anti-collaborative government vetos over decisions.53
Democratic experimentalists have identified these and other benefits of information 
pooling and diffusion.54 However, as we saw in chapter 7, a present limit to reaching their ideal 
in practice is the cultural resistance and lack of capacity of some agencies to adopt such 
information pooling roles. The thesis has accordingly argued that we may need to look beyond 
agencies and focus on the development of other mechanisms to achieve this “pillar”. The 
RNRM case provided one such illustration here, namely funding a state or national level 
collaborative forum comprised of representatives of localised actors.
To sum up, the findings suggest there are at least seven key pillars to “good” NEG, 
namely: (i) background circumstances likely to make NEG more or less applicable as a tool for 
environmental problem solving; (ii) government funding; (iii) skilfully designed incentives; (iv) 
capacity building and training; (v) mobilising environmental interests; (vi) linking action at 
different scales; and (vii) improving the flow of information.
While not hard and fast prescriptions guaranteed to always “work”, these “rules of thumb” 
provide valuable guidance55 for policy makers seeking to construct “good” NEG. Further, 
although NEG scholars are well aware of the importance of some of these individual building
51 Margerum, n 47 at 141; Karkkainen, n 2 at 235-236.
52 Indeed, it is possible that links between local and higher state or national forums may in fact increase the chances 
of enhancing and fostering greater representation of other interests at a local level such as interests outside of a 
defined region: Margerum, n 47 at 145.
53 Sabel C and Simon W, “Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty” in De Burca G and Scott J (eds), Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006) p 396-403.
54 See: Karkkainen B, Fung A and Sabel C, “After Backyard Environmentalism Toward a Performance Based 
Regime of Environmental Protection” (2000) 44(4) American Behavioural Scientist 690.
55 Lubell et al, n 9, p 289.
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blocks, very few theoretical frameworks have encapsulated these pillars in their entirety.56 These 
pillars will thus likely be of benefit to scholars in future normative theorising regarding NEG.
Having outlined some pillars of “good” NEG, the next section turns to consider some 
specific theoretical issues.
9.2 Insights for theory
This thesis has primarily focused on NEG in practice, however, a number of implications 
have also been identified for NEG theory. This section draws out four key theoretical insights 
made by this thesis. The first insight discussed below relates to normative debates in the 
literature. Here the findings suggested that NEG in practice supports some aspects of critics’ 
arguments and other aspects of proponents’ arguments. This leads the thesis to counsel both 
sides to put the boxing gloves to one side and better respond to the world as it is rather than as 
they would like it to be.
Revisiting some of the broad theoretical themes raised in chapter 1, the second insight 
discussed below is the thesis’ confirmation of the hybridity hypothesis regarding the interaction 
between law and new governance. Thirdly, this section looks at what we have learnt from NEG 
experiments about the role of the State. It suggests that the State remains strong and active, but 
points to the need for normative theories to better address the thesis’ findings regarding the risks 
of State authority. Finally the section draws on empirical insights to highlight the divergent 
types of non government actors involved in NEG, fleshing out the different consequences each 
pose for NEG’s participatory aspirations.
Commencing with normative debates, a useful starting point is to revisit the controversial 
issue of whether NEG does secure improved environmental outcomes.57 Some of the NEG 
experiments that were the subject of this thesis were still in their infancy, and the available data 
sources were too limited and unreliable to make this issue a central part of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, it may be of value to comment on it here, albeit tentatively and on the basis of the 
less than perfect data sources.58.
Turning first to the EIP, the analysis chapters revealed59 that this experiment had achieved 
significant improvement to local environmental issues (so much so that collaborators began to 
disengage and questions were raised as to the desirability of continuing some EIPs). However 
the EIP was weaker in reducing broader environmental issues, with only leading and good
56 Democratic experimentalism is perhaps one of the closest; see: Karkkainen et al, n 54.
57 For an overview see: Koontz and Thomas, n 4.
58 See Sabatier et al, n 4.
59 See Gunningham and Sinclair, n 3.
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industries being able to demonstrate achievements (and even those that occurred in the case of 
leading performers were likely to have arisen even without the EIP).
In the NEIP case, the likelihood of significant environmental outcomes being delivered 
was minimal at best. This was attributable primarily to the fact that in all but quite rare 
situations, the NEIP failed to engage and obtain commitment from key industry actors,60 lacked 
funding sources to foster commitments that went substantially beyond “business as usual”, 
developed weak performance standards, conducted highly ineffective monitoring and 
implementation and struggled to maintain a collaborative organisation.61
The findings regarding the RNRM program suggest its regional bodies and strategic 
planning approach were more likely than NEIP to deliver important environmental 
improvements, not least because of government investment in monitoring, technical assistance 
and implementation. At the same time, the potential extent and scope of environmental 
improvements was constrained by flaws in the program, including conflict among high levels of 
government, burdensome accountability arrangements, and most damningly, insufficient 
funding for achieving desired improvements with regard to such a complex problem.62
In short, the above suggest that NEG is not some “holy grail” for solving environmental 
problems - it will work some of the time, but not all of the time.
Turning to some of the more specific normative debates, the findings suggest that 
criticisms of NEG have sometimes been overdrawn. For example, chapter 563 demonstrated that 
consensus can mean different things to different people64 and generalised claims65 that all 
consensus approaches lead to problems such as lowest common denominator solutions or a 
focus on the least important environmental issues, are overdrawn.66 Furthermore, the findings 
suggest that trust operates differently in different contexts, and at least in some situations like 
EIP, may be largely irrelevant to successful collaboration and effective outcomes.67 Most
60 Karkkainen B, “Information-Forcing Regulation and Environmental Governance” in De Burea G and Scott J (eds), 
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006) p 296; Gunningham and Sinclair, n 3 at 149.
61 Bidwell R and Ryan C, “Collaborative Partnership Design: The Implications of
Organizational Affiliation for Watershed Partnerships” (2006) 19 (9) Society and Natural Resources 827 at 840
62 Head B, “Participation or Co-governance? Challenges for Regional Natural Resource Management” in Eversole R 
and Martin J (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (Ashgate, 2005) p 145-146.
63 Karkkainen, n 5 at 240, Fn 116; See also Karkkainen B, “Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance” (2004) 4:1 
Global Environmental Politics 72 at 91.
64 Leach W, “Theories About Consensus” (2005) 20 (2) Conservation Biology Volume 573 at 574.
65 See discussions in: Coglianese C and Allen L, “Does Consensus Make Common Sense?” (2004) 46 (1) 
Environment 10; Coglianese G, “Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy” in Orts E and Deketelaere 
K (eds), Environmental Contracts Comparative Approaches To Regulatory Innovation In The United States and 
Europe (Kluwer Law International, 2001) p 96.
66 Innés J, “Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics” (2004) 3(1) Planning Theory 5 at 7.
67 Raymond L, “Cooperation without Trust: Overcoming Collective Action Barriers to Endangered Species 
Protection” (2006) 34(1) The Policy Studies Journal 37; see: Lubell et al, n 9, p 277.
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strikingly, this finding demonstrates the mirror opposite of the broad criticisms that NEG is “all 
talk and no action” - leading to mutual goodwill but little impact.68
In contrast, the analysis chapters also provided empirical support for a number of broad 
criticisms charged against NEG. For example, the findings in chapter 5 suggest that while 
collaboration in NEG is not impossible, it is costly and time consuming.69 Thus without 
significant government investment or some other transaction cost reducing mechanism,70 NEG 
experiments will likely only be optimal in limited situations71 such as small communities with a 
direct connection to an environmental resource.
While recognising that representation, inclusion and deliberation criteria are “high” 
ideals that can vary greatly, Chapter 6 also reinforced claims by some authors that “real 
participation”72 and deliberation73 is difficult for NEG to achieve in practice. Further, the 
findings confirmed the very real capacity for NEG to disenfranchise environmental interest 
groups,74 or to rely unduly on the fortuitous existence of local groups that often lack a broad 
vision or the skills to play an effective countervailing power ro le .75 Finally, the findings in 
Chapter 7 added support to claims that NEG can create significant risks of agency capture, 
unprincipled deal making and rent seeking.76
Yet despite the fact that many criticisms of NEG were reinforced by the present study, it 
would be unjustified to conclude that NEG is somehow inherently flawed or that governments 
and citizens should shut up the NEG shop and go home. As pointed out across all empirical 
chapters, significant steps and achievements had been made toward all features of “good” NEG,
68 Lubell M, “Collaborative Environmental Institutions: All Talk and No Action?” (2004) 23(3) Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 549 at 551 ;Raymond, n 67 at 54.
69 Lane M, 2006, “Critical issues in regional natural resource management”, paper prepared for the 2006 Australian 
State o f the Environment Committee, Department of the Environment and Heritage, Canberra, < http://www. deh. 
gov.au/soe/2006/int egrative/ nrm-issues/ index.ht ml> at 4-5; Coglianese, n 65, p 113.
70 For example skilfully designed penalty default.
71 Gaines S, “Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development” (2002/2003) 10 Buffalo 
Environmental Law Journal 1 at 17; Cannon, n 20 at 428.
72 Abel and Stephan, n 13 at 625; Margerum , n 47 at 141 -142; Tushnet M, The New Constitutional Order (Princeton 
UP, 2003) p 170; Farber D, “Models of Reinvention” (1999) October/November Boston Review 24 at 24.
73 Abers R, “Reflections on What Makes Empowered Participatory Governance Happen” in Fung A and Wright E 
(eds), Deepening Democracy (Verso Press, 2003) p 200; Head B, “Governance” in Saunders P and Walter H (eds), 
Ideas and Influence Social Science and Public Policy in Australia (UNSW Press, 2005) p 54-57; Steinzor R, 
“Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command to Self-Control” (1998) 22 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 103 at 142.
74 See: McCloskey M, 1996, ‘The Skeptic: Collaboration Has Its Limits” High Country News ,
May 13 . www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1839 [ accessed 10 May, 2008 ] .
75 Defilippis J, Fisher R and Shragge E, “Neither Romance nor Regulation: Re-evaluating Community” (2006) 30(3) 
673 at 684 (arguing that countervailing powers will need a political vision that goes beyond local); Farber D, 
‘Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection” (2000) U. 111. L. 
Rev. 61 at 75.
76Steinzor R, ‘The Corruption o f Civic Environmentalism” (2000) 30 Environmental Law Reporter 10909; Steinzor, 
n 73.
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and in some cases, emerging institutional structures for overcoming these weaknesses were 
being trialed.
The lesson from the above then, is this: we are swimming in far more vast and murky 
waters than we suspect. Many proponents and critics of NEG will need to let their high horse 
drown before we can make significant progress swimming together toward the shore of 
understanding and fully appreciate the strengths, weaknesses, potential and limitations of NEG.
This is not to disparage vital normative theoretical projects in NEG. Rather it is to suggest 
that both proponents and skeptics need to better respond to realities in practice. At minimum, 
this will require many scholars to relax their more idealistic and ambitious normative claims, 
because these have sometimes served to cloud both the strengths and weaknesses of NEG. 
There are several leading NEG theorists that have recently begun to take this path, such as 
Karkkainen in the USA77, Head in Australia,78 and Scott and Holder within the European 
Union.79
The second theoretical insight from this thesis is that new governance and law tend to 
operate in a hybrid relationship.80 Although there are a number of views on the interaction 
between law and new governance, the “hybridity” thesis81 best reflects the constructive co­
existence of law and new governance that was evident in this thesis’ findings.82
All three cases studied relied on law to lay down outer parameters and broad aims for 
NEG, but imparted discretion to collaboratives to set specific targets and determine how they 
should be implemented.83 In EIP, collaborations were required to confirm and not slip below 
existing legislated and licence standards, but they were given freedom to go “beyond 
compliance”. In developing regional resource condition targets in RNRM, plans remained 
consistent with, rather than undermined, standards elaborated in law such as the Vegetation 
Management Act. Moreover, in NEIP, requirements for targets to be consistent with planning 
schemes and existing environmental protection policies ensured NEIP plans coexisted and 
supported pervading legal norms.
Given evident risks of tokenism and vague environmental performance goals in many of 
these NEG cases, the “thin green line” provided by law across these areas was arguably vital to 
preventing manifest back sliding in existing environmental protection standards.
77 As Karkkainen has aptly put it: “Both its proponents and its skeptics must own up to the fact that some parts are 
working better than others, and some parts are probably not working at all.”; Karkkainen, n 2 at 212.
78 Head, n 62.
79 Scott J and Holder J, “Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union” in De Burca G and Scott J 
(eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, 2006) p 212.
8(1 De Burca and Scott, n 7, p 9-10.
81 De Burca and Scott, n 7; Trubek and Trubek, n 10.
82 Certainty the role of law was not always uniform across the cases, however it was central to the cases in many other 
respects. De Burca and Scott, n 7, p 6.
83 De Burca and Scott, n 7, p 8.
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Notably, law also formed a vital hybrid with new governance in other ways. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous section, negative incentives are a key pillar in the success of NEG, not 
least because they can leverage action from reluctant actors. Further, the findings in EIP 
revealed that direct legal compulsion could also support NEG. This may involve successfully 
mobilising highly recalcitrant actors to engage in a new governance approach.84 Law also acted 
as a useful tool for compliance via licence change and court proceedings, which ensured actors 
ultimately fulfilled their NEG commitments.85
The third insight provided by the thesis concerns the changing role of the State. As we saw 
in chapter 1, many authors have suggested that NEG appears to blur the traditional line between 
State and civil society.86 In particular, the State no longer is the exclusive actor, top down 
command is no longer the only means of achieving action, nor indeed is decision making any 
longer entirely centralised.87 What then to make of this shift? Is it a "withering away” -  the State 
becoming one of many actors involved in governance but no longer privileged in terms of 
power and influence?88 Or does the State retain certain unique roles and if so what are they? 
Based on the experience of the case studies, there was little evidence that the shift evident in 
NEG “threatens” the authority of the State, “hollows it out” 89 or amounts to effective 
deregulation.90 Rather the State has remained “strong”, and continues to play three unique and 
fundamentally important roles.91
First, the state ensures there are resources for NEG. In cases such as NEIP and RNRM, the 
State was “strong” in the sense that it was the main provider of resources (both in kind and
92monetary) for the organisation of NEG, decision making processes and implementation.
Second, the State played a central role in steering and setting overarching frameworks, 
albeit to varying degrees of specificity, that defined the nature of participation and negotiation, 
established expectations of performance, processes to be followed, and accountability 
obligations to be met.
84 Although this was typically only successful for local issues rather than broader environmental issues.
85 De Burca and Scott, n 7, p 8.
86 Karkkainen, n 5 at 237-238.
87 See: Karkkainen, n 63 at 75-78.
88 Mol A, “Bringing the Environmental State Back In: Partnerships in Perspective” in Glasbergen P, Biermann, F and 
Mol A (eds), Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development, (Edward Elgar, 2007); Gunningham, n 35; 
Karkkainen, n 2 at fn 2.
89 Rhodes R, Understanding Governance, Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability (Open 
University Press, 1997).
90 Lowi T, “Frontyard Propaganda” (1999) October/November Boston Review 19 at 19.
91 Lawrence G and Cheshire L, “Managing Nature: The Promises and Problems o f Regional Environmental 
Governance in Australia” Plenary Address at the Ecopolitics XV Conference Environmental Governance: 
Transforming Regions and Localities, Macquarie University, Sydney 12-14, November 2004 at 12.
92 Notably, even though NEIP relied on the resources of collaborators or external sources, such money was typically 
provided by government grants or agencies collaborators. Where no specific funding was provided (as in the EIP case) 
the strength of the State still remained vital and evident, although here it was “command” powers used to encourage 
or directly compel partners to bring necessary resources to the table.
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The third role performed by the State involved providing public accountability and 
compliance across the cases, using accountability and enforcement mechanisms93 and/or having 
“the final say” over decisions. As vve saw in the NEIP and RNRM case, it was in this third role 
that the State most visibly flexed its muscles, often dominating decisions and/or exercising strict 
accountability controls.
Of course, as we saw, the State was not always “strong” enough (eg. failing to provide 
sufficient resources, letting accountabilities slip) and it often struggled to fulfil other roles that 
were expected of it -such as acting as a pooler and distributor of information. Further non 
government actors were also involved in many of the above roles and it is not suggested that the 
State is necessarily the exclusive provider of all these functions.94 However, the need for some 
degree of effective State intervention in these three key areas is paramount and is broadly 
reflected in the pillars of good NEG described above.
This understanding of the State generally confirms the implicit or explicit claims in most 
NEG theories, namely that the State remains “active” in new governance.95
However another key insight from this thesis for NEG theory -  particularly the more 
normative and idealised treatments such as strands of democratic experimentalism,96 
collaborative governance97 and others98 -  is that an “active” State can very often be a 
“controlling” State. In broad terms, the above theories often have an implicit assumption or 
idealised hope that the State will work to support NEG and achieve a more participatory 
approach to problem solving by devolving both decision making power and responsibility for 
implementation. Yet as the thesis found in chapter 6, the State can often dominate decisions 
when it has its own funding or its own programs at stake in NEG, effectively undermining 
NEG’s deliberative and participatory aspirations. The tendency of the State to “shed its load” by 
utilising inadequately supported volunteers was a related example of the negative role 
sometimes played by the State- treating groups more as their own “private” delivery 
mechanisms than empowered publics. Further, where continued investment is ongoing, as in
93 For example the use of law in EIP or even ultimately the withdrawal of funding in RNRM.
94 Resourcing for example was supplemented by non government actors’ time, knowledge and effort, although 
respondents clearly saw government as ultimately responsible for either resourcing NEIP and RNRM programs or for 
ensuring industry took action in EIP. Non government actors also exercised their own social and economic leverage 
to induce cooperation of some industries, although ultimate recourse to State power was central for poor performers 
in EIP (and vitally needed in NEIP). Non government actors also had input in terms of: influencing performance 
goals, who participated, how implementation was to be conducted, and in terms of accountability and enforcement 
roles. However ultimately all of this occurred within a framework o f minimum baselines set by overarching 
legislation, government vetos and oversight.
95 Lobel, n 5 at 502; Fung and Wright, n 15.
96 Fung and Wright, n 15.
97 Freeman, n 37 at 31-33.
98 Freeman J and Farber D, “Modular Environmental Regulation” (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795 at 895, 901.
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RNRM, the State evidently maintains and extends its control through rigid accountability 
controls," potentially morphing collaborations into bureaucracies.
Given this, the above NEG theories may be better served if they were able to merge an 
understanding of the importance of not deresponsibilising the State, with an understanding of 
the threat of “State” pow er,100 particularly given that wider trends in governance have often 
been revealed to involve participatory deliberative and community empowerment in name 
only..101
The fourth and final theoretical insight from the findings is that there is a significant 
diversity of actors in civil society, each bringing different strengths and weaknesses to the NEG 
process. Theories and research in NEG (including this thesis) tend to variously refer to 
participants in NEG as stakeholders, non government actors, “community” and similar 
neologisms. All of these terms call to mind actors from civil society but they do so in terms that 
do not do justice to what the study suggests is a disparate and heterogeneous collection of actors 
from civil society. 102
At a broad level, the findings suggest there are at least four main categories of actors 
(excluding for present purposes economic private interests such as industry) engaged in NEG.103 
That is, localised environmental groups, state and national environmental groups, ordinary 
citizens who have little or no experience in working with governments and so called “usual 
suspects” -  citizens or groups already mobilised and active around an issue. In this study, each 
of the broad groupings had different motivations for participating and each brought with it 
different capacities and skills that pose different challenges for NEG.
Much has already been said above about local and state environmental groups above so it 
will not be repeated here.104 Ordinary citizens played a unique role, participating primarily105 
when they have a significant personal stake in the issues at hand. Correspondingly they were 
less likely to participate when doing so involved significant time, resource or skill demands. In 
general they focused primarily on the local impacts that motivated their decision to participate, 
offering less input into broader environmental concerns. They were unlikely to try and represent 
others within their demos (unless the affected group of actors was very small) and they had a
99 Lawrence and Cheshire, n 91 at 8.
100 Defilippis, n 75 at 684-685.
101 Certainly, Head appears to be better aware of such trends: Head, n 62.
102 Karkkainen, n 5 at 238.
103 Karkkainen, n 5 at 238.
104 Suffice it to say that local groups were quite effective at sustaining their involvement, both because o f group 
numbers and interest in longer term environmental issues.
105 There were o f course exceptions such as altruistic actors or others who continued to participate due to a lack of 
trust.
Cameron Holley New Environmental Governance
386
tendency to disengage when their interest had been satisfied, making it difficult to sustain 
effective collaboration where they were the dominant actors.106
Usual suspects dominated NEG initiatives where the stakes in environmental problem were 
diffuse, not least because they already had an interest in the issues and were easily identifiable 
interests for organisers of NEG such as government agencies. Usual suspects, particularly those 
who were dependent on government funding in the past, also had a particular attraction to NEG 
when there is a promise of accessing and control funding - a factor which itself can lead to 
increased problems with rent seeking behaviour.107
While these groups were likely to bring with them a passion and knowledge about the 
issues at hand, they were considered not to be “typical” of the local affected population.108 
Despite their passion, usual suspects struggled in conducting meetings, coordinating their group 
and rising to other management expectations of their collaborative organisation. The benefit of 
usual suspect groups was they could draw on existing membership to rotate representatives 
making it easier to sustain collaboration, and they were more likely to be informally accountable 
to a wider range of actors in their group.
While these categories are in need of further refining,109 even in their present form they are 
of some significance for NEG theory. Not least, at an explanatory level they suggest that 
references to “participatory” aspirations or notions of “participation” often referred to in NEG 
theories are too vague110 -  there are in fact many different kinds of “participation” going on that 
have different normative implications for environmental outcomes and democracy. Indeed, 
these findings suggest that NEG theory must be clearer about what kinds and levels of 
participation by what group of actors it sees as necessary to provide an effective and democratic 
alternative vision of governance.111 The four categories provided by this thesis may help in 
informing this work.
The above has outlined for the reader four key theoretical insights made by this thesis. This 
included taking some steps toward resolving normative debates in the literature and the 
confirmation of a hybridity relationship between law and new governance. It also suggested the
106 Of course, one should not “look down” on their contribution or involvement given they were typically 
disenfranchised interests, overlooked by traditional regulation who were forced to bear the brunt o f society’s 
industrial lifestyle. VEPA, n 5, p 2; Conley A and Moote M, “Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource 
Management” (2003) 16 Society and Natural Resources 371 at 377.
107 Taylor, n 29, p 185.
108 Taylor, n 29, p 185.
109 Most are generalisations and none purport to capture every aspect of how a certain category of actor will behave. 
Some ordinary citizens for example were motivated by broader altruistic concerns. Further, contextual factors such as 
coming from an extremely small affected population were seen to alter the motivations for participating and the way 
actors behaved in NEG.
110 See Karkkainen B, “Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?” in Fung A and Wright E (eds), Deepening 
Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance (Verso 2003) p 222-223.
111 Karkkainen, n 5 at 239.
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State remains strong and active, but pointed out that it can at times be “too active” and “exploit” 
or dominate NEG. Finally, the above also highlighted some key categories of “participants” and 
the roles they play in NEG, suggesting there is a need for clarity in terms of what NEG is 
striving for in a participatory approach.
Despite having outlined many policy and theory related recommendations, implications 
and insights arising from this research, much more still remains to be learned and tested 
regarding NEG. The next section turns to outline where research in NEG could head.112
9.3 Research
In the course of reviewing literature and conducting the research on NEG, a number of 
critical areas for research were identified as important to advancing our understanding of 
NEG.113 Some of these have already been discussed in the analysis chapters, however five other 
broad areas for further research are worth mentioning here.
First, this thesis has taken a theoretical orientation that approaches NEG from the basis of 
broad principles recognised as common to NEG. The thesis has demonstrated the utility of using 
the conceptual “tool” of “good” NEG to develop a structured understanding of this recent shift 
in environmental governance. While this tool will hopefully help to guide and inspire future 
comparative empirical research into NEG in practice and theory,114 such a broad focus may 
gloss over important theoretical and practical differences within the evolving NEG field. 
Accordingly an important area for both theoretical and empirical study is to more closely 
examine and test some of the distinctions and differences between NEG theories, determining 
which may better account for NEG descriptively or provide a better normative vision in view of 
the realities of practice.
Related to this issue is another - this thesis conducted a comparative analysis of arguably 
the most central defining features of NEG. However as NEG is still an emerging and evolving 
field, its key features will no doubt be subject to further refinement.115 Accordingly, future 
research will be needed to confirm whether or to what extent the features examined in this thesis 
remain important to NEG, and to examine other features in NEG as it evolves.
A third area for research is based on the recognition that the conclusions and implications 
drawn in this thesis are limited to the sub cases and case studies from which they were drawn. 
While the comparative analysis of multiple programs and sub cases has allowed this thesis to
112 Lubell et al, n 9, p 293.
113 Lubell et al, n 9, p 293.
114 Hendriks C, Public Deliberation and Interest Organisations: A Study of Responses to Lay Citizen Engagement in 
Public Policy (ANU Thesis, 2004) p 327.
115 Lobel, n 5 at 501.
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reflect on a significant variance in NEG designs and contexts, research into other manifestations 
and experiments in NEG is still vital to test and confirm what the findings and implications 
drawn here hold for other NEG institutions and contexts. Attention could also be paid to how 
other specific conditions and issues relating to the key defining features are examined here.
There is also a need for further research on the case studies, particularly the younger cases 
of RNRM and NEIP.116 Indeed although the thesis proceeded over four years, there are many 
important issues that have been raised both here and in the literature that were not able to be 
examined but that warrant further attention.117 Future research into these cases could also reflect 
longitudinal aspects such as changes over time, and to what extent environmental outcomes are 
achieved.
Indeed, a fifth and final area for research that has not been explored in its entirety in this 
project or indeed elsewhere is NEG’s impact on environmental outcomes. A wide ranging and 
comparative quantitative and qualitative study is arguably vital to determine the extent to which 
its processes actually improve the environment.118 A useful framework for conducting such a 
study has recently been raised in the literature by Koontz and Thomas.119
120All of these questions will require a creative and long term agenda for NEG research. To 
conclude, the next section turns to reflect generally on NEG’s position in environmental 
governance and its future.
9.4 Concluding Comments
In conclusion, this thesis has sought to open a space for practitioners and scholars to pause 
for thought, reconsider, and reformulate their understanding of and orientation regarding NEG. 
Its primary message can be stated like this - NEG can work, but it may not be as straightforward 
or as effective as many may hope. Nevertheless, if, practitioners and scholars capitalise on its 
strengths and respond to its limitations in practice (which has not always been their forte) then 
this new form of governance can and should make an important contribution to environmental 
outcomes.
At the time of writing, many in Australia appear to be slowly “coming round” to a similar 
conclusion - a fact which is seeing a shift in direction for some of the NEG experiments studied 
in this thesis. While the relatively successful EIP program certainly continues to command
1.6 See: Head, n 62.
1.7 Hendriks, n 114, p 328.
118 Koontz and Thomas, n 4.
119 Koontz and Thomas, n 4.
120 Lubell et al, n 9, p 295.
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VEPA’s support, it is a different story with NEIP. Indeed in 2008 the VEPA put the NEIP on
hold while it undertook a review of both the NEIP’s successes and weaknesses to find a new
121way forward.
The RNRM program is also undergoing a transition, in part brought about by a recent 
change in government. As the incoming Labor government has rightly pointed out: deficiencies 
in RNRM have been highlighted by a number of government reviews, including claims that 
RNRM and similar programs have been unable to demonstrate value for investment.122 The 
result has been the announcement in 2008 of a reformed RNRM program that “recognises that 
the previous system was not working efficiently”,123 but that seeks to build on the “strengths of 
previous natural resource management”.124
Pioneering NEG experiments internationally may also be moving toward a critical stage of 
reform, not least the Habitat Conservation Planning process, where there have been increasing 
calls for agencies to learn from and adjust to regulatory mistakes and success.123 In Europe, it is
perhaps too early to say whether similar lessons are being learned with regard to the most
126influential, but relatively recent NEG innovation, the Water Framework Directive.
What do these developments suggest about NEG’s position in environmental governance, 
and indeed its future? At one level, NEG evidently remains something of a continuing 
experiment for States and civil societies. It is also clear, however, that such experimentation is 
at a stage of transition -  moving from a period of trial and testing to one of consolidation and 
refinement; keeping what works, and finding new ways to do things where it didn’t. NEG’s 
future success will accordingly require building on pillars and lessons like those provided by
this study. It will also require closer scrutiny and analysis by scholars of NEG in practice to
127ensure that any refinement of NEG keeps it on the “right path” toward success.
Given that programs like RNRM have 50 year goals, the road ahead is clearly long, and if 
early experience is anything to go by, there are likely to be many bumps and potholes along the 
way. Nevertheless, as history has shown, the reformation of environmental governance will 
continue to progress, however unevenly, suggesting there is all the more reason to learn now 
from both successes and failures of NEG so that we can build a more effective and democratic 
approach for environmental governance in the future.
121 http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/projects/NEIPS/default.asp.
122 http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/cfoc-faq.html.
123 Joint Media Release Hon Peter Garrett MP Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts, Hon Tony Burke 
MP Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry” “Caring for our Country - better land management, less red 
tape” DAFF08/024BJ14, Mar 2008.
124 http://www.nrm.gov.au/funding/future.html.
125 Camacho A, "Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management" (2007) 55 UCLA Law 
Review available at http://ssm.com/abstract=969676 viewed 10 May 2008
126 Scott and Holder, n 79.
127 Lubell et al, n 9, p 295.
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A p p e n d i x  1: I n t e r v i e w  P r o t o c o l  a n d  C o n s e n t  
F o r m
Interview Protocol
Opening biographical questions
• How long have you been involved in the sub case?
• What role and involvement have you taken in the sub case?
General success and failures of program
• What would you say you are proudest o f in the sub case process?
o What factors may have contributed to these successes?
• Have there been any frustrations or difficulties faced during the sub case process?
o What are some of the causes of these frustrations/difficulties? 
o In what ways do you think things could have been done differently to avoid 
such frustrations/difficulties?
Collaboration
• How did the sub case go about forming the collaborative group?
o Challenges?
o Did any factors assist in the process? Trust? Funding? 
o Was consensus an important part of the process?
• Do you think the partners are sufficient?
o Is any one missing?
• Have partners remained active during implementation stages?
• Is the collaboration sustainable over the longer term?
o What factors may assist or detract form it being maintained?
Participation
• How was the membership of sub case determined?
o Voting? Government Selection?
• How representative is the sub case?
o What ways or methods were used to achieve representation? What were their 
advantages/disadvantages?
• Are there any environmental, NGOs or community based groups?
o If so what has their role been? If not, what factors may have contributed to the 
absence?
• Are there ways that the sub case or its members seek to interact/communicate with the
wider community?
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• How did the decision making process operate?
o Negotiation? Voting? Mediators?
• Was there equal influence from partners?
o Can you describe some examples of this influence? What are some of the 
reasons for this?
Accountability, learning and adaptation
• How were targets and objectives set?
• Are the targets adequate in your opinion? For example, will they lead to positive 
outcomes for the environment and community?
• What implementation has occurred?
• Has progress been on target or behind? What factors contributed to this?
• How is monitoring of targets, actions and evaluation been going? 
Advantages/disadvantages?
• How effective are accountability arrangements?
o Do partners “check” each other’s behaviour?
o What role does government play?
• Has the sub case group been able to learn from monitoring data and adapted its 
management process?
o What factors contributed to this? Weaknesses and strengths?
o Has there been any sharing of learning or experiences between cases? 
Conclusion
• Do you have any other comments about the sub case process?
• Have I missed anything you think is relevant or you would like to talk about?
• Who else do you think would be good for me to talk to?
Consent Fo r m
Brief description
This project examines current collaborative environmental and natural resource 
management approaches that involve public, private and community stakeholders at local, 
regional, state and national levels. The project is examining the various regional natural 
resource management approaches in Queensland, as well as two collaborative regulatory 
initiatives in Victoria that have been implemented for big business and neighbourhoods.
By means of this examination, the project will contribute to current theory and practice 
regarding how to best design the coordination of stakeholder resources and capacities so as to 
effectively and efficiently achieve environmental and natural resource regulatory goals. The 
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project’s practical significance for the various stakeholders will be to provide them with 
independent feedback on, and identify opportunities for enhancing and improving ongoing 
management and regulatory approaches.
Specific aims of the project
The aims of this research project are to:
1. assess the environmental and regional natural resource management arrangements for 
Queensland, as well as analyse neighbourhood environment improvement plans and 
environment improvement plans, in regards to: (a) their effectiveness; and (b) their capacity 
to fulfil regulatory and other environmental goals at a local level through the mobilisation of 
stakeholder’s knowledge and capacity;
2. develop a participatory strategy capable of substantially improving the environmental 
performance of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises through integration of environmental 
considerations into their core business activities;
3. develop principles for, and a broader model of, Local Capacity Regulation that is robust, 
sustainable and easily reproduced, and capable of being applied to a wide range of other 
environmental and regulatory contexts; and
4. develop an institutional framework that can facilitate effective community intervention in 
other domains of governance.
Before the interview/Confidentiality and privacy considerations
I am a researcher at the Australian National University, where I am working on a project 
described above. I am conducting interviews with a range of stakeholders concerned with that 
subject matter. Before we start the interview, it is important that I tell you the following:
1. all information you provide will be kept confidential and not disclosed in any published 
data;
2. no organisational name or individual name will be used or disclosed by the ANU research 
team, and any information we publish will not enable a reader to identify that we have 
spoken to you;
3. data would be stored in a locked cabinet in the locked office of the chief investigator. The 
identity of the interviewee will be coded and the codes kept separately as an additional 
security measure;
4. the only known circumstances when confidentiality would not be 
protected would be if data were subject to subpoena; and
5. please note that your participation is voluntary and you do not have to answer any questions 
and you can end the interview at any point you wish.
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Contact Details
If you have any questions regarding the research project please contact Cameron Holley, 
School of Resources, Environment and Society, Australian National University, ACT 0200, 
telephone (02) 6125 3569, email u 4 152043@anu.edu.au.
If you have any questions concerning human ethics please contact Human Ethics Officer, 
Research Services Office, ANU, ACT 0200, telephone (02) 6125 2900, email 
Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au.
You agree to be interviewed on the basis stated above:
Signed
Print
Date
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Figure 6.1: Membership Across EIP Case
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gov.______________________
Figure 6.2: EIP Sub Cass Membership
% of Total Membership
□  Other collaborations of gov. and non 
gov.
■  Other non environmental interests 
(business, community groups etc.)
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■  Local Environmental Groups
■  Local Residents
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Figure 6.3: Membership Across NEIP Case
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Figure 6.5: Membership across RNRM in Queensland128
Unknown7%Traditional Owners 
8%
Local Govt 24%
Science / reseaith 3%
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Community 7%
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Figure 6.6: RNRM Sub Case Membership
% Total Membership
□ Traditional Owners
□ Science
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■ Local Government
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128 W helan J and O liv e r P, The Place, Limits and Practice of Collaboration: Lessons from Case Studies in 
Community Participation in Natural Resource Management (C R C  for Coastal Zone, Estuary and W aterw ay  
Managem ent, 2005), p 32.
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